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This book by its nature raises many questions, not least of which is why an 
actor would be asked to write the foreword to a book of philosophy. An 
even better question is, Why would an actor jump at the chance? 
Well, this actor, while playing the Cigarette Smoking Man ("CSM" to 
many) on The X-Files, puzzled over many questions raised by the show, 
such as conspiracy theory, skepticism and credulity, aliens and the para-
normal, and the nature of evil itself. And this actor may be unique, given 
his degree in philosophy and his reading of evolutionary biology and skep-
tical literature. This actor is also not in the least intimidated by celebrities 
in his own field but rather stands in awe of the giants of science and philos-
ophy, Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett in particular. Howembarrass-
ing, then, that this actor starred in a series relentlessly attacked by Dawkins 
himself. 
I was always startled by the assumption of X-Files fans that since I was 
acting in the series, I was obviously not only interested in the subject mat-
ter but also a believer in aliens, conspiracies, and the paranormal. I guess 
viewers understand the life of an actor through interviews with A-list celeb-
rities. Those of us who work in the trenches take on acting roles because 
we get them. The idea that we sit back and choose from a range of offers 
is delightful to contemplate, but the reality is that we do the work we get. 
Trust me, it was a sheer accident that I ended up doing this series for many 
years. But once in the role, I had to deal with a range of fascinating issues 
that included explaining to the shocked fan that, no, I don't believe there 
are aliens among us; I don't believe in high-level government conspiracy; 
and I certainly don't believe in astrology, past lives, or telepathy. 
Probably the most pervasive question I faced was, Why is the series 
so popular? We were all asked this question, and we all had different an-
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swers depending on our angle of view. My response might have been the 
least expected since I began with a related question: Why was Shakespeare 
so popular? As a teacher of acting I had often lectured on Shakespeare. I 
have argued that Shakespeare and his writings were unique because his ge-
nius sat on the cusp of two worldviews and he drew inspiration from both. 
Marshall McLuhan was another early intellectual hero of mine; I was pro-
foundly influenced by his argument that the printing press changed how 
we see the world, not because of the content of printed works, but because 
of exposure to the medium itself. In the decades following the invention of 
the printing press in the late fifteenth century, there were dramatic changes 
in Western humans' worldview. The medieval world included religiosity, 
connectedness to the environment, lack of interest in self-identification, 
anonymous presentation of artistic works, and lack of interest in visual 
perspective. The beginning of the modern world saw the decline of feudal-
ism, the separation of the individual, the beginnings of modern science 
and the scientific method, and, soon, the stirrings of the Enlightenment. 
Shakespeare's brilliance stemmed, in part, from his intimate connection to 
both worldviews. 
What has this to do with The X-Files? Is it possible that the show strad-
dled a similar transition of worldview? The 1990S saw the full emergence 
of computer use and the Internet, following an era of extensive television 
viewing, and a corresponding decline in use of printed media. If McLuhan's 
thesis has validity, viewing media in pixels instead of print should have an 
effect on the perspective and worldview of the user. To this observer at least, 
it appeared that a major lack of trust in formerly respected authority devel-
oped. Books were either not read or, if they were, not trusted. At the same 
time, there was an explosion of information in the ethereal cyberworld. 
People no longer knew what or whom to believe. So a television series deal-
ing with those very issues of belief and authority struck a responsive chord. 
What do we see moving forward into the twenty-first century? Instead 
of the rigorous application of science and reason to cope with this world of 
uncertainty, we see a huge increase in superstition in general and religion 
in particular, in North America at least. We see a major decline in human 
rights and a reduction of complex problems to simple-unsuccessful-
solutions. In short, we see the end of the Enlightenment. Was The X-Files 
a symptom and a harbinger of a world dangerously veering toward super-
stition and religion and away from reason and science? 
What is the role of narrative in shaping our view of the world? To put 
an evolutionary spin on the question, Who benefits from narrative and 
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what kind of narrative? Unique in important ways, The X-Files is nonethe-
less typical of popular narrative in our culture because it represents a battle 
between Good and Evil- the latter being me, in case you were wondering. 
Why is this the overwhelming narrative in popular culture, and what effect 
does this narrative have? 
Let's imagine two different storytellers in two different hunter-gatherer 
caves on opposite sides of a valley. One tells the story of the evil tribe on 
the other side of the valley, of how we must work together to overcome 
our adversaries and be willing to fight to the death to protect our people. 
The other tells a story of human complexity, of how some humans are dan-
gerous but most are not, of how we should befriend strangers and open 
our world to a range of possibilities. The next day the two tribes meet un-
expectedly in the valley as they each expand their hunting territory. Guess 
what? The first tribe wipes out the second while the second is still wonder-
ing if the first tribe is friendly or not. 
So who benefits? Certainly not the genes of the teller of complex stories 
and his listeners. Those genes are gone. No, the genes that survive and go 
on to replicate belong to the storytellers of the conflict of good and evil. 
In the environment in which humans evolved it may be that narrative in 
general and this type of narrative in particular had real survival value. 
Since we are still essentially the same species that we were as hunter-
gatherers, perhaps it is to be expected that we love these stories of good 
and evil. We were selected to love them. But is this a good thing? In our 
modern environment, does a reduction to good and evil help us? Or does 
it give us AI-Qaeda and George Bush? 
Whether there is really such a thing as Evil is beyond the scope of this 
foreword. But an actor who tries to portray evil is in serious trouble. What 
do you do? Grow a long moustache and twirl it a lot? As viewers and fans 
of the show know, I took a different tack when assigned the role of the an-
tagonist who was referred to by Chris Carter himself as "the Devil:' I de-
cided I was the hero and Mulder was the bad guy. Of course as the CSM 
I was ruthless and unfeeling, but to do what I believed had to be done, how 
else could I be? Do the so-called evil men of history believe they are the de-
mons others make them out to be? Or are they often doing what they think 
is right, however horrific that may seem to the rest of us? Put another way, 
perhaps life is more complicated than a simple division of good and evil. 
But what of the other major aspect of the series, its emphasis on the 
paranormal? What is an actor with a degree in philosophy to make of that? 
The simple reply to the astonished fan when I confessed my nonbelief in, 
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say, aliens was that the burden of proof was on them, the believers, not 
on me, the skeptic. Since, naturally, the believers were never satisfied with 
this reply, I determined to investigate further. Eventually I stumbled on 
CSICOP-the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the 
Paranormal- and discovered that most paranormal claims had been sub-
jected to rigorous research - and found wanting. 
Among the many prominent scientists on the masthead of CSICOP 
was Richard Dawkins, who had transformed my intellectual life years 
earlier when I read The Selfish Gene. He was also an outspoken critic of 
The X-Files, claiming that it undermined rational thought and promoted 
pseudoscience. How could I continue to work on a show that so apparently 
betrayed my own beliefs? Was it enough for me to say, "Well, it's just fiction 
after all"? 
Here is what Dawkins said in the 1996 Dimbleby Lecture: 
A fair defence, you might think. But soap operas, cop series and 
the like are justly criticised if, week after week, they ram home the 
same prejudice or bias. Each week The X-Files poses a mystery and 
offers two rival kinds of explanation, the rational theory and the 
paranormal theory. And, week after week, the rational explanation 
loses. But it is only fiction, a bit of fun, why get so hot under the 
collar? 
Imagine a crime series in which, every week, there is a white 
suspect and a black suspect. And every week, 10 and behold, the 
black one turns out to have done it. Unpardonable, of course. And 
my point is that you could not defend it by saying: "But it's only 
fiction, only entertainment:' 
As I have said, I am a great admirer of Dawkins, but is it possible his re-
sponse to our show has been rather quick and glib? Proponent of science 
that he is, he has offered no scientific evidence that the show actually influ-
ences the way people think about the paranormal. Two kinds of studies 
spring readily to mind. One could survey X-Files viewers and a control 
group to see if paranormal belief is more common among X-Files viewers. 
Or one could do laboratory studies, shOwing one group episodes of X-Files 
and another group Animal Planet and studying the comparative effects 
on paranormal belief. My own straw polls of college groups when I used 
to lecture at American universities suggested a level of paranormal belief 
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among fans similar to that in the general population. Not very scientific, I 
admit, but more than Dawkins has offered. 
Furthermore, Dawkins's analogy of the black and white criminals may 
not hold up under closer scrutiny. After all, for each week's mystery, a so-
lution was proposed by a woman and another by a man. And, "10 and be-
hold;' each week the man's solution triumphed. If the show is inSidiously 
presenting a bias under the guise of fiction, why were the feminists not up 
in arms? 
Is my challenge to Dawkins valid? Or, like the Cigarette Smoking Man 
himself, am I manipulating reason to justify my own actions, in this case, 
continuing to perform in such a successful series? 
Being involved in The X-Files was a wild and wonderful journey. To be 
involved in the publication of this book was yet another unexpected plea-
sure. The questions raised by the phenomenon of The X-Files continue to 
reverberate. 




This volume explores philosophically significant connections to The X-
Files around three rallying points. Each point is given its own section. The 
first section is "The Credos:' It explores the philosophical significance of 
the show's three primary slogans: "The truth is out there;' "Trust no one;' 
and "I want to believe:' The second section is "The Characters." It pro-
vides philosophically interesting character studies of Fox Mulder (David 
Duchovny), Dana Scully (Gillian Anderson), the Cigarette Smoking Man 
(CSM, played by none other than William B. Davis), and Assistant Direc-
tor Walter Skinner (Mitch Pileggi). The third section is "The Episodes:' 
In this section, which benefited the most from the new edition, you will 
find discussions of philosophical issues raised by "Clyde Bruckman's Final 
Repose;' "Jose Chung's From Outer Space," Fight the Future, and the 2008 
motion picture I Want to Believe, respectively. 
Each section contains chapters written by scholar-teachers who appre-
ciate The X-Files almost as much as you do (and, in Professor Foy's case, 
perhaps more). Within each chapter, you'll find the contributing authors 
discussing philosophical issues in metaphysics (the study of ultimate re-
ality), epistemology (the study of knowledge), ethics (the study of right 
living) and axiology (the study of value, of which ethics is one facet), aes-
thetics (the study of art and beauty), political philosophy, feminism, and 
existentialism, among others. Because we are teachers as well as scholars, 
each chapter is written for those new to philosophy; thus, the discussions 
presuppose very little prior background in philosophy. 
The first section contains five chapters. Mark Peterson begins the vol-
ume with "The Truth Is Out There: Abduction, Aliens, and Alienation;' in 
which he distinguishes three kinds of inferences: deductive, inductive, and 
abductive. With the help of Charles Sanders Peirce, Peterson argues that 
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Mulder's talent for solving "unexplained phenomena" is grounded in his 
proficiencies in abduction. Scully, an able investigator in her own right, 
regularly relies on induction. Peterson further argues that Mulder's ap-
proach can be beneficial to fledgling and professional philosophers alike. 
In "Freedom and Worldviews in The X-Files," Alan White explores the 
issue of freedom and determinism. After providing the reader important 
background on this classic debate, he sets his sights on how Mulder's and 
Scully's views of things started to merge as the series progressed. There is 
an important link to the first chapter in this regard: Peterson argued that 
we should become more like Mulder. As we saw with Scully, this takes some 
effort. However, White is skeptical of the claim that there is any Significant 
sense in which we are free to change worldviews on the basis of discov-
ered truth, despite what Peterson and The X-Files itself seemingly imply. 
In "Postdemocratic Society and the Truth Out There:' Professors Louzecky 
and Flannery strive to show the contemporary political relevance of The X-
Files. They begin by articulating the necessary conditions for sound dem-
ocratic government and argue that the kind of secretive political tactics 
employed by the Syndicate are necessarily inconsistent with democracy 
exactly because they undermine publicity and informed decision making. 
They then go on to use Mulder and Scully as models for how governmental 
agencies like the Syndicate-be they fictional or real-can be marginal-
ized. "Some Philosophical Reflections on 'Trust No One'" begins explor-
ing the "Trust no one" credo by reminding the reader of the episode that 
launched it: "The Erlenmeyer Flask:' Richard Edwards and I discuss two 
different philosophical theories that support Deep Throat's charge, albeit in 
two very different ways. First, if Thomas Kuhn's "paradigm view" of science 
is correct, then it seems that the scientific community plays a surprisingly 
large role in shaping which data are accepted and which are rejected. This 
poses problems for Scully's strict reliance on scientific inquiry to debunk 
or uphold the veracity of Mulder's work. Can Scully trust herself as a sci-
entist? Second, if psychological egoism is true, then all human persons are 
naturally selfish; if so, then we cannot trust others to ever act on our behalf 
(except, perhaps, when our interests coincide). In the final chapter in this 
section, '''I Want to Believe': William James and The X-Files:' Keith Dromm 
uses The X-Files to compare and contrast the ideas of William James and 
W K. Clifford. Dromm argues that Mulder's approach to belief has much 
in common with the ideas expressed by William James in his essay "The 
Will to Believe:' while Scully has affinities with the thought of W K. Clif-
ford as expressed in "The Ethics of Belief' However, Dromm continues, 
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Walter Skinner more nearly personifies the views in James's later work 
Pragmatism. Dromm then concludes by arguing that, of the three models 
of belief acquisition, the Skinner model is preferable. 
The second section also contains five chapters. William Schneider's 
chapter, "Ancient X-Files: Mulder and Plato's Sokratic Dialogues;' is an 
innovative attempt at drawing parallels between Mulder and Socrates re-
garding the latter's charge to "know thyself' In a literary fashion similar 
to Descartes' Meditations, Schneider leads the reader into an introspective 
soliloquy on Mulder's motivations and convictions regarding his search for 
the truth. In "Scully as Pragmatic Feminist: 'truths' Are Out There;' Erin 
McKenna focuses on the well-known intellectual shift in the Dana Scully 
character. At first, Scully is the hardheaded scientist. However, McKenna 
argues that the season 7 episode "all things" solidifies crucial changes in 
how Scully sees herself and understands the world around her. This, in 
turn, facilitates a discussion of contemporary philosophical ideas associated 
with feminism and pragmatism. Professors Joseph Foy and Timothy Dunn 
delve deep into the Cigarette Smoking Man character in "Moral Musings 
on a Cigarette Smoking Man:' They utilize core principles and theories of 
moral philosophy to explore and assess two common interpretations of 
the one who must "take the elevator up to work" (as Skinner would say). 
By drawing on many examples from the series, they conclude that both 
interpretations are inadequate. Undaunted, they boldly argue that the CSM 
is no ordinary villain but represents a particularly perverse inversion of 
the moral order and as such fundamentally challenges traditional moral-
ity. In this way, through his "transvaluation of power;' the CSM character 
teaches us a deeper lesson about classical images and understandings of 
evil. "Walter Skinner: The X-Files' Unsung Hero" has Evan Kreider present 
Assistant Director Skinner as a paradigm for understanding Aristotelian 
and Platonic interpretations of virtue and, in this way, redemonstrates the 
relevance of ancient Greek virtue ethics for contemporary society. Interest-
ingly, Kreider does not argue that Skinner is the epitome of a virtuous per-
son, due to a recurring character flaw; however, that flaw makes him very 
human, which might explain why so many can identify with his character. 
The last chapter of this section is also something of a throwback to ancient 
Greek philosophy, at least in terms of its presentation. Plato's dialogues 
are renowned, but very few contemporary philosophers choose to pres-
ent their material in this form. For our benefit, Gordon Barnes has crafted 
in "Science and the Mystery of Consciousness" a lively dialogue between 
Mulder and Scully taking place near the end of season 1, mere hours before 
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the events in "The Erlenmeyer Flask:' Our heroes debate the classic philo-
sophical question of whether human persons are nothing over and above 
their physical bodies. As you might expect, Mulder attempts to argue that, 
given undeniable facets of human consciousness, persons are not merely 
the sum total of their physical parts, but Scully is resistant to this idea. 
The third and last section contains four chapters. The first two are re-
vised versions of chapters that appeared in the 2007 edition. Each of these 
highlights Darin Morgan's important role in the evolution of the series. 
'''Clyde Bruckman's Final Repose' Reprised 2009" provides an analysis of 
the character played admirably by Peter Boyle. Bruckman possesses the 
ability to divine the future, raising the classic triad of issues about free-
dom, fate, and foreknowledge. I argue that philosophical concerns associ-
ated with these three issues can be abated so long as we remember that 
our choices explain what is antecedently true and known about us and not 
vice versa. I further argue that Darin Morgan's tendency to interpret the 
Fox Mulder character as dangerously obsessive can be traced back to the 
Bruckman episode; ironically, it is Morgan who appears prophetic when we 
see Mulder languishing thirteen years later in the opening scene of I Want 
to Believe. In "The Many Tales of 'Jose Chung:" Evan Kreider and I team 
up to bravely offer an interpretation of the wild and wildly popular episode 
"Jose Chung's From Outer Space." (You know, the one with Alex Trebek.) 
We argue that Morgan raises classic philosophical concerns about truth 
and knowledge that ultimately calls into question the idea "the truth" is 
objectively "out there:' This leads us to interpret him as implicitly affirming 
existentialism. We subsequently enlist the aide of Jean-Paul Sartre to ex-
plore the extent to which Mulder and Scully have led existentially authen-
tic lives, especially given who they have become in I Want to Believe. This 
chapter concludes by making it clear exactly why Darin Morgan's episodes 
were so instrumental in the development of the series. The third chapter 
of this section is Chris Trogan's "Feelings and Fictions: Emotion and Belief 
in Fight the Future." Trogan explores the aesthetic content and value of 
Fight the Future. His primary goal is to articulate and assess the paradoxi-
cal set of beliefs that it is reasonable to identify and empathize with fic-
tional characters like Mulder and Scully but unreasonable to identify and 
empathize with your friend's story that his mother recently died when you 
discover that she is very much alive. Trogan also argues that his preferred 
resolution to this issue has beneficial ramifications for imaginative moral 
reasoning and character development. This section concludes with a new 
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chapter written especially for this volume, "] Want to Believe . .. But Now 
What?" Evan Kreider and I again join forces to offer an interpretation of 
the 2008 motion picture] Want to Believe. On one level, the film conveys 
Mulder and Scully as experiencing what Aristotle calls the highest form of 
friendship-a genuinely reciprocal relationship, this one fifteen years in 
the making. On a deeper level, the film serves as a microcosm of the core 
ideas that drove the series for nine years. This insight leads us to hazard an 
articulation of what the philosophy of The X-Files consists of, which seems 
like a fitting way to conclude the book. 
The book also contains two appendixes. The first, written by Joseph 
Foy, is a synopsis of the main storyline mythology running through The 
X-Files. Professor Foy reminds us of the intricacies of the Syndicate, the 
black oil, and pending alien colonization. The second is an episode-by-
episode synopsis through Fight the Future. (Because of this, only post-
season 5 episodes that are directly referred to in the text are listed by 
season.) In addition to listing story code, episode author and director, and 
a brief plot summary, I alert the reader to relevant philosophical issues the 
episode conveys. I also direct the reader to chapters that heavily rely on 
ideas or plot devices from the episode in question. 
The updated edition does a better job of including material from sea-
sons 6 through 9; however, it remains fair to say that seasons 1 through 5 
receive more attention. Do not interpret this fact as evidence that I believe 
the later seasons were somehow deficient (even though I am admittedly 
a bit partial to the episodes in seasons 3 and 4). Rather, this choice was 
forced upon me by time and book-length constraints, and the updated edi-
tion pushed both limits. There is simply too much quality philosophical 
content in The X-Files to fit into one book. I therefore decided to focus now 
on seasons 1 through 5 and pray (perhaps with the help of Albert Hosteen 
[Floyd "Red Crow" Westerman] and the Navajo "holy people") that I'll 
have a chance in the future to put together a book the emphasizes seasons 
6 through 9. 
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Blockhead believes: some mysteries are not meant to be explained, merely 
marveled at and appreciated for what they are. In a very clumsy attempt 
to show my loving appreciation-and because I don't own a rowboat-I 
dedicate this book to her: 
For Patricia-
"Then We Believe the Same Thing" 
Introduction 
Mulder, Scully, Plato, Aristotle, and Dawkins 
Dean A. Kowalski 
That The X-Files is such a natural choice for a book like this is not for the 
reason you might initially think. It's not that it was "metaphysical" in the 
sense that it was about extraterrestrials and various otherworldly topics 
that no one could ever really prove true or false. This reminds me of all 
the times I would find a new bookstore, eagerly throw the doors open, and 
march straight back to its Metaphysics section, merely to be disappointed-
again - at finding only volumes on the healing power of white crystals and 
how-to books about tarot card reading (once, I swear, with the faces of Stu 
Charno and Alex Diakun on the cover). 
Rather, the very premise of the show incessantly reminded you (and 
once in Navajo) that "the truth was out there:' and then every week be-
guiled you to find it. Yes, sometimes the truth pursued was about con-
scious black oil and shape-shifting aliens. But the deeper point remains: we 
were to search for the truth and were determined to find it, even though 
we didn't have all the information or all the tools to unearth it that we'd 
like. This is exactly the mind-set of the philosopher. 
Furthermore, the show's two heroes represent two fundamental but 
disparate search methods. Special Agent Dana Scully (Gillian Anderson), 
a trained medical doctor who also studied physics in college, is the con-
summate scientist. The default starting position for her search is to set a 
naturalistic and empirical course. Her partner, Special Agent Fox Mulder 
(David Duchovny), also possesses an impressive educational pedigree. He 
is an Oxford-educated psychologist and an intuitively gifted FBI profiler. In 
fact, he is considered one of the best analysts ever aSSigned to the Violent 
Crimes Division. However, his methods are anything but conventional. Be-
cause his interests invariably involve "unexplained phenomena:' he often 
sets methodological courses for "extreme possibilities" that transcend 
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conventional scientific wisdom. Yet, Mulder and Scully invariably engage 
in respectful, honest dialogue. They regularly insist on substantiating their 
approaches and hypotheses with evidence (broadly conceived) and logical 
rigor, all in hopes of locating the truth "out there" that continually eludes 
them. This, again, is a staple of quality philosophical inquiry. 
The School of Athens Analogy 
I would like to say - and, dare I say, want to believe - that the divergent 
approaches embodied in the characters of Dana Scully and Fox Mulder are 
a bit analogous to those of two giants from the history of philosophy: Plato 
and Aristotle. I suspect that many of my profeSSionally trained colleagues 
will scoff at this purported analogy and accuse me of speaking tongue in 
cheek. But allow me to explain. 
There is a famous painting by Raphael called The School of Athens. The 
two focal points are Plato and his star pupil, Aristotle. Curiously, the two 
philosophers are looking at each other, with Plato pointing to the sky and 
Aristotle with his arm stretched out horizontally, palm facing down in a 
cautionary manner. It is widely believed that Raphael was attempting to 
capture the basic philosophical difference between the two greats: Plato 
believed that one must reach a non earthly plane in order to unlock the 
deepest secrets of truth and knowledge - his "realm of the forms" - but 
Aristotle believed that truth and knowledge can be obtained through 
carefully constructed hypotheses grounded in astute observations of our 
earthly surroundings. Aristotle, then, is cautioning his teacher not to (liter-
ally) overlook or underappreciate that which is directly in front of him. 
Mulder and Scully are just a bit like that. Mulder is insistent that a com-
plete explanation for what he often experiences must include an unearthly 
source. If we stay at the conventional level of straightforward empiricism, 
our account of things will forever remain incomplete. Is Mulder too qUick 
in searching the heavens? Is he irrational in doing so? Perhaps Mulder's 
methodology has been shaped by nonrational elements; it seems conceiv-
able that his witnessing his sister's alleged alien abduction and his father's 
involvement in some of the early X-Files somehow help to explain Mulder's 
psychological penchant for looking skyward. But this doesn't necessarily 
mean that Mulder is irrational. After all, similar nonrational explanations 
have also been offered for Plato's proclivities to look toward an unearthly 
realm, specifically his early involvement with Pythagorean mathematics 
and the psychological effects of witnessing his teacher's "abduction" by the 
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Athenian court. These facts might drive Plato to believe that "the truth is 
out there"; in this way it is beyond the seditious grip of the Sophists, or the 
untrained Athenian assembly. Scully embodies Aristotle's warning about 
keeping oneself grounded. Both see the value of empirical study and rigor-
ous scientific testing. The sort of ideal explanations that Plato and Mulder 
seek are, at best, unwarranted or simply cannot be had, and, at worst, they 
are merely whims of fancy. 
Contemporary philosopher Norman Melchert seems to confirm the 
developing analogy in this way: "Two quite different intellectual styles are 
exemplified by Plato and Aristotle. Plato is a man with one big problem, 
one passion, one concern; everything he touches is transformed by that 
concern. Aristotle has many smaller problems. These are not unrelated to 
each other, and there is a pattern in his treatment of them all:'! I don't know 
whether series creator Chris Carter had Plato and Aristotle in mind when 
originally crafting his protagonists - I doubt it - but Melchert seems to be 
equally describing Mulder and Scully. Melchert continues, "One feels in 
Plato a profound dissatisfaction with the familiar world of sense ... Plato 
is a combination of rationalist and mystic:' For Aristotle, however, "truth 
concerns the sensible world, and our knowledge of it begins with actually 
seeing, touching, and hearing the things of the world. The senses, although 
not sufficient in themselves to lead us to knowledge, are the only reasonable 
avenues along which to pursue knowledge:'2 Everyone is clear that Scully, 
especially early in the series, is true to Melchert's description of Aristotle; 
however, some often overlook the fact that Mulder can be understood as a 
combination of rationalist and mystic.3 (More on this later.) 
Just as there are disagreements in the ivory tower of academia about 
whether Plato's approach to finding the truth is more effective than Aris-
totle's, we in the "marketplace" of popular culture can ask the same ques-
tion about Mulder's and Scully's. Moreover, just as few philosophers 
anymore are strictly Platonists or strictly Aristotelians, we can also ask how 
the methods of Mulder and Scully might be beneficially combined. Might 
doing so give us a better picture of how the world "out there" really is? 
With a hybrid approach might we be able to answer some questions that 
we couldn't answer otherwise? If so, which? If not, why not? Questions 
like these, it seems to me, begin to capture the inherent philosophical sig-
nificance of The X-Files at the most foundational level. And such questions 
are not idle. Some philosophers believe that, even with all the scientific 
data we have amassed about human beings, an adequate account of what 
persons are as conscious beings must go beyond the physical facts about 
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us. Other philosophers reason that if we are free and responsible for our 
choices and actions, as our experiences seem to indicate, then it cannot be 
that we are merely the sum total of our physical parts. Therefore, without 
disparaging or discounting the importance of Scully's trust in quality sci-
entific research, it seems that we might do well to follow Mulder's lead (or 
something like it) in articulating a complete account of how things are. 
Nevertheless, the School of Athens analogy cannot be pushed too far. It 
begins to break down as soon as we remember that Mulder and Scully are 
television characters and not philosophers. Moreover, Plato offered astute 
philosophical arguments why his realm of the forms must exist; he was 
not merely driven by nonrational, psychological factors in seeking the un-
earthly explanation, as, arguably, Mulder initially was. So, why press the 
analogy at all? Paradoxically, it's useful because it fails in other, more in-
structive, ways. When Raphael depicts Plato pointing to the sky, Plato is not 
literally pointing up to some extraterrestrial plane, even if Mulder might 
be. The unearthly plane Plato seeks is not some distant planet but an ab-
straction. While Mulder might countenance the idea that all of his earthly 
experiences are ultimately explained by ancient visitors from a different 
solar system, Plato would stress that his realm of the forms exists nowhere 
in physical space but yet "contains" all the unchanging truths and concepts 
that literally explain everything we experience (and even some things we 
don't). Therefore, Plato is the only nonnaturalist in this regard. Moreover, 
Mulder isn't a straightforward supernaturalist either. He is more suspicious 
of the dogmatism of organized religion than of Aristotelian attempts to 
capture the truth. Rather, Mulder's default position (especially once the 
character is established) seems to be that Scully's naturalism often isn't in-
clusive enough. If aliens exist and if they somehow account for life on this 
planet, then Scully's stockpile of current scientific wisdom must be revised 
and expanded. Thus Mulder isn't anti science (even if he sometimes comes 
off that way) so much as he is skeptical of how science rules out some phe-
nomena by fiat merely because they don't accord with what scientists cur-
rently know. 
The basic point of Mulder's character in this regard is that we should 
be open to exploring "unexplained phenomena" via "extreme possibilities;' 
especially if no other, more conventional scientific approach seems viable. 
This doesn't mean that they always warrant such treatment. After all, in 
"Beyond the Sea" Mulder himself tells Scully, "Dana, ... open yourself up 
to extreme possibilities only when they're the truth:' However, to rule out 
these possibilities simply by fiat runs the danger of trapping oneself in a 
Introduction 5 
myopic view of the world. Of course, Mulder sometimes errs in the other 
direction. He occasionally eschews sound investigative modes of inquiry, 
typically by not carefully considering competing hypotheses to his "extreme 
possibilities" mentality. (Anybody recall the ill-conceived "drowning by 
ectoplasm" hypothesis?4) This tenuous methodology walks a razor's edge. 
It often causes strife between Mulder and Scully. Recall "Born Again;' in 
which Mulder asks Scully, "Why is it still so hard for you to believe, even 
when all the evidence suggests extraordinary phenomena?" Scully delib-
erately answers, "Because sometimes ... looking for extreme possibilities 
makes you blind to the probable explanation right in front of you:' Also, 
recall the classic exchange about Robert Modell (Robert Wisden), aka 
"Pusher;' in which Mulder comments, "Modell psyched the guy out. He 
put the whammy on him:' Scully immediately quips, "Please explain to me 
the scientific nature of the 'whammY:" A bit perturbed, Mulder asks for 
Scully's take on the Modell case. Scully admits that she believes Modell is 
gUilty but adds, ''I'm just looking for an explanation a little more mundane 
than 'the whammy:"s 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that somehow they were successful in 
blending their two respective approaches to seeking the truth. This is what 
we would expect from two intelligent truth seekers engaged in honest dia-
logue. The goal takes precedence over the idiosyncrasies of the individuals 
engaged in reaching it. Perhaps this is why Mulder's work became more re-
fined once Scully joined him on the X-Files. Perhaps their interactions also 
explain Scully's slow transformation away from her strict Aristotelianism. 
They become united without completely giving up their preferred mind-
sets. A scene from Fight the Future (just before the infamous non-kiss) sub-
stantiates these claims. Scully arrives at Mulder's apartment to inform him 
that she is leaving the bureau. He pleads with her not to resign. She reminds 
him that they were teamed up only because she was to debunk his uncon-
ventional work-to ruin him. He confides in her, "But you saved me! As 
difficult and as frustrating as it's been sometimes, your god damned strict 
rationalism and science have saved me a thousand times over! You've kept 
me honest ... you've made me a whole person. lowe you everything:'6 
Professor Dawkins and The X-Files 
Even after the admission that the analogy to Raphael's School of Athens 
can only be pressed so far, some philosophers will no doubt argue that it 
is completely misguided, bordering on dangerous. Here I have in mind 
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Richard Dawkins. In 1996, Dawkins blamed The X-Files for making the 
paranormal fashionable at the expense of careful scientific research: 
Less portentously it [the paranormal vogue in popular media] 
may be an attempt to cash in on the success of The X-Files. This is 
fiction and therefore defensible as pure entertainment. A fair de-
fense, you might think. But soap operas, cop series and the like are 
justly criticized if, week after week, they ram home the same preju-
dice or bias. Each week The X-Files poses a mystery and offers two 
rival kinds of explanation, the rational theory and the paranormal 
theory. And, week after week, the rational explanation loses. But it 
is only fiction, a bit of fun, why get so hot under the collar? Imag-
ine a crime series in which, every week, there is a white suspect 
and a black suspect. And every week, 10 and behold, the black one 
turns out to have done it. Unpardonable, of course. And my point 
is that you could not defend it by saying: "But it's only fiction, only 
entertainment:' 
Let's not go back to a dark age of superstition and unreason, a 
world in which every time you lose your keys you suspect polter-
geists, demons or alien abduction.? 
Here, Dawkins seems to be offering an argument by analogy. It invites 
us to imagine a show like Law and Order -let's call it Law and Smorder. 
Weekly, on Law and Smorder, there are two primary suspects for commit-
ting the featured crime; one is African American and the other Caucasian, 
but, as it turns out, every week the African American is the perpetrator. 
Dawkins (rightly) believes that such a fictionalized crime drama is socially 
irresponsible, and perhaps morally objectionable, presumably because it 
"week after week rams home the same prejudice or bias:' and doing so has 
negative or harmful effects on its audience (or society at large). But, con-
tinues Dawkins, The X-Files is just like Law and Smorder in this regard. A 
mystery is proposed and then investigated, but week after week, Mulder's 
paranormal theory wins out over Scully's more rational and conventionally 
scientific explanation. Therefore, because it, too, weekly rams home the 
same prejudice or bias that has negative or harmful effects on its audience, 
it is just as sOcially irresponsible (and perhaps morally objectionable) as 
Law and Smorder is (or would be, if it were actually on the air). 
There are two controversial components to Dawkins's argument. First, 
some prejudices or biases are morally objectionable, but not all. My bias 
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that the Green Bay Packers are the best NFL football team ever doesn't 
seem morally objectionable in and of itself. So, we must take care in deter-
mining whether the bias in question results in negative or harmful effects. 
Thus, of course, the bias Dawkins implies about racial stereotypes as they 
pertain to crime is clearly socially irresponsible, if not morally objection-
able; it heightens social tensions and propagates general malaise. But what 
about Dawkins's contention that The X-Files conveys a similar irrespon-
sible or objectionable bias? What negative or otherwise harmful effect 
might there be in glorifying Mulder's paranormal theories and denigrating 
Scully's more rational and scientific approach? Perhaps Dawkins is assum-
ing something akin to what W. K. Clifford famously argues in "The Ethics 
of Belief' Clifford writes: 
Every time we let ourselves believe for unworthy reasons, we 
weaken our powers of self-control, of doubting, of judicially and 
fairly weighing the evidence. We all suffer severely enough from 
the maintenance and support of false beliefs and the fatally wrong 
actions which they lead to .... But a greater and wider evil arises 
when the credulous character is maintained and supported, when 
a habit of believing for unworthy reasons is fostered and made per-
manent. ... The danger to society is not merely that it should be-
lieve wrong things, though this is great enough; but that it should 
become credulous, and lose the habit of testing things and inquir-
ing into them; for then it must sink back into savagery.8 
Presumably, then, Dawkins finds The X-Files socially irresponsible because 
it tends to make its millions of viewers, and thus a Significant fraction of 
society, into gullible, Simple-minded folk who habitually believe for un-
worthy reasons (and invariably act on those unjustified beliefs). This would 
explain his closing comment that we must guard against going back to an 
age of unreason such that whenever something goes wrong, we blame "the 
grays" (as Mulder would say). Therefore, the first controversial component 
of Dawkins's argument is whether The X-Files has the kind of mesmerizing 
grip on society necessary to turn us into the sort of dullards Dawkins and 
Clifford fear. 
Even though The X-Files was extremely popular, we must conclude 
that Dawkins missed the mark on this one. Yes, The X-Files spawned a de-
voted fan following that became incredibly active on the Internet. In fact, 
fans became so vocal that it was necessary to give them a name for easy 
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reference - the "X -Philes:' But I don't know of any X -Phile who bought 
crates of sunflower seeds, donned a pair of red Speedos, and traveled di-
rectly to his local university to upstage its science faculty. Further, I don't 
know of any X-Phile who avoided vacationing in Cabo because she feared 
"that Mexican goat-sucking thing" would mortally slime visitors with 
deadly bacteria. Nor do I know of any X-Phile who traveled far and wide 
to see Cher concerts in hopes of catching a glimpse of the Great Mutato 
chomping on a peanut butter sandwich. These suggestions are admittedly 
tongue-in-cheek, but I suspect that most X-Philes find them well placed. 
For all that shameless hyperbole, Richard Dawkins is an incredibly gifted 
philosopher and scientist. Any second-rate philosopher can critique an ar-
gument grounded in empirical predictions about the future that never come 
to fruition. So, being as charitable as possible to Dawkins's position, per-
haps The X-Files fueled the paranoia of those prone to adopt governmental 
conspiracies and in this way may have indirectly spawned various new but 
unfounded theories about the government's covert involvement in our lives. 
However, this recent domestic development might also be explained by the 
(more or less) simultaneous end of the cold war: without the Soviet Union to 
worry about, who should the paranoid distrust now? Even so, there simply 
isn't any evidence to the effect that The X-Files had (or continues to have) the 
kind of negative influence on society that Dawkins claims.9 
The second controversial component of Dawkins's argument is whether 
he accurately portrays the show. That he doesn't may be even more un-
pardonable for X-Philes. Consider the following trips down memory lane. 
In "Beyond the Sea;' Mulder questions Scully's appeal to the paranormal 
in the Boggs case because Boggs is "the greatest of liars:' This is evidence 
of Mulder's discriminatory powers. Furthermore, as early as "Pilot" (the 
show's very first episode) we see Mulder using empirical methods to sub-
stantiate his paranormal claims. When he and Scully are driving down a 
highway, the radio and clock in their rented car spontaneously malfunc-
tion. Mulder recognizes this and suspects extraterrestrial activity. He im-
mediately stops the car, opens the trunk, and (very fittingly) spray paints a 
large "X" on the highway. His doing so proves crucial to substantiating his 
"missing time" hypothesis later in the episode. In "E.B.E:' Mulder refines 
this testing procedure by using two stopwatches to demarcate his "missing 
time" phenomenon. 
Three further examples are especially telling against Dawkins's posi-
tion. First, in the attempt to determine whether Agent Jack Willis (Chris-
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top her Allport) or Warren James Dupre (Jason Schombing) survived a gun 
battle in "Lazarus;' Mulder asks Willis to sign a birthday card for Scully. 
Willis, one of Scully's former lovers, shares the same birthday as Dana. 
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Willis would have known that Scully's 
birthday was still two months away at the time he was approached by Mul-
der. The man appearing to be Willis immediately signs the card (with his 
left hand even though Willis is right-handed). Mulder presents this evi-
dence to Scully, implicitly arguing as follows: If the person who Signed this 
card was Jack Willis, he would have known that it wasn't Scully's birthday 
(and, in any event, would have Signed it with his right hand); because the 
man who Signed the card didn't know it wasn't Scully's birthday (and used 
his left hand to sign the phony card), it follows that the person who Signed 
it wasn't Jack Willis, even if it looks like him. Mulder used this argument to 
further substantiate his paranormal theory that Willis and Dupre have un-
dergone some sort of psychic transfer such that Dupre now inhabits Willis's 
body. Second, in "Piper Maru;' a season 3 episode, we see Mulder testing 
his hypothesis that French salvage-ship operators suffer from high levels of 
radiation due to exposure from an alien craft. Scully offers the competing 
hypothesis that the sailors could have been affected because the French have 
resumed nuclear testing. Mulder replies, "I checked. It's [the course of the 
French salvage ship 1 thousands of miles away from any test sites:' Discon-
firming competing hypotheses is the hallmark of good scientific inquiry. 
Therefore, finally, we shouldn't be too surprised to find Mulder being inter-
ested in substantiating his hypotheses with evidence. Recall "Little Green 
Men;' in which Scully tries to comfort a dejected Mulder: "But, Mulder ... 
during your time with the X-Files, you've seen so much;' to which Mulder 
candidly replies, "That's just the point. Seeing is not enough, I should have 
something to hold on to. Some solid evidence. I learned that from you:' 
While it should now be clearer why Melchert's "rationalist and mystic" 
moniker seems applicable to Mulder (as well as Plato), Dawkins's com-
plaints against The X-Files run into other problems. It simply isn't clear 
that the paranormal theory always wins out. In "War of the Coprophages;' 
Scully's more conventional explanation is superior. Sometimes, as in 
"Quagmire;' Mulder eventually agrees with Scully that the more natural-
istic explanation is epistemically preferable (even though it turns out to 
be false). There are numerous cases, like "Grotesque;' in which we are left 
to wonder which protagonist offers the preferable theory. This is the real 
beauty of the show: invariably we are left to decide for ourselves. 
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In any event, time and time again, Scully's careful empirical methods 
save the day. Her efforts are significant factors in "Ice;' "The Erlenmeyer 
Flask;' "The Host;' "Firewalker;' and "D0d Kalm" - and these examples 
all come from the first two seasons alone. Furthermore, why would Mul-
der "encourage" Scully to perform autopsy after autopsy if he weren't at all 
interested in empirical findings? Mulder is no Gil Grissom, but he's not 
Scooby Doo either. Thus it is far from clear that the show disparages care-
ful scientific inquiry in the way Dawkins suggests. 
If that weren't enough, consider that after Scully has saved Mulder's life 
in "End Game;' we hear her in a voice-over as she sits at Mulder's bedside: 
Transfusions and an aggressive treatment with anti-viral agents 
have resulted in a steady but gradual improvement in Agent Mul-
der's condition. Blood tests have confirmed his exposure to the still 
unidentified retrovirus whose origin remains a mystery. The search 
team that found Agent Mulder has located neither the missing sub-
marine nor the man he was looking for. Several aspects of this case 
remain unexplained, suggesting the possibility of paranormal phe-
nomena ... but I am convinced that to accept such conclusions is 
to abandon all hope of understanding the scientific events behind 
them. Many of the things I have seen have challenged my faith and 
my belief in an ordered universe ... but this uncertainty has only 
strengthened my need to know, to understand, to apply reason to 
those things which seem to defy it. It was science that isolated the 
retrovirus Agent Mulder was exposed to, and science that allowed 
us to understand its behavior. And ultimately, it was science that 
saved Agent Mulder's life. 
Three years and dozens of bizarre cases later, Scully never deviates from 
this mission. In attempting to discover hidden truths about her cancer (in 
"Redux"), she tells us: 
If my work with Agent Mulder has tested the foundation of my be-
liefs, science has been and continues to be my guiding light. Now 
I'm again relying on its familiar and systematic methods to arrive at 
a truth, a fact that might explain the fate that has befallen me .... If 
science serves me to these ends ... it is not lost on me that the tool 
which I've come to depend on absolutely cannot save or protect 
me ... but only bring into focus the darkness that lies ahead. 
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Clearly, careful scientific inquiry has an important role to play in The 
X-Files; thus, it simply isn't clear that the show denigrates science in any 
obvious way. And if a careful inspection of the show does not support 
Dawkins's claim that it invariably glorifies irrational paranormal explana-
tions over more-traditional, rational scientific explanations, then Dawkins 
is not entitled to his conclusion that The X-Files is socially irresponsible, let 
alone morally objectionable, because it fosters credulity in its audience.1O 
Nevertheless, the contributors to this volume owe a debt of grati-
tude to Professor Dawkins. Ironically, he was among the very first philos-
ophers to publicize the philosophical significance of The X-Files. My co-
contributors and I wish to follow his lead. We only regret that we couldn't 
get our act together sooner and realize what Dawkins did a decade ago: 
The X-Files is incredibly rich in philosophical content, as I hope you soon 
discover. 
While I expect you to enjoy reliving your favorite X-Files moments, I 
truly hope that by the time you've studied the pages to come, you'll better 
understand why I believe that this book will take its rightful place next to 
similar books about Seinfeld, The Simpsons, and Buffy the Vampire Slayer. 
However, I will leave that judgment up to you. If nothing else, like me, 
you'll never see The School of Athens or the Metaphysics section of a book-
store the same way again. 
Notes 
1. Norman Melchert, The Great Conversation, Volume 1, 4th ed. (San Francisco: 
McGraw-HilI, 2002), 160. 
2. Melchert, The Great Conversation, 157-58. 
3. I don't believe that this description is either anecdotal or anomalous. We can 
find it in the work of other professional philosophers. Consider W T. Jones: 
It has been remarked that everyone is born either a Platonist or an Aristote-
lian. Plato and Aristotle, that is, represent two different attitudes toward the 
world .... Where Plato was otherworldly and idealistic, Aristotle was practi-
cal and empirical. ... Whether one prefers Plato's philosophy or Aristotle's 
depends in large measure on one's own basic temperamental bias. To some 
Plato may seem too visionary and impractical; these people will probably 
prefer Aristotle as a cool, level-headed rationalist. Those who are moved 
by Plato's "lofty idealism" will probably feel that Aristotle by comparison is 
pedestrian and uninspiring. (The Classic Mind, 2nd ed. [New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1970], 217-18) 
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4. The relevant dialogue from the season 7 episode "all things" is simply too 
good not to revisit: 
SCULLY: (To Mulder, annoyed) I said, I got the lab to rush the results of the 
Szczesny autopsy, if you're interested. 
MULDER: I heard you, Scully. 
SCULLY: And Szczesny did indeed drown but not as the result of the inhala-
tion of ectoplasm as you so vehemently suggested. 
MULDER: Well, what else could she possibly have drowned in? 
SCULLY: Margarita mix, upchucked with about forty ounces of Corcovado 
Gold tequila which, as it turns out, she and her friends rapidly consumed 
in the woods while trying to re-enact the Blair Witch Project. 
MULDER: Well, I think that demands a little deeper investigation, don't you? 
SCULLY: No, I don't. 
5. This exchange also deserves to be rehearsed more fully: 
MULDER: [In response to Scully's scientific query about "the whammy") I 
don't know, maybe, maybe it's some mental aspect of some eastern mar-
tial art. You know, the temporary suppression of the brain's chemistry, 
produced by a specific timbre or cadence in Modell's voice. His voice 
seems to be the key. 
SCULLY: Mulder, Modell's last known employment was as a convenience store 
clerk. He has never been trained by ninjas. He has never even been out of 
the U.S. He is just a little man who wishes that he were someone big ... 
and, and, we're feeding that wish. That, that failed psyche screening ... if, 
if Modell could actually control people's minds, right now, he'd be an EB.I. 
agent, right? He'd be a Green Beret, uh, a Navy Seal. 
MULDER: Maybe the ability came to him more recently, like in the last two 
years. 
(Scully looks unsatisfied) 
MULDER: Well, 0, 0, okay. What's your big theory? How do you explain what 
Agent Collins did? I mean, this was a sane man, a family man with no prior 
history of psychological problems, sets himself on fire. You witnessed that. 
How does that happen? 
SCULLY: What do you need me to say, Mulder, that I believe that Modell is 
guilty of murder? I do. I'm just looking for an explanation a little more 
mundane than "the whammy:' 
What is so interesting about this exchange is that moments before, Mulder utilizes 
his training (and incredible intuitive gift) to give an astounding off-the-cuff profile of 
Modell that impresses Scully. This substantiates the view of Mulder being developed 
here: he is something of an intuitive mystic (even if mystic isn't quite the right term) 
and rational (social) scientist. 
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6. The closing dialogue from the movie further substantiates the idea that their 
approaches are beneficially blended but still remain distinct. Consider: 
MULDER: You were right to want to quit! You were right to want to leave me! 
You should get as far away from me as you can! I'm not going to watch 
you die, Scully, because of some hollow personal cause of mine. Go be a 
doctor. Go be a doctor while you still can. 
SCULLY: I can't. I won't. Mulder, I'll be a doctor, but my work is here with 
you now. That virus that I was exposed to, whatever it is, it has a cure. You 
held it in your hand. How many other lives can we save? Look ... (She 
clasps his hand.) ... If I quit now, they win. (They walk off together.) 
7. The passage is taken from Dawkins's 1996 BBC1 Richard Dimbleby Lecture, 
"Science, Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder:' It can still be found on the Web 
in its entirety. For the specific quote, see http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/dawkins/ 
lecture_p12.html. (Accessed Oct. 25, 2006.) 
8. Quoted in Michael Peterson, ed., Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 69-70. 
9. Wouldn't Star Wars or Star Trek be just as damaging to society? What evi-
dence is there that we will travel faster than the speed of light and meet friendly extra-
terrestrials with something called a "universal translator" pinned to the front of our 
jumpsuits? Perhaps Dawkins and his scientific skeptical community would reply that 
these shows are clearly pieces of science fiction, but some shows, like The X-Files and 
now Medium, straddle and blur the lines between science fiction, fictional drama, and 
nonfictional drama. There may be something to this complaint; it would help to ex-
plain Darin Morgan's inexplicit statement in "Jose Chung's From Outer Space" that the 
X-Files (and thus The X-Files) are somehow responsible for the "non-fiction science 
fiction" genre. Even with this admission, however, it still remains unclear clear that 
Dawkins accurately predicted The X-Files' grip on society. 
10. The counterargument here can be put like this: Even if there is a stereotype 
against the benefit of good scientific inquiry in Anglo-American culture (something 
that I'm not willing to automatically grant), only the most serious X-Philes would 
begin to show the signs of credulity Dawkins fears. However, those who know the show 
best - the X -Philes - also know that the show doesn't propagate an antiscientific mes-
sage, as demonstrated with just a few examples above. Therefore, even if there is an an-
tiscientific bias that might be exploited by the media, it is false that The X-Files exploits 
it. Thus, Chris Carter and his production team are not guilty of any social irrespon-
sibility. My thanks go to Evan Kreider, AI White, Tim Dunn, Joe Foy, Mark Peterson, 
and Greg Ahrenhoerster for a lively debate about Dawkins's position. 
For a different potential response to Dawkins's argument, please see chapter 1. 






The Truth Is Out There 
Abduction, Aliens, and Alienation 
Mark C. E. Peterson 
Philosophy and Bad Puns 
Each episode of The X-Files invariably begins by reminding its viewers that 
"the truth is out there:' This banner, this motto, the show's central epistemic 
and ontological axiom, conceals a jaw-droppingly awful pun. The pun has 
two parts. Part one: The truth "out there;' the truth from which we are 
alienated, is that there are aliens. That's bad enough, but the second part is 
worse and begins like this: Mulder overcomes his alienation by questioning 
not only the official denial that aliens exist but also the official mind-set that 
defines which explanations are permitted and which explanations are crazy. 
Officially speaking, from the FBI's point of view, extraterrestrial aliens are 
not thinkable at all or, if they are, thinking about them is defined as crazy. 
Mulder climbs around such doublethink by using a kind of logical inference 
discussed at length by the father of American pragmatism, Charles Sanders 
Peirce (1839-1914). And, thus, part two: In contrast to the FBI's privileged 
standard for explanatory or inferential methods, deduction and induction, 
Mulder uses a kind of inference that Peirce called the "inference of hypoth-
esis formation," or abduction. Therefore, the epistemic and ontological 
theme embedded in The X-Files' central axiom ("The truth is out there") 
is that Mulder, alienated from the truth that there are aliens, overcomes his 
alienation by using "abduction" to infer the existence of aliens. 
This is bad enough to bear repeating: The aliens abduct human vic-
tims, but Mulder's abductive inference abducts the existence of aliens.' 
The idea of overcoming your alienation from the truth is familiar terri-
tory to philosophy and specifically to existentialism, an area of philosophy 
concerned with the foundations of meaning-but, with a pun this bad, we 
will need to exercise a bit of caution before jumping in. Horrible puns like 
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this one are a good example of why articles that poke around in popular 
fiction looking for philosophical themes can seem to be as meaningful or 
logically rigorous as Madame Zelma's palmistry. On the one hand, it hap-
pens that some "analyses" of literature and art are actually built entirely 
upon the sand of clever jokes rather than on the more time-consuming-
and admittedly less hilarious-archaeological excavation of a text required 
to find buried philosophical treasure.2 They seem to let amusing verbal 
coincidences stand in for understanding and are not, therefore, taken seri-
ously by academically respectable philosophers. On the other hand, philo-
sophical analyses of popular art and literature have one advantage. They 
return philosophy to its roots in the real world, to the marketplace where 
people barter, lie, tell stories, waste their time, and undertake the most vital 
activity connected with the advancement of human culture: leisure.} To 
put this a bit more metaphorically, if philosophers define themselves as 
too good for the Agora (the main market area in ancient Athens, where 
Socrates blocked traffic), then we exile ourselves to the Acropolis and its 
lofty, theoretical point of view-high above the marketplace and closer to 
the gods but disconnected from the concerns of reallife.4 
Testing for Philosophical Depth 
So, before launching into a discussion of philosophical themes in The X-
Files, we must determine whether this pun is simply a joke masquerading 
as profound philosophical reflection, or something philosophically deep 
but (thank goodness) funny too. Puns like this can be suggestive, but by 
itself "Mulder abducting aliens" is not enough to assert that The X-Files 
embodies anything philosophically interesting. Something can look philo-
sophically interesting without being philosophically interesting in the same 
way something can look like a rare seventeenth-century French writing 
desk without being one. In the same way, any story can be given the look 
of an existentially rich narrative by dressing it up with a few characteristic 
features (like darkness, meaninglessness, hopelessness, or people turning 
into cockroaches). Like a fake antique-a desk made yesterday and shel-
lacked to imitate the surface of the real thing-stories can look like exis-
tentialism while only imitating the veneer. Fortunately, we can distinguish 
superficial attempts from sincere and profound ones in the same way we 
check to make sure the wood in a two-hundred-year-old desk is really two 
hundred years old. We turn the thing upside down and check to see if exis-
tentialism runs deeper than the surface, whether the themes continue to 
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inform the program underneath the dark and lingering close-ups of Scully 
wiping her eyes in disbelief. We can test inside its plotlines for less "punny" 
and more-traditional existential themes. 
On the surface, of course, the series looks perfectly existential. It is an 
homage to Arthur Conan Doyle with Mulder and Scully standing in for 
Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson, and a plotline held together by a glue 
mixed out of Mary Shelley, Rod Serling, and Emmanuel Levinas. <; The aes-
thetic affect of the show, a glossy film noir, carries the full complement of 
existential motifs usually employed in art and literature when they wish to 
examine existential ideas-it is chock-a-block with gloom, desperation, 
surreal characters, and the anxiety of being on the threshold of the ter-
rible secret. The anxiety in this case is not merely that there are aliens, 
scary enough on its own, but that this urgent "truth" has been intention-
ally withheld by a conspiracy of dangerous people. So long as the truth 
is kept from us, so long as we do not have it, we must live in service to a 
truth provided by someone else, and thus our lives will be lived, not on our 
own terms, but on the terms of whoever provides that truth-whether 
that "truth" is true or not. Existentially speaking, this is precisely what it 
means to lead an "inauthentic" life, a life we do not author (etymologically 
speaking, to live authentically literally means to be the author of your own 
life). "The truth is out there;' but we can only get to it if we are willing 
to creep out to the edge of our comfortable and familiar world to find it. 
Mulder and Scully wade through their crazy case files, encountering un-
explainable disappearances, ghosts, conspiracy nuts (like Mulder's three 
acolytes from "The Lone Gunmen"), and an occasional humanoid fluke 
worm from Chernobyl (as in "The Host"). We trail alongside Mulder as he 
leaves his basement office with Scully and heads out to look for the truth, 
for a hypothesis that will explain his unsolved cases, cases discarded be-
cause they were too crazy, too far outside the accepted realities of the FBI's 
worldview to be "taken seriously;' outliers in the data set too far from the 
approved linear regression to be considered data at all. Working the frayed 
edges of an accepted worldview is always the stuff of existential literature 
and art. It reawakens the meaning in our own lives by evoking the rejected 
and alien "other" and, in that way, throws into sharp relief the dominant 
worldview and its effects on what and how we know.6 
These ornamental curlicues all look like serious existentialism, but 
we still need to look beneath the surface for traditional existential themes 
to know whether The X-Files truly is philosophically interesting or just a 
knockoff, something crafted to look philosophically interesting. Here's how 
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we do that: existential analyses typically identify two underlying causes for 
alienation from the truth, and we need to see whether we can find one of 
them running throughout the series. They are (1) that it is impossible to 
find any truth whatsoever because there is no absolute truth, or (2) that 
something inherent in how we know things, in knowledge itself, prevents 
us from gaining an adequate understanding of the truth. Nietzsche's "death 
of God:' which questions the reality of any absolute standard in morality 
or knowledge, is an example of the first. Once God is no longer believable, 
scientifically or even logically-in fact, once all absolutes are called into 
question-the idea of a certain and definite truth, "out there" beyond the 
windshield of our own psychological preferences, becomes moot. There 
are no independent truths for us to know or to act as a foundation for 
our beliefs. The world becomes a hell, the Hieronymus Bosch landscape 
we find too often in real life or, better, paraphrasing Yeats, with no center, 
things fall apart.7 
The second cause produces its own kind of hell, but what does it mean 
to say that something in our thinking conditions how we can think about 
things and thus what we can know? Think about it this way: when you 
think about the world, the thinking you do is like a pair of glasses or lenses 
stuck on the end of your nose through which you see the world. The glasses 
are put there by culture and biology. Now, if you forget you have them on, 
and you will, you might believe that the world is exactly the way it looks. 
But sometimes, when the things you look at stray over to the edge of the 
lens and start to go out of focus, you may suddenly discover (or remem-
ber) the lenses stuck there between your understanding of the world and 
the world you are trying to understand. This is not a problem if you can 
take the glasses off, but these glasses-which can be called a worldview, a 
conceptual framework, or a paradigm-are a pair of glasses you cannot re-
move. Like those lenses, a worldview limits what you can think-what you 
can focus on-and in this way predetermines what you can know about 
the truth. By nurture or by choice, each person carries around a model of 
how he or she believes the world works, a paradigm through which the rest 
of life's experiences are filtered and reshaped in exactly the way a pair of 
prescription lenses bends the light entering your eye, and, thus, what you 
can know about the truth. Orwell's novel 1984 and Huxley's Brave New 
World are probably the best accounts in literature of how this can work, 
and, in film, The Matrix is an obvious example. Philosophically, the effect 
of worldview on understanding is best described in Plato's "Allegory of the 
Cave:' from The Republic, or in Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit.8 
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Fortunately, The X-Files tells us explicitly which cause is at work for 
Mulder and Scully; the series is a perfect case study for cause number 2. 
The show proclaims that "the truth is out there:' that there is a truth, and 
that we are simply kept from it by the FBI's institutional mind-set, the 
official lenses through which it views the world. These lenses determine 
what is and is not a reasonable investigation, and what cases should and 
should not be pursued. From the show's point of view, the FBI's institu-
tional paradigm insists that anything extraterrestrial is crazy. So even if the 
opening pun seems too clever, The X-Files turns out to be saturated with 
philosophical questions completely familiar to, and well within, the West-
ern intellectual tradition. Peirce's use of the term "abduction" for the logic 
of hypothesis creation accurately describes Mulder's activity, along with 
the ontological and epistemological commitments of The X-Files series. 
Mulder's ability to find the right hypothesis, despite institutional and so-
cietal blinkers about what counts as real, challenges the conceptual frames 
of both Scully and the FBI's administrative hierarchy by attending more 
closely to the data, even the "crazy" data, and by exposing unexamined as-
sumptions that somehow keep everyone else alienated from the truth that 
there are, gasp, aliens. 
Once we scratch the surface, we find that The X-Files not only embodies 
an accessible and contemporary reflection on alienation, and an illustra-
tion of the methodological relationship between hypothesis formation and 
hypothesis testing, but also even suggests how Mulder's use of abduction 
to overcome his alienation can resolve our own existential alienation and 
anxiety. We do not have man-eating bacteria to worry about (except, per-
haps, in Mexico), but we all occasionally feel a vague and unsettling "alien" 
something-or-other lurking just beyond what we are able to understand. 
It could be whether God exists or whether the people we love, love us in re-
turn, or whether all the choices we have made about life are wrong. Mulder 
uses abduction to see through the murky and unsettling X-I-know-not-
what that keeps him alienated. What works for Mulder might work for 
ustooY 
Alienation 
In The X -Files, the source of alienation and its attendant existential anxiety 
is that the institutions of power have framed any investigation of the world 
(and Mulder, remember, works for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) in 
such a way that we will always remain alienated from the truth, the truth 
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that there are aliens. Institutions (like the nefarious Syndicate or the FBI 
itself) do this in two ways: (1) they mask the data through deliberate obfus-
cation, and (2) they bend the lenses and twist the explanatory paradigms, 
the models of "acceptable" explanations, so that any data pointing to an 
alien truth are ignored, discarded, or ridiculed. Deliberate obfuscation is 
easy to do and easy to understand. It depends on smoke and mirrors or 
on crafting "plausible deniability:' as the Cigarette Smoking Man (CSM) 
would say, but it has a weakness. What is hidden, no matter how cleverly, 
may eventually be discovered; even the Smoking Man might accidentally 
leave his nicotine-stained fingerprints on something. The second technique 
is infinitely more subtle and depends on bending the lenses, on construct-
ing an institutional mind-set that makes it impossible to imagine the alien 
truth in the first place. Any data that point toward the truth are simply 
defined as "crazy," along with any explanation, or person, crazy enough 
to take such data seriously. Mulder thus became the youthful, Oxford-
educated genius who went crazy and now inhabits the basement along with 
all those crazy files. Scully is at first ridiculed and then later puts her own 
career at risk simply by working with "Spooky" Mulder (as in "Squeeze"). 
We could say, then, that we are kept alienated from at least some of the 
truth, and from any meaning we might derive from uncovering it, by insti-
tutionally accepted models of reality that guarantee that the truth is always 
excluded. If people cannot "think outside the box:' then "outside the box" 
is the best place to hide the truth. We know this is the case for The X-Files, 
since everyone in the FBI-except the conspirators-thinks that Mulder 
is crazy, even though Mulder is the only one who knows the truth. Mulder 
knows the truth (about aliens) because he is the only one able to think 
outside the institutional box.1O 
In simpler language, everyone is stuck thinking inside the box except 
Mulder and the conspiracy (in the form of the Syndicate, including, per-
haps, Deep Throat [Jerry Hardin] and his successor X [Steven Williams]). 
Nearly everyone else in the show has been successfully alienated from the 
truth. But this begs two questions: (1) If the official investigative proce-
dures, the acceptable paradigms of what is and is not allowable, the insti-
tutional box, successfully obscure that truth and any data that point to the 
truth, then how was Mulder able to overcome this alienation, see beyond 
the deliberate deceptions, and, by treating his officially crazy data seri-
ously, find the truth? And (2) how is it, specifically, that an "institutional 
paradigm" can keep Scully, perfectly brilliant in her own right, from seeing 
what Mulder sees?" 
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The short answer is that Mulder can see the truth because he obvi-
ously has not been blinkered by the FBI's official version of reality and 
is therefore free from the institutional filters that would otherwise keep 
him from using all the data to formulate a hypothesis-even the officially 
crazy data. This begins to address the first part of our pun: The X-Files' 
claim that we are alienated from the truth that there are aliens. We have 
sketched out the characteristic existential themes we would expect to find 
in a work of existential fiction, but we now must turn to the second part 
of our horrible pun, that Mulder uses "abductive inference" to abduct the 
existence of aliens. For this we need to consider C. S. Peirce's discussion of 
how abductive inference works and how it is related to its more popular 
and powerful cousins, deduction and induction, and then see how failing 
to distinguish abduction from induction answers our second question and 
explains Scully's predicament: why she is unable to see the truth as Mulder 
sees it. Once we consider the essential features of abductive inference, we 
will have both the vocabulary and the technical appreciation to move be-
yond groaning at the pun and toward understanding the deeper implica-
tions of this superficial wordplay. 
Peirce and Abduction 
Charles Sanders Peirce's discussion of inference sheds light on the question 
of how data are related to a hypothesis that explains them and what dis-
tinguishes the process of hypothesis formation, what he came to call "ab-
duction;' from inductive and deductive inferences. 12 The difference among 
these, and especially between abduction and induction, is critical to under-
standing how the FBI imposes and maintains its institutional worldview. A 
quick tour of Peirce should help us make sense of Mulder and Scully and, 
ahem, how Mulder "Peirces" the veil of smoke surrounding the alien truths 
out there.13 
Peirce summarizes the main forms of reasoning in his 1903 Harvard 
Lectures. 
These three kinds of reasoning are Abduction, Induction, and De-
duction. Deduction is the only necessary reasoning. It is the rea-
soning of mathematics. It starts from a hypothesis, the truth or 
falsity of which has nothing to do with the reasoning; and of course 
its conclusions are equally ideal. ... Induction is the experimental 
testing of a theory .... It sets out with a theory and it measures the 
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degree of concordance of that theory with fact. It never can origi-
nate any idea whatever. No more can deduction. All the ideas of 
science come to it by the way of Abduction. Abduction consists in 
studying facts and devising a theory to explain them. Its only jus-
tification is that if we are ever to understand things at all, it must 
be in that way.14 
Deduction and induction are the familiar forms of logical inference that 
allow us to determine, on the one hand, a set of necessary and certain 
consequences and, on the other, a probabilistic account of how likely or 
unlikely a given hypothesis might be. They are well-established and popu-
larly understood ways of using logic to make sense of the universe. Deduc-
tive inferences are most familiar in mathematics. Think about geometry 
proofs. You start with a set of axioms or premises from which you then 
derive statements that are absolutely certain and that follow with neces-
sity. No additional evidence, for instance, can make the interior angles of 
a triangle add up to 1800 more than they do already. In a deduction, noth-
ing can make its conclusions more certain because they are necessary and 
certain by definition. Science, by contrast, is inductive. Induction works by 
collecting data in order to confirm or deny the probability that a hypoth-
esis is true or false. While induction does not provide certainty the way 
deduction does, it does provide probability-and with enough data, an 
extremely strong and predictive probability. Think about a well-established 
scientific hypothesis like gravity. The effects of gravity are not, technically 
speaking, deductively certain (in the same way that 1 + 1 = 2 is certain), and 
yet the probability is extremely high that my coffee cup will fall to the floor 
when the cat pushes it off the desk. In this case, probability is, "for practical 
purposes," nearly as robust as certainty. 
If deduction is necessary and certain, and induction is probabilistic, 
then where does that leave abduction? Peirce constructed abductive infer-
ence in this form: 
The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. IS 
The process is like trying on explanations, like trying on shoes, until you 
find one that fits. Once you find one that seems to fit, you still cannot say it 
is a good explanation-not yet. You can only say that it might be, and that 
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is all abduction amounts to; so, compared to deduction and induction, 
abduction is barely an inference at all. Deduction proves. Induction con-
firms. Abduction suggests. Where deduction and induction have moun-
tains of justification available for their methodologies, abduction has none 
at all-but that doesn't matter. "No reason whatsoever can be given for 
it, as far as I can discover; and it needs no reason, since it merely offers 
suggestions:' 16 
While this seems to give abduction a limited role in explaining the 
universe and makes it a weakling compared to the deductive certainties or 
the inductive probability projections of its cousin inferences, abduction 
turns out to be critical. Deduction, on Peirce's reading, merely derives facts 
or ideas from a hypothesis and induction only tests a hypothesis: neither 
of them actually creates the hypothesis on which they operate. Therefore, 
when you want to think something new, something from outside the box, 
so to speak, you must use abduction. In Peirce's language, "Abduction ... 
is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction 
does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the nec-
essary consequences of a pure hypothesis."17 
Induction versus Abduction 
The subtle issue at work in The X-Files is that, sometimes, we confuse in-
duction with abduction: we confuse testing a hypothesis we have already 
presupposed with creatinga new hypothesis. In fact, nowadays it is custom-
ary to think of hypothesis creation as part of the process of working out 
an induction; that is, working out the likelihood of a particular hypothesis 
based on the data we have collected. Clearing up this remaining ambiguity 
gives us a good look at what distinguishes Mulder from Scully. Philosopher 
Paul Redding describes it this way: 
'Abduction' was the term Charles Sanders Peirce used in his later 
writings for a type of inference that he had earlier called 'hypoth-
esis' and that is now commonly called 'inference to the best ex-
planation.' According to Peirce, abduction constituted, alongside 
induction, a distinct second form of nondemonstrative or proba-
bilistic inference. Especially in his later work, Peirce conceived of 
abduction methodologically as a distinct step in scientific inquiry. 
By abduction the investigator postulated some possible non-
apparent cause which would explain the existence of otherwise 
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surprising phenomena. This postulation was then to be empiri-
cally tested by procedures drawing on deduction and induction. IS 
Peirce wanted to provide an account for the kind of inference that leaps from 
a surprising event or collection of data to a new hypothesis that explains 
them, and his description may as well be referring specifically to Fox Mul-
der. "The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of insight, 
although of extremely fallible insight. It is true that the different elements 
of the hypothesis were in our minds before; but it is the idea of putting to-
gether what we had never before dreamed of putting together which flashes 
the new suggestion before our contemplation:'19 Even though abduction is 
often thought to be a part of the inductive process in scientific reasoning, it 
actually precedes the process of testing. It provides the hypothesis we test. 
The relation between the hypothesis formulated by an abductive infer-
ence and the testing and confirmation performed by an inductive infer-
ence can be illustrated a bit more clearly in statistical terms. Imagine a set 
of data points plotted on a graph. It is possible, statistically, to find a line 
drawn through those points that describes, or fits, that set of points best. 
Think about how science typically works. We make observations about the 
world, map out those observations, and then try to find an explanation 
that fits them. A linear regression, the line drawn through the cloud of data 
that fits the data best, is like a hypothesis. Once drawn, that line can be 
extended along its trajectory to suggest where we might look for more and 
new data. If the original data suggest a particular line, then, statistically 
speaking, we can expect to find similar evidence along an extension of the 
same line. If the original data, to put this another way, suggest a particular 
line of inquiry, then, if we follow that line, we can expect to find more evi-
dence like the evidence we started with. Of course, in any scientific mea-
surement not all the data-or even most of it-will line up perfectly. The 
data are always somewhat loosely clustered or scattered into a rough shape 
of some sort, but even a general clumping of data is enough to suggest 
where you can draw a line that describes most of them. An educated guess 
at where to draw the line is abductive. Looking for data to confirm the line, 
after it is drawn, is inductive. 
Once a hypothesis has been well established-once we find a lot of 
data points where an extension of the line predicted they would be, or 
when we continue to find evidence that maps into our same, original, clus-
ter-we have good reason to become suspicious of new data points that 
fall too far from the line. In other words, once we have enough evidence 
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to believe our hypothesis is true, new evidence that does not confirm our 
hypothesis will not be easily accepted. In fact, data points might show up 
so far off the line that we can reasonably suspect that they are not real data 
at all but artifacts of the measurement or mistakes in our observations: like 
a smudge on the lens we mistake for a distant galaxy, or a glowing weather 
balloon we mistake for a UFO, or even, perhaps, crazy observations that 
belong to a category we have to label with a variable like "X." Points like 
this, well off the line of an accepted hypothesis, are called "radical outliers." 
Inductive method tells us that when enough radical outliers appear-
like a second flock of data points landing adjacent to the flock we used 
to draw our original line-they stop being radical outliers and begin to 
suggest that our initial data set was not large enough. A lot of new points 
suggest that we got it wrong from the start and that our original line needs 
to be bent or shifted to include them, or that we may have found an en-
tirely separate line of evidence-a second hypothesis we need to look into. 
Scientists with well-established theories will assert in public that when 
sufficient amounts of new, nonconfirmatory, data enter the system, the 
hypothesis will be swapped out for one that accounts for the new data-
but this is never what happens. Once accepted, hypotheses have their own 
inertia. Once we adopt a hypothesis-usually based on a relatively small 
sample size-we are reluctant to let go of it, regardless of how many radi-
cal outliers we find later. A great deal of both data and psychological moti-
vation is required to force us to reexamine hypotheses and explanations we 
have accepted and to which we have grown accustomed. It seemed crazy 
to fifteenth-century scientists, for instance, to think that Earth orbited the 
sun. What is interesting is that it was not a preponderance of new data that 
changed Copernicus's mind about the relation of the sun and Earth. The 
hypothesis was changed, not by a flood of radical outliers or new data, but 
by a reformulation of Ptolemy's hypothesis into one that would explain all 
the data more economically. Prior to this, data suggesting a different, non-
Ptolemaic, orbital arrangement were ignored, ridiculed, or bent into pre-
Copernican orbits in increasingly dizzying ways. The power and inertia of 
a previously accepted hypothesis kept even Einstein clinging to his nar-
rower vision of the universe long after quantum mechanics began to raise 
serious questions about God and dice.20 
To plug this back into The X-Files, any new data distinct from the es-
tablished line, no matter how much of it there is, will be seen by those 
from inside the FBI's institutional point of view as radical outliers: as irrele-
vant or crazy. Anyone who pursues data points defined as radical outliers, 
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therefore, will appear just as crazy and irrelevant as the radical outliers he 
or she pursues. This, in part, explains why his colleagues started calling 
Mulder "Spooky" and began ridiculing and marginalizing his work. An 
institutionally approved hypothesis, line, or conceptual framework always 
ensures that nothing alien is ever taken seriously. Alien evidence or any 
inconvenient data like the alleged existence of aliens can thus be labeled 
as radical outliers and locked away in the basement with that other radical 
outlier, Fox "Spooky" Mulder. Here is a bit of relevant conversation from 
the series itself, at the beginning of the episode "Piper Maru": 
SCULLY: I'm constantly amazed by you, Mulder. You're working 
down here in the basement, sifting through files and transmis-
sions that any other agent would just throwaway in the garbage. 
MULDER: That's why I'm in the basement, Scully. 
SCULLY: You're in the basement because they are afraid of you, 
of your relentlessness, and because they know that they could 
drop you in the middle of the desert, tell you that the truth is 
out there, and then you'd ask them for a shovel-well, maybe 
not a shovel. Maybe a backhoe.21 
On Helping Scully Out of the Box 
Now we can see that the so-called craziness of the data does not depend 
only on some quality in the observations-mysterious computer chips 
implanted at the base of the neck, unexplainable crop circles, and so on. 
These are red herrings. Craziness is determined by how far those observa-
tions fall from the official party line, how far they fall from the expected 
range of allowable data. That is what defines these data points as crazy. 
In this way, hypotheses already put in place condition which observations 
count. Since aliens are excluded from these institutionally acceptable ex-
planatory models, any data that suggest the activity of aliens are also ex-
cluded. So, both what we can think (the existence of aliens) and how we 
can think (the hypotheses we assume that condition what we look for) are 
set up to make sure we remain alienated from the truth. 
With these ideas in place we can finally answer our earlier question 
about Mulder and Scully: why can Mulder see through the official mind-
set when Scully cannot? Peirce's discussion suggests that Mulder is using 
abduction, while Scully, even though she believes she is using abduction 
and formulating hypotheses, is not. She merely conducts inductions along 
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already-established and acceptable "lines of inquiry:' The proof of this 
is simply that, for all her effort, her explanations are often wrong while 
Mulder's are usually (and with regard to aliens, finally) right. When she 
starts to explain one of the crazy events she and Mulder are sent out to 
investigate, she selects data that seem reasonable based on what she thinks 
a reasonable explanation would be. Once she makes the assumption that 
some explanations are more reasonable than others, try as she might, she 
automatically filters out any radical outliers (or explains them into sub-
mission) that do not confirm her preconceptions about what hypotheses 
are acceptable: hypotheses that do not, as we know, include fat -sucking 
mutants who translate medieval Italian texts (as in "2Shy"). This keeps her 
inside the box, inside the frames of her own expectations about what an 
explanation should look like, and thus keeps her from finding the truth. 
To her, of course, Mulder looks crazy because he accepts possibilities that 
seem crazy to her-and again they seem crazy to her because they do not 
meet the criteria she has presupposed about what a reasonable hypothesis 
is. So long as she is stuck in this box (mind-set, institutional paradigm) 
nothing alien-and for The X-Files, remember, that means the truth-will 
ever get in. Her condition precisely illustrates the second of the two under-
lying causes of existential alienation mentioned earlier: the alienation from 
the truth produced by the way our own cognitive processes, our cultural 
and biological lenses, can limit what we know. She embodies an "unhappy 
consciousness;' the kind of thinking trapped by self-imposed limitations it 
cannot itself recognize. 
Scully's situation is complicated, but Mulder, even though he knows 
the truth and has managed to free himself from the mind-set that blinkers 
his partner, is even harder 'to explain. How did he manage to avoid being 
absorbed into the institutional paradigm, the corporate mind-set, when 
nearly every other FBI agent succumbed? The answer to this question is the 
answer to existentialism's big question: how do I get to the truth, the truth 
from which I am alienated, the truth I need to live an authentic life? The 
answer looks easy. To escape this alienation, just let go of your conditioning 
worldview, and then, using all the crazy data, make the leap of abduction. 
Finding the Edge of Your Fishbowl 
Advice is easy. There is, of course, a catch that sits at the center of all exis-
tential thought, like a bad tooth you cannot leave alone. To understand 
Mulder we must put ourselves in Scully's shoes. Here's the catch: Scully 
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finds herself in a paradoxical situation. Her own explanations often do not 
satisfy her, and, worse, she begins to suspect that her crazy partner may not 
be so crazy after all. This edginess is evident from the private reflections 
she entrusts to her computer diary at the end of the day, after she files her 
public reports for the FBI hierarchy. In those private entries she confesses 
to an anxiety not only about all the crazy evidence her official reports ex-
plain away but also about her inability to create a satisfying explanation. 
This uneasiness comes from questioning her own methods, her loyalty to 
thinking inside the inductive box. Compounding this uneasiness is the 
fact that, as hard as she tries, she will never be able to question her own 
methods well enough to see what is wrong with them, until enough radical 
outliers pile up to force her over the edge. As the series moves along, Scully 
begins to see what Mulder is seeing and eventually reverses roles when she 
meets her own earlier skepticism in the person of her new partner, Agent 
Doggett (Robert Patrick). Agent Doggett plays skeptic to Scully's more 
evolved point of view just as Scully once played skeptic to Mulder. But this 
comes later in the series. The task remains impossible for her so long as she 
attempts to think her way out of the box, so to speak, by using the same 
kind of thinking that created the box in the first place. Her early anxiety 
is caused by running up against the rough edges of this box-for the un-
certain edge between what we think we know and what we really know is 
always rough.22 
Scully's predicament speaks to the larger existential issue on display in 
The X-Files. It is our own. How do you uncover the presuppositions that 
condition your thinking by using the same kind of thinking conditioned 
by the presuppositions you must now try to uncover? It looks unsolvable. 
"Understanding how our understanding conditions what we understand" 
looks like an impenetrable, paradoxical tangle. To put it a bit more simply, 
the goldfish does not know it is in a bowl. We share the goldfish's situa-
tion. Locked inside our worldviews we cannot find the sharp edges of our 
knowledge, of our fishbowls, nor determine how what we know conditions 
what we can know. There is, however, some consensus on how to resolve 
this situation. One approach is to begin by noting that you cannot leap 
out of your worldview any more than you can leap out of your skin-but 
you can start to crawl out. Mulder is our example. If Mulder overcomes 
his alienation by abduction, by using all the data, especially the data soci-
ety calls crazy, then what about using abduction to overcome the kind of 
alienation produced by our own existential predicament? We have to start 
where we are. In The X-Files, our alienation from the truth (that there are 
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aliens) is caused by having assumed, in advance of the data, a set of insti-
tutionally acceptable explanations for the world that condition the kind 
of data we accept as reasonable and the kind of data we ignore as mere 
radical outliers. This process, Peirce suggests, locks us into using induction 
while at the same time discouraging the formation of new hypotheses that 
would provide better, if more alarming, explanations. Mulder engages in 
abduction by beginning with the data themselves and not with the lines 
drawn by institutional authority or cultural paradigm. He attends to the 
data, no matter how far out ofline they appear, and in that way he veers off 
the official, culturally reinforced and institutionally acceptable line toward 
the truth. For us, we must begin by attending to the radical outliers in our 
experience, by looking for what seems most alien to our worldview. Even 
if we cannot remove our cultural lenses, we can start to look for the edges, 
the borders where our understanding and expectations begin to get blurry: 
where things fall out of focus. Those margins give us the boundary layer 
for what we think is reasonable and what we think is unreasonable. Once 
we know that, we can trace the line of our own regression to determine 
what it avoids and excludes. We cannot see the bowl from the inside, in 
other words, but only from the suffocating edge where the water meets 
the air. 
Finding the edge of our fishbowl or, better, rooting out the inherent 
limits of our understanding, is hard work not only because of the nasty 
logical paradox lurking at the heart of the matter but also for psychological 
reasons. A terrible and paralyzing anxiety goes along with this kind of self-
exploration, and this too appears in The X-Files. There the anxiety does 
not follow from the fear of being swept up into the totalizing, institutional 
mind-set that hides the truth about aliens, or having your teeth drilled and 
ovaries supercharged (like Scully in "Ascension"). 
The anxiety, for Scully as much as for us, comes from stepping off the 
line of a comfortably satisfying hypothesis, wading into deep and muddy 
water and into the unnerving suspicion that we may not know everything 
we think we know. Human beings are profoundly uneasy with the possi-
bility that the truth might not be fixed and eternal, or with the knowledge 
that what we know is not the whole story. Once you walk up to the edge of 
your own certainties and stare "out there" into the zone of abduction and 
mystery-the territory mapped by The X-Files-you begin to understand 
the anxiety existential authors attempt to describe. Letting go of these com-
fortable certainties and plunging ourselves into the basement with Mulder 
and Scully is something we instinctively avoid. Existential anxiety, like the 
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Buddhist notion of tanha, is a kind of snarl in the yarn of our desire, a slip-
knot tied out of our inherent craving for fixed and unchanging truths or 
for consistent institutional and conceptual frames that keep us safely apart 
from the crazy thing we fear most: the rough recognition of our own igno-
rance that Socrates called wisdom.23 The alternative, of course, is to live in 
ignorance of our ignorance. The X-Files describes the existential condition 
of human beings and points toward a solution, an exit. Like Mulder, we 
have to pick up our flashlights and, filled with expectation and presenti-
ment, explore the darkness in our world, our lives, and ourselves. If we do, 
what works for Mulder should work for us. 
Epilogue 
One last thought: in addition to the insights this show offers our everyday 
lives, there is another, slightly crazier, resonance between Mulder's search 
for the truth in The X-Files and the book you hold in your hands-be-
tween Mulder's abduction of aliens and the idea that a philosophy text 
might look for "the truth" out there, in a popular television show. I say 
this because a book about finding philosophically meaningful themes in 
a popular sci-fi TV show is a bit alien to today's academic philosophy.24 
It is the kind of activity that makes serious-minded philosophers wrinkle 
their noses and use the word "popular" as a pejorative. Like Mulder's ab-
ductive inferences, a book like this one includes data points in its linear 
regression usually excluded from philosophical analysis because they seem 
"crazy" because they lie outside the academically acceptable boundaries 
of the academic box. Popular television is out on the fringes of acceptable 
academic data in exactly the same way Mulder's cases, his X-Files, are on 
the fringes of forensic responsibility. Perhaps Mulder's example suggests 
that being open to all the data points, including "crazy" data like popu-
lar nonacademic sources in art and literature, might reveal the limitations 
inherent in contemporary academic philosophy, that is, the edge of our 
institutional fishbowls. Put another way, perhaps philosophy's adherence 
to privileged paradigms of reasoning, specifically induction and deduction, 
exile it up to the Acropolis, away from the center of life, rather than help 
find a way down through discarded lines of inquiry and into the basement. 25 
If, as Emil Fackenheim used to remind us, paraphrasing Hegel, "philos-
ophy is the Sunday of life," then perhaps in addition to prayerful reflec-
tion on the op-ed and business sections of our lives, it is appropriate (and 
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necessary) that we meditate on the Sunday comics, including that televised 
comic book, The X-Files. 26 
What works for Mulder should work not only for us as individuals but 
also for philosophy. 
Notes 
1. Maybe turnabout is fair play since the driving psychological motive in Mul-
der's life was his conviction that his sister had been, noninferentially, abducted by 
aliens. 
2. "Deconstruction" is an example of the kind of analysis that can too often lean 
on jokes or linguistic coincidence. When done properly, deconstruction produces star-
tling and useful insights, but it is easily abused and, as a result, has earned a rotten 
reputation. Thus, this now well-worn joke: 
QUESTION: What do you get when you cross a deconstructionist with a 
Mafia hit man? 
ANSWER: You get an offer you can't understand. 
3. Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's 
Press, 1998). 
4. Interestingly enough, and by contrast, just off the Agora Hephaestus and 
Athena, as gods representing practical and theoretical wisdom, share the temple. In the 
Acropolis, overlooking Athens, Athena has the main temple to herself. 
5. Arthur Conan Doyle authored the Sherlock Holmes series; Mary Shelley is 
the author of Frankenstein; Rod Serling is an author and director of The Twilight Zone; 
and Emmanuel Levinas, one of the twentieth century's greatest philosophers, explored 
the theme of meaning in the face of totalitarian politics and thinking. 
6. Examples of "frayed edges" in existential literature or philosophy include 
Kafka's use of absurdity to make you rethink what it means for a story or person to be 
"reasonable." Waking up as a cockroach, for instance, as the main character in Meta-
morphosis does, is the classic example. Something subtler, but even more frightening 
than six-foot-tall cockroaches, is the frayed edge of religious faith in an age of science: 
not a faith that blindly runs over rationality but that acknowledges it fully and without 
looking away. This is the theme of S0ren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, one of the 
first texts to embody the kinds of themes we can unearth in The X-Files. 
7. See W. B. Yeats's (1865-1939) poem "The Second Coming" (1921). 
8. This analysis of The X-Files points to an interpretation that situates existen-
tialism in what the nineteenth-century German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel called the 
"unhappy consciousness:' At a certain level in its development, consciousness finds 
itself restrained from advancing further by the very categories it uses to think. Only by 
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recognizing the way in which its own conceptual categories frame its understanding 
can consciousness move on to a more adequate point of view and a more adequate 
comprehension of its relation to what it thinks: in this case, what Hegel called "reason." 
(See G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller [Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1979], 119-38.) While the matter is well beyond the scope of the present 
discussion, it is important for both philosophical and historical reasons to take note of 
the issue here. The unhappy consciousness permeates much if not all of the discussion 
concerning the nature and origin of existential thought. See Jean Wahl, Le malheur de 
la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel (Paris: Rieder, 1929). 
9. John Locke coined the phrase "something I know not what" to describe the 
underlying substance of primary qualities. Locke believed we do not and cannot have 
an adequate conception of "substance." John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing (London, 1690), Book 2, chap. 23, 2. 
10. With regard to the power of wrapping Mulder and his data in the "crazy" 
label, viewers might remember the Cigarette Smoking Man's comment from "The 
Blessing Way" to his Syndicate cohorts that "the matter with the FBI will be handled 
internally, as always." 
11. Scully, of course, eventually overcomes her own "paradigm paralysis;' a set of 
institutional lenses strong enough to repress even her own abduction, presumably, at 
the hands of the aliens. More on this below. 
12. Peirce's use of terminology is not consistent across his career. His early work 
calls this form of inference "hypothesis;' but he eventually began referring to it as "ab-
duction" and finally as "retroduction:' 
13. For a more in-depth discussion of abductive inference, in addition to the cita-
tions upcoming, see T. K. Fann, Peirce's Theory of Abduction (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1970); H. G. Frankfurt, "Peirce's Notion of Abduction;' Journal of Philosophy 
55 (1958): 593-97; A. W. Burks, "Peirce's Theory of Abduction;' Philosophy of Science 13 
(1946): 301-6; and F. E. Reilly, Charles Peirce's Theory of Scientific Method (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1970), 31. 
14. c. S. Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 
Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, ed. P. A. Turrisi (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1997), 217-18. 
15. c. S. Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: 
Dover, 1955), 151-52. 
16. c. S. Peirce, Lectures on Pragmatism, in The Collected Papers, Vol. V: Pragma-
tism and Pragmaticism (1931), lecture 6, §4, para. 171. Online at http://www.textlog.de/ 
peirce_pragmatism.html. Accessed June 24, 2006. Or, put another way, Peirce says, "It is 
to be remarked that in pure abduction, it can never be justifiable to accept the hypoth-
esis otherwise than as an interrogation. But as long as that condition is observed, no 
positive falsity is to be feared; and therefore the whole question of what one out of a 
number of possible hypotheses ought to be entertained becomes purely a matter of 
economy" (Peirce, Philosophical Writings, 154). 
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17. Peirce, Collected Papers, Vol. V, lecture 7, §1, para. 181. 
18. Paul Redding, "Hegel and Peircean Abduction:' European Journal of Philos-
ophy 11, no. 3 (2003): 295. 
19. Peirce, Collected Papers Vol. V, lecture 6, §4, para. 171. 
20. Einstein's famous retort when confronted by the indeterminacy of subatomic 
physics was that "God does not play dice with the universe." 
21. This example, and its episode, illustrates that even while Mulder creates, or 
abducts, his hypothesis by including all the data, he also goes on to use induction and 
deduction - testing his hypothesis against new data and working out its consequences 
to test it for internal contradictions and external contraindications-to rule out com-
peting hypotheses. In this particular case he is interested in why a French salvage team 
is suffering strange radiation burns. Scully suggests that it is merely because the French 
have resumed nuclear testing. Mulder replies that he checked and found that the near-
est testing site is thousands of miles away from the French sailors. 
22. A telling example occurs in the episode "End Game" (season 2). Scully has had 
Mulder rescued from an ice sheet in the Pacific where he had followed what he claimed 
to be a shape-shifting alien. Scully narrates: "Many of the things I have seen have 
challenged my faith and belief in an ordered universe. But this uncertainty has only 
strengthened my need to know, to understand, to apply reason to those things which 
seem to defy it." This is a good illustration of her commitment to inductive procedure 
as the only right way to understand the universe, and of her failure to use abduction to 
see beyond her line of "reasonable" inquiry to the truth. 
23. Tanha literally means "thirst," but in Buddhism it refers to the craving to ob-
tain things (or ideas or states of being) that will, one imagines- unhappily and incor-
rectly-make one happy. In this context, it refers to an inherent hunger humans have 
for unchanging and fixed truths on which they then expect to hang a meaningful life. 
This expectation is the origin of sorrow. 
For more on the link between existential anxiety and the Socratic idea of wisdom, 
see Mark C. E. Peterson, s.v. "Wisdom:' in Dictionary of Existentialism, ed. Haim Gor-
don (West Port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 494-96. 
24. Although this is clearly changing with the recent publication of such books as 
William Irwin, Mark T. Conard, and Aeon J. Skoble, eds., The Simpsons and Philosophy: 
The D'ohf of Homer, Popular Culture and Philosophy 2 (Chicago: Open Court, 2001); 
William Irwin, ed., The Matrix and Philosophy: Welcome to the Desert of the Real, Popu-
lar Culture and Philosophy 3 (Chicago: Open Court, 2002); and even James B. South, 
ed., Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Philosophy: Fear and Trembling in Sunnydale, Popular 
Culture and Philosophy 4 (Chicago: Open Court, 2003). 
25. Consider the observations of Bruce Wilshire and John McCumber. See Bruce 
Wilshire, Fashionable Nihilism: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy (Albany: State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 2002); Bruce Wilshire, The Moral Collapse of the University: 
Professionalism, Purity, and Alienation, SUNY Series in Philosophy of Education (Al-
bany: State University of New York Press, 1990); and esp. John McCumber, Time in the 
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Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era (Evanston, IL: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 2001); and John McCumber, Reshaping Reason: Toward a New Philosophy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 
26. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and 
Francis H. Simpson (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), 1:92: "Philosophy demands 
the unity and intermingling of these two points of view; it unites the Sunday of life 
when man in humility renounces himself, and the working-day when he stands up in-
dependently, is master of himself and considers his own interests." In fact, philosophy 
for Hegel must be the link between Athena and Hephaestus, between the Sunday of 
profound reflection and the workaday world in which life is lived and finds meaning in 
its dark and anxiety-producing foundations-down there in the basement. 
Freedom and Worldviews in 
The X-Files 
V. Alan White 
Men can never be free, because they're weak, corrupt, worthless 
and restless. The people believe in authority; they've grown tired of 
waiting for miracle or mystery. Science is their religion; no greater 
explanation exists for them. 
-Cigarette Smoking Man, "Talitha Cumi" 
Certainly one of the major reasons The X-Files garnered such a loyal fol-
lowing is the intricate chemistry that developed over the course of the 
series between agents Fox Mulder and Dana Scully. In the beginning that 
chemistry took the form of a radical titration of Mulder's fuming passion to 
prove that paranormal events exist against the cool skepticism of Scully's 
devotion to reason and science. In the end the two achieved something 
more like a covalence of these same elements with a common and comple-
mentary vision of a considerably more complex world than either origi-
nally conceived. In between, they discovered that they constantly, mutually 
catalyzed one another to produce various degrees of belief, credulity, and 
astonishment about what truth might be "out there." 
Therefore we can see that one overarching philosophical theme of 
the series is the question of how it is possible for people to change their 
fundamental views of the world. Although The X-Files poses this question 
in a sci-fi caricatured way, the question is not much different from more 
familiar and historical examples of such transformation, such as Augus-
tine's midlife conversion from sinner to (literal) saint, Malcolm X's late-life 
renunciation of racism, and Lavoisier's rejection of the phlogiston theory 
of combustion through careful experimentation. The general mystery of 
this phenomenon of intellectual conversion to an alternative worldview 
is itself a vexing X-Files-like labyrinth of questions about epistemology, 
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psychology, sociology, biology, and the disciplinary subsets intertwin-
ing these, and any finally satisfactory account of it would try to answer at 
least most of these questions in a comprehensive, tight-knit way. To avoid 
such a necessarily encyclopedic and complete response, perhaps we should 
limit ourselves to one central and crucial philosophical question nested 
deeply within all others in such an inquiry: are we truly free to choose 
between worldviews and their various components (or is the Smoking 
Man on to something in the epigraph about the slavishness of people)? 
Is there some recognizable component of free will in the matter of intel-
lectual conversion to a modified worldview? And specifically in the context 
of The X-Files, were Mulder and Scully free to choose what they believed, 
either as represented at the beginning of the series, during its run, or at 
the end?1 
A Crash Course in Free Will 
To investigate whether anyone has free will, we must first be clear what 
we're talking about and looking for-the conceptual nature of freedom 
and free will. Philosophers have put forward various accounts of what 
constitutes some conditions of human freedom: lack of constraints, open-
future choice, reasons-responsiveness, capability of being held responsible, 
and so on.2 However, following J. L. Austin and some others, let's general-
ize from these more focused suggestions and say that freedom in general 
always requires two interrelated components of ability and opportunity (or 
opportunities-more about this in a moment).3 The idea here is roughly 
that one can be free if and only if one is able to be free in some relevant 
way, such as being able to think, speak, move, and so on, and one has a 
course of thought or action open to the exercise of such abilities, so one 
isn't unduly distracted, one's lips aren't duct-taped, one isn't superglued to 
the floor, and so on. Note that freedom in general then is a state of affairs 
where one has some sort of internal capacity or power, and one has as well 
an external situation so that that capacity or power can complete its func-
tion. Only when both these internal and external conditions obtain can 
one be said to be truly free to think, to speak, to move. 
Applying this picture of freedom to the specific issue of free will re-
quires a bit of explanation. To begin, philosophers are for the most part 
divided into two mutually exclusive camps that are at odds on the question 
of how human brains and/or conscious minds function. The question here 
is whether the basis of consciousness is only an immensely complex system 
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of causes and effects, such as a purely biological account of thought might 
provide, or whether consciousness might include deviation from the strict 
rule of cause and effect, for example by appeal to quantum physics or su-
pernaturalism. These two views are respectively termed determinism and 
indeterminism. To begin to understand the relevance of these views to the 
question of the freedom of minds, note that one main difference between 
them is that by determinism the future of such a mind's function is lo-
cally (in the next moment) "closed," and by indeterminism the future of 
a mind is locally "open:' That is, by determinism a given state of mind at 
one present moment causes one, and only one, state of mind in the next 
future moment as an effect. All other conceivably different future states of 
mind relative to the present one are "closed" off by the present causal one. 
By contrast, the indeterminism of a given present state of mind that is not 
causal is "open" to at least two alternative local future states of mind. One 
can see that these two views have one immediate tie-in to opinions about 
the freedom of such minds. If our minds' futures are always closed by de-
terminism, then those futures based on our "choices" only go one particular 
way and no other. By indeterminism, on the other hand, our futures are at 
least sometimes open to this future and that future-as the 1980s Modern 
English song Melt with You goes, "the future's open wide!" So it may seem 
that determinism robs us of a free will to choose between distinct futures 
and indeterminism restores it.4 
Unfortunately, things are more complicated than that in part because, 
depending on what exactly "freedom" means, each of the determinist or 
indeterminist views of minds can lay claim to free will, and one can be 
made to exclude it as well. It all depends on what free will ability is sup-
posed to be, and what opportunity or opportunities are additionally needed, 
and what determinism and indeterminism can provide in terms of these 
components of freedom. 
Say, for example, that a determinist interprets an ability to make a free 
choice as weighing options and coming up with the best one. Sophisticated 
computers can do this, and they are essentially causal mechanisms (their 
functional states are such that their futures are always locally closed). So a 
determinist view of mind can accommodate such an account of ability and 
thus regard our minds to be a form of mechanistic supercomputer. Say then 
also that the determinist puts forward an additional account that states, for 
example, if a mind is caused to select the best it can in a situation, and that 
selection is objectively correct, proper, and satisfactory (by some measure), 
then it is properly freely chosen because no other possible future course of 
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that mind would make sense. Such a view combining deterministic ability 
with the sufficiency of just one future opportunity is in fact called a com-
patibilist account of freedom, and some like-believing determinists dub 
themselves thus.5 
But what if, to the contrary, such a closed future is deemed insufficient 
for freedom? (That the future, to be freely chosen, should be "open wide.") 
For example, what if the best a mind can select in a situation is a fifty-fifty 
proposition of heads or tails, without any further preference between the 
two? A determinist account of this mind says that one actually is preferred, 
for one is finally caused to be selected over the other. But here indeter-
minists cry foul- how can that one be truly freely chosen if the other is 
equally preferred?6 Truly free choices in these circumstances demand that 
both future alternatives are available for choosing. This means that any 
such choice requires plural opportunities in the future-and real ones, in 
a genuinely open future way. And if that is correct, determinism is false, at 
least for minds that are conceived as free in this way (so they can't be super-
computers). So for philosophers that demand such a plurality of future 
opportunities for any stated ability of mind to choose freely, freedom is 
incompatible with a determinist account of the locally closed future. Such 
philosophers of freedom are termed incompatibilists; they hold that the ne-
cessity of the plurality of opportunities for choice cannot be reconciled 
with locally closed future determinism. Incompatibilist indeterminists-
sometimes called libertarians-believe that minds at least sometimes 
function in indeterminist ways, and when they do, the plurality of future 
opportunities assures that this free will to choose actually exists. 
So there are determinists who believe that compatibilist freedom exists, 
and indeterminists who believe that incompatibilist freedom exists. But 
now for a moment think hard (so to speak) on this matter of incompati-
bilism. Incompatibilism as a belief is only a very abstract conceptual view 
about the philosophical need for locally plural open-future opportunities 
for freedom of choice and does not commit to whether such a future exists. 
Thus there are some determinists who agree with this view, and since they 
are also determinists about minds, reject any belief in such freedom of mind 
and will. For them the truth of determinism rules out such incompatibilist 
free will. They are called hard incompatibilists-determinists who do not 
believe that the opportunities form of free will exists.7 
Whew! Our seemingly simple question about whether Mulder and 
Scully can freely will to change their worldviews has at least two different 
and complicated answers. "Yes, possibly:' say compatibilists and libertari-
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ans-though their yeses are based on very different ideas about how minds 
work and what freedom is. "No;' says the hard incompatibilist, agreeing 
with the libertarian about what freedom ought to be but then holding that 
it cannot exist, agreeing also with the compatibilist about the truth of the 
determinism of mind. 
Who's right? The good news is that it appears we would only have to 
answer two questions in order to find out: how exactly do minds work, 
especially when they choose or decide things, and does freedom require a 
plurality of future opportunities or not? The bad news: philosophy has not 
arrived at a definitive answer to either of these.8 
So are we stuck? Perhaps not. No matter what the final truth about 
free will might be, there is still one fact before us. Scully and Mulder (and 
people in the other historical examples) did change their worldviews based 
on their unusual experiences. Next, let's see what it is to change one's mind 
in this way, and see if any consequences for freedom pop up. 
What Is It to Change Worldviews? 
What is a worldview? That also is a complicated question. But our X-Files 
heroes can help us out here. Scully, even to the end of the series, is a true 
skeptic in the sense that she only believes what the evidence minimally and 
rationally requires her to believe. Nevertheless, her own extraordinary ex-
periences, including both a near-fatal illness and pregnancy of partial alien 
origin, convince her that the world in fact involves a secret, systematic alien 
invasion of Earth orchestrated by government conspiracy in cahoots with 
the invaders. Mulder of course has something like a belief about the strong 
possibility of all this from the beginning (remember his cherished "I want 
to believe" poster?), based on previous (preseries) experiences, though ones 
dubious in their strength and number. In one sense Scully comes around to 
Mulder's original worldview, and hers changes more than his-yet we also 
see that Scully maintains a certain parsimonious attitude about belief that 
Mulder never shares (except in some episodes in which Mulder actually 
comes to doubt his beliefs because he is manipulated to do so). Mulder's 
worldview is always then one fundamentally of faith that the world is more 
than it appears to be, a faith that Scully even to the end never shares (except 
for her faith in God), committed skeptically to reasons and evidence as the 
primary basis of forming a view of the world. 
A world view then is partially a function of attitude about what in our 
experiences counts as evidence of what there is in the world. The spectrum 
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of such attitudes includes not only skepticism and faith but also blind accep-
tance, obdurate universal disbelief, modest gullibility, and a host of others. 
Focusing on this more subjective aspect of what a worldview is, the central 
question here then is which kind of attitude is bestto obtain truth about the 
world-which attitude is the most reliable to know what's "out there"? 
Despite the Smoking Man's previously quoted quasi defamation of 
science, and to some extent Mulder's as well, Scully's scientific and skepti-
cal attitude seems the best contender to ferret out truth. In part that is 
because skepticism includes a tendency for one not to believe, and this 
hesitancy can compensate for the mind's evolved, natural inclination to 
work as a confirmation engine, seeking relationships wherever possible.9 
But a scientific attitude also includes another check on rushing to judg-
ment-a conviction that the only reliable evidence is essentially public in 
character, accessible for verification and falsification by others. As just one 
example of how we are well served by skeptical science, one just needs to 
recall the notorious "cold fusion" incident. There some scientists them-
selves got caught up in exciting experimental data that seemed to indicate 
that energetic fusion reactions could take place at ordinary temperatures, 
and consequently they bypassed further trials and peer review to announce 
this revolutionary discovery directly to the public. But then the shared col-
lective attitude of science took over, and labs around the world found that 
the data was erroneous and not replicable as a definite fusion reaction. The 
prospect of such an exciting discovery made the original researchers forgo 
the checks and balances that thorough scientific process provides-they 
"wanted to believe" too much that cold fusion was indeed "out there:'IO 
Mulder's dedication to his duties, spurred by memory of his sister's 
abduction by aliens, sometimes likewise disposes him to "cold fusion" mo-
ments. In one memorable instance from "D0d Kalm," Mulder is convinced 
that what were apparently rapidly aging sailors on a derelict ship "proved" 
that time shifts could occur-only for Scully to discover that their condi-
tion had a less exotic, if also somewhat unusual, scientific explanation. But 
the most touted example of this is Mulder's almost flip "drowning by ecto-
plasm" theory in the season 6 episode "all things." The Ghostbusters would 
have been proud, but Scully is not at all impressed. The autopsy shows that 
the young woman drowned in her own margarita mix. 
One question we could then pursue is whether worldview-forming at-
titudes themselves can be freely chosen. Of course, once again that would 
depend on whether we ever actually have free will, and we now know that 
the hard incompatibilist would say no here. But if we were to say consistently 
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with a compatibilist or libertarian that we could change our attitudes about 
the world, what, exactly, would we be claiming to possess? What would be 
freedom to change the way we view the world? 
First, we ought to admit that the idea that we can change our attitudes 
merely by choosing to do so seems a little odd. People who are disposition-
ally skeptical, faithful, cynical, loving, hateful, and so on are not usually 
susceptible to easy change in these attitudes. They are manifestations of 
individual personality, and personality, once set in us in early life, does not 
easily change. 
Second, though rare, instances of "attitude adjustment" admittedly do 
occur. Augustine did become faithful to God, and Malcolm X did aban-
don racist attitudes. Both of these changes, however, occurred within the 
context of lives in which many past experiences inclined the individuals 
toward a different way of seeing the world. That is, specific occurrences 
added up in cognitive significance to make another way of thinking about 
things reasonable. Lavoisier's experiments likewise convinced him that see-
ing combustible objects as possessing an internal power to burn-the no-
torious concept of phlogiston-was less reasonable than seeing them as 
being able to combine with oxygen in a process of burning. 
So it seems that any freedom to adjust our attitudes must fit within 
this picture of it being a reasonable process, where attitudes may change 
due to the weight of sufficient reasons to do so. (Of course, there must also 
be unreasonable instances of attitude change as well, such as King George 
III's slip into paranoia due to inadvertent arsenic poisoning, but it is hard 
to see examples such as these as free processes.) II 
Consider again Mulder and Scully. Both exhibit a persistence of belief 
attitudes consistently across the course of the series, Mulder's consisting of 
(not-quite-blind) faith that the paranormal is "out there;' whereas Scully 
is dubious of that claim. But their experiences and the evidence thereof 
tweaked both of their attitudes. Scully's skepticism has to bend to the facts, 
and facts about the "black oil;' the Syndicate, alien hybrids (including her 
own child), and so on become, at least past the middle of the series' run, 
indisputable even to her. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the Syndi-
cate's decades-old cover-up about the pending invasion staves off Scully's 
assent to these facts for quite some time, and, as mentioned before, actually 
lead Mulder to question his faith that he is right in "wanting to believe" (for 
example, Mulder's doubt as orchestrated in "Little Green Men"). Both char-
acters at these points of the series are still responding consistently with their 
overall attitudes but with respect to the rational weight of evidence as well. 
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Are Mulder and Scully free to change or adjust their dispositional belief 
attitudes? If they are, the rational weight of evidence must play an essential 
part in that phenomenon. And even hard incompatibilists must acknowl-
edge the causal role of evidence in rational changes of attitude, though of 
course they would not call such changes free. So reasons are either merely 
causal in rational attitude making, as the hard incompatibilists say (and 
at least those compatibilists who are determinists), or they are influences 
compatible with some sense of free rational attitude adjustment. 
Thus far we have concentrated only on the subjective side of what con-
stitutes a worldview in studying attitudes that shape it. But any worldview 
deserving of the name must have an idea of a world so shaped. What is 
meant by the term "world" here? 
There appear to be at least two discernible components to an idea of a 
world (or universe, which is the expansive sense we take "world" to mean). 
One is metaphysical or ontological. That has to do with what ultimately is 
real in this world, or what kinds of entities are found in it. When Mulder 
and Scully first meet, their worldviews are very different in this respect. 
Mulder believes that the world might well include aliens, spirits, extrasen-
sory perception, and other paranormal phenomena as well as the more 
mundane material objects of our acquaintance. Scully's world at that time 
excludes the former exotic stuff in favor of positing only the latter mate-
rial things that science verifies to exist, such as the elements and forces of 
chemistry and physics. One overlap between them is that they both ulti-
mately make allowances for theism-that whatever else this world con-
tains, there may well be a God who created it all. 12 
This theistic commitment, which is a commonplace metaphysical fea-
ture of most people's worldviews, signals one familiar strategy to integrate 
the other major component of any worldview. That component is axiologi-
cal, or a sense of the values one finds in the universe. All but the most nihil-
istic worldviews have some sense of what values obtain in the world, from 
the most basic sense of good and evil in human experience to far-flung 
accounts of beauty and the meaning of existence itself. Clearly Mulder and 
Scully share far more axiologically than otherwise in their worldviews, for 
they have agreeable senses of right and wrong, the nature of good and evil 
moral character, a high regard for the truth, and both seemed to root these 
values in some sort of sense of an ultimate ground of being. 
The interplay of these two worldview components is a familiar theme 
in philosophy. Ethics, for instance, attempts to see clearly the place of value 
(if any) in the furniture of the universe. Philosophy of religion seeks human 
Freedom and World views in The X-Files 45 
value as it relates to the possible existence of God. Philosophy of science ex-
amines how science studies reality and how value concerns might influence 
that study. Metaphysicians who study free will attempt (as seen above) to 
see whether that (seemingly) valuable commodity exists, and if so, how. 
What philosophy has shown us in these more topical explorations of 
worldviews is that this interplay of existence and value is one of mutual 
influence in constructing a picture of the world and its parts. From the 
philosophy of science, for example, a convincing argument was made by 
Norwood Hanson that although we tend to sharply distinguish acts of 
observation from theories we might have about reality more generally, 
in truth we can't divorce observation from theory, because observation 
requires interpretation, and theory provides the background for interpre-
tation. One of his examples of this involves the Renaissance figures Johannes 
Kepler and Tycho Brahe, respectively a Copernican heliocentrist and a Ptol-
emaic geocentrist, who both might look at the same sunrise. Kepler sees 
Earth racing east in the direction of the relatively still sun, while Brahe sees 
an unmoving Earth being overflown by a moving sun. They both in any 
case see the same thing, which amounts to a new day, yet, what produces 
that dawn is viewed from very different theories of how the sun and Earth 
work. 13 Thomas Kuhn (and in a different way, Larry Laudan) argued in 
addition that one factor influencing which of helio- or geocentrism is held 
to be correct is itself a function of values the one might hold dear or re-
ject. 14 For example, it seems clear that one reason geocentrism lasted so 
long was that it was consistent with the traditional value-laden belief that 
humankind was the center of God's creation, whereas heliocentrism was 
willing to sacrifice at least a literal interpretation of that belief. Later, an 
accumulation of other observations from many people (with their own at-
tendant values) swelled into a tsunami of evidence that swamped the an-
thropocentrism behind geocentrism. That human-laden value could no 
longer be rationally and literally expressed in terms of the fact of Earth's 
nonrotation. 
Mulder and Scully regularly see the same things going on in the world 
but the phenomenon often manifests differently for them. For instance, 
in the episode "Lazarus;' Scully is aiding Agent Jack Willis (Christopher 
Allport), who is also her former lover, in his attempt to catch a modern-
day Bonnie-and-Clyde bank-robbing duo, Warren James Dupre (Jason 
Schombing) and Lula Phillips (Cec Verrell). Both Dupre and Willis are fa-
tally wounded and rushed to the same local hospital. Dupre is presumed 
dead, but the medical team-and Scully-strives to revive Willis, even 
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though he's been flatlined for thirteen minutes. At Scully's continued be-
hest, the medical team is finally successful in reestablishing Willis's pulse. 
But for the remainder of the episode, Willis acts strangely. In fact, he acts 
a lot like Dupre and nothing like Jack Willis. Scully recognizes this. Never-
theless, she resists the conclusion that Willis and Dupre have undergone 
some sort of "psychic transference;' which is to suggest that Dupre now 
inhabits Willis's body. Rather, she concludes that Willis's strange behav-
ior is explained by the fact that he suffers from physical and psychologi-
cal trauma. After just a bit of investigative work, Mulder soon adopts the 
hypothesis that Dupre and not Willis survived the gun battle in the bank. 
So, if Scully and Mulder are privy to the same data (and, arguably, Scully 
has intimate access to some that Mulder lacks), then why do they interpret 
it differently? 
Keeping in mind Hanson's position about theory and observation, 
recall that Scully's worldview includes placing great value in the explanatory 
success of science. From a naturalistic or scientific perspective, it makes 
more sense to interpret the data surrounding Willis and Dupre as indicat-
ing that Willis is suffering from trauma and not that Dupre is inhabiting 
Willis's body. Interestingly enough, given the title of the episode and Scully's 
religious background in the Catholic Church, the viewer might wonder why 
Scully isn't more receptive to the idea that the data is supporting a form 
of resurrection (especially after her experiences in "Beyond the Sea"). This 
might be (and probably is) a case in which the value Scully places on sci-
ence contravenes the value she places on religion. Mulder, who ironically 
isn't all that religious (at least in any conventional sense), is pretty quick to 
interpret the data as supporting a resurrection-type hypothesis. Mulder's 
interpretation is probably better accounted for by his value-laden belief 
that seeking the truth out there sometimes involves an appeal to extreme 
possibilities, especially for unexplained phenomena. 
What's interesting here is that what is taken to be a fact is a function of 
what one values, and one's values are in turn influenced by what one takes 
to be the facts. The additional factors of influence are indisputably what 
is taken to be "out there" -what our experiences directly show us as we 
interpret them and how we take into account the reported experiences of 
others. As we tend to see our experiences and these reports as commensu-
rate with our values, our worldview is stable and verified, and as making 
sense, rational. But as our experiences conflict with our values, something 
has to go, or we risk sliding into incoherence and irrationality. Either we 
must adjust the facts as we take them to be within the system of values we 
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hold (e.g., we surrender geocentrism for heliocentrism), and/or we reorder 
or jettison parts of the system of values itself (e.g., we abandon belief in 
God as the basis for anthropocentric values, or, more likely, we retain belief 
in God and dismantle our strong appeal to anthropocentrism). 
Consider Mulder and Scully's worldviews as the series progresses. Both 
apparently started from a nominally theistic worldview (e.g., as Scully sig-
nals in "Revelations" and "All Souls;' and yes, apparently even Mulder, who 
holds his views to his vest throughout the series like unplayed cards, as 
disclosed in the final episode [see note 13]) with a strong respect for truth 
and morality. Beyond this intersection of their values, however, they split 
attitudinally as to how these basic values should be implemented in estab-
lishing facts. Mulder often intuitively trusts experience for what it seems to 
be on its face. If an experience is colored with tinges of supernaturalism, 
then so be it-there may be more in heaven and earth than in Scully's 
(naturalistic) philosophy. Scully on the other hand initially distrusts her 
personal experiences that have that same occult character, on the basis 
of a more scientific approach that places greater value on collective and 
interpersonal experiences than potentially deviant personal ones (she rec-
ognizes, so to speak, the folly of cold-fusion wishful thinking, even if it 
is spawned in a lab). What enables them to continue this entangled dis-
agreement is of course the nature of what they are actually dealing with. 
It involves a massive conspiracy orchestrated from the highest levels of 
international authority to cover up an ongoing plot by extraterrestrials to 
dominate the planet. The intricacy of the cover-up, involving deception 
layered on deception that intrudes into the personal histories of Mulder 
and Scully, often give both of them ample reason to question the veracity 
of particular experiences and even their respective root values of belief and 
skepticism. 
Still, as the events and experiences mount through the seasons of the 
series, it becomes indisputable to both Mulder and Scully that things in 
the world are not as they have always assumed them to be. Mulder comes 
to see that even his deep-seated personal beliefs about his own family 
are erroneous (e.g., his mother's "involvement" with the CSM), and that 
the government he works for is partly corrupt and manipulating him 
for secret nefarious purposes. Scully on the other hand comes to see that 
ordinary and familiar scientific explanations do not work for some phe-
nomena, and that what she took to be the scientific nature of reality had 
to be vastly expanded to include extremely unusual occurrences and un-
anticipated realities (as in "The Erlenmeyer Flask;' "Redux I and II," and, 
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of course, Fight the Future). Both their worldviews change, and both merge 
more tightly together, especially in their common grasp of a startling and 
grim truth about the possible course of humanity's fate. And though their 
adventures and the revelations thereof are not exactly what is termed "nor-
mal" or "natural;' within the sphere of The X-Files universe, it only makes 
sense that they relent to the evidence, in however tortured a manner it 
is presented to them, and see the world for what it really and terribly is. 
Their worldviews change, but within the context of the series, they change 
rationally. 
Mulder and Scully: Free or Unfree? 
Does either or both of The X-Files protagonists freely change worldviews? 
To formulate a good, conservative answer let's examine one other case of 
(relatively minor) worldview revision. This one involves an intriguing argu-
ment about free will itself and was put forward by the distinguished phi-
losopher Peter van Inwagen. 
Van Inwagen has long argued for the truth of libertarianism, by his 
own admission as an essential feature of a theistic worldview requiring that 
view of free will. One of his most familiar defenses for the incompatibil-
ism that libertarianism posits is known as "the consequence argument:' 
Though the particulars of this argument need not concern us here, suf-
fice it to say that van Inwagen concludes that closed-future determinism 
of mind cannot be compatible with what we need for an adequate concept 
of free will. In other work van Inwagen held that only indeterminism of 
mind, along with its essential commitment to the need for plural future 
opportunities of choice, could provide for free will. IS 
That is, until recently, when van Inwagen stirred up the philosophical 
world by declaring that it appears that indeterminism of mind is incom-
patiblewith free will as well. His argument essentially shows that given that 
a mind can choose between at least two different alternatives, there can be 
no possible way to guarantee that that mind fully controls its final selection.16 
Van Inwagen argues roughly as follows. Assume that indeterminism is 
true. Then stipulate that someone makes a choice among some group of 
alternatives, and furthermore allow that the final choice actually made is 
the most rational one among those alternatives. Can the chooser have good 
reason to assure anyone (including herself) before (or after) the actual choice 
that the choice is genuinely hers in the sense that she was able to prevent 
any other possible decision? If the choice process was indeterministic, and 
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thus had to be undertaken with the real possibility that some other choice 
could be (or could have been) made, this additional fact would force a "no" 
answer to this question. The open future for an indeterministic choice 
means that any choice alternative, reasonable or not, is genuinely avail-
able to the mind making that choice, and thus assurance that the choice 
somehow absolutely rules (or ruled) out the others that are (were) possible 
cannot be sustained. Another way of saying this is that indeterminism by 
definition appears to block a mind's final ability to control its decisions. 
To understand the force of this a bit more, let's go back to one of the 
strongest responses for the libertarian-indeterminist against the determin-
ist. That response depended on the case that one was faced with two dis-
tinct possibilities of choice, but two that were fifty-fifty in the sense that 
neither was reasonably favored above the other. If the selection of one 
(heads, say) was realized by mental determinism so that the other really 
could not occur, then the other (tails) would not be available to that mind. 
So the unavailable possibility, which would otherwise be as reasonable a 
choice as the one caused to occur, cannot be one free for a reasonable mind 
to choose. This claim is based on the insight, that since what is reasonable 
seems intuitively an accessible option for choice, if freedom is to be maxi-
mally consistent with reasonable possibilities, determinism cannot say that 
a causal resolution of such a situation is free. 
In this ideal situation of different alternatives that are perfectly rationally 
balanced ones, van Inwagen's complaint about indeterminism is at least di-
minished a little. For a mind that makes a fifty-fifty toss-up decision can 
say that its control of what is finally decided is in fact as rational as it can 
be, for any decision it makes is equally rational, and any further control 
placed upon one alternative against another is thus not justifiable as being 
a rational one. Just as the opportunities are maximal for a rational choice 
in this case, so is the ability to control such a choice (because this case 
requires a minimum of control for a rational outcome). However, shift to 
any other case of choice where the alternatives are not perfectly balanced 
as rational choices. Then van Inwagen's complaint about an indeterministic 
process of choosing returns with a vengeance. 
But here's where the van Inwagen account steers back in the direction 
of our inquiry about Mulder and Scully. After offering his double-edged 
incompatibilism of free will with both determinism and indeterminism, 
van Inwagen declares a curious form of "my sterian ism" about free will. That 
is, he stubbornly believes that people have this freedom (at least some-
times), but he cannot rationally sort out how! This trenchant belief in the 
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face of insufficient reasons can be fairly easily explained from the overall 
perspective of van Inwagen's worldview. His core belief in God, which for 
him unites what is ultimately real with what is of ultimate value, cannot let 
free will slip from the picture of how everything in the universe works. If 
there were no free will, then people would be either the unwitting pawns 
of God or some senseless, valueless creatures of God self-deceived into be-
lieving that they really have worth and choice. And van Inwagen cannot 
countenance either option and retain an idea of God as having created us 
as truly valuable beings. So free will stays in his worldview-even if it can't 
be understood as part of it. 
Is this irrational of van Inwagen? It is too easy just to respond flatly, 
"Of course:' For him, detailed questions about free will are lower-order 
ones with respect to his worldview, and if his worldview is overall a correct 
one, then the large-scale need for some account of freedom to reconcile 
God's providence with human value supersedes the specific need for an-
swers to those detailed questions. From the perspective of his worldview, 
van Inwagen's mysterianism about free will translates into a rational, open-
ended question, in which his posited belief in the ultimate meaningful-
ness of free will is anchored in the rationality of the entire worldview (and 
therefore kicks the whole question of whether van Inwagen is rational in his 
mysterianism back to the question of whether his worldview is rational). 
Mulder and Scully both exhibit similar mysterian tendencies to believe 
in something despite not being able to make sense about it throughout 
the series, and often because such beliefs are required in the context of 
their worldviews (and specific episodes). Scully's religious belief in God, of 
course, is basic to her worldview, though she recognizes that it is not always 
clear even to her that her belief in God makes sense (as in the season 7 epi-
sode "Orison").!7 Mulder's belief in the authenticity of his memory of his 
sister's abduction likewise at some points becomes suspect to him as well 
(recall "Little Green Men"). Some of these beliefs, as it turns out, are justi-
fied, others not, and still others remain open. And, as for van Inwagen, the 
attitude of faith that carries these beliefs forward only makes sense within 
the larger sense-making of their worldviews. Their "choices" to continue 
or to jettison these dicey beliefs are functions of what they take to be suf-
ficient worldview reasons to do so. 
However, one real lesson about the nature of these arguably free "choices" 
can be skimmed off this. If free-will decisions are to be anything really 
worthwhile, they must be made in the context of reason. For if reasons for 
making a decision cannot be said to be part of the causes that compati-
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bilists rely on to explain their version of free will, then that form of free 
will does not yield a rational picture of the mechanisms of mind as they 
"choose." And equally, if reasons for a decision cannot be aligned with how 
indeterministic minds arrive at their one alternative from an open future 
smorgasbord of them, then that account of working minds is not rational. 
In short, to be valuable, any freedom, compatibilist or incompatibilist, 
ironically must be slave to reason. 
So do Mulder and Scully alter their worldviews of their own free will? We 
really don't know, and in part because we don't have those final answers to 
how minds work and what freedom really is. But we do know that in the 
context of the series, their experiences, and those of others around them, 
do grow into a force of reason to rationally require them to reshape their 
worldviews, freely or not. In that respect the Smoking Man as quoted above 
did have a point: if one actually has good reasons for believing things that 
any current science cannot embrace, then one might be better off expand-
ing one's worldview beyond that limited perspective. However, unless we 
throw in with something like a worldview such as van Inwagen's, perhaps 
we should also say about our X-Files heroes that we should be a little more 
like Scully, and a little less like Mulder, when it comes to strongly believing 
that free will must have played a genuine part in their adventures. 
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where the former determinist use means "control by cause" and the latter indetermin-
ist use means "control of all real possibilities." This potential difference between what 
the disputants mean by "preference" respectively reflects what John Fischer has termed 
the difference between "reasons control;' which is consistent with determinism, and 
"guidance control;' which is not. See Fischer, My Way. My ambiguous use of "prefer" is 
meant to convey a sense of this difference without getting into technicalities. Later, in 
the section "Mulder and Scully: Free or Unfree?" I submit a more detailed version of 
this argument put in terms of reasons and control. 
7. A good contemporary representative is Derk Pereboom, Living without Free 
Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
8. Dean Kowalski quite rightly challenges my apparently unqualified claim that 
resolving factual, empirical issues about how the mind works might resolve the problem 
of free will. If my claim is taken to mean that knowing how minds work is a necessary 
condition for resolving the free will problem, then that would be obviously false, for at 
least some (if not all) compatibilist concepts of freedom are consistent with both deter-
minism and indeterminism. But any demonstration that the mind works deterministi-
cally (or not) would be sufficient to eliminate some views on free will, and to that extent 
any prospect of discovering the empirical truth about the mind is quite relevant. 
9. For an explanation of what I mean by saying the mind is a "confirmation 
engine;' see Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
Ultimately I agree with Popper's view that evolution has tended to favor the psycho-
logical tendency of minds to see connections in experience, since many such connec-
tions about dangers, predators, resources, and the like would promote survival and 
reproduction. The downside of this, as is part of Popper's point, is that minds are 
skewed by nature to see connections where there are none. 
10. See http://partners.nytimes.com/library/national/science/050399Sci-cold-fusion 
.html (accessed August 20, 2006). 
11. For an account of George Ill's condition, see http://www.dfci.harvard.edu/abo/ 
news/press/attacks-of-king-george-3rd-madness-linked-to-metabolism-molecule.asp 
(accessed August 20, 2006). 
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12. Some readers will be jolted by this claim, since in many episodes Mulder's 
only open skepticism about anything-and then often in the form of near mockery-
concerned Scully's Catholic faith. But this exchange in the final episode undermines 
Mulder's seeming persistent scorn of traditional theism: 
MULDER: "Mm. I've been chasing after monsters with a butterfly net. You 
heard the man-the date's set [for the alien invasion]. I can't change that." 
SCULLY: You wouldn't tell me. Not because you were afraid or broken ... but 
because you didn't want to accept defeat. 
MULDER: Well, I was afraid of what knowing would do to you. I was afraid 
that it would crush ... your spirit. 
SCULLY: Why would I accept defeat? Why would I accept it, if you won't? 
Mulder, you say that you've failed, but you only fail if you give up. And I 
know you-you can't give up. It's what I saw in you when we first met. It's 
what made me follow you ... why I'd do it allover again. 
MULDER: And look what it's gotten you. 
SCULLY: And what has it gotten you? Not your sister. Nothing that you've set 
out for. But you won't give up, even now. You've always said that you want 
to believe. But believe in what, Mulder? If this is the truth that you've been 
looking for, then what is left to believe in? 
MULDER: I want to believe that ... the dead are not lost to us. That they 
speak to us ... as part of something greater than us-greater than any 
alien force. And if you and I are powerless now, I want to believe that if we 
listen to what's speaking, it can give us the power to save ourselves. 
SCULLY: Then we believe the same thing. 
MULDER: Maybe there's hope. ("The Truth," season 9, episode 20) 
If we are to take Mulder at his word here, then he always quietly held much the 
same theistic convictions as Scully-and perhaps only needled her as a form of ironic 
reversal of her skepticism about the paranormal. 
[The fact that Mulder grasps the gold cross Scully wears around her neck in this 
scene is telling. However, because Mulder often thought that theologians can be just as 
dogmatic as scientists when it comes to unexplained phenomena, we might alternatively 
interpret Mulder's scorn for organized religion in "Revelations" and "All Souls" at face 
value. Mulder's spirituality, as seen in "The Blessing Way" and "The Field Where I Died;' 
might then be the key to understanding Mulder's relevant dialogue to Scully in "The 
Truth." On this alternative, however, we must conclude that Mulder and Scully don't 
quite believe in the same thing (Mulder doesn't share her Roman Catholic theism), but 
they might share a belief in some form of minimalist (yet redemptive) theism.-ed.] 
13. Norwood Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1958), 4-19. 
]4. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1970); Larry Laudan, "Dissecting the Holistic Picture of Science;' in 
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Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, ed. Martin Curd and J. A. Cover (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1998), 159-69. Crudely put, the main difference between these accounts 
on the issue of value is that Kuhn holds that values guiding scientific worldviews and 
their parts ("paradigms") are completely relative to those worldviews, while Laudan 
argues that values can carryover from one worldview to another. 
15. Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986). 
16. Peter van Inwagen, "Free Will Remains a Mystery," in The Oxford Handbook of 
Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 158-77. 
17. This exchange at the end of the episode (season 7, episode 7) is relevant here, 
after Scully has killed a murderous psychopath: 
MULDER: You can't judge yourself. 
SCULLY: Maybe I don't have to. 
MULDER: The Bible allows for vengeance. 
SCULLY: But the law doesn't. 
MULDER: The way I see it ... he didn't give you a choice. And my report 
will reflect that ... in case you're worried. Donnie Pfaster would've surely 
killed again if given the chance. 
SCULLY: He was evil, Mulder. I'm sure about that, without a doubt. But 
there's one thing that I'm not sure of. 
MULDER: What's that? 
SCULLY: Who was at work in me? Or what ... what made me ... what made 
me pull the trigger? 
MULDER: You mean if it was God? 
SCULLY: I mean ... what if it wasn't? 
If it wasn't-was it the Devil, as Scully seems to suggest? Or does she mean to question 
the very existence of free will? 
Postdemocratic Society and 
the Truth Out There 
Richard Flannery and David Louzecky 
It's not a war, it's a pageant. 
- Robert De Niro to Dustin Hoffman in Wag the Dog 
A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves 
with the power knowledge gives. A popular government without 
popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue 
to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both. 
- James Madison 
Do we live in a "postdemocratic" society, a society of illusions where only 
the gullible believe in anything except their own interests and where the 
powerful make policy decisions in secret? The X-Files raises that possibility 
in almost every episode. It is our contention that Fox Mulder and Dana 
Scully both passionately reject this idea. "The truth is out there:' and we 
need it. The problem is finding it, and finding the evidence that will be 
convincing. Our two detectives illustrate different approaches to solving 
the truth problem, Scully the orthodox and Mulder the knight-errant, but 
the search unites them, and they are not content with the search itself, the 
process. They want answers, and they are willing to take all sorts of chances 
with their careers, their lives, and their sanity to overcome the obstacles, 
many of which are the interests of powerful people and organizations in 
maintaining ignorance and secrecy. Scully and Mulder use their official 
credentials and positions to be warriors for democracy, truth-out-in-the-
open democracy. They provide the sharpest possible contrast with the 
behavior of so many of our real bureaucrats covering their behinds and 
obfuscating the truth as a way of life. Do our heroes suggest an agenda 
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and a method of reviving democracy through individual actions instead of 
institutional reform? We think so. 
The X-Files is about one of the most important philosophical prob-
lems of our everyday political lives: publicity. The secrecy of contempo-
rary governments is destroying democracy by undermining one of the 
preconditions without which democracy is not possible. Democracy re-
quires that citizens make informed decisions about public policy; that 
cannot be done without publicity. If political leaders are making decisions 
in secret, those decisions are outside the scope of public discussion and 
argument. They are undemocratic. The X-Files is a particularly powerful 
exploration of this problem. Certainly an invasion by aliens constitutes 
conditions for secrecy if anything does, and a consortium of political and 
corporate leaders constitutes the best and the brightest experts to make 
decisions about how to handle this invasion. Mulder and Scully, however, 
make heroic efforts to discover the truth and inform all of us. By trying to 
provide us with what we need to engage in the democratic political pro-
cess, they demonstrate their own democratic citizenship. 
The Show 
We should always remember that The X-Files is a network television show 
created in hopes of reaching the mass TV audience for the then fledgling 
Fox network in the early 1990S. Chris Carter tells us that the series was 
specifically inspired by one of his own TV favorites, Kolchak: The Night 
Stalker. Darren McGavin, the original Kolchak, even appears in The X-Files 
as Mulder's predecessor at the FBI. The Night Stalker was a TV tribute to 
the famous noir films of the 1940S. These are low-budget, black-and-white 
movies, mostly thrillers and mysteries. The films are called "noir" because 
they are very dark, shot at night with a heavy use of light and shadow. They 
are also dark in terms of what's happening, the motives of the characters, 
the incomplete explanations, the interference in the plot by powerful out-
side forces, and the violence, which in these films is likely to be directed 
at the lead characters as well as the victims. Sound like The X-Files? No-
tice that Scully and Mulder are repeatedly beaten, abducted, and abused. 
Unlike Arnold Schwarzenegger or Bruce Willis, however, they rarely hurt 
anyone, and Mulder and Scully are often running away. The X-Files isn't 
really noir; the stars of those movies were at best antiheroes. Their main 
motives were likely to be survival or revenge. Mulder and Scully are heroes. 
They could save themselves by just walking away from the X-Files and get-
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ting on with promising FBI careers. That's exactly what their enemies and 
their FBI bosses want them to do. But not these two. Flashlights in hand, 
they persist. They want truth and justice, and they want us to find out 
what's going on. We're rooting for them because they're on our side. It's 
television. 
Television shows originate in Hollywood even when they're filmed 
in Vancouver. Hollywood guys like Carter are not trying to impress us 
with their erudition and sophistication. They're trying to get us tei watch 
again next week. They use things they think the audience already knows 
or feels. Carter is trying to scare the pants off us because he knows we like 
scary movies. He has decided to make extraterrestrials an important part 
of the series, but he doesn't invent a new story about aliens. He relies on 
the most well-known myths, Roswell and alien abduction, to construct his 
plot. Many of the visual images in The X-Files come directly from Steven 
Spielberg's blockbuster Close Encounters of the Third Kind. See the dancing 
lights? See the totally massive alien ships that fill the screen? 
If The X-Files has political content, as we're arguing here, what does 
Carter figure the TV audience knows and feels about politics? Remember, 
this is the early 1990S, long before Fox News decided to grab audience share 
by becoming a Republican version of Pravda. (Pravda [Truth] was the old 
official Communist Party newspaper in the Soviet Union). Carter figures, 
just like most social scientists, that the mass audience neither knows nor 
cares much about politics, and conventional political talk irritates and bores 
them. So he doesn't bother with it; politics will turn people (and their TV 
sets) off. Social scientists call this "depoliticization:' and few would con-
test that the American TV audience of the early 1990S was depoliticized. 
It became quite fashionable to think that politics was just plain irrelevant 
in face of the "new" technology and the "new" economy. A new "global" 
society was emerging, and the old structures and ideas were just obsolete. 
See New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman's famous 1990S book The 
Lexus and the Olive Tree for a characteristic presentation of these themes; 
better still, check out the cover stories of the country's newsmagazines of 
that era.' 
Notice how little all this matters in The X-Files; it's not discussed and 
it's rarely mentioned. Does that mean we're making all this up and seeing 
things in the show that just aren't there? No, because The X-Files offers a 
counterview to all this conventional wisdom week after week. People are 
oblivious because they're living in a dream world-not a "real" dream 
world like The Matrix, but a decadent and uninformed dream world like 
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The Titanic. They don't know because the truth-which is out there-is 
being kept from them by powerful forces inside and outside their govern-
ment and the other governments and this has been going on for a long 
time. The television audience doesn't have to feel stupid; people and insti-
tutions have betrayed them. Mulder and Scully are trying to save the day 
by bringing the truth to the light of day. Once the folks find out, they will 
presumably do the right thing because democracy will go to work. (Would 
the folks really do the right thing if democracy could work? More on that 
below.) But democracy can't start without truthful public information; it 
will be a sham-our point exactly. 
For many years a staple of political science texts about u.S. politics has 
been a discussion of the "trust and confidence" question. This is a question 
asked by pollsters: Can you trust the government all of the time, most of 
the time, some of the time, or almost never? Back in the olden days ofTru-
man and Ike and JFK, Americans used to respond "all the time" and "most 
of the time;' most often in the range of 60 to 70 percent. Then in the days 
of Vietnam and Watergate public confidence fell off the cliff. Everyone fig-
ured it was understandable: people found out the government had been 
lying. But Watergate and Vietnam faded into history books and public 
confidence remained low. Why? There were contending explanations. It 
was the media, which were always debunking everything. It was the econ-
omy-the median income remained about the same from the early 1970S 
to the late 1990S after thirty years of rising fairly steadily-and people were 
blaming the government, following the view of politicians like President 
Ronald Reagan, who told them government was the problem. Some said 
that both the people and the media lived in a new age in which pessimism 
was replacing traditional USA optimism. As Chris Carter started The X-
Files in September 1993, he had every reason to think the mass audience 
would not be put off by a story that depended on a basic premise that the 
government was engaged in a massive cover-up. Just to make sure his au-
dience remembers, Carter calls Mulder's first inside source Deep Throat, 
a nickname Watergate reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein used 
for their inside source. Most of America knows about that. We even had 
a big movie about it: All the President's Men, starring Robert Redford and 
Dustin Hoffman.2 
In the world of The X-Files how has the cover-up been maintained? 
Partly, the forces protecting the secrets have used their government and 
corporate powers to hide things. They intimidate people into silence by 
threatening their livelihoods and families. They have also been enormously 
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successful at discrediting the truth-tellers. Why don't Mulder and Scully 
just go to the newspapers? The newspapers won't touch their story without 
the same kind of evidence that Scully keeps telling Mulder he hasn't got, the 
kind of proof that could be presented in a courtroom. Mulder knows a lot 
of the truth, but he's desperate to get the "proof" that will convince others, 
beginning with Scully. There is a free press in the United States, but it is 
caught up with being respectable and conventional. It trusts conventional 
sources and conventional evidence not renegade FBI agents with axes to 
grind. Very few reporters show up in The X-Files as intrepid truth-seekers. 
Instead, Chris Carter has the Lone Gunmen, unofficial and unrespectable 
hackers. He anticipates the bloggers and Web sites of today with these often 
comic but indispensable allies. So the free press is there, but its business-as-
usual approach is an impediment to getting at the deeper secrets. 
In the episode "The Blessing Way" Albert Hosteen (Floyd Westerman), 
who saves Mulder, does a little soliloquy explaining that Native Americans 
have come to trust memory rather than history because history can be, 
and has been, controlled by dangerous men with their own agendas. His-
tory is about documents and official reports, the kind of thing the Ciga-
rette Smoking Man and the Well-Manicured Man and their associates can 
and do manipulate every week. We've recently learned (once again) how 
skeptical we need to be about government-sponsored reports after the rev-
elations about the falsity and exaggeration of the "intelligence" reported 
concerning Sad dam Hussein's famous weapons of mass destruction. Im-
portant writers for the country's two flagship newspapers, the New York 
Times and the Washington Post, were in collusion with government advo-
cates of an attack on Iraq. The writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries such as Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham and Thomas Jeffer-
son and even John Stuart Mill assumed that a constitutionally free press 
guaranteed that the truth would come out. In our own time we have dis-
covered that a comfortable establishment mass media monopolizing most 
of the normal ways people get their information can have problems truth-
telling and truth-seeking.3 
Noble Lies 
Alfred North Whitehead, one of the greatest philosophers of the twen-
tieth century, said, "The safest general characterization of the European 
philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."4 
That's an exaggeration, of course, but only a slight one, and only slightly 
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less of one than saying that politics is also a series of footnotes to Plato. 
In the interest of social stability and absolute loyalty Plato thought it was 
not just permissible but necessary for rulers to lie to their subjects.5 These 
lies are noble because instead of trying to advance their personal wealth or 
status, the rulers are trying to advance the interests of the citizens. In our 
recent political history Watergate is the most widely discussed example of 
the noble lie. President Nixon, as well as the other members of his admin-
istration, was engaging in deception on several levels, but while he was 
drowning, Nixon claimed that no one intended to profit from the decep-
tions; they had the interests of the citizens in mind. Nixon thought that 
the president needed to do what had to be done to defeat our communist 
adversaries in the cold war. He also believed that his Democratic oppo-
nent, George McGovern, was soft on communism and would betray the 
country. Many agreed with Nixon, later regretting that he had "gone too 
far:' "crossed the line:' but not that he was wrong in principle. 
Similarly in The X-Files, the leaders who are lying and secretive are 
not trying to enrich themselves. Like Plato they think the citizens must be 
deceived for their own good. They are engaged in a noble lie. Not only does 
calling a character Deep Throat recall Watergate, but also the Cigarette 
Smoking Man keeps filing evidence that Mulder and Scully gather from 
their investigations and provides some protection for them at crucial junc-
tures because they provide him with the best data about the matters that 
the noble lie is designed to hide-and perhaps because, like Vietnam-era 
secretary of defense Robert McNamara, he thinks the truth should even-
tually be made known in a democratic society. He must take great care, 
however, to prevent Mulder or Scully from turning into a Daniel Ellsberg, 
who was working on and archiving "the Pentagon Papers" as a secret study 
for the Pentagon civilian and military brass when he decided to take his 
"x-file" to the media.6 
We were engaged in the Vietnam War, and Ellsberg thought that citi-
zens in a democratic society should know how and why we got into that 
war. Making that material public was essential to inform us; otherwise, we 
couldn't make good decisions about whether and how to continue or end 
the war. Our leaders thought that if we were informed, we would make de-
cisions so bad that society would be destabilized. Even McNamara thought 
that the truth should be told only eventually, after our having the informa-
tion could not interfere with the decisions of the leaders. The Pentagon 
Papers would provide the material for an interesting historical narrative, 
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but in order to learn from history, we have to be able to apply it-and that 
requires being fully informed about the current situation.7 
For all of that, in the episode "Conduit" the mother asks Mulder why 
it's always so important that the truth be known. That's a hard question 
that reminds us that when the philosopher Baruch Spinoza was asked by 
the charwoman who cleaned the building where he lived whether he be-
lieved in God, he answered, «Yes, of course." His lie was comforting and 
perhaps justifiable. Nevertheless, we don't have the greatest respect for 
people who need comforting lies. Suppose we discovered that tens of thou-
sands of our fellow citizens and millions of the citizens of other countries 
were killed in Vietnam and Iraq for unjustifiable reasons. It would hurt 
deeply and irrevocably. Nevertheless, the truth must be known if we are to 
make responsible policy decisions. The condescending sympathy that just 
might pass in personal relationships has no place in political life. 
The X-Files is an interesting, exciting, and compelling dramatic dis-
cussion of one of the most pressing political problems of the modern age: 
publicity or secrecy? Will we demand that our leaders provide the infor-
mation we need to make rational decisions about how we are governed, 
or will we tolerate noble lies when our leaders think we are incapable of 
handling the truth? No one will tolerate lies concocted to enrich the rulers 
and their cronies. The question is whether we will tolerate the noble lies 
told in our interest, to promote social stability and loyalty. This chapter 
argues that we should not. Publicity is a fundamental and necessary condi-
tion of democracy because democracy assumes that citizens are making 
informed decisions about public policies.s Insofar as we tolerate noble lies, 
we undermine democracy.9 
It is difficult to determine whether the deceptions involved in our 
invasion of Iraq were intended to enrich some large organizations or pro-
tect us from terrorism, because the information we need to make that 
determination has not been made public. The beauty of The X-Files as 
dramatic political philosophy is that the element of personal and orga-
nizational enrichment has been effectively eliminated, leaving us with the 
uncluttered question about the connections among noble lies, publicity, 
and democracy. In The X-Files we are being visited (invaded) by aliens, 
and the corporate-government consortium, the Syndicate, is engaged in a 
series of programs to deal with the situation. Should we be informed, have 
a public discussion, and decide on policies-or are we incapable? Would 
being informed lead to panic and chaos-instability and disloyalty? 
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Plato thought that the people of his ideal society needed to be told 
they were put in their various (mostly subordinate) social roles because of 
their genetic profiles. This was his infamous "myth of the metals" (414b-
41Sd). Believing that their subordination was inevitable and "natural," he 
thought, would keep the people in line. The most fundamental argument 
against democracy is that people are too stupid to make important deci-
sions about the way society should function. They will make huge mis-
takes (Plato thought democracy meant that people would decide to do 
what their "passions" told them to do) and there will be chaos and disaster. 
Nowadays, most everyone believes in democracy in general because no-
body has much confidence that there is any special ruling elite produced 
by lineage or schooling that is a better judge of things than the citizens are. 
Nevertheless, Plato's undemocratic argument lives on in the view that there 
are some decisions that need to be made in secret and sometimes kept se-
cret because the decisions are just too technical for people to understand, 
or else (as in the case of The X-Files) letting the big news out would cause 
panic and chaos that would hurt everybody. Think what would happen to 
the stock markets! 
What about this idea that democracy is dangerous because the seeth-
ing, panicky masses will run amok when they find out? First of all, people 
who believe in democracy believe that it's the only kind of politics that 
can possibly justify people obeying the laws and observing the rules. John 
Rawls made this argument in great detail in his book A Theory of Justice, 
and there's hardly a political philosopher anywhere outside of the Islamic 
fundamentalists who disagrees with his "first principle;' the first statement 
of which is: "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others."lo Beyond this 
ethical reason for democracy there are some good practical reasons for it. 
Democracy generates consent: people make the rules, and they have ways 
to change the rules using their political institutions. You don't have to have 
a bloodbath to get rid of a bad ruler like Claudius in Hamlet. Leak it to 
the newspapers, haul him into court, have an election. There's less drama, 
but there's much more order because people can go about their business. 
They are "represented" by the whole design of democracy. (Sure, plenty of 
people are overrepresented and underrepresented in the real democracies 
we all know, including the United States, but the solution isn't less democ-
racy, but more.) 
What would happen if the big secret of the alien invasion got out? It 
would be a big media event, no doubt, and some people would panic. We 
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can be pretty sure that most people would demand that the government 
"do something" about it as with AIDS or the September 11 attacks. Further-
more, the people would want to know what their government was doing, 
but most people wouldn't want to know too much about the details-
that's what Congress and the papers and all those interest groups are for. 
And they might not mind if the government kept some stuff it was doing 
secret if the secrecy was necessary to fool the aliens, for example, in order 
to develop the antidote to the "black oil:' Did America fall apart on 9/11? 
No; most people thought the country became more united and resolved 
and public-minded. So the big chaos the Cigarette Smoking Man and his 
coconspirators seem to expect is a myth of their own imagination not sup-
ported by what we know about how big democratic societies work. 
Would the decisions made by the government democratically be bet-
ter or worse than those made by the Syndicate Mulder is trying to expose? 
There is no way of knowing for sure, but the decisions would have to con-
sider the broad interests of the public or at least appear to take those into 
account. It's dubious that a democratic government could possibly agree 
to a scheme that would make most people slaves of the aliens, for instance. 
Please notice, however, that a democratic government would have a far 
better chance of organizing vast resources to foil the alien invasion and it 
would be in a much better position to make and keep some deal with the 
aliens if that's what it decided to do, because it would have public support. 
Our point is that elitism arguments about the necessity of nondemocracy 
in some special cases usually don't turn out to be very convincing on either 
philosophical or pragmatic grounds. 
Bentham and Kant on Publicity and Democracy 
We all tend to focus on the benefits of democracy and slight the underlying 
conditions that make democracy possible. We enjoy being able to worship 
freely and speak our minds. We are irritated by technological, governmental, 
and corporate invasions of our privacy. We like to think we are equal to all 
of our fellow citizens and will be treated justly by the system. The benefits 
of democracy are seen and experienced daily, but the underlying conditions, 
being less visible, are easier to miss. Freedom and privacy, equality and jus-
tice are fundamental values and benefits of democracy, whereas publicity and 
rationality, also fundamental values, are necessary conditions of democracy. 
We cannot have a democratic society without publicity and rationality. 
In Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer characterizes democracy this way: 
64 Richard Flannery and David Louzecky 
The citizens must govern themselves. "Democracy" is the name 
of this government, but the word doesn't describe anything like a 
simple system; nor is democracy the same thing as simple equal-
ity. Indeed, government can never be simply egalitarian, for at any 
given moment, someone or some group must decide this or that 
issue and then enforce the decision, and someone else or some 
other group must accept the decision and endure the enforce-
ment. Democracy is a way of allocating power and legitimating its 
use .... What counts is argument among the citizens. II 
Argument among the citizens is essential to democracy, and that argu-
ment cannot be legitimate unless it is informed. By its nature argument is 
rational, and the citizens cannot be informed without publicity enabling 
public scrutiny. Leaders must make public the information that citizens 
need to make rational policy decisions. 
Since those in power are conspiring to deceive, there is ample room for 
conspiracy theories in discussing The X-Files. "Suspicion always attaches to 
mystery. It thinks it sees a crime where it beholds an affectation of secrecy; 
and it is rarely deceived;' says Jeremy Bentham. A bit later he points out 
that "secrecy is an instrument of conspiracy; it ought not therefore, to be 
the system of a regular government." Conspiracies are great fun to discuss 
at cocktail parties, but they are distracting, for the aim here is noble-sav-
ing us from panic, chaos, and disastrous actions. Remember, in The X-Files 
we are not engaged in invading a foreign country for empire or profit; we 
are being invaded by foreign powers-but not by an identifiable country, 
by aliens. That's even scarier than terrorists. 12 
We shouldn't be flip, for many think that the danger of terrorists justi-
fies secrecy. In The Lesser Evil, Michael Ignatieff argues that "while open 
proceedings are fallible, they at least create the possibility for correcting 
error:' Later he says, "The war waged against terror since September 11 puts 
a strain on democracy itself, because it is mostly waged in secret, using 
means that are at the edge of both law and morality .... Openness in any 
process where human liberty is at stake is simply definitional of what a 
democracy is." Nevertheless, "we are faced with evil people, and stopping 
them may require us to reply in kind. If so, how do we keep lesser evils 
from slipping into greater ones?" Although Ignatieff doesn't recommend 
a noble lie, he does sanction secrecy. We avoid destroying democracy, he 
thinks, by not being secret about the secrecy-and not making it perma-
nent: "Electorates and legislators are invariably told by their leaders, 'If you 
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only knew what we know ... .' But this is not good enough. It is the very 
nature of democracy that we should know what they know. It may not 
always be possible to know immediately: a government can be justified in 
withholding information on a sensitive operation if disclosure would ac-
tually jeopardize lives. But the justification for secrecy can be only tempo-
rary, not permanent." The X-Files is about this perennial and fundamental 
philosophical problem, publicity in a democratic society-a problem that 
is particularly urgent right now. 13 
The term "publicity" is part of a long democratic tradition and is 
defended by the most prominent members of both the teleological and de-
ontological camps. That is, to decide political policies in a principled way, 
we consider two different sorts of things: the consequences of the policies 
and the rights of the participants. If we let the consequences override the 
rights, we are deciding teleologically; if we let the rights override the con-
sequences, we are deciding deontologically. When teleologists and deontol-
ogists disagree, matters get really tough. However, both Jeremy Bentham 
(teleologist) and Immanuel Kant (deontologist) are clearly in agreement 
about the fundamental necessity for publicity (albeit for different reasons). 
In his essay "On Publicity" Bentham has this to say: "The greater the num-
ber of temptations to which the exercise of political power is exposed, the 
more necessary is it to give to those who possess it, the most powerful 
reasons for resisting them. But there is no reason more constant and more 
universal than the superintendence of the public. ... [If] it be impossible 
that any thing should be done which is unknown to the nation ... you take 
away all the weapons of discontent." The suggestion to "take away all the 
weapons of discontent" contrasts sharply with the views of Plato, who rec-
ommends the noble lie as necessary for political stability. Bentham con-
tinues: "That a secret policy saves itself from some inconveniences I will 
not deny; but I believe that in the long run it creates more than it avoids; 
and that of two governments, one of which should be conducted secretly 
and the other openly, the latter would possess a strength, a hardihood, and 
a reputation which would render it superior to all the dissimulations of 
the other." It is worth remembering that democratic countries have in fact 
done much better than their adversaries in the wars of recent history even 
though they haven't been as effective at keeping secrets. 14 • 
In dealing with some objections to publicity Bentham points out that 
the main one is that "the public is an incompetent judge .... This then is 
the reasoning of the partisans of mystery:-you are incapable of judging, 
because you are ignorant; and you shall remain ignorant, that you may 
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be incapable of judging:' There are of course exceptions to publicity, and 
one of the important philosophical problems is to specify with some clar-
ity what they are. Here are Bentham's suggestions: (1) when it favors the 
projects of enemies, (2) when it unnecessarily injures innocent persons, 
and (3) when it inflicts too severe a punishment on the guilty. And that's 
the rub: if the aliens know that we are working on a vaccine for their virus, 
then publicity may be counterproductive. But the double rub is that the 
Syndicate has already decided for us exactly how we will respond to the 
alien invasion. And that is unacceptable in a democratic society. IS 
In To Perpetual Peace Kant sets out six conditions for perpetual peace 
among peoples and nations. As the translator and commentator Ted Hum-
phrey says about Kant's view, "Publicity is the context and goal of political 
life, to seek and preserve peace .... In this way, citizens exercise their free 
rationality openly .... Publicity provides the only context for true civic life:' 
Since Kant grounds his metaphysics of morals on rationality itself, aliens 
are clearly included if they possess rationality, and the ones in The X-Files 
do possess rationality. Anyone familiar with Kant's categorical imperative 
would expect exactly the formulation that Kant gives this underlying con-
dition of democracy: "All actions that affect the rights of other men are 
wrong if their maxim [description] is not consistent with publicity."16 
Modern and Postmodern 
Much of the discussion of The X -Files among philosophers has been about 
epistemology and metaphysics. Epistemology is about knowledge, belief, 
truth, and reasons-what they are and how we get them. To disagree about 
whether "the truth is out there" is to disagree about what's real. That's 
metaphysics. Mulder and Scully seem to be using different epistemological 
methods to find the truth, and they frequently come to different conclu-
sions about what's real. Scully is scientific and gets everything wrong. Mul-
der is wild and crazy, postmodern, and gets things right. Wrong. They are 
both modern and scientific. They both pay attention to empirical evidence 
and hypotheses. They are both careful. They both think "the truth is out 
there." And Scully gradually comes round to alien hypotheses. "Gradually" 
is the operative term: she's responsible-she comes around only after her 
more conventional and conservative hypotheses fail to fit the evidence. 
When, in the film Fight the Future, she tells Mulder that she plans to quit 
because she's been hindering him, he points out, only a bit romantically, 
that she's been not just helpful but necessary: "Your strict rationalism has 
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kept me honest:' As far as we can tell, there is no postmodern epistemology 
or metaphysics here. 
Modernism, sometimes called the Enlightenment, begins with the 
scientific revolution. People always gathered evidence and reasoned, but 
in the seventeenth century, or a little before, they began organizing the 
practice and paying more attention to it. Some think that modernism, the 
enlightenment project, has failed and want to replace it with what they call 
"postmodernism;' one tenet of which is that "the truth is not out there." 
For us moderns, the truth is out there, and our task is to figure out what it 
is. The postmodernists make up the truth to serve their interests and im-
pose it on what is out there. 
Every couple of years there is a spate of media articles about the dif-
ferences in textbooks from country to country: The Japanese story (inter-
pretation) of the Second World War is different from the Chinese story. We 
usually judge the quality of their stories by comparing them with ours. This 
is not postmodernism; it's jingoistic educational propaganda. To be mod-
ern is to think that an accurate and complete description of the Second 
World War is possible. The problem is that we don't have all the evidence 
and never will. That means we either honestly admit our ignorance-or 
fill in the gaps with a story, called a historical narrative. Since multiple nar-
ratives are consistent with the evidence, we have to choose among them, if 
we want one. How? Postmodernists would never be so sleazy as to choose a 
narrative for a government to use for indoctrination. Their narrative choice 
will be dictated by some grand value, like equality, justice, or democracy.17 
The postmodernists add one more metaphysical point: there is no truth 
out there beyond their morally laudable narrative. This claim is backed 
with an epistemological point: not only don't we have all the evidence, not 
only can't we get all the evidence, but talking about even the possibility of 
getting all the evidence is incoherent because our understanding is con-
fined to some narrative or other.18 
There is a great deal more to postmodernism than this, but it is per-
fectly clear that The X-Files is not a gripping epistemological conflict be-
tween a modern Scully and a postmodern Mulder. They are both moderns: 
they both think the truth is out there, gather evidence, and reason from 
that evidence. Mulder begins with wilder hypotheses. As Scully is exposed 
to evidence that doesn't fit her conventional hypotheses, she too begins 
to move toward wilder alternatives. This is standard, modern scientific 
practice. Just think about wormholes and superstrings with thirteen (or 
is it eleven?) dimensions. In addition, Scully especially is thinking about 
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what will hold up in court. Nevertheless, she fills her reports with data and 
speculations that don't meet the courtroom criteria. As a result she must 
face the exasperation and derision of her colleagues and superiors (as in 
"Squeeze;' "Gethsemane;' and "Redux I and II"). The real problems faced 
by Scully and Mulder are not epistemological; they are political. l9 
Questions about postmodern politics are still more complicated and 
controversial than those about epistemology and metaphysics. If the truth 
is not out there to be discovered, then the alternative is to adopt a narrative 
that satisfies our interests-whether that model be scientific or political. 
Well, not exactly our interests but the interests of the powerful, for while 
high-minded academics may be devoted to democracy, the narratives (e.g., 
those of war, and energy and environment) in terms of which policy is 
conducted are the narratives of those in power. In a case of art imitating 
life, the wise Navajo Albert Hosteen (Floyd Westerman) in "Blessing Way" 
tells us: 
There is an ancient Indian saying that something lives only as long 
as the last person who remembers it. My people have come to trust 
memory over history. Memory, like fire, is radiant and immutable 
while history serves only those who seek to control it, those who 
douse the flame of memory in order to put out the dangerous fire 
of truth. Beware these men for they are dangerous themselves and 
unwise. Their false history is written in the blood of those who 
might remember and of those who seek the truth. 
We have the same narrative problem with Iraq that we've had with Viet-
nam. When Osama Bin Laden was fighting the Soviets (with our help), he 
was a freedom fighter; now he's a terrorist. Since the narrative that governs 
policy is the narrative that furthers the interests of those in power, post-
modernism is postdemocratic ... 
Postmodernism, like Plato's views, is a matter of academic discussion, 
but The X-Files is about one of the most important political problems of 
our everyday lives: publicity. The secrecy of contemporary governments 
and corporations is destroying democracy, not in the sense of replacing 
modern democracy with something called postmodern democracy, but in 
the more mundane sense of violating one of the conditions without which 
democracy is not possible. Without rationality and publicity we don't have 
democracy; we have rule by the powerful. Most leaders think that they 
know better than the citizens. And in Plato's Republic, a founding docu-
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ment of Western politics, we find the justification for the noble lie that 
they use to lead undemocratically. Thus, through Plato and postmodern-
ism some might lead us to postdemocratic political society. We can either 
"resist or serve," as the infamous tag line of "The Red and the Black" says. 
The focus on epistemology among philosophers is not surprising. 
After Descartes, almost everything else in philosophy became peripheral 
to epistemology. Nevertheless, it is still a bit surprising because in 1971, 
John Rawls brought philosophers back to taking an interest in politics and 
ethics, and he is perfectly clear, again and again, in both A Theory of Justice 
and Political Liberalism, that publicity is essential for a good society, which 
is one in which free and equal citizens cooperate fairly. Public reason char-
acterizes persons in public roles, is about public goods, and is based on 
public ideas. Freedom and justice depend on public reason and public 
justifiability. In addition, contrary to Plato, public reason is necessary for 
social stability.20 
Safety and Information 
"Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national 
conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will after a time, give way to its 
dictates .... To be more safe ... [nations] at length become willing to run 
the risk of being less free:' says Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper 8. 
"The vast secrecy system shows no signs of receding," wrote Senator Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan three years before 9/11, and we suspect there has been a 
great increase since then in secrecy, including the secret monitoring of citi-
zens. When information of the greatest importance for the conduct of our 
public lives is kept secret, we can always blame the media. They should do 
a better job. But the primary fault lies elsewhere: with a system of informa-
tion management and with all of us as democratic citizens.2! 
The X-Files focuses on the problem of secrecy, but it also dramatizes 
another problem of information in democratic society. Much public infor-
mation in our country is generated by government agencies and news 
organizations. The process these organizations use to create and manage 
information from the facts they gather is not simple. There seem to be sev-
eral steps: 
1. Which stories deserve investigation? Should the X-Files Unit of 
the FBI remain open? Which cases can Mulder investigate, and 
which must he leave alone? 
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2. How should the investigations be managed? Is the proper focus 
on physical evidence or eyewitnesses? Whose testimony counts? 
Who is credible? Scully and Mulder are forever wrangling about 
these issues. 
3. What parts of the total amount of information should be in-
cluded in the report? One of Scully's jobs is to report the results 
of the investigation to the bosses back at the bureau. 
4. How should the evidence be interpreted? Mulder "wants to be-
lieve:' but Scully is skeptical. Beyond our two heroes, what is 
the FBI position? The bosses frequently meet in little panels to 
roast the latest report from the X-Files Unit. 
5. What should be done with the information and analysis? Mul-
der and Scully's investigations are usually buried, but what if 
they were released and democratic institutions had to deal with 
the alien threat? Would there be a "war on aliens"? Is that the 
reason the conspirators don't want the secrets to get out? We 
have tried to deal with this hypothetical question above. 
Each of these steps offers the possibility for confusion, conflict, and the 
distortion of information. In The X-Files the major problem is that the 
conspiracy (the Syndicate) is actively sabotaging the investigation, but 
even if there were no sabotage at all, there would be serious problems in 
generating accurate information from such a process. 
If you'd like confirmation that all this conflict about information pro-
cedure portrayed in The X-Files is real and significant, there's no better 
place to look than The 9/11 Commission Report. The FBI and other govern-
ment agencies produced information that could have, and probably should 
have, foiled "the planes operation" of Al-Qaeda, but it wasn't processed or 
managed well enough.22 
Philosophers have probably not analyzed this aspect of public infor-
mation nearly as much as it deserves. It's not just observers and facts; it's 
the political process by which "information" is created that bears on the 
truth and accuracy of the information. How is it that Hollywood guys like 
Chris Carter can be sensitive to this aspect of our political life? We suspect 
the reason is that movies and TV shows are created by a similar collabora-
tive process in which many individuals and many agendas are involved. It 
is part of their own daily routine, so they're alive to it when they see it in 
other places. 
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Democratic Behavior 
The character of Walter Skinner may be the closest to real life of all The 
X -Files personae. He's a recognizable character, the sincere bureaucrat who 
wants to do the right thing. Skinner has many scenes with the Cigarette 
Smoking Man. It is always obvious that Skinner's skin is crawling. How 
dare this interloper use and manipulate his agency? He'd like to throttle the 
Smoking Man, but he has to deal with him. Skinner protects our heroes 
more than anyone else, but there are limits and conditions to his assistance. 
Mulder and Scully need to do things the FBI way or he can't help them. 
Mulder especially chafes at Skinner's caution and priorities and rules. 
Mulder and Scully provide us with models of democratic political behav-
ior. Democracy has always depended on the willingness, indeed eagerness, of 
persons to act as responsible individuals in the face of large organizations. 
In dramatic cases from Nuremberg to My Lai we recognize that "I was just 
following orders" does not cut it as a response from citizens. They must be 
willing to get informed, to reason, and to act in the face of opposition. Few 
of us will find ourselves at Nuremberg or My Lai, but we are all members 
of large organizations that function much better when we "follow the pro-
cedures;' as Scully is forever being told and reminding Mulder. But our re-
sponsibility as citizens and especially as members of large organizations is 
not to simply follow procedures and file reports. The responsibility of the 
agents of the FBI is to investigate and ferret out the truth. This is one mes-
sage of The 9/11 Commission Report, and it was corroborated by the trial of 
the executives at Enron. Officials of public and corporate institutions need 
to be loyal to the larger democratic mission of their organizations if our 
society is going to work well. In another case of art imitating life, in "Deep 
Throat" Deep Throat tells Mulder that sometimes the truth needs to be 
kept from the public, at least for a while. It's both a claim and a warning, 
but Mulder, democratic hero that he is, investigates anyway. 
Real or pretended dangers prompt secrecy and restrictions on public-
ity. If we intend to keep our democracy safe from consortiums of corporate 
and government leaders who undermine it to suit their convenience and 
their power, then we all need to model our behavior after Skinner, Scully, 
and Mulder both as citizens and as members of large organizations. They 
are the heroes of our time. The truth is out there. Our task as democratic 
citizens is to find it and make it public. In this way, we can resist becoming 
a postdemocratic society. 
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Some Philosophical Reflections 
on "Trust No One" 
Richard M. Edwards and Dean A. Kowalski 
The credo "Trust no one" was firmly established in both the mythos and 
the ethos of The X-Files television series in episode 23, "The Erlenmeyer 
Flask," which aired on May 13, 1994, as part of the first season of The X-
Files. Mulder and a skeptical Scully are advised by the government insider 
and Mulder's secretive guide, Deep Throat (DT, played by Jerry Hardin), 
to "trust no one:' All of the previous episodes contained the tag line "The 
Truth Is Out There" in the opening credits. "The Erlenmeyer Flask" intro-
duced a new tag line, "Trust No One." While this piece of advice seems well 
placed, especially given what we know about the government and those 
working behind (or above) it in The X-Files and in American history, the 
assertion, if pushed far enough, seems rationally flawed. After all, if Mulder 
literally cannot trust anyone, it follows that he cannot trust DT's advice. 
Furthermore, Mulder does not always follow the dictum. He seems to trust 
the Lone Gunmen implicitly, and he comes to trust Scully and later Skin-
ner (Mitch Pileggi). Why does Mulder almost always trust these charac-
ters even though he almost never trusts the Cigarette Smoking Man (CSM, 
played by William B. Davis) or the various governmental agencies? This 
chapter explores how two theories from the history of philosophy-the 
Kuhnian conceptual relativist or constructivist view of scientific truth and 
Hobbesian "psychological egoism" -weigh in on The X-Files imperative 
to "trust no one." 
More carefully, this chapter has three goals. First, it will explore Scully's 
initial "scientism," or unquestioning acceptance of scientific theories, and 
how it might prevent her from locating the truth "out there." Second, it will 
show how the behavior of various characters (although the CSM predomi-
nantly) seems illustrative of psychological egoism-a theory of human 
nature to the effect that all human behavior is motivated by self-interest. 
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If psychological egoism is true, then trusting others seems like a danger-
ous business. Third, examples taken from various episodes of the show, 
but "The Erlenmeyer Flask" in particular, will be used to demonstrate the 
philosophical weaknesses of the two theories in question. 
«The Erlenmeyer Flask" 
"The Erlenmeyer Flask" begins with Mulder being awakened by a telephone 
call from DT. Mulder is instructed to watch a video clip about to appear on 
a local news broadcast, but even with Scully's help he is unable to glean the 
importance of a car chase ending with a man jumping from a pier. Mulder 
and Scully decide to investigate the incident site and there learn that three 
other law enforcement agencies are already investigating the circumstances 
of the man's supposed death, as no body has yet been recovered. 
Seeking additional clues to the man's identity, Mulder and Scully 
examine the impounded automobile. Mulder notices that the caduceus 
sticker- two snakes intertwining around a staff, the emblem of the Amer-
ican Medical Association - that was visible on the vehicle in the video is 
absent from the car that he and Scully are examining. Mulder enhances the 
video and traces the license plate to a Dr. Berube (Ken Kramer), a physi-
cian ostensibly working on the Human Genome Project for the Emgen 
Corporation in Gaithersburg, Maryland. When he is questioned, Berube 
claims to know nothing of the events. Mulder and Scully do not under-
stand DT's interest in the incident, and their disillusionment with DT's 
cryptic parceling out of information emerges in a confrontation between 
Mulder and his guide when Mulder returns home. DT encourages Mulder 
to stay the course, asserting that Mulder has "never been closer." Mulder's 
and Scully's interest is again piqued when the supposed dead man emerges 
alive from the waters off the pier and Dr. Berube is found dead. 
Mulder discovers an Erlenmeyer flask with a label reading "Purity 
Control" while going through the debris of Berube's ransacked laboratory. 
Scully has the contents of the flask analyzed at Georgetown University 
(GU) while Mulder goes to Berube's home. There he intercepts a phone 
call to Berube from the man who had jumped from the pier. Mulder drives 
to the injured man's location but does not find the caller. Scully learns that 
the flask contained bacteria with plant-cell components called chloroplasts 
and viruses used in animal somatic gene therapy. The importance of this 
discovery is clear when Scully calls Mulder in scene 16 with the preliminary 
analysis of contents of the flask: "Now, I may be understating the strange-
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ness of this, Mulder. Bacteria like this ... it may have existed, but not for 
millions of years, not since before our ancestors first crawled out of the 
sea:' Mulder traces a number frequently called from Berube's residence to 
a company called Zeus Storage. At the company, he finds what appear to 
be living humans suspended in fluid-filled tanks. The next morning Scully 
learns from a DNA specialist that the bacteria in the flask are extraterres-
trial. Mulder takes Scully to Zeus Storage and finds the facility emptied of 
the bodies and all equipment. 
Mulder comes to believe that Berube had been experimenting on humans 
using extraterrestrial viruses. DT confirms Mulder's hypothesis and in-
forms Scully and Mulder that the injured man, Dr. Secare (Simon Webb), 
was part of the experiment and that the governmental group overseeing 
the program is in the process of sanitizing and hiding what remains of it. 
Scully learns that the DNA specialist has died in an automobile accident, 
and Mulder succeeds in finding Secare in the attic of Berube's home just 
before a man in a gas mask shoots Secare, exposing Mulder to a deadly gas 
that seeps from Secare's wound. Secare's body is removed and a stunned 
Mulder is taken into custody. 
Scully finds DT at Mulder's apartment the next morning and is told 
that evidence of the program in the form of alien tissue is still housed in 
the High Containment Facility at Fort Marlene, Maryland. Scully retrieves 
what appears to be an alien fetus, and DT arranges to exchange the tissue 
for Mulder on a bridge outside Washington, D.C. Mulder is released, but 
during the exchange DT is mortally wounded. DT's dying words to Scully 
are "Trust no one." The X-Files section of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation is closed, Scully and Mulder reassigned, and the alien fetus safely 
deposited by the CSM in the basement of the Pentagon. 
Though the dictum "Trust no one" is an explicit directive to be skepti-
cal of all people and their motives, it also tacitly includes being skeptical of 
the process or processes that one uses to glean objective truth(s). In other 
words, the dictum applies not only to people and aliens, if the latter exist, 
but also to the different methods trusted by Scully (and Mulder) to deter-
mine the "truth." 
Scully's Worldview 
Scully believes that the truth "out there" is discoverable and wholly explain-
able by naturalistic science and that that which is true corresponds to the 
facts correctly understood (apart from her religious convictions, perhaps). 
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She asserts an objective reality that is knowable and understandable as "it is:' 
Scully's "realism" is based on the belief that the world and its operative laws 
can be known by the knower via careful scientific inquiry as it is and that 
the knower's worldview does not affect or diminish knowing the world as it 
is even though different people having different senses may experience the 
world differently. Truth can be known and it can be known objectively for 
truth does not depend on the knower, it exists independent of the knower. 
For Scully, the truth "out there" is hidden only by a lack of naturalistic knowl-
edge (even if the Syndicate sometimes makes finding it doubly difficult).l 
For example, Scully's reliance on science and scientific knowledge is 
well expressed by a scientist (or perhaps an actor playing a scientist on Mul-
der's television) in scene 2 of "The Erlenmeyer Flask": "Science does not 
jump to conclusions. Science is not a guessing game:' Later, in scene 20, Scully 
tells Mulder, "I've always put my trust in the accepted facts;' in other words, 
an objective, external truth. Furthermore, Section Chief Blevins (Charles 
Cioffi)-probably at the behest of CSM-wouldn't have assigned Scully 
to the X-Files if she weren't the consummate scientist. Remember that she 
was to debunk Mulder's work.2 
Thus Scully represents a distinctive worldview, one associated with 
some form of scientific naturalism (and probably methodological natural-
ism-the idea that science proceeds as if there are no supernatural expla-
nations without explicitly discounting the existence of the supernatural). 
A worldview is a paradigm or comprehensive framework of belief through 
which an individual, people, or society experiences, interprets, or under-
stands the world. This framework encompasses the breadth of human ex-
perience and perception, including of course science, but also such things 
as religion, culture, ethics, money, art, politics, and all that constitutes the 
world known to the individual or society at large. 
All humans interact with the world from and through their worldviews. 
One's worldview is an interpretive matrix or paradigm through which one 
perceives the world, much like viewing the heavens through the lens of a 
telescope or the visible world through eyeglasses or a microscope: A world-
view or paradigm is like an array of pigeonholes in a post office or the file 
structure of a computer: incoming information is organized and contex-
tualized within a known and accepted structure. Incoming data are sorted 
and made understandable by the pigeonholes or file structure. Mail is not 
dumped onto the floor of a post office nor e-mails sent into cyberspace 
without an address. There is an organizing structure that makes these data 
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understandable. The organizing structure of our mind is our worldview, 
and as our worldview receives and understands new information, it is re-
shaped by the additional information. A worldview is a living and evolving 
organic unity 
As our worldviews or paradigms morph to accommodate any new in-
formation, anomalies-information that is not easily contextualized into 
the paradigm-continually arise. When the volume of anomalies over-
whelms our morphing worldview's ability to accommodate new infor-
mation, a "paradigm shift" occurs. This shift signals that a worldview is 
discarded and a new one that more adequately contextualizes or explains 
the totality of the available information is adopted. In science this is called 
a "scientific revolution." 
Kuhn on the Importance of Paradigms 
University of Chicago physicist Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922-1996) believed 
that scientific worldviews or paradigms playa surprising role in shaping 
what we know about the natural world.3 Kuhn's theory of the progression of 
scientific knowledge seems to assert that the "truths" of science are relative 
to the currently accepted concepts of the scientific community. "Truths" 
are those theories and data that correspond to the accepted set of scientific 
theories. Kuhn's theory of the progression of scientific knowledge may be 
outlined (very) roughly as follows: 
The process begins with "normal science." Normal science is conducted 
within the parameters of an accepted set of scientific theories that cohere 
into a transcending paradigm or worldview. New data are processed or 
made understandable by correlating them to the existing paradigm. Anom-
alies, repeatable data that do not correlate to the paradigm, are disregarded 
until the number of anomalies becomes so great as to bring into question 
the validity of the paradigm. The questioning of paradigmatic validity is 
called a "crisis," and the scientific community responds by changing, mas-
saging, or "resolving" the paradigm in such a way that it accounts for a 
sufficient number of the anomalies, relieving the pressure on the accepted 
system. The resolution of a sufficient number of these anomalies ushers 
in a new period of normal science, which continues until the theory can 
no longer resolve the anomalies without destroying the theory. This de-
struction and creation of a new paradigm is what Kuhn calls a "scientific 
revolution." Science then enters into a "pre-paradigmatic" phase in which 
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various paradigms compete to account for the available data in the most 
efficient and coherent manner. This competition ultimately reconstructs 
a new accepted transcending paradigm. "Truth" then becomes that which 
correlates with the new paradigm, and the process begins anew. 
Paradigms are ultimately a set of received beliefs accepted by a scien-
tific community. Paradigms provide the framework of accepted knowledge 
that a student learns, and in many cases-medicine, for example-the 
accepted paradigm provides the objective basis of the licensing of practi-
tioners. Scully is a physician trained in and accepting of a particular para-
digm as true. Kuhn's theories assert that Scully's truth is relative to the truth 
of the currently accepted paradigm and that as it changes-via being re-
solved or a revolution - what Scully thought to be true may not be true in 
the new set of received beliefs. Thus her knowledge base changes when one 
paradigm is replaced with another. 
Kuhn's historical analysis of how science progresses seemingly ques-
tioned the acceptance of scientific truth as objectively and immutably de-
scriptive of reality. Kuhn showed that science does not discover or establish 
objective truth, nor does it gradually evolve toward objective truth as the 
knowledge base expands. Kuhn demonstrated that science and scientific 
knowledge undergo radical changes or revolutions that reinterpret sup-
posedly established objective truths. When these paradigm shifts occur, the 
whole interpretive matrix (science or a subset thereof) formed by the knowl-
edge base changes to accommodate new knowledge and old unexplained 
data (anomalies) in new ways that alter, reconfigure, or completely reject 
established "truths:' Scientific truth is therefore relative to an ever-changing 
knowledge base that makes universal or absolute truth impossible. 
Kuhn seemingly holds that although new scientists are indoctrinated 
with the dominant methods and concepts of a discipline, scientific truth, 
though grounded in the external world, is only representative of the exter-
nal world within the confines of the shared interpretive matrix of that sci-
entific discipline and the more transcending concepts of science in general. 
If this is so, Scully cannot trust herself to be an effective guide and part-
ner in investigating the X-Files with Mulder because she will reject data, 
events, people, or actions that do not correlate to dominant methods and 
concepts. Scully's original assignment was to debunk Mulder's work, and if 
Kuhn is correct, she tries to do so, not because Mulder's work is inaccurate 
or does not represent the external world, but only because her (then) cur-
rent paradigm determines any data inconsistent with it to be inconclusive 
(at best) or, more likely, illusory or misinterpreted. 
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Therefore, it seems to follow on Kuhn's view that because the scien-
tific community determines what data is real, it-and not the external 
world-determines scientific truth. This explains why Kuhn's view of sci-
ence is often called the conceptual relativist or constructivist theory of sci-
ence: scientific truth is relative to current scientists' conceptual schemes 
and is, thus, constructed by them. On this interpretation, Kuhn's view runs 
counter to the credo that "the truth is out there." In fact, it's tempting to 
claim that, according to Kuhn, the so-called truth "out there" is actually 
contained in the scientific community. 
The X-Files is replete with examples of the tension between Scully's 
current scientific paradigm and her new findings (data) from working 
with Mulder. A vivid early example is from scene 18 of the "The Erlenmeyer 
Flask:' This scene continues the analysis of the contents of the flask Scully 
took to Georgetown's microbiology department in scene 16. At n:45 P.M. Dr. 
Carpenter (Anne DeSalvo) hands Scully the completed analysis of the bac-
teria and reveals a startling conclusion concerning some anomalous data: 
"A fifth and sixth DNA nucleotide. A new base pair. Agent Scully, what you 
are looking at ... exists nowhere in nature. It would have to be, by defini-
tion ... extraterrestrial." This new finding leads Scully to confide in Mulder: 
"You know, I've always held science as sacred. I've, I've always put my trust 
in the accepted facts. And what I saw last night ... for the first time in my 
life, I don't know what to believe:' Thus, in an admittedly simplistic way, we 
see the very beginning of a pending scientific revolution for Scully (at least 
if she cannot resolve the data, which seems unlikely given that, as shown 
in "Pilot," her current paradigm excludes extraterrestrials). This tension is 
only heightened when she later retrieves the alien fetus from Fort Marlene. 
Scully's (fictive) example here seems problematic for Kuhn's concep-
tual relativist theory of science, at least as typically conceived. If the sci-
entific community determines which data are true (kept) and which are 
false (rejected), then we might wonder why revolutions occur at all. Where 
would obvious and significant anomalous data then come from if not from 
the external world? But if such data comes from the external world, then the 
scientific community doesn't determine scientific truth in the way Kuhn 
(seemingly) believes. 
However, it must be stressed that the basic methodology of Scully's 
scientific paradigm-the scientific method broadly conceived-cannot 
simply reject the DNA analysis as an anomaly. Though the analysis does 
challenge Scully's paradigm, it does not challenge the underlying method-
ology that gives rise to that paradigm. The methodology that gave rise to 
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that paradigm is the same methodology that gives rise to the new data. The 
scientific method is not wrong. New (unexpected) data has been entered 
into the knowledge base, and the scientific method and Scully's received 
paradigm evaluate it appropriately. The anomaly is too great to be shunted 
aside, and Scully is forced to alter her received paradigm to account for 
the data. "The truth is out there" and is discoverable, but the process of 
discovery and finding that truth ends only when the external world is 
completely understood. Though the knowledge base and understanding 
of that knowledge may alter, the scientific method works to resolve the 
changes. The truth of Scully's received paradigm may not be totally and 
objectively descriptive of the external world; however, her truth is resolv-
ing itself in accord with her objective methodology. This is part of Scully's 
personal "scientific revolution;' which continues throughout the series as 
her knowledge base expands and her scientific paradigm changes to ac-
count for the infusion of new knowledge (not to mention the growing or 
recurring prominence of her Roman Catholicism). 
Therefore, in response to the objection leveled at Kuhn's view of sci-
ence, it seems to be a misunderstanding of Kuhn to assert that his reso-
lutions, reconstructions, and revolutions mean that scientific truth does 
not accurately represent the external world or that the external world will 
never be known as "it is" with no future resolutions, reconstructions, and 
revolutions necessary. Kuhn is actually asserting that all available data is 
revelatory of the external word and that a transcending or overriding truth 
is possible when all of the data is available from which to construct a tran-
scending theory of the external world. Kuhn's intent is not to assert that 
all truth is relative; rather he is asserting that there is an orderly process 
that moves in spurts, or revolutions, that holds the potential of under-
standing the external, physical world as "it is." Scully's personal scientific 
revolution is what Kuhn would expect, an orderly evaluation of the avail-
able data that adjusts the received theory allowing for the acceptance of 
the new data. Yes, the new theory may be different or expanded, it may 
even change in great leaps or revolutions at times, but the process or meth-
odology through which it is developed remains valid and the same. Thus 
perhaps Kuhn's views don't present a problem for Scully after all, despite 
initial appearances (which were probably due to an overinterpretation of 
Kuhn's views).4 
This is Scully's personal evolution throughout the series. For Scully, 
"The truth is out there" means that anomalies may be effectively resolved 
by the application of the scientific method and that the application of the 
Some Philosophical Reflections on "Trust No One" 85 
scientific method accurately describes the external, physical world as "it is" 
in light of the available knowledge base that is expanding, with the escha-
tological potential of creating an immutable transcending theory. 
Scully's dilemma is that she cannot fulfill her assignment of debunk-
ing Mulder's work if she does not hold to a rigid set of scientific theories 
that disregard anomalies on the basis that they do not fit the received inter-
pretation of the extant knowledge base, yet she is repeatedly faced with 
such anomalies. Scully is thus forced as the series progresses to rely less on 
the received interpretation of the extant knowledge base and more on the 
scientific method to merge the new knowledge with the old knowledge, 
trusting that the method will allow her to progressively comprehend and 
then ultimately understand the external, physical world. If she is careful 
enough, then perhaps she can trust herself and her methods as Mulder's 
partner on the X-Files. 
Deep Throat, the Cigarette Smoking Man, and 
Psychological Egoism 
In describing the theory of human nature known as "psychological ego-
ism," the seventeenth-century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes asserted 
that selfishness is the fundamental driving force of human actions. He 
writes: "During the time men live without a common Power to keep them 
all in awe they are in that condition called War; and such a war, as is of 
every man against every other man."5 Thus, according to Hobbes, our nat-
ural inclination is to act in ways that gain us advantage over our associates. 
Even such apparently selfless acts as charitable acts or good deeds done for 
no reward are motivated by the selfish desire to be recognized, to feel su-
perior to, or more powerful than, the person for whom the good deed was 
done or the charity given.6 James Rachels describes "psychological egoism" 
in his book The Elements of Moral Philosophy in this manner: "We may 
believe ourselves to be noble and self-sacrificing, but that is an illusion. In 
reality, we care only for ourselves."? 
The X-Files provides many memorable examples that seem illustrative 
of psychological egoism. Recall DT's comment to Mulder at the end of the 
"Deep Throat" episode, "As I said, I can provide you with information, 
but only so long as it's in my best interest to do SO:'8 DT's successor, the 
mysterious X (Steven Williams), reminds Mulder (in "One Breath") of their 
precarious arrangement, "You got him killed! You got her killed. That's not 
going to happen to me. You're my tool, you understand? I come to you 
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when I need you." The CSM, however, may be the best example of a char-
acter who illustrates psychological egoism; he regularly acts from selfish 
motives. Season 5 has at least three episodes that demonstrate the driving 
force behind the CSM's actions. In "The End" the CSM advises FBI Spe-
cial Agent Jeffrey Spender (Chris Owens), who will later in the episode be 
revealed as the CSM's son: "Don't become part of someone else's cause or 
crusade. Pursue your own self-interest. Always."9 In "Redux II;' the CSM 
offers to help Mulder find the cure for Scully's cancer, but that offer itself 
is driven by the CSM's own self-interests. This episode also reveals that the 
Syndicate (perhaps at the behest of the CSM) has helped Mulder for its own 
self-interest. Here the CSM is challenged by another member of the Syndi-
cate after the CSM allowed Mulder to escape: "We're too vulnerable. Our 
man in the FBI is exposed, what Mulder may have seen could expose our 
plans." The CSM's response demonstrates the motivation for the freeing of 
Mulder: "What Mulder's seen only serves us. Serves to ensure our plans." 
Even our heroes can serve as examples of psychological egoism. Recall 
the "Leonard Betts" episode. Leonard Betts survives and rejuvenates by con-
suming human cancers. His job as emergency medical technician in Pitts-
burgh allows him access to the necessary cancer biologicals that are "waste" 
to others but the essential nutrient for him. He grows his head back when 
he is decapitated in an ambulance accident and then grows a second body, 
which is sacrificed in a later fiery crash in an attempt to convince Mulder and 
Scully that he is dead. Ultimately the original Betts corners Scully in an am-
bulance and tries to extract a cancer that he perceives is growing inside her. 
Scully kills Betts by discharging an ambulance defibrillator to his head. After 
Betts's fiery death, Scully says, "Well, whatever he was doing, he's taking the 
secret to his grave:' To which Mulder replies, "Yeah, for the second time:' 
Scully does not tell Mulder why she was attacked. Perhaps this is due to 
the challenge that the attack poses to her evolving scientific paradigm. Per-
haps it is due to a desire for privacy and certainty before sharing. Perhaps 
it is due to her unwillingness to worry Mulder needlessly. Perhaps it is due 
to a myriad of other possibilities that are never divulged. All speculation 
aside, regardless of the specific reason, Scully presumably withholds the 
information because she feels that it is in her best interest to do so. The 
episode closes with Scully realizing that a drop of blood on her pillow may 
indicate that Betts's perception that she has cancer is correct. 
Her actions in ensuing episodes, particularly "Redux I and II" of the 
next season, demonstrate that Scully's withholding of the information is 
based both in her desire to determine that a cancer exists and in her con-
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cern for Mulder. The first reason demonstrates Scully's scientific propen-
sity not to jump to conclusions. However, the second (as we'll soon see) 
challenges the idea that Scully always acts in her own best self-interest, 
which presents a pressing problem for psychological egoism. 
In fact, it is undeniable that throughout the series both Mulder and 
Scully frequently choose the other's best interest over their own. Again, one 
might assert, for example, that Scully was acting not in her best interest 
but in Mulder's when she did not inform Mulder of Betts's perception. In 
"Redux I" Scully helps Mulder fake his own death so that he can more eas-
ily investigate the supposed Department of Defense cover-up of the proof 
for extraterrestrial life, even though initially she did not want to participate 
in the charade. Most vividly, perhaps, Mulder risks his life to save Scully's 
in Fight the Future. Recall that the rescue mission was occasioned by the 
Syndicate's desire to finally be rid of Mulder "without turning his quest 
into a crusade." One of the leading Syndicate members, Conrad Stughold 
(Armin Mueller-Stahl), decides, "Then you must take away what he holds 
most valuable. That which he can't live without" -Scully. However, one 
might also interpret such examples of Scully's and Mulder's actions as self-
motivated; indeed, the psychological egoist must hold this. Mulder and 
Scully would then be caught in games of self-deception if either believes 
that one sometimes acts merely on the behalf of the other. 
Before moving forward with the critique of psychological egoism, con-
sider one last telling example. In "Redux II," the CSM asks Mulder to resign 
from the FBI and join him in the Syndicate, where Mulder will have power, 
respect, and perhaps even the truths about the pending colonization con-
spiracy and, more important, his sister. The potential selfish motivations 
of both the CSM and Mulder are reflected in the following dialogue: 
MULDER: What do you want from me? 
CSM: Want from you? 
MULDER: You give me these things, the only things I ever wanted 
and I can't think of any reason for you to do so. 
CSM: Well that's true, no act is completely selfless. But I've come 
today not to ... not to ask, but to offer. To offer you the truth 
that you've so desperately sought. About the project, about the 
men who've conspired to protect it.IO 
Mulder quickly rejects the offer. We again see the CSM (clearly) supporting 
psychological egoism. But if psychological egoism is true, then all human 
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action is selfish. What about Mulder's behavior here and elsewhere? What 
about Mulder and Scully's interactions generally? The preponderance of 
apparently nonegoistic actions in the Mulder-Scully relationship seems to 
indicate that not all people are exclusively driven by selfishness. However, 
unless the psychological egoist is prepared to reinterpret all the data in such 
a way that any purported counterinstance of egoistic behavior actually re-
sults from self-deception, there seems to be much evidence to falsify this 
theory of human nature. 
But even if the psychological egoist attempts this reinterpretation, a 
new problem then presents itself. Rachels explains the problem of ascrib-
ing egoistic motives to all actions in this manner: 
Once it becomes the controlling assumption that all behavior is 
self-interested, everything that happens can be interpreted to fit 
this assumption. But so what? If there is no conceivable pattern of 
action or motivation that would count against the theory-if we 
cannot even imagine what an unselfish act would be like-then 
the theory is empty .... People act from greed, anger, lust, love and 
hate. They do things because they are frightened, jealous, curi-
ous, happy, worried and inspired. They are sometimes selfish and 
sometimes generous. Sometimes ... they are even heroic. In the 
face of all of this, the thought that there is but a single motive can-
not be sustained. I I 
In some circles, the objection that Rachels describes is called a self-sealer 
fallacy. If it becomes impossible to falsify a theory grounded in empiri-
cal findings, then the theory is no longer persuasive. Rather, it becomes 
a prejudice. Rachels is arguing just that: in cooking up all the data to fit a 
preconceived quasi theory of human nature, psychological egoism remains 
unsubstantiated. 
So, how should we explain why Mulder trusts Scully (in addition to the 
Lone Gunmen and Skinner)? It simply might be the regularity with which 
these associates put his interests on a par with his. This also explains why 
Scully comes to trust Mulder: he regularly is willing to place Scully's inter-
ests either above or on a par with his own. In this way, mutual trust devel-
ops and a meaningful relationship (to some degree or another) blooms. 
This is also why Mulder almost never trusts the Syndicate and the CSM: 
They almost never put Mulder's interests on an equal footing with their 
own. Put another way, even if psychological egoism is false, people still 
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have the option to act on selfish desires. Those acquaintances who regu-
larly choose not to act selfishly become trusted allies (the Lone Gunmen 
and Skinner) or friends, and sometimes something more. Indeed, they be-
come that which we cannot live without (Scully). 
Societal Trust 
Though Rachels rightly rejects psychological egoism as the sole driving 
force in individual or societal actions, he argues that something like it is 
at least the primary force for creating societal trust in the social contract 
theory of morality: "the idea that morality consists in the set of rules gov-
erning how people are to treat one another that rational people agree to 
accept, for their mutual benefit, on the condition that others follow those 
rules as well." 12 What Rachels is asserting is that members of a society cede 
their individual self-interests for mutual or societal self-interests. 
"Trust" is neither earned nor innate within humanity; rather trust is 
negotiated much along the lines of the cold war concept of "mutually as-
sured destruction" (MAD). The USSR did not attack the United States and 
the United States did not attack the USSR because an attack by either side 
would have resulted in the destruction of both. It was to the mutual benefit 
of the United States and the USSR to act according to their tacit contract. 
This idea of trust asserts that humans will act in a trustworthy manner 
because it is to their benefit to do so, not because trust is inherently good 
or right or because being "trustworthy" is a virtue. Rachels asserts that "we 
follow the rules because it is to our own advantage to live in a society in 
which the rules are accepted."13 The rationale is as egoistic as the rationale 
of the CSM and his cabal. They act in the manner that protects and pro-
motes their power and privilege. Surely, then, DT was correct in direct-
ing Scully and Mulder to "trust no one," for they and we never know who 
might have an advantage or who is seeking an advantage that is consistent 
with their perceived best self-interests and not our perceived best self-
interests or a society's perceived best self-interests. 
Rachels recognizes this weakness and asserts that the social contract 
must have penalties for those who break the rules, for "only then can we 
feel safe."14 Yet for the CSM and his cohorts there seem to be few rules and 
penalties, only power and privilege, at least until the alien conspiracy to pro-
duce human-alien hybrids fails and the Syndicate, save the CSM, is incin-
erated by alien rebels fighting the alien colonists with whom the Syndicate 
was in league (season 6, episode 12, "One Son"). Perhaps the Syndicate's 
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trust in the alien colonists was misplaced, or perhaps the alien colonists 
acted in their own perceived best self-interest in not protecting the Syn-
dicate from, or giving them more information about, the alien rebels. In 
retrospect, the Syndicate should have recognized the long-established pat-
terns of untrustworthy behavior of both the alien colonists and the alien 
rebels. Neither could be trusted because of an established pattern of acting 
in their own perceived best interests. 
The members of the Syndicate maintained their conspiracies, power, 
and privilege by being above the law; or, rather, as guardians of the social 
contract, they were like the pigs in George Orwell's Animal Farm, "more 
equal" than the other animals on the collective. These guardians used the 
social contract to their benefit and rarely suffered for it, for they had little 
fear that they could be harmed, because they eliminated those who might 
harm them. This was why Scully and Mulder were reassigned after the 
Erlenmeyer flask incident: their investigations endangered the privilege 
and power that that these guardians enjoyed by living outside or above the 
social contract. 
Why then should we trust other people in society? Rachels answers 
that it is because it is mutually beneficial to all members of the society to 
do so. The CSM and his associates are the exceptions because they have 
the power and privilege to live outside or above the social contract. They 
can do as they please to achieve whatever they wish, and therefore they are 
not to be trusted within the context of the social contract because there 
they have little or no fear of retribution. In effect, the CSM and the rest 
of the Syndicate are not part of the social contract. If this analysis is true, 
then it is irrational for anyone to trust anyone who is outside of one's so-
cial contract. Why then did the U.S. government trust the Russians? One 
answer is that the relationship between the United States and the USSR, at 
least relative to nuclear weapons, was a social contract among equals. One 
could also assert that both the United States and the USSR had established 
behavioral patterns that made a nuclear strike anomalous-though pos-
sible, given the worldwide political climate of the cold war-to the global 
political paradigm as well as not coincident with either country's perceived 
best self-interest. 
Mulder and Scully were to "trust no one" because those who had the 
power and privilege to abrogate the social contract could and would abro-
gate it if they deemed it to be in their best interest to do so. Trust may be 
fostered by a social contract among equals, but those who are "more equal" 
cannot be trusted. And, as with Mulder and Scully, trust seems to grow 
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among equals who regularly treat each other accordingly. Certainly there 
is risk in personal relationships if people act egoistically even some of the 
time, but those risks are mitigated as Scully and Mulder's relationship blos-
soms and their knowledge of each other's behavioral patterns deepens. 
Notes 
1. Of course, Mulder also seeks objective truth, whether it concerns the abduction 
of his sister, the existence of aliens and human-alien hybrids, or any other phenomena. 
For Mulder, the truth is invariably hidden by a lack of naturalistic, supernaturalistic, 
paranormal, and extraterrestrial knowledge that, when blended, gives a clearer (even if 
not perfect) understanding reality. 
2. Perhaps "End Game" is the best early example of Scully's reliance on science 
as a tool to understand the world. The relevant dialogue is quoted in the introduction 
to this book. 
3. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1976). 
4. Whether this rejoinder can be sustained will probably depend on whether 
Kuhn's view can be infused with these elements of scientific realism and still be consis-
tent with the overall tenor of his view. For example, Kuhn writes: 
Examining the record of past research from the vantage of contemporary 
historiography, the historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when 
paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. Led by a new para-
digm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more 
important, during revolutions scientists see new and different things when 
looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before. It is 
rather as if the professional community has been suddenly transported to 
another planet where familiar objects are seen in a different light and are 
joined by unfamiliar ones as well. Of course, nothing of quite that sort does 
occur: there is no geographical transplantation; outside the laboratory every-
day affairs usually continue as before. Nevertheless, paradigm changes do 
cause scientists to see the world of their research engagement differently. In 
so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we 
may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different 
world. (Scientific Revolution, 111) 
It might be that Kuhn can be understood as more of a scientific realist here, but, admit-
tedly, whether this interpretation holds up to scrutiny will require further exploration. 
For an apt discussion of the different ways Kuhn has been interpreted, see Del Ratzsch, 
Science and Its Limits, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000). 
5. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London, 1651), chap. 13. 
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6. James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 4th ed. (NY: McGraw-Hill 
Higher Education, 2003), 65-67. 
7. Rachels, Moral Philosophy, 64. 
8. Interestingly enough, Mulder immediately asks his guide, "What is your in-
terest?" to which DT answers, "The truth." It's not immediately clear that DT's further 
motive here is illustrative of psychological egoism, but more on this sort of insight 
later. 
9. This might also be interpreted as illustrating ethical egoism because the CSM 
seems to be giving his son an imperative. However, as is well known, the most plausible 
reason for asserting ethical egoism is a prior conviction of the truth of psychological 
egoism. Thus, this bit of dialogue might be illustrative of both theories. 
10. Emphasis added. 
11. Rachels, Moral Philosophy, 74-75. 
12. Rachels, Moral Philosophy, 150. 
13. Rachels, Moral Philosophy, 150. 
14. Rachels, Moral Philosophy, 150. 
((I Want to Believe" 
William James and The X-Files 
Keith Dromm 
In philosophy, there is likely no more important difference than that be-
tween believing in something with justification and believing in some-
thing for no or insufficient reasons. According to many philosophers, 
even though a belief is true, if the believer doesn't have good reasons for 
holding it, then not only does the belief not count as knowledge, it should 
never have been adopted. I In his classic essay "The Ethics of Belief:' the 
nineteenth-century mathematician and philosopher of science W. K. Clif-
ford (1845-1879) argued for such an attitude toward unjustified belief. He 
wrote there that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe 
anything upon insufficient evidence."2 However, in response to Clifford's 
essay, the American philosopher and psychologist William James (1842-
1910) composed an equally famous essay, "The Will to Believe," in which he 
argued that we have a right to hold certain beliefs even when justification 
is wanting. James argued that this was true, for example, of religious be-
liefs. Beliefs like these have such a far-reaching and profound influence on 
our lives that to forgo holding them because the evidence is not available 
can do more harm than adopting what might turn out to be a false belief. 
Whenever that is the case, it would be an "irrational rule" that prohib-
ited us from adopting a belief of this sort because we lack the justification 
for it.3 
The James essay resembles the caption and sentiment of one of the 
most recognizable images from The X-Files: the "I Want to Believe" poster 
that hangs on the wall of Fox Mulder's office in the basement of the FBI 
building. In addition to that poster, there is much else in The X-Files that 
shows Mulder and James to have a similar attitude toward belief. There is 
another interesting similarity between James and Mulder. James also had 
an interest in the paranormal. For much of his life, he pursued research in 
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this area alongside his more typical scientific and philosophical investiga-
tions. While Clifford also had an interest in the paranormal, he was mainly 
concerned with debunking reports of paranormal phenomena. Dana Scully, 
in her skepticism about the paranormal and her adoration of science, bears 
a resemblance to Clifford. 
This chapter will explore the parallels between the two central charac-
ters of The X-Files and these important philosophers. Each pair represents 
a different model for how we should form our beliefs. While the respective 
virtues and vices of each model will be considered, neither will be recom-
mended. There is another character on The X-Files who represents a better 
model for how we should go about acquiring beliefs: Assistant Director 
Skinner. His constant efforts to balance the obligations of his job with his 
desire to take seriously the work of Mulder and Scully resemble the ap-
proach to belief acquisition that James articulated after he wrote "The Will 
to Believe." He offered this model in his writings on the philosophical view 
known as pragmatism, for which he was the most prominent advocate. 
In the first section of this chapter I will describe the relevant similarities 
between Clifford and Scully. In the second section I will do the same for 
the early James and Mulder. In the final section I will argue that Skinner's 
pragmatic approach is both more just and more efficacious than either of 
the other models. 
Scully and Clifford 
Dana Scully had been assigned to the X-Files in order to "debunk" Mul-
der's investigations or, as it was more diplomatically explained to her in the 
pilot episode, to submit them to the "proper scientific analysis." In her first 
conversation with Mulder, Scully reveals that she shares with her superiors 
some of their skepticism about his work. When Mulder asks her whether 
she believes in the existence of extraterrestrials, Scully replies: "Logically, 
I would have to say 'no: Given the distances needed to travel from the far 
reaches of space, the energy requirements would exceed a spacecraft's capa-
bilities."4 Mulder dismisses this as "conventional wisdom." He has already 
warned her that in his work the "laws of physics rarely seem to apply:' Scully, 
on the other hand, finds "fantastic" "any notion that there are answers be-
yond the realm of science." 
W. K. Clifford was also a debunker of reports of the paranormal, though 
probably a more enthusiastic one than Scully.s He believed that it was not 
only intellectually but also morally irresponsible to believe in things that 
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go beyond science or, as he might also put it, since he seemed to believe the 
two equivalent, to believe on insufficient evidence. 
He begins his essay "The Ethics of Belief" with a sort of parable. He 
asks us to imagine a shipowner who has let sail an unseaworthy ship of 
emigrants. The ship sinks, taking all on board with it. The shipowner, how-
ever, believed that the ship was seaworthy. He initially had doubts about 
this. The ship was old and had often needed repairs. Others had commu-
nicated to him their concerns about the ship's seaworthiness. But he man-
aged to rid himself of his doubts. He reminded himself that the ship had 
sailed successfully many times before. He also "put his trust in Providence;' 
who he believed would certainly protect the passengers, who were inno-
cent of anything but the desire for better lives. The shipowner came to 
believe sincerely and strongly that the ship would complete its voyage. His 
belief turned out to be wrong, but is he responsible for the consequences? 
He let the ship sail only after he came to believe it was safe. Clifford argues 
that the shipowner is "verily guilty" of the death of the passengers. 
For Clifford, the strength and sincerity of the shipowner's belief is 
irrelevant. What is more important is how he arrived at the belief: "The sin-
cerity of his conviction can in no wise help him, because he had no right to 
believe on such evidence as was before him."6 He lacks that right because he 
did not arrive at his belief through, as Clifford puts it, "patient investigation" 
but only by "stifling his doubts." Instead of assuring himself of the ship's sea-
worthiness by inspecting it and then, if needed, repairing it, he performed a 
mental exercise that allowed him to forget his doubts. He should have taken 
his doubts seriously and dispensed with them only if he could prove them 
to be unfounded. He merely pushed those doubts out of his mind by allow-
ing himself to think of only the positive, but weak, reasons for believing the 
ship to be seaworthy. Such positive thinking might be effective in improving 
one's self-esteem, but it cannot save a ship from sinking. 
Now, not all our false beliefs will have such dramatic consequences. 
But, Clifford argues, while the pernicious effects of a wrongly held be-
lief might be neither immediate nor by themselves great, over time and 
through the accumulation of such bad beliefs, the consequences can be 
severe. For example, Clifford argues that "no one man's belief is in any 
case a private matter which concerns himself alone:'7 We typically do not 
keep our beliefs to ourselves. We share them with others. They are some-
times adopted by our neighbors and friends and inherited by our children. 
Many of the beliefs we acquired in school once had humble beginnings 
in the mind of a single person. No one, whatever his or her position in 
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society, escapes the responsibility to adopt only justified beliefs, because 
each one of us has some influence on the beliefs our fellows adopt. Scully 
discusses one kind of such influence in "Fresh Bones." Despite Mulder's 
research into the "zombification phenomenon," Scully dismisses voodoo 
as a superstition that "only works by instilling fear in its believers;' as do all 
superstitions. So, even though "it's as irrational as avoiding a crack in the 
sidewalk;' beliefs like voodoo will spread among people because of the fear 
of disbelieving them but not because of any evidence in their favor. 
Clifford also describes the effects a wrongly held belief can have on the 
believer. Every time we allow ourselves to accept a belief on insufficient 
evidence, "we weaken our powers of self-control, of doubting, of judicially 
and fairly weighing the evidence."8 It takes practice and discipline to be a 
good thinker. In the same way that an athlete will lose some of her ability, 
or at least slow her progress, if she relaxes her regimen or strays from her 
diet, our thinking ability will be degraded every time we use it improperly. 
And even if the belief I wrongly acquire turns out to be true, while I might 
escape some immediate harm to myself or others, I will become increas-
ingly credulous the more beliefs I adopt without good reason, and I might 
eventually "lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them:'9 
Scully never seems to give up this habit, even though she eventually 
comes to adopt many of Mulder's beliefs about alien abduction around 
which the central story arc of the series revolves. Her acceptance of those 
beliefs is gradual and based on the accumulation of evidence and her own 
direct experience. In contrast, Fox Mulder's beliefs about the paranormal, 
while in some cases strongly supported, are based more on such things as 
hope. He admits as much in the episode "Quagmire;' in which Scully and 
Mulder are investigating a series of killings attributed to Big Blue, a suppos-
edly mythical sea serpent that has made a tourist attraction out of a lake-
side community. After Mulder and Scully conclude- incorrectly, as it is 
revealed only to the audience-that the murderer was merely a voracious 
alligator, Mulder expresses some disappointment: "I guess I just wanted Big 
Blue to be real. I guess I see hope in such a possibility." Scully understands; 
"People want to believe;' she replies. But Clifford warns that the comfort a 
belief gives one-for example, the hope it might fulfill-does not provide 
a legitimate reason for its adoption: "The fact that believers have found joy 
and peace in believing gives us the right to say that the doctrine is a com-
fortable doctrine, and pleasant to the soul; but it does not give us the right 
to say that it is true." 10 While Clifford might be correct that simply wanting 
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a belief to be true is no indication that it is actually true, James reveals in 
his essay "The Will to Believe" that Clifford himself is not entirely innocent 
of allowing his emotions to influence what he believes. 
Mulder and James 
James's first published writings were mostly on psychology. He is, in fact, 
considered the founder of American psychology. He believed that psychol-
ogy would allow for the scientific study of the mind, replacing philosophy 
as the principal discipline for its study. His two-volume textbook The Prin-
ciples of Psychology remains influential. Mulder would likely have read it 
or other works by James while he was studying psychology at Oxford. But 
James's interests were various and far ranging, though all in some way 
related." These other interests included the paranormal. He devoted a good 
amount of time to investigating reports of ghost sightings, mediums, mes-
merism, telepathy, thought transference, and extrasensory perception. He 
was a member and cofounder of the American Society for Psychical Research, 
and he wrote and lectured on this research. 
However, James discovered that most of the reports of the paranormal 
that he investigated were frauds or hoaxes. He nevertheless continued with 
his investigations. He wrote to a friend: "If I go on investigating, I shall 
make anyhow an important discovery: either that there exists a force of 
some sort not dreamed of in our philosophy, (whether it be spirits or 
not)-or, that human testimony, voluminous in quantity, and from the 
most respectable sources, is but a revelation of human imbecility."12 He 
continues and says that "I hate to settle down into this last conviction." 
Mulder would also at times express doubts about his own investigations. 
In "Little Green Men:' he wonders whether he has only been chasing such 
figments of his imagination and laments that his merely having seen things 
that point to the existence of extraterrestrials is insufficient proof: "Seeing 
is not enough; I should have something to hold on to." But despite this lack 
of evidence, he perseveres. The evidence, in any case, seems mostly for con-
vincing others, not himself. While he occasionally expresses these doubts 
about his beliefs, they seem to rest on something stronger than evidence. 
In the episode "E. B. E.," Scully suggests what this might be in a warning 
she gives to Mulder: "I have never met anyone so passionate and dedicated 
to a belief as you. It's so intense that sometimes it's blinding. But there are 
others who are watching you, who know what I know and whereas I can 
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respect and admire your passion, they will use it against you. Mulder, the 
truth is out there but so are lies:'13 
In his essay "The Will to Believe," James observes that it is often our 
passions that determine what we believe. For example, he argues that the 
disagreement between himself and those like Clifford is not over whether 
and when we should use our intellectual faculties; rather, it is a conflict of 
passions: "It is not intellect against all passions ... it is only intellect with 
one passion laying down its law:'14 In his elevation of scientific explanation 
over any other way of making sense of reality, Clifford is submitting to 
his passions no less than Mulder, and the passion he has chosen to follow 
comes with risks like any other. 
James identifies two sometimes conflicting views about our responsi-
bilities when it comes to acquiring beliefs. We can take our primary duty 
to be respecting the principle" We must know the truth." Alternatively, we 
can favor the principle" We must avoid error." The two are not equivalent. 
While believing in a truth will typically save us from error, it does not nec-
essarily follow that by refusing to believe a falsehood, we end up believing 
in the truth. For example, Scully might refuse to believe one of the wilder 
conspiracy theories of the Lone Gunmen, but that refusal won't entail her 
belief in the true explanation of the event their theory was intended to 
explain. She might simply not believe in any explanation of the event. 
According to James, Clifford has chosen "We must avoid error" as his 
guiding principle. What determined that choice? It is not intellect accord-
ing to James. "We must avoid error" is a principle that instructs us how to 
use our intellect properly, so without circularity our intellect cannot be the 
arbitrator of the two conflicting principles. Only our "passional nature;' as 
James would put it, can make such a choice. He explains, "We must remem-
ber that these feelings of our duty about either truth or error are in any 
case only expressions of our passional nature." 1 5 One person might be more 
worried about falling into error or making mistakes than she is concerned 
with learning the truth. Her greatest fear might be of becoming a dupe 
or someone's fool. Another person might feel that truth is of the great-
est importance and be more willing to risk error as long as she increases 
her chances of discovering truth. Each view comes with risks. While the 
first person, in respecting above all the principle "Avoid error," will be less 
likely to become anyone's fool, she decreases her chances of discovering the 
truth. The person who takes "Know the truth" as her guiding principle will 
increase her chances of discovering the truth, but she pays for that with a 
greater tendency toward error. Although our passions will typically incline 
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us toward one principle over the other, we can still manage to resist or sur-
render to our passions, and being made aware of the risks associated with 
each choice can lessen or strengthen our commitment to a passion. 
James does not believe that we should obey one principle to the exclu-
sion of the other. He argues against dogmatic obedience to either. In cer-
tain cases, but not all, we are warranted in elevating the search for truth 
above the risk of error. These are cases in which the evidence is not suffi-
cient for making a choice as to what to believe, but a choice must be made 
nevertheless. As they did with our choice between the two principles, our 
passions will here have a role to play. In such cases, it is permissible to allow 
our passions to incline us toward a particular belief. As James explains, 
"Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide between 
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be 
decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, (Do 
not decide, but leave the question open: is itself a passional decision-just 
like deciding yes or no-and is attended with the same risk of losing the 
truth."16 He believes that religious beliefs are an example of such a choice. 
It is the nature of most central religious beliefs that the absolute proof of 
their truth is available to no one but the omniscient. But it also true that 
beliefs of this sort typically promise a reward for those who simply hold 
them. For beliefs such as these, it cannot be true "that to yield to our fear 
of its being in error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may 
be true."I? We certainly assume a greater risk of being in error by holding 
such beliefs, but the possible reward of their truth outweighs the risks as-
sociated with holding a false belief. So, for James, only an "irrational rule" 
would proscribe our assuming these risks. 
The beliefs of James and Mulder in the paranormal seem similarly based 
on hope and other elements of their "passional nature." Mulder admits in 
"Colony" that he lacks proof for the beliefs that motivate his investigations 
and acknowledges the risks of holding such beliefs: 
I have lived with a fragile faith built on the ether of vague memo-
ries from an experience that I can neither prove nor explain. When 
I was twelve, my sister was taken from me, taken from our home 
by a force that I came to believe was extraterrestrial. This belief 
sustained me, fueling a quest for truths that were as elusive as the 
memory itself. To believe as passionately as I did was not without 
sacrifice, but I always accepted the risks to my career, my reputa-
tion, my relationships, to life itself. 
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James's essay "The Will to Believe" is a defense of our right to assume such 
risks for beliefs like these. . 
James does not believe that our passions should be the final arbiter 
of all our beliefs. In science and law, for example, "the need of acting is 
seldom so urgent that a false belief to act on is better than no belief at all." 
In such cases, it is better to wait on objective evidence before adopting a 
belief. He would also not endorse the shipowner's belief in his ship's sea-
worthiness. The shipowner was presented with a choice that certainly could 
have been decided on "intellectual grounds." And our willing cannot bring 
about any sort of belief. This will only work and be appropriate for those 
choices between beliefs that meet certain criteria; those options that James 
calls forced, momentous, and living. IS The choice has to be unavoidable, 
of great importance, and relevant to us given our background. Mulder's 
search for his sister and the truth about her disappearance is an example 
of such a choice. As his narration in "Colony" reveals, Mulder was aware of 
the risks of believing so "passionately" in the existence of extraterrestrials, 
but his belief "sustained" him, as he puts it, suggesting that without it he 
would be assuming even greater risks to his well-being. 
Skinner 
In Fight the Future, Mulder asks Scully rhetorically, "Five years together 
Scully, how many times have I been wrong?" Although Mulder did turn 
out to be right most of the time, that not only adds nothing to the justi-
fication for his beliefs, it also fails to demonstrate that he was acting re-
sponsibly in holding them. How to act responsibly in forming beliefs is an 
important issue. Not only what but also how we believe can have profound 
effects on our own lives and the lives of others. Mulder and Scully provide 
different models of how we should go about forming beliefs. Choosing be-
tween them determines the kinds and amounts of risks that we are willing 
to assume for ourselves and others. 
But while Clifford recommends one model over the other, James-as 
it was explained in the previous section-actually argues for adopting 
both and using each where it is most appropriate. Mulder also seems to 
recognize that neither model works well to the exclusion of the other. He 
admits to Scully in Fight the Future: "Your strict rationalism and science 
has saved me a thousand times over. You kept me honest:' However, there 
is something missing from both models that should cause us to pause be-
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fore settling on this approach. It is something that James emphasizes in his 
later writings: a respect for "older truths." 
In addition to his developments in psychology, James is at least equally 
well known as the chief proponent of the philosophical view called prag-
matism. Over the course of his career, James's research and writings be-
came increasingly concerned with philosophical topics as his interest in 
experimental psychology waned. Pragmatism, however, was not a later view 
of James. There is evidence of pragmatic views in his earlier writings on 
psychology. But it was not until later in his life, most notably with the lec-
tures that were published under the title Pragmatism, that he presented his 
fullest and most developed articulation of these views. 
Pragmatism is, according to James, primarily a method, but it is also 
associated with a famous theory of truth. The pragmatic method holds 
that the practical consequences of a concept exhaust its meaning. 19 Bor-
rowing ideas from another American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1839-1914), James argues that concepts can only be distinguished by their 
practical effects, their cash-value, as he calls it. What a concept means can 
be no different from the practical consequences its truth can have. So, if 
for any two concepts we can imagine the same effects, the concepts are the 
same; as he puts it, "There can be no difference which doesn't make a differ-
ence."20 And if for any concept we cannot imagine any practical difference 
its truth can have, then it is meaningless. This method is used by James 
to resolve seemingly interminable disputes in philosophy, such as the one 
about the nature of truth. 
Pragmatism tries to rid the concept of truth of its metaphysical mys-
teriousness. A popular view in philosophy to this day takes the truth of a 
belief to consist in its agreement or correspondence with reality. However, 
what it is for a belief to agree or correspond with reality, according to James, 
had never been clearly articulated; it had become a "meaningless abstrac-
tion."21 The pragmatic method explains all that agreement with reality could 
possibly mean: it refers to those beliefs that "we can assimilate, validate, 
corroborate and verify"; they are the beliefs that "pay" in this way.22 This 
is "truth's cash-value." If a belief gets us lost more often than it helps us 
find our way about, if it doesn't allow us to anticipate correctly the future, 
or if it isn't conducive to the success of any of our other projects, only a 
peculiarly strong form of dogmatism would allow one to accept that belief 
as true. A belief that does manage without fail to do those things would 
unhesitatingly be taken as true. The instrumental value or usefulness of a 
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belief is all that we can mean by designating it as true. As James explains, 
"That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, 
therefore, is the meaning of truth:'23 
Questions about the truth of a belief arise most often with respect to 
novel experiences. When we encounter a fact that we have never experi-
enced before, various explanations might offer themselves as candidates 
for belief. These might be suggested to us; they might occur to us spon-
taneously. It is up to us to decide which explanation best accounts for the 
novel fact. Most of The X-Files episodes revolve around such encounters; 
an ostensive definition of the FBI's X-Files would point at examples of 
them. As we have seen, The X-Files presents us with two different mod-
els for dealing with new experiences. Mulder is often willing to accept the 
most fantastic explanation for a novel fact, whereas the skeptical Scully is 
hesitant to accept any explanation that she cannot comfortably describe 
as "scientific," leaving her at risk of not adopting any new belief about the 
fact. 24 The pragmatist will accept the belief that has the most instrumental 
value. And, as James shows, a belief that has that quality will have to be one 
that can be accommodated by one's prior beliefs with the least amount of 
adjustment. 
James says that any new truth must be one that "marries old opinion 
to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of conti-
nuity."25 A new belief that fails to fit with the older ones will have little 
instrumental value. It will either float free of the other things we believe, 
being either superfluous or an encumbrance, or it will upset too many of 
our older beliefs by contradicting them. This threatens to leave us bereft of 
the very means for adjudicating its truth, which can only come from the 
stock of our already-held beliefs. To avoid this, James explains, we must act 
conservatively when adopting new beliefs by showing a proper degree of 
respect for older truths. 
All older truths were once new ones. When new truths become old, 
"their influence is absolutely controlling."26 James is anticipating some 
ideas of the twentieth-century Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(1889-1951). Wittgenstein uses the analogy of a riverbed to describe how 
new truths become old ones and the function served by the latter: 
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of em-
pirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels 
for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; 
and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions 
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hardened, and hard ones became fluid .... And the bank of that 
river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only 
to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place 
now in another gets washed away or depositedY 
Like James, Wittgenstein believes that there is nothing irrevocable about 
this process. The old truths can eventually be washed away, again becom-
ing part of the "fluid" that gets carried along the river. But no new belief 
can be adopted without taking into account the hardened beliefs of the 
riverbed. 
Neither James in the "The Will to Believe" nor Clifford in "The Ethics 
of Belief" pays enough attention to the role played by older truths. Clif-
ford imagines that they all could and should be tested, that this is "not 
only possible and right, but our bounden duty."28 But this attitude is not 
simply too ambitious, it also fails to recognize that any testing must take 
place against the background of such "older truths" or "riverbed" beliefs. 
As Wittgenstein puts it, ''All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation 
of a hypothesis takes place already within a system"; this system is "the in-
herited background against which I distinguish between true and false."29 
This system provides the prior beliefs that we must use in assessing the 
truth of any new candidate for belief, for example, Scully's beliefs about 
science or Mulder's beliefs about paranormal phenomena. James in "The 
Will to Believe" is too intent on redeeming the role that passions play in 
our acquisition of beliefs and does not give enough attention to the role 
played by older truths in this process. Their counterparts in The X-Files 
suffer from similar faults. Mulder, in typically preferring the more novel 
or peculiar explanation for a phenomenon, shows little concern with rec-
onciling those explanations with "older truths."30 Scully fails to appreciate 
that the beliefs that make up her "conventional wisdom;' as Mulder once 
characterized it, were once all novel facts and, while "hardened," will never 
lose their susceptibility to being displaced from their current position. A 
better model for belief acquisition in The X-Files, the pragmatic approach, 
is Assistant Director Skinner. 
The X-Files series begins with Skinner playing the role of Mulder and 
Scully's nemesis, as a possible collaborator or minion of the Smoking Man. 
It is eventually revealed that his allegiances are, like Mulder's and Scully's, 
to the truth, and he becomes their ally. But in honoring this allegiance he 
has to respect other commitments as well. He complains to Scully in "The 
Blessing Way:' "I think you underestimate the duties and responsibilities of 
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my position as Assistant Director." These responsibilities include balanc-
ing the respect he is obligated by his job to show to his superiors with his 
desire to take seriously the novel facts uncovered by the investigations of 
Mulder and Scully. This is a responsibility for which Mulder and Scully, 
and possibly The X-Files audience, never had enough appreciation. 
Taking those authorities to be analogous to the "older truths;' and Mul-
der and Scully's investigations as a supply of "novel facts:' Skinner manages 
them like a pragmatist. He works within the "system" to achieve the goal 
he shares with Mulder and Scully, the truth, but his strategy for achiev-
ing it is both more just and more efficacious. Mulder's tendency to accept 
a belief simply because of its novelty is unreliable, and Scully's resistance 
to novel explanations sometimes amounts to an unreflective obedience to 
authority.3! In contrast to both, Skinner acts so as to balance the new with 
the old, or to "play the middle;' as he puts it in his narration in the season 
6 episode "S.R. 819": "Every minute of every day we choose. Who we are. 
Who we forgive. Who we defend and protect. To choose a side or to walk 
the line. To play the middle. To straddle the fence between what is and 
what should be. This was the course I chose:' His allegiances might seem 
ambiguous at times, unless we take them to be ultimately to the truth and 
not to either the new or the old exclusively. Scully suffers from the same 
blindness she attributes to Mulder. Both of their respective "passions" 
sometimes distract them from the truth, causing each to make a fetish of 
the old or the new. Skinner's allegiances are arguably more firmly attached 
to the truth, despite the tensions that frequently erupt in his relations with 
Mulder and Scully and the lack of sympathy he might sometimes receive 
from the audience. 
Skinner is a model of pragmatism in another way. He is sometimes 
a mediator between the impatient passion of Mulder and the incredu-
lity of Scully. As the one to whom they report, the person who makes the 
final decision on the disposition of their reports, he must often decide be-
tween their respective "passions." This is analogous to the role that James 
assigns pragmatism. It is intended to mediate between what he calls the 
"tender-minded" idealist and the "tough-minded" skeptic. James describes 
pragmatism as a "mediating way of thinking."32 Whether or not he decides 
correctly in every case, this is Skinner's burden, another one of his "respon-
sibilities." It is quite easy to come up with the most fantastic explanation 
for a phenomenon or to refuse to accept any explanation that does not fit 
with one's settled view of the universe. Skinner doesn't enjoy these liber-
ties. His job requires him to make a decision that will in the end have some 
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pragmatic value. In "The Blessing Way," Scully is suspended for "miscon-
duct:' After the meeting in which this decision is handed down, she con-
fronts Skinner in the hallway and asks, referring to the officials who made 
the decision, "Who are these people?" "These people are doing their job," 
Skinner replies. "These people have a protocol to follow, which is some-
thing you and Agent Mulder did not do." Skinner knows very well that for 
his beliefs to have any influence, to be at all useful, he must respect certain 
protocols. These include a respect for "older truths;' which his deference 
to "these people" can be taken to represent. And while Mulder and Scully 
are sometimes suspended or reassigned because of their lack of deference, 
Skinner maintains his power (apart from one well-designed plot from the 
CSM in "Avatar"), limited though it is, and thereby often manages to be 
more effective in the propagation of the truth. 
James reveals in "The Will to Believe" how an apparent commitment to 
rationality might actually keep us from the truth. In his writings on prag-
matism he more fully recognizes the responsibilities we must honor in our 
efforts to know the truth. While he never repudiated the role he assigns to 
our will in "The Will to Believe:' he came to recognize further constraints 
on how we should go about acquiring beliefs. In particular, our beliefs must 
be useful. They cannot be so if we do not respect "older truths" in adopting 
them. This respect is missing from both the Clifford/Scully and the early 
James/Mulder models of belief acquisition. This leaves them in danger, in 
the former case, of believing too little, and in the latter, of believing too 
much. 
While the pragmatic approach is modeled by Skinner, James's person-
ality remained throughout his life more closely aligned with Mulder. He 
persisted in his belief that-to use a slogan for which James would likely 
have had great affinity-"the truth is out there." He believed that there 
was more to reality than what was presented of it through our ordinary 
senses. He suggested that "our ordinary human experience, on its mate-
rial as well as on its mental side, would appear to be only an extract from 
the larger psycho-physical world:'}} and he believed it was possible to get 
"a sense of present reality more diffused and general than that which our 
special senses yield."34 For James, the paranormal, as well as such things as 
mystical experiences, was potentially evidence of this greater reality. His 
status as a prominent academic and intellectual likely afforded him the 
liberty to hold these beliefs and to persist as he did with his search for this 
greater reality. He never had the same responsibilities as a person like Skin-
ner. Even though he was the chief proponent of pragmatism, there were 
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very few pragmatic constraints on what beliefs he espoused. Such liberty 
is not merely enviable; it is likely to the benefit of us all that thinkers like 
James-and perhaps fellow investigators of the paranormal like Mulder-
are allowed to enjoy it. Their views, like any others, are equally candidates 
for the truth, and the more such candidates there are, the more likely we 
are to arrive at the truth, even pragmatically conceived. 
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Mulder and Plato's Sokratic Dialogues 
William M. Schneider 
It is November 12, 1997, and FBI Special Agent Fox Mulder has just returned to 
his apartment from Trinity Hospital after receiving news that his partner of four 
years, Special Agent Dana Scully, is a living miracle. Literally overnight, her ter-
minal cancer has gone into remission. But a shadow of guilt still haunts Mulder. 
He has difficulty accepting, or even fathoming, the fact that his quest for the truth 
has put Scully's life in such jeopardy. As he sits at his desk, his mind wanders 
from ScuUy to the other woman bound up with his life of searching, his sister, 
Samantha. He is still confused about his meeting with her-or a young woman 
claiming to be Samantha-two nights ago. Mulder gazes once more at the blood-
and tear-soaked picture of him and Samantha taken so many years ago. While 
the tears are his, the blood is allegedly that of the nefarious Cigarette Smoking 
Man. Assistant Director Skinner informed Mulder that there is reason to believe 
that the Smoking Man was assassinated, shot from outside the window of his 
apartment. 
Mulder leans back in his desk chair, staring at but hardly noticing the desk's 
more than typically chaotic appearance, in the wake of the recent police and FBI 
crime-scene searches. His mind is now nearly as disordered as his desk. He recon-
siders all that Michael Kritschgau has told him and also the Cigarette Smoking 
Man's claim that Kritschgau's information wasn't entirely to be trusted, that it 
was only a now familiar mix of fact and fiction designed to further the ends of ... 
of whom? Too vexed to follow that train of thought any further, his mind shifts 
to recall the uncomfortable and accusatory discussion with his partner's brother, 
Bill ScuUy, outside Dana's hospital room. This leads him to think again about 
Scully's suffering and how much blame he might bear for it, his thoughts circling 
back to where they began. 
Mulder sighs and shifts his eyes from the desk to take in the wreckage sur-
rounding him; the disordered contents of his life lie littered around his apart-
ment. Still too numb to clean Scott Ostelhoff's blood from his rug, Mulder lets 
his eyes wander past it to the closest bookshelf. His eyes come to rest on an 1865 
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first-edition copy of George Grote's Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 
and he immediately thinks back to his studies at Oxford. His philosophy professor, 
like Grote, preferred "Sokrates:' with the Greek kappa, to the now more familiar 
"Socrates:' (After all, that's how Socrates would have spelled it, he'd remark.) Begin-
ning to stir from this brown study, Mulder reaches over and pulls the book from 
the shelf. He recognizes the well-worn sections of the text, sections through which 
he now remembers searching for dues to the contents of Plato's dialogues, espe-
cially those early dialogues-the so-called Socratic dialogues-that feature most 
prominently Sokrates the searcher, the teacher, the willing guide to the good life. 
Almost without thinking, Mulder now finds himself grasping his copy of 
Plato's Complete Works as well as R. E. Allen's translations and commentaries on 
some of Plato's early dialogues. But he's really grasping for something he can't 
quite remember, or perhaps for something that has always just eluded him, like 
the answer to one more X-File, one whose outline was vaguely visible to him 
years ago, in his student days, and which hovers near, promising helpful connec-
tions to his present conundrum. 
Mulder begins to reexamine the notes he placed in the margins of Plato's 
early dialogues. He is again taken in by Plato's writing, as he was so many years 
before. Although he is alone, we can hear Mulder's thoughts ... 
In his speech of defense during his trial for being a public menace, the Greek 
philosopher Sokrates puts his audience in mind of a bit of wisdom attrib-
uted to the so-called Seven Sages and inscribed at the temple at Delphi: 
Know thyself. Reflecting this wisdom, Sokrates cautions his listeners, "The 
unexamined life is not worth living for men:" Moreover, he reminds those 
in attendance at his trial that he has spent virtually his entire adult life 
questioning the citizens of Athens about who they thought they were, often 
revealing to them the self-deceptions that obscured their understanding of 
themselves and their place in society. If there is anything remembered by 
the typical reader of Plato's Apology, it is Sokrates' emphasis on the funda-
mental importance of seeking self-knowledge and finding the truth. But 
what more do I need to know about the beliefs and recommendations of 
the historical Sokrates before I can safely conclude that this single-minded 
pursuit of self-knowledge and truth is the path to Sokratic excellence and 
the good life for me? And what are its dangers? 
I t was three citizens of Athens-Meletus, joined by Anytus and Lycon-
who brought Sokrates to trial in 399 BeE. These three purported to be 
working for the best interests of the state, according to the protocol for the 
Athenian system of legal justice. The Athenians had no public official cor-
responding to the role of district attorney, as we have, to bring state charges 
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against an individual. Instead, it was left to concerned citizens to provide 
a check on potentially dangerous activities of others in the state. If some-
one acted in a manner contrary to the state's best interests, the citizens 
were expected to bring the matter before the magistrates for legal action, 
if the magistrates determined such action was warranted by the question-
able activity. In Sokrates' case, the magistrates were moved by the appeal 
of Meletus and his confederates to issue formal charges against Sokrates. 
Diogenes Laertius, the ancient chronicler, on the authority of Favorinus, a 
first-century historian who claims to have searched out this information in 
the Athenian state archives, reports the indictment in this way: "This indict-
ment and affidavit is sworn by Meletus of Pithus, against Socrates, the son 
of Sophroniscu3 of Alopece: Socrates is guilty of refusing to recognize the 
gods recognized by the state, and of introducing other new divinities. He is 
also guilty of corrupting the youth. The penalty demanded is death."2 
But weren't the three formal charges a convenient fiction, a screen to 
conceal the real intentions of those powerful Athenians with vested inter-
ests in the status quo who wanted Sokrates discredited or, ideally, out of the 
way entirely so their work could continue, uninterrupted by the searching 
questions of one who made it his life's work - his «divine mission;' he calls 
it in his speech of defense-to uncover the truth? What are the real facts in 
this case?' 
The date of Sokrates' trial was fewer than five years removed from 
Athens's humiliating defeat at the hands of her arch rival, Sparta. What fol-
lowed that defeat was a period of near-tyrannical rule by a cadre of thirty, 
installed by Spartan command in place of the Athenian democratic insti-
tutions. But the democratic tradition, with roots running back over a hun-
dred years to the reforms ofCleisthenes in the late sixth century BeE, would 
not be so easily swept aside. Staunch democrats-among them Anytus, one 
of Sokrates' eventual accusers-outlasted the "tyranny of the Thirty" and 
had reestablished a fragile democracy by the century's turning. 
But what about Sokrates? Why would the influential among the Athenian 
democrats fear him enough to want him "disappeared"? And if Sokrates 
was a genuine threat to the state, why the facade of religious charges? Why 
not just expose him as an enemy of the state? If there are answers to these 
questions, they're likely to be found in Plato's dialogues, but they certainly 
won't be obvious. 
If I remember anything from my Oxford days, it's that these dialogues 
always work on multiple levels; like X-Files, nothing in them is exactly as it 
seems. Not recognizing the fact until now, it seems I've been reading X-Files 
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long before I lobbied to reopen that FBI unit in 1991. Sokrates' trial might 
have been the very first X-File, millennia before J. Edgar Hoover's Native 
American werewolf in 1946. And just as is the case with my FBI X-Files, I've 
never been entirely satisfied that I've solved the case of Sokrates. 
In Plato's Apology, Sokrates reminds the jurors of his day-to-day ac-
tivities, tracing back to the time the oracle at Delphi proclaimed Sokrates 
wisest among men. Confused by the oracle's statement, Sokrates begins a 
search for its possible meaning. He explains: 
I went to see one of those reputed to be wise .... Then, when I ex-
amined this man-there is no need for me to tell you his name, he 
was one of our public men-my experience was something like 
this: I thought that he appeared wise to many people and especially 
to himself, but that he was not. ... After this I approached another 
man, one of those thought to be wiser than he, and I thought the 
same thing .... After that I proceeded systematically .... I found 
that those who had the highest reputation were nearly the most 
deficient .... After the politicians, I went to the poets, the writers 
of tragedies and dithyrambs and the others .... Finally I went to 
the craftsmen .... So even now I continue this investigation as the 
god bade me-and I go around seeking out anyone, citizen or 
stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I do not think he is, I come to 
the assistance of the god and show him that he is not wise.4 
What result would these Sokratic inquiries have had on the mind-set of the 
average Athenians who daily witnessed them in the public places of Athens? 
They would see that these generally respected men are not experts, are not 
fit to guide their city. Worse, the thoughtful citizen must also begin to 
recognize that the demos-the 'people' in 'democracy' -have thus shown 
themselves unable to function properly in their role as the ultimate source 
of power in the state, the force that places power in the hands of those 
who will propose and implement policies on behalf of Athens and her 
citizens. These Athenian citizens, after all, were responsible for appointing 
those figures whose incompetence to govern Sokrates' questioning reveals. 
If there are no wise men among the electorate, there will be none among 
the elected; and none will be the wiser regarding their sorry state. Wisdom 
is required for effective democracy, and Sokrates' daily activities bring into 
clear focus the weaknesses of both the democratic process and those who 
make it run. 
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In a fragile democracy, there is no place for Sokrates. 
Is there a place for me in this democracy? What would those early de-
fenders of democracy think of me? Would they act to discredit or remove 
me, too? And Scully? Since I opened my first X-File six years ago, but espe-
cially now, as more and more details fall into place, the picture that has come 
into focus for me is of a government incapable of protecting its own citizens, 
of looking out for their best interests, along with a kind of shadow govern-
ment whose work is, at best, ambiguous, but which seems, above all, bent on 
obscuring its true aims. To what end? The best interests of the citizens? But 
a shadow government can have only shadow citizens, and these are not us. 
That the Athenian democrats would have acted to stop me is no sure 
measure that this work of mine ought to be abandoned. Like Sokrates' efforts 
in Athens, my work must be judged on its own merits. Can it be favorably 
compared with the work of Sokrates, twenty-four hundred years ago in 
that nascent democracy at Athens? 
What good came of Sokrates' unceasing investigations? Plato's dia-
logue Euthyphro, set chronologically shortly before Sokrates' speech of 
defense in the Apology, provides a potentially frightening suggestion. In 
this dialogue, Sokrates and the priest Euthyphro bump into each other just 
outside the law courts in Athens. Sokrates is on his way into the court to 
hear a reading of the charges contained in Meletus's formal indictment, so 
that he may begin to prepare his speech of defense for the trial. Euthyphro, 
though, is there with the intention of seeking an indictment for murder 
against his own father for having captured, bound, and abandoned one of 
his own slaves who had, in a drunken rage, killed another of his servants. 
Euthyphro's father had taken no thought of what might happen to this 
drunken, murdering slave while he sent to the temple priests at Athens to 
discover what should be done with him. Before the messenger returned with 
instructions from the temple, the murdering slave had died of neglect. 
Euthyphro's friends, relatives, and family members are outraged that 
Euthyphro dares to bring this case to the attention of the magistrates, plead-
ing that the gods will surely be offended by this affront to his own father. 
Euthyphro is not deterred-is perhaps, in fact, spurred by this general re-
sistance to his plan-and assures Sokrates that it is the right and pious 
thing to do. Euthyphro boldly remarks, in an affected third-person voice, 
"Euthyphro would not be superior to the majority of men if I did not have 
accurate knowledge of all such things."5 The priest Euthyphro has thus set 
himself up as an expert on the subject of pious behavior, and Sokrates is 
eager to test the knowledge Euthyphro claims to possess. 
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Characteristically, it doesn't take long before Euthyphro is confounded 
by Sokrates' questions, offering conflicting accounts to Sokrates in his effort 
to make clear his ideas. Initially so confident in his wisdom, Euthyphro 
soon admits to being unable to tell Sokrates what he means concerning the 
nature of piety, justice, and right action. At the close of this short dialogue, 
Euthyphro abruptly flees the scene in confusion, pleading other important 
business to which he must now attend. 
It is interesting to note that the defense Euthyphro presents for bring-
ing this criminal complaint against his father is one that we find familiar; 
in fact, the justification Euthyphro offers is strikingly akin to our own ideal 
of justice: our personification of Justice holds a balance scale to weigh the 
evidence while wearing a blindfold over her eyes so as not to be biased by 
mere appearances. One ought not to pay attention to who stands before the 
bench - friend or stranger, wealthy or poor, black or white-but only to 
the facts that bear on that person's guilt or innocence. As Euthyphro points 
out to Sokrates: "One should only watch whether the killer acted justly or 
not; if he acted justly, let him go, but if not, one should prosecute, [even] 
if ... the killer shares your hearth and table."6 While it is not included in 
this dialogue, Sokrates articulates the same view in another of Plato's dia-
logues, the Gorgias, when he urges his interlocutors that a person "should 
accuse himself first and foremost, and then too his family and anyone 
else dear to him who happens to behave unjustly at any time:' so that the 
wrongdoer might be properly punished and so become a just person once 
again, recovering the health of his souU 
What is it, then, that prompts me to revisit this dialogue now, as I 
search for an answer to whether my search for the truth parallels Sokrates' 
own "divine mission"? What does Sokrates' questioning of Euthyphro 
accomplish? In this case, Sokrates seems to move Euthyphro from what 
even Sokrates seems to believe is the correct course of action-bringing 
his father's actions to the attention of the court magistrates to determine 
whether a crime has been committed, so that the action, if criminal, may 
be properly punished-to paralyzing Euthyphro with doubt about his ac-
tions. Sokrates seems to have taken away Euthyphro's confidence in his ac-
tion and replaced it with nothing positive but only perplexity. Euthyphro 
departs, seemingly at a loss, perhaps unsure about what he ought to do 
now. One more respected "expert" has been publicly knocked from a ped-
estal. How many such can Sokrates knock down before society becomes 
unmoored? 
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If I succeed in learning the facts about myself, of finding those truths 
for which I've been searching past all obstacles, and along the way uncover 
what seems an almost unimaginable conspiracy, will I, like Sokrates, take 
from people their beliefs about a well-founded, democratically run soci-
ety, leaving citizens with an awful truth and nothing to install in its place? 
Should I, in my searching for my past-my self-and the larger truth 
that increasingly seems to be bound up with it, properly be seen, as those 
staunch democrats perhaps saw Sokrates, as an enemy of the people, a 
threat to be quieted or removed? 
Mulder catches himself contemplating taping an X on the window in front of 
him, hoping that someone will appear with answers to these difficult questions. 
But Deep Throat is dead, as is the mysterious X-two more apparent casualties 
for Mulder's cause, his quest for the truth. After bouncing his basketball a few 
dozen times, Mulder sits back down to revisit the second of his ancient X-File 
cases involving Sokrates ... 
Am I a threat? If so, to whom, or what? Who am I? What am I be-
coming? .. 
The unexamined life is not worth living. Know thyself. These sayings 
rattle in my head like a taunt, telling me what I should do without telling 
me how to succeed. I think I've tried as hard as anyone-harder than most 
ever do-to piece together my life, to fill in the gaps, to make sense of 
everything that has happened to me. My father, his work, his shadowy con-
nections; what my mother knew of all this, and only later came to under-
stand. And my sister, Samantha, now brought before my eyes, finally, after 
all these years, then taken away just as quickly, trailing even more questions, 
as she drove off with one who seemed to be my very nemesis, suddenly 
turned potential benefactor. What happened? What's happening? If I can't 
fill in these blanks, or am given too many false leads and phony answers, 
will it be impossible for me to fulfill the Sokratic dictum? Will "they" have 
gotten rid of me as surely as if they had put a bullet through my chest, as 
they did with Cancer Man the other night? 
Still, now in the midst of these ruminations on Sokrates and the dia-
logues of Plato, I can't shake the feeling I'm overlooking another possibil-
ity in my search. There's more here to be learned. 
Plato's dialogue Meno is set in Athens, chronologically just a few years 
prior to the events described in the Euthyphro and the Apology. Most likely, 
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Sokrates' conversation with Meno takes place about 403 BeE, shortly after 
the overthrow of the short-lived tyranny of the Thirty, in the early days 
of the recovered democracy. It needn't be a factual account of an actual 
meeting between Meno and Sokrates-and, later in the dialogue, Anytus, 
staunch defender of democratic Athens-but it may have been. Meno is 
certainly a historical figure, as we find reference to him in accounts other 
than Plato's dialogues. It is perhaps in this dialogue that Plato most force-
fully drives home what it is to know oneself-to have a self to know, or 
to be a self that can be known - by showing us a frightening example of a 
non-self: Meno. 
The Meno starts almost like the other Sokratic dialogues begin, with 
Sokrates quickly shifting his interlocutor's attention to the importance of 
discovering the definition of a moral concept, in this instance, virtue. But 
unlike Plato's other early dialogues, Sokrates' main interlocutor, Meno, is 
not interested in developing his own proposals for a definition of virtue. 
By comparison, for example, in the Euthyphro the priest tenaciously de-
fends his favored conception of piety by repeatedly making revisions to his 
initial definition that address potential difficulties raised during the course 
of Sokrates' questioning. Indeed, Euthyphro is so enamored of his favored 
candidate for a definition of "piety" that he finally and happily returns to 
it, without immediately recognizing that fact, just prior to the close of the 
dialogue; he is so convinced that something like his original general defini-
tion is correct that, through a number of revisions that had seemed to leave 
that definition behind, he eventually wends his way back to it in response 
to Sokrates' questions. Yet Meno, by comparison, after three times offering 
different popular definitions of virtue, will do nothing either to explain or 
defend any of them. He simply drops each proposed definition at the first 
hint of trouble. 
As eventually becomes clear over the course of this dialogue, Meno is 
really only interested in having others tell him things, things that sound 
impressive and that will make him appear intelligent when he repeats them 
in public; he even boasts to Sokrates, at one point, that he has made a 
thousand fine speeches on virtue. But the unfortunate result of Meno's 
practice of memorizing others' beliefs is that he no more understands 
these ideas than a parrot knows the meaning of what it has been trained to 
recite. Lacking understanding, Meno is unable to edit the beliefs he picks 
up; he becomes a walking set of conflicting beliefs, without the skill to rec-
ognize that embarrassing fact. More important, though, it is not obvious 
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that there is anyone we can honestly call "Meno." For this figure in Plato's 
dialogue who answers to that name is really no more than a collection of 
others' beliefs and ideas (others who are themselves, perhaps, no more than 
that, as well). Meno cannot fulfill Sokrates' request, cannot come to know 
himself; there is no self to know. Certainly there is a physical human being 
here, called Meno. It occupies space and time. It even has a history. Some 
collection of past and present events can be ascribed to this physical entity. 
But there is just as certainly nothing about it to make it more than acciden-
tally unique, to stamp it with the mark of a self Perhaps the best indication 
of this is that it is Sokrates who excuses himself and abandons the conver-
sation, thus bringing this dialogue to a close. 
If Meno cannot come to know himself because he is no more than a 
collection of others' ideas and convictions, how could any of us who have 
been raised and taught by others, who are the beneficiaries of long tradi-
tions of belief and practice-or who have been fed a steady diet of lies 
and half-truths-ever hope to accomplish this task? Unless Sokrates is a 
charlatan-a popular suspicion to which Sokrates refers in his speech of 
defense, and against which he believes he must defend himself in the court 
of popular opinion - there must be an answer in these dialogues, buried 
in details and implications, waiting to be uncovered. 
Sokrates works tirelessly in the Meno to get Meno to do his own work 
on the problem of defining virtue, expressly telling Meno to set aside the 
ideas of his teacher, Gorgias, and to explain his own beliefs, so that these 
can be investigated in their conversation. At least this much is clear to me: 
Sokrates sees this inquiry into one's beliefs as the key to coming to know 
oneself. This activity constitutes the self-examination Sokrates stresses as 
essential to any human life worth living. Why is that? Because it is only in 
this process of stating, clarifying, comparing, revising (or perhaps reject-
ing) beliefs that one begins to understand the content of those beliefs and, 
as a result, the content of one's self. For it is just these beliefs that make us 
who we are. These are the beliefs and ideals that motivate us to act as we 
do, and so define our character. The beliefs and ideals we choose, as a result 
of rational inquiry-and not those features that we come to possess by 
mere historical or biological accident-are what mark a person as who he 
or she is. 
Yet it is just these beliefs that Meno refuses to examine. He never makes 
any belief his own by working to understand it, fitting it into a consistent 
network of beliefs, and consciously affirming it as his own. No search. No 
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self. No wonder Sokrates leaves at the close of this dialogue. He leaves no 
one behind; he has been talking to a ghost all along. 
Nowhere in Sokrates' troubling exchange with Meno does Sokrates 
show the slightest interest in any historical facts about Meno. His emphasis 
is wholly on beliefs-especially beliefs related to the key moral concepts 
under discussion-and the process of investigating those beliefs. I can now 
see that we're meant to conclude that the self is not a collection of mere 
historical accidents but the product of informed and deliberate choices, 
the products of careful Sokratic investigation. The activity of examining 
one's life is, in fact, the activity of constructing the self. The self emerges 
through this activity; it is not discovered as some artifact might be. 
If Sokrates is correct about Meno, they couldn't kill me by keeping my 
past from me. Still, ... that may be small comfort if I don't yet know who I 
am in this deeper Sokratic sense. 
But perhaps the most important lesson here is that who I am is always 
under my control, because the choices I make in these inquiries are always 
mine. And it is up to me to be willing to do all the difficult work - the work 
that Meno shuns-to craft an answer to Sokrates' question: Who are you? 
Mulder reaches into his desk drawer for a stashed bag of sunflower seeds. How-
ever, he happens upon an old family photo album. He flips through the pages, 
now wondering more than ever why he believes knowing the past will help him 
to know who he is now. Perhaps Sokrates is of more help. He sets the album aside 
and again begins paging through Plato's Apology, studying the details of Sokrates' 
trial, to begin the day's third philosophical investigation of the unexplained ... 
I returned to Plato's Sokratic dialogues after all these years removed from 
them, prompted by something I only half remembered about them, like 
a familiar tune running on a loop through my head but whose lyrics I 
couldn't quite pin down. I was looking for something to guide me through 
the latest, most vexing developments in my own search for the truth. But 
what have I found? Nothing but more X-Files, this time from ancient 
Greece. I stare at the words on the pages, follow the details of each conver-
sation, examine each argument Sokrates advances, and am all too keenly 
aware that these are just the pieces of a bigger puzzle Plato requires us to 
assemble, if we wish to understand. To understand the dialogues? More: to 
understand ourselves. 
After my latest reflection on the Meno, I'm also sure it's necessary that 
it is I who assemble this picture. Plato can't do that for me, or hand me 
the answer. He even says that much, in his own voice for a change, in a 
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public letter he wrote, now referred to as Plato's "Seventh Letter": "This 
knowledge is not something that can be put into words like other sciences; 
but after long continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint 
pursuit of the subject, suddenly, like light flashing when a fire is kindled, it 
is born in the soul and straight away nourishes itself."8 Even if Plato could. 
hand us answers, he wouldn't. Through these dialogues, Plato has Sokrates 
show us why it is so crucial that we do this work on our own, why there is 
no other way to arrive at the lessons, the wisdom, the knowledge of self he 
wants us to gain, on our way to living well. 
Who am I? Am I an enemy of the people? Or am lone of those con-
cerned citizens, like Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon, who act on behalf of the 
state when it can't-or won't-act on its own? Then, am I, perhaps like 
Meletus and his cohorts, mistaken in my beliefs about my cause, or mis-
guided in my intentions or motives? Am I so sure my reasons aren't petty, 
or merely personal, as perhaps were the motives of Sokrates' accusers? Per-
haps another hard look at the Apology-an examination of Sokrates' moti-
vations-will help me with my own case, if I can only sort through the 
relevant details of that ancient X-File. 
The speech of defense Sokrates offers the Athenian jury is presented 
as a defense against the formal charges brought by Meletus and his col-
leagues, and it is that. But it is also more than that. A careful reading of the 
speech reveals Sokrates' larger defense of his life as a philosopher, Sokrates' 
own Apologia pro Vita Sua. In recalling this speech to us, Plato is asking us 
to judge Sokrates on yet another level: can Sokrates be acquitted for choos-
ing to live his life as a philosopher, for questioning any Athenian he en-
counters, and for going "around doing nothing but persuading both young 
and old ... not to care for [the J body or ... wealth in preference to, or as 
strongly as for the best possible state of [the 1 soul"?9 
Sokrates, repeatedly in his speech of defense and in others of Plato's 
Sokratic dialogues, states his interest in the well-being of the people of Ath-
ens and his role as a genuine benefactor of the state. He goes so far as to 
call himself the "true statesman;' the only one living who practices the true 
political craft. 1o It seems absurd to think of Sokrates on the campaign trail, 
making political speeches to the electorate with the hope of moving them 
to vote for him. In fact, parts of his speech of defense, and nearly the whole 
of the Gorgias, seem to cast him as the antipolitician. He makes it a point 
to distance himself from the ordinary practices of the orator, telling the 
jurors he will not resort to mere rhetorical tricks or shameless spectacle in 
order to be acquitted of the charges in Meletus's formal indictment. What, 
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then, can he mean when he says he is the only true politician? There must 
be an answer in the texts; these lines don't flow idly from Plato's hand, then 
survive for twenty-four hundred years. 
The beginning of an answer to this question comes by way of a varia-
tion on the typical Sokratic question: What is the role of the politician in 
the state? What is Sokrates' conception of the true political craft, and how 
does he see it connected to his life as a philosopher? In the Athenian de-
mocracy-far more direct than our own representative democracy-the 
politician was charged with representing the best interests of the citizens by 
trying to make the best possible community in which they could live. One 
way to accomplish this goal is through establishing laws and policies to 
regulate the behavior of citizens in a way most conducive to the good of all 
citizens. However, with the establishment of any law come the lawbreakers, 
those who feel themselves above the law and so not bound by its dictates. 
With each illegal act of these lawbreakers, the good of the community is 
undermined a bit more. The typical politician's response, certainly in our 
day, is to enact ever-harsher penalties with the hope that these will finally 
curb the criminal interests of the lawbreakers. But this seems to be a vain 
hope. Nor does this description seem apt for the figure of Sokrates Plato 
describes to us in these dialogues. Sokrates is no lawmaker, and certainly 
no enforcer of public codes. 
So what am I overlooking in this speech of defense? What details are 
here, in this text in front of my eyes, but still eluding my grasp? What other 
way could there be to practice the craft of the politician, to work for the 
best interests of the citizens, without falling into our stereotypical mold of 
the politician? 
Why didn't I go out and rob someone this morning? Why didn't I 
murder anyone today? Certainly not because I was afraid of the law and 
its corresponding punishments. I simply have no desire to do those things, 
because I believe they're wrong, and I think it's important for me to avoid 
doing things that are wrong. Perhaps I shouldn't be thinking of laws that 
are imposed on people, external forces capable of shaping the behavior of 
citizens of the state, but laws of another sort altogether. I've given these 
laws to myself and, in so doing, stamp them as ones that I want to obey, 
not break, regardless of what punishments might be associated with them. 
I'm governing myself. 
What does this perspective on law have to do with Sokrates? Every-
thing. The daily activity Sokrates describes in the Apology is activity designed 
to get each individual citizen of Athens to think about these sorts of laws, 
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to test and refine their understanding of these important principles, so that 
they may be used to help guide them in their choices day to day in order 
to live a better life, in order for all to benefit from that life well lived. The 
person who could bring an entire community of individuals to the level 
of self-reflection necessary to govern themselves justly would certainly de-
serve the title "true statesman." Such a person would be a genuine bene-
factor of the state, as Sokrates proclaims himself in his speech of defense. 
I'm confident Sokrates' motives in questioning the Athenians are as he 
explains them in his speech of defense; Sokrates takes himself to be on a 
divine mission to improve the citizens of Athens and so to make the state 
a better place for them all. His tireless search for the truth, as well as his 
acting as a guide to each citizen he interrogates, is just the work of the 
true statesman. If he has fallen short of his goal, it isn't through any fault 
of his own. How else could he educate in a way that would produce the 
understanding necessary for knowledge in a setting where so many already 
believed they knew the answers to these important questions of his? If any-
one thinks he's in possession of something, he isn't going to look for it; it's 
only when a person recognizes that something is lacking that he will start 
his search. The confusion that arrives in the Sokratic inquiry is a necessary 
first step in prompting understanding, and so in gaining knowledge. If one 
of Sokrates' interlocutors fails to pursue the inquiry past that intermedi-
ate state of perplexity, that is the risk and price of true education, the kind 
necessary to establish a firm foundation for the democracy Athens cher-
ished. While a state could run well on mere true belief, it would only do so 
by luck; no true statesman would settle for chance as a dictator. 
How many of us, though, could ever be statesmen of this sort? Plato's 
Sokrates is often said to be a model, yet inimitable-himself a character as 
puzzling as the content of any FBI X-File Scully and I ever encountered. 
I'm struck, suddenly, by another line from Plato's Meno, spoken by Any-
tus in response to Sokrates' question concerning who teaches virtue: any 
Athenian gentleman could teach a willing student about virtue; we've all 
learned it-had it handed down to us-from those who have come before 
us. I I When Anytus utters this, in the context of the dialogue, it is obvious 
that he is colossally mistaken, and we are meant to recognize the enormity 
of his error. As I step back from the Meno, back into my world, though, this 
exchange suddenly seems more hopeful. Perhaps it doesn't take a city full 
of Sokrateses but only one Sokrates who can make a city full of virtuous 
citizens, citizens who know themselves and, hence, govern themselves with 
moral principles that have survived Sokratic scrutiny. 
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I don't need to imitate Sokrates the statesman. I need to imitate Sokrates 
the person. I need to recognize that 1 don't know many things-and now 
I'm not talking about mere historical facts-and that it is important for 
me to be actively searching for that knowledge; for it's only by actively 
searching that I'll come to understand, to know, and so to live well. In one 
sense perhaps, and surprisingly, Plato is asking me to become more like 
Anytus or Meletus-just a plain citizen concerned and willing to act for 
the state's well-being-but with this important difference: I must be a citi-
zen whose judgment isn't obscured, one who, unlike Meno, never tires of 
doing the hard work necessary to understanding and so who knows what 
is best, and so does what is best, but not merely accidentally, as Euthyphro 
seemingly acts against his father. 
Perhaps, then, in this regard I'm not too far different from Sokrates 
the person. After all, aren't we both seeking the truth with a single-minded 
determination, truth that will serve the best interests of the state, that is, 
the citizens whose lives are bound up with one another's? But if rereading 
these dialogues has taught me anything, it's that surface comparisons are 
always only an invitation to inquiry. It's certainly possible for two people 
to be doing the same thing yet to be poles apart with respect to the moral 
worth of their actions and their corresponding characters. Maybe I'm more 
like the vengeful Meletus-driven by the memory of my sister's abduc-
tion -or the shortsighted Anytus-blindly rushing forward with the best 
intentions, only to harm those close to me, like Scully-than the virtuous 
and virtue-seeking Sokrates. 
I think I must, now more than ever, take to heart the very advice Sokrates 
gives to himself: "1 have long been surprised at my own wisdom-and 
doubtful of it, too. That's why I think it's necessary to keep reinvestigating 
whatever I say, since self-deception is the worst thing of all. How could it 
not be terrible, indeed, when the deceiver never deserts you even for an in-
stant but is always right there with you? Therefore, I think we have to turn 
back frequently to what we've already said, in order to test it by looking at 
it 'backwards and forwards' as the ... poet puts it!'12 
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Scully as Pragmatist Feminist 
"truths" Are Out There 
Erin McKenna 
At the start of The X-Files Scully is the obvious opposite of Mulder. The 
traditional dualisms of reason/emotion, objective/subjective, and scientific 
(hard) knowledge / felt (soft) knowledge (among others) are clear. The 
typical male/female dualism, however, is interestingly reversed between the 
two characters. Throughout the series the writers play with the tensions 
within Scully, and Mulder as well. They also begin to challenge the dual-
istic structure itself. It seems as if we were supposed to come to see that 
the strength is in the complementary nature of the opposites (a kind of 
Rousseau-style marriage without the radical inequality).l However, over 
time we see a change in Scully (and Mulder as well). I will not try to ana-
lyze the whole series here but rather use a single episode to ground a dis-
cussion of Scully's approach to knowledge and truth and how it develops 
over the years.2 
The Importance of "all things" 
In season 7, an episode entitled "all things" (written and directed by Gillian 
Anderson) represents an important shift in Scully's scientific approach to 
knowledge and truth. In this episode Scully encounters a former lover and, 
with Mulder out of the country, embarks on a series of encounters that 
open her to other ways of knowing-auras, chakras, visions, the impor-
tance of coincidence. While there were hints of a growing openness to such 
ways of knowing before, this episode goes further. 
I will argue that in the transformation we see a shift in views of meta-
physics and epistemology that mirrors the shift that occurs with the emer-
gence of American pragmatism and is strengthened by certain elements 
of feminist philosophy. In this shift reality is changing rather than static, 
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knowledge becomes a working hypothesis rather than something certain, 
truth becomes plural rather than singular. Further, philosophy becomes an 
experiential enterprise that finds meaning in practical consequences rather 
than the logical relations of concepts. On the move away from more classic 
philosophical methods, Charlene Haddock Seigfried writes: 
Pragmatism and feminism reject philosophizing as an intellectual 
game that takes purely logical analysis as its special task. For both, 
philosophical techniques are means, not ends. The specific, prac-
tical ends are set by various communities of interest, the mem-
bers of which are best situated to name, resist, and overcome the 
oppressions of class, sex, race, and gender. The problem with phi-
losophy's enchantment with 'the logic of general notions' is that it 
forces specific situations into predetermined, abstract categories. 
Pragmatism's fundamental criticism of traditional philosophy is 
that it 'substitutes discussion of the meaning of concepts and their 
dialectical relationship to one another' for knowledge of the spe-
cific groups of individuals, concrete human beings, and special in-
stitutions or social arrangements.3 
While the pragmatist feminist shift seems to threaten the more rational, 
objective, conceptual, scientific approach often held up as the ideal, it need 
not. That remains a way of knowing, and an important and often reliable 
or workable way. Pragmatism is itself grounded in the scientific method. 
However, pragmatism and feminism make room for other ways of know-
ing. They may even require them in order to fill out the possibilities of 
reality. 
Episode Summary 
In "all things" we find Scully as her usual skeptical self, not paying attention 
as Mulder explains the increasing complexity of crop circles. She refuses to 
join Mulder as he heads off to England to wait for the appearance of an ex-
pected crop circle. Mulder asks Scully to go see a woman at the American 
Taoist Healing Center to pick up some information he needs on the crop 
circles. She does not make this a priority, and when she finally does go, 
she is rude and dismissive, even though she does not know what the cen-
ter does. However, through a series of coincidences, she finds her former 
lover (and former teacher), Dr. Daniel Waterston (Nicholas Surovy), in the 
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hospitaL He has been living in Washington, D.C., for ten years, and she did 
not know it. He has heart problems and may be dying. 
We find out he was married and had a family when he and Scully were 
previously involved. Scully had left to end the affair and left medicine to 
join the FBI. Subsequently Daniel's marriage had dissolved, and his daugh-
ter blames Scully for what has happened to her family. This pushes Scully 
further in her questioning of life paths not taken, of the choices we make 
along the way-an overarching theme of this episode. 
When Scully finally visits the American Taoist Healing Center, the ma-
terial she picks up for Mulder drops from her hand and reveals informa-
tion on the heart chakra. Later, when she returns to the center, she says, 
''I'm a medical doctor and a scientist and you're right, I don't know what 
it is that you do." She had been intrigued, though, when the woman had 
previously told her she needed to keep her mind open and slow down. She 
is back to find out what the woman meant and to sort out what all the 
coincidences, near accidents, and visions might mean. She encounters an 
entirely different perspective on disease and life. Accidents and disease may 
be ways of getting our attention so that we focus on our choices (our life 
paths) more clearly. The woman at the center, who was a physicist herself, 
makes the judgment that Scully is more open than she may realize; it is a 
matter of what she does with the openness. More coincidences and some 
visions finally push Scully to try a different approach. With Daniel now in 
a coma, she has someone come to the hospital to run energy through his 
chakras. His physician gets very upset, but Scully argues that if it is not 
harming Daniel, they should be open to it. The daughter agrees, and it 
seems to work. Scully believes it may be what saved his life. Daniel belittles 
this belief as he seeks to get her to go back both to medicine and to him. 
At the end of the episode, the vision of a woman in a ball cap and 
hooded jacket, which has repeatedly led Scully to critical junctures, appears 
one more time. This time when Scully chases her, she catches the woman, 
and it turns out to be Mulder. He is back early because no crop circles ap-
peared. Scully and Mulder end up in a late-night conversation about how 
we find our path in life and what might happen if we miss important signs 
along the way. They apparently spend the night together. 
Some Basics of a Pragmatist Approach to Knowledge and Truth 
To understand pragmatism, one needs to place it in the larger context of 
the history and development of philosophy. I apologize if the brevity of 
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this treatment results in a caricature of any position. I cannot hope to pre-
sent a full picture of pragmatism here, but I will focus on William James's 
Pragmatism to pull in the concepts most central to my present analysis. 
Pragmatism takes Darwin's theory of evolution seriously. This view 
required some radical rethinking of metaphysics. Reality was no longer 
static but changing-in process. Nor could knowledge and truth any lon-
ger be singular, universal, and unchanging. Knowledge and truth became 
working hypotheses rather than something fixed and final. Pragmatism is 
at its core a melioristic philosophy; it sees the world as malleable and seeks 
growth and improvement. However, it recognizes that humans are fallible, 
that our perspectives are always partial and limited. This, combined with a 
changing world, calls for an experimental method as the most reliable way 
to gain knowledge and a theory of truth that embraces pluralism. Knowl-
edge and truths are partial (not complete), perspectival (not neutral, uni-
versal, or objective), and provisional (not final or finished). 
As James says, «The widest field of knowledge that ever was or will 
be still contains some ignorance, ... Some bits of information always es-
cape."4 Further, individuals cannot ever know it all. We all have our biases, 
and we always approach things from a certain perspective. This perspective 
colors what we see and limits what we pay attention to. The fact that as 
humans we make mistakes, that we miss things, that we see things through 
specific lenses, results in a view of knowledge that cannot (and does not 
seek to) make claims to objectivity and certainty. More-traditional views 
of science and philosophy seek to find ways to neutralize such "bias" and 
through logic and controlled experiments to find the objective truth. For 
pragmatism, our knowledge grows through experience and the experi-
mental method, but it is never finished. This impacts the pragmatist view 
of truth as well. Truth is seen as both partial and in process, and so a plu-
ralistic view is embraced. 
The pragmatists, too, believe that "the truth is out there:' As James says, 
for pragmatism, "true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, cor-
roborate and verify. False ideas are those that we can not. That is the practical 
difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning 
of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as:'5 Truth, on this view, is a pro-
cess; it requires verification. This sounds very much in line with the hard, 
empirical, scientific approach to knowledge and truth that is tied to Scully 
early in the series. But then James says, "You can say of it then either that 'it 
is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is usefuL'" Accord-
ing to James, both of these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely 
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that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. "True is the name 
for whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its 
completed function in experience .... Primarily, and on the common-sense 
level, the truth of a state of mind means this function of a leading that is 
worth while."6 This view seems to make room for Mulder's softer, more 
subjective approach to knowledge and truth. His hypotheses, proven or 
not, do lead inquiry in some productive directions. In "all things" Scully 
clearly begins to meld these two approaches (though she is still obviously 
uncomfortable with the new ways of seeing) and so can be seen to repre-
sent the pragmatist approach to knowledge and truth. 
Over time Scully moves from being a scientific empiricist who seeks 
materialist explanations that confirm a truth of the matter to being a plu-
ralist and radical empiricist who seeks materialist explanations but is open 
to other input. She becomes more comfortable with uncertainty and de-
velops an openness to multiple perspectives. James's notion of radical em-
piricism states that only "things definable in terms drawn from experience" 
shall be debated, that relations between things are matters of experience, 
so there is no need of "trans-empirical connective support" to explain the 
universe.? That is, we can have purely empirical explanations of all debat-
able phenomena. However, because we are fallible and need to embrace a 
pluralist stance, this does not rule out the hypothesis of God or something 
"beyond." It does rule out dogmatic beliefs, but "if the hypothesis of God 
works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now what-
ever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does 
work, and that the problem is to build it out and determine it so that it 
will combine satisfactorily with all the working truths."8 With a scientific 
approach one does not need God or the supernatural, but the pragmatist 
approach does not rule out such perspectives. 
This matches very well with Scully's blending of science with her per-
sonal religious beliefs, her scientific certainty with her growing willingness 
to question and doubt. It also matches the blending of Scully and Mul-
der themselves. In "Beyond the Sea" we have a nice twist in which Scully 
takes on Mulder's openness and Mulder takes on Scully's scientific rigor 
and skepticism. In this episode, when Scully's father dies, she has a vision 
of him. (She has such visions of the dead in multiple episodes.) She starts 
to look in the X-Files at a folder labeled "Visions of the Dead:' but she 
slams the drawer shut. She and Mulder then begin to investigate a case in 
which a psychopathic prisoner claims to have psychic abilities that can aid 
the agents in rescuing kidnap victims. Mulder is sure he is faking. Scully 
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begins to believe. He knows things about her and her father. She follows 
his clues and finds evidence that helps to break the kidnapping case. Afraid 
to be publicly tied to such unconventional ways of thinking, she lies to 
the police about how she came to find the evidence but admits to Mulder 
that she found it on the basis of what the "psychic" said. Mulder tells her 
not to trust him, but Scully responds by saying she thought Mulder would 
be proud of her. She says, "I never thought I'd say this, but what if there 
is another explanation?"; "I've opened myself to extreme possibilities." 
Mulder responds by saying that one should only open oneself to "extreme 
possibilities" when they are true. With Mulder in the hospital with a gun-
shot wound (predicted by the psychic), Scully successfully concludes the 
investigation, finding further confirmation along the way that the prisoner 
is indeed psychic. Then at the end of the episode, as Scully and Mulder 
switch back to their more usual roles, Scully begins to explain to Mulder 
how the prisoner could have known all the things he did without any su-
pernatural abilities. Mulder asks why, with all that she has seen, she can't 
believe. She says, "I'm afraid to believe." The tension Scully faces in this 
episode, and her struggle with competing belief structures, is very much 
in line with the pragmatist view of how knowledge and truths change and 
grow with experience. 
James cautions that our "truths" must agree with the world we experi-
ence and the ideas we live by. Scully would generally agree. Any new truth 
must "derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and 
it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly. 
To 'work' means both these things; and the squeeze is so tight that there is 
little loose play for any hypothesis. Our theories are wedged and controlled 
as nothing else is."9 It is this squeeze that Scully feels throughout the series. 
Mulder's hypotheses usually "derange common sense and previous belief" 
too much. Many episodes match their competing explanations for events; 
Scully is usually able to find one that does not "derange common sense and 
previous belief." 
My favorite example of this is "War of the Coprophages." Mulder is 
in a town where people are apparently dying from cockroach attacks. He 
has gone there to investigate strange lights, which he thinks might be con-
nected to UFOs. With each death, Mulder calls Scully to ask her to come 
help him; he makes it clear that these attacks need to be taken seriously 
because they have been witnessed by scientists not yahoos. Each time, she 
is able to explain the death in a scientific, rational way. One is an aller-
gic reaction, one is the result of psychotic disorder connected to drug use, 
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another is due to a brain aneurysm. By the time there is a fourth death, 
Scully is on her way to join Mulder because she finds the growing number 
of deaths improbable and strange. She suspects a new species of cockroach 
has been imported in the manure being sent to an alternative-fuel research 
facility. The sheriff in the town posits killer cockroaches from some gov-
ernment research gone awry. Mulder, on the other hand, begins to form a 
theory that the cockroaches are alien robots sent out into the universe as 
scouts and that the lights he came to investigate are "insect swarms." He 
reaches this conclusion with the help of two other scientists, who in the 
end go off together. The lights disappear and the cockroach attacks end. 
Scully sarcastically notes that by the time there is another "invasion of arti-
ficially intelligent dung eating robotic probes from outer space;' the chil-
dren of the two scientists will know what to do. 
Scully, believes the existence of intelligent life on other planets is highly 
improbable given the random working of evolution (she declares herself 
a Darwinian at the beginning of the episode). She sees no real need to re-
vise her final hypothesis here, though she had been moved to agree with 
Mulder that something strange was happening in the town. Her rational, 
scientific explanations of each individual death do not add up to a satisfy-
ing explanation for all of them. Further, in the end, there is room for an-
other view that may lead us forward productively. Mulder, typing on his 
computer at the end of this episode, points out that through evolution 
we share the insect's brain as a basic reactive mechanism. If probes are 
sent to study us, what will extraterrestrials think of us? he wonders-as he 
smashes an insect that appears on his plate. Here Scully's way of seeing sits 
side by side with Mulder's. However, in other episodes such as "Beyond the 
Sea;' Scully is pushed to assimilate new ways of seeing (even as she tries to 
back away) when old ways do not yield satisfying answers. The new "makes 
itself true, gets itself classed as true, by the way it works; grafting itself then 
upon the ancient body of truth, which thus grows much as a tree grows by 
the activity of a new layer of cambium:'iO This is where the pluralism of 
pragmatism comes into play. We have truths, rather than Truth; truths are 
out there. II 
William James borrows a helpful metaphor to explain the pluralist 
stance of pragmatism. He describes a hotel corridor with many rooms off 
it. Pragmatism is the corridor. It is open to a variety of beliefs and ap-
proaches. 12 What holds pragmatism together is its approach or method. As 
James says, pragmatism seeks to understand events, beliefs, and theories in 
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terms of their practical consequences. «What difference would it practically 
make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?" 13 The ef-
fects equal the conception. «The whole function of philosophy ought to be 
to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite 
instants in our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true 
one:' It is important to note here that pragmatism is more a method than a 
particular view. It is open to the new and stands «against dogma, artificial-
ity, and the pretence of finality in truth."14 Pragmatism draws on various 
schools of thought and life views. 
James's radical empiricism calls for careful analysis of «facts" but en-
courages us to be open to all types of knowledge. Pragmatism « 'unstiff-
ens' our theories. She has in fact no prejudices whatever, no obstructive 
dogmas, no rigid canons of what shall count as proof .... She will entertain 
any hypothesis, she will consider any evidence."15 Pragmatism is open but 
not overly permissive. Pragmatism, like Scully, retains a skeptical side but 
without a dogmatic refusal to consider other ideas. This is the philosophy 
most suited to the X-Files, which by definition present open, live questions 
that push our thinking in new directions. Though Scully may have been 
an unwilling participant in these explorations at first, experience brings 
her to a new place. The dualisms of reason/emotion, objective/subjective, 
and scientific (hard) knowledge / felt (soft) knowledge (among others) are 
blended. 
Some Basics of a Feminist View of Knowledge and Truth 
As with pragmatism, feminism also rejects dualistic ways of thinking. One 
result of this is that a pragmatist feminist perspective calls for a concept of 
the individual as a social self. The classical liberal notion of the self (the 
conception that most informs current Western thinking) is based on a false 
dualistic caricature. The classical liberal, rational, impartial, objective, sci-
entific way of knowing is built on a picture of the individual as rational, 
competitive, autonomous, and atomistic (radically separate from others). 
This notion of the self underlies most social contract theory and theories 
of democracy. Here rational, competitive, autonomous, and atomistic indi-
viduals follow their enlightened self-interest and agree to form a contract 
to come together and live under a sovereign in order to gain increased 
peace and security. This notion of the self underlies the notion of the in-
visible hand and laissez-faire capitalism. This is the idea that things work 
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out for the whole of society if rational, atomistic, autonomous individuals 
look out for their own self-interest without the undue interference of the 
government. 
Both pragmatists and feminists have critiqued this view of the self as 
inaccurate and inadequate. They believe persons are not only rational but 
also emotional. Neither pragmatists nor feminists find compelling evidence 
that individuals are completely self-interested. In contrast to the neatly lin-
ear explanations of the origins and development of persons and society 
found in social contract theory, pragmatists and feminists see the develop-
ment of individuals and societies as continuously ongoing and cooperative 
enterprises. Individuals are born into the middle of things, societies de-
velop and change. Individuals are interconnected and interdependent from 
the start. 
Lorraine Code offers an interesting critique of the liberal individual 
and traditional views of autonomy by arguing (using Annette Baier's work) 
that we are all "second persons." That is, we gain our sense of self and indi-
viduality through our relationships with others. The picture of the atom-
istic and competitive self just does not make sense for a biological creature 
that procreates sexually, gestates for nine months, is born helpless, and 
has one of the longest and most dependent childhoods of any animal we 
know. Starting from this, "a person perhaps is best seen as one who was 
long enough dependent upon other persons to acquire the essential arts of 
personhood. Persons essentially are second persons. Implications of this 
claim ... add up to a repudiation of individualism in its ethical and episte-
mological manifestations, which is less an explicit critique than a demon-
stration of the communal basis of moral and mental activity. It is possible 
to endorse Baier's 'second persons' claim without renouncing individuality, 
if 'individuality' is not equated with 'individualism.' "16 While this view of 
the self can also be found in the work of the pragmatists, feminist analysis 
has done much to deepen both the critique of the classical liberal individual 
and the development of alternative models. Most specifically for this chap-
ter, feminist analysis has drawn attention to how our thinking about gen-
der affects our view of the self, and so of knowledge and truth. If the self 
is not atomistic but rather is social, does not present itself as fully grown 
and autonomous but rather as dependent and developing, our notions of 
knowledge and truth are challenged as well. 
As with pragmatism, a paper like this cannot begin to do justice to the 
rich history and variety found within feminist theory. So here I will con-
Scully as Pragmatist Feminist 135 
tinue to rely on Lorraine Code's What Can She Know? to make the points 
most central to my analysis. 
First, feminist analysis reveals the ways in which women have been dis-
credited as knowers. Through most of the history of philosophy women 
have been connected more to emotion than reason, more to the body than 
the mind, more to the particular than the universal, more to the concrete 
than the abstract, more to the subjective than the objective. Agent Scully 
must dety this picture of the feminine to gain credibility as a doctor and as 
an FBI agent. As a man, Mulder is granted credibility, which is then under-
mined by his unorthodox beliefs. Understanding that women start off with 
a lack of credibility is important for understanding why pragmatist and 
feminist views of knowledge and truth are often seen as suspect. Tradition-
ally in philosophy "theoretical knowledge ranks as the highest achievement 
of reason. It is abstract, universal, timeless, and True. To attain this status it 
must transcend the particularity of practice (praxis) with its preoccupation 
with the contingent, the concrete, the here and now."17 Women like Scully 
work hard to transcend as well, so they will be taken seriously. Both prag-
matism and feminism challenge this idea and embrace a view of knowledge 
and truth that begins and ends with practice and is seen as partial and 
perspectival- that is, subjective. As Code says, "There is no good reason 
to believe that taking subjectivity into account entails abandoning objec-
tivity."18 But many who embrace the more traditional view see it this way. 
Both pragmatists and feminists see knowledge and truth as a slow, com-
municative process. Knowledge and truth are never fixed or complete but 
always tentative. Embracing the sociality and uncertainty of knowledge and 
truth claims is seen by pragmatists and feminists as a "safeguard against 
dogmatism and rigidity."19 More-traditional views dismiss it as relativism. 
In the realm of philosophy, relativism is usually seen as an "anything 
goes" approach to knowledge that lacks rigor and objectivity. Relativism is 
seen as synonymous with a lack of critical thinking and judgment. There is, 
however, a critical or mitigated relativism that is open to the uncertainty of 
knowledge, and so is able to embrace multiple perspectives, while still en-
abling a critical perspective capable of making informed judgments. One 
example of this can be seen in feminist approaches to knowledge, perhaps 
most clearly embodied in feminist approaches to science. 
This kind of approach calls for respect for what is being studied rather 
than a cool distance, an ability to listen to others rather than an attempt to 
reduce and control others, an understanding of positionality that allows 
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one to understand differences rather than a purported universal stance, and 
a willingness to be held accountable for one's actions rather than a posi-
tion of neutrality.20 One begins to wonder if this is not just good science, 
rather than a particularly feminist approach. Science is a project of testing 
hypotheses. It requires a community of inquirers to replicate and challenge 
results and theories. It requires control in an experiment but also an ability 
to see and hear the unexpected. It requires that we take the approach Lor-
raine Code calls mitigated or critical relativism: "Hence I have argued for a 
mitigated relativism, constrained by objectivity and a commitment to real-
ism, but capable of taking subjectivity, accountability, and a range of per-
spectives seriously into account by refusing the tyranny of ideal objectivity, 
universality, and gender-neutrality."2! Feminist approaches to knowledge 
and truth, then, see that the perspective of the knower is always at play 
and that this subjectivity must be acknowledged in order to attain anything 
like objectivity. Denial of subjectivity results in the misguided attempt to 
make a particular perspective or experience into a universal perspective or 
experience. Feminists understand the consequences of such a move all too 
well, as that is what the history of knowledge and truth claims has been-
male perspectives and experiences universalized as human perspectives 
and experiences. 
This insight supports and deepens the pragmatist approach to knowl-
edge and truth. Pragmatism, feminism, and good science all require a pro-
cessive approach to knowledge and an understanding of truth as partial, 
perspectival, and tentative. This calls for a pluralistic approach that is open 
to alternatives. The episode "all things" pushes just this point as Scully shifts 
her approach. 
Scullys Pragmatist Feminist Approach: "all things" Considered 
Throughout the series, as she seeks to explain the cases she and Mulder 
work, we see Scully embodying the process of developing knowledge and 
belief that James describes (ascribed to Schiller and Dewey). She encounters 
aproblem that is an open question and she deliberately seeks to resolve the 
problem and explain the unexplained. She hits a roadblock and is pushed 
to consider other explanations. As James says: 
The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a 
new experience that puts them to a strain. Somebody contradicts 
them; or in a reflective moment he discovers that they contradict 
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each other; or he hears of facts with which they are incompatible; 
or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy. The result is an 
inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, 
and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass 
of opinions. He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of 
belief we are all extreme conservatives. So he tries to change first 
this opinion, and then that (for they resist change very variously), 
until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the 
ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter, some 
idea that mediates between the stock and the new experience and 
runs them into one another most felicitously and expedientlyY 
We see this in episode after episode. Scully offers her empiricist scientific 
explanation at the start of each case. She pursues her investigation along 
these lines until something she cannot explain clearly persists or something 
new arises. Then we are usually left to consider Mulder's more eccentric 
theory, with Scully's doubts ringing in our ears. She does not, however, usu-
ally rule out his ideas completely. 
In "all things" we see Scully encounter a "state of perplexity, hesitation, 
doubt."23 When she dismisses Mulder's trip to look for crop circles, saying 
she is not interested in "sneaky farmers who happened to ace geometry in 
high school," she is sure of her more rational scientific view and approach. 
When she goes to the hospital to pick up the autopsy results that confirm 
her view of a case as drowning, not from "inhalation of ectoplasm" as Mul-
der contested, but from rapidly consumed margarita mix, she is even more 
sure of herself. But when she opens the envelope, instead of autopsy results 
she finds an X-ray with her former lover's name on it. She goes back to 
the nurse's station to clear up the problem and confirms that the patient 
is indeed her former lover. She would never have known he was in D.C., 
much less that he was sick, if she had not worked the case with Mulder that 
led her to go get these autopsy results and if those results had not gotten 
mixed up with his file. She tries to ignore this coincidence and get on with 
her business, but she almost gets into an automobile accident. Being dis-
tracted by what becomes a repeated vision of a woman in a baseball cap and 
hooded jacket is the only thing that saves her. At the American Taoist Heal-
ing Center she first encounters the idea that the coincidences and accidents 
might be something more and that she should pay attention. 
When Daniel's heart stops, she takes appropriate medical action, but 
he ends up in a coma. We then see Scully engage in an "act of search or 
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investigation directed toward bringing to light further facts which serve to 
corroborate or to nullify the suggested belief."24 When she returns to the 
Taoist healing center to get more information, she is engaged in investiga-
tion. When she follows the vision of the woman in the baseball cap into a 
Buddhist temple, she is engaged in investigation. When she brings in the 
man to run energy through Daniel's chakras, she is engaged in further in-
vestigation that might serve to corroborate or nullify the new beliefs she is 
encountering. In the end she tells Daniel it was no accident that he got sick, 
signaling an embrace of this knew way of thinking and knowing. 
John Dewey says, "To maintain the state of doubt and to carryon sys-
tematic and protracted inquiry-these are the essentials of thinking."25 
Scully had done this throughout the series. In this episode it results in a 
more radical shift of perspective. In the end, when she and Mulder are talk-
ing over everything that has happened since he left town, he says, "I leave 
town for two days and your whole life changes?" "I didn't say my whole life 
changed." When Mulder notes, "You spoke to god in a Buddhist temple and 
god spoke back;' she says, "I didn't say god spoke back:' We see that Scully 
begins to qualify this new view of things and subject the whole experience 
to her more accustomed methods. These are to be seen, not as competing 
systems, but as complementary, as are Scully and Mulder themselves. That 
they apparently sleep together that night can be seen as a metaphor for the 
integration of the two approaches Scully and Mulder represent. That plu-
ralism is the pragmatist feminist approach to knowledge and truths. 
Conclusion 
Both pragmatism and feminism are seen by some as fringe elements of 
philosophy. Their approach to knowledge and truth are often singled out 
as the grounds for dismissing them as not "real" philosophy. They are ac-
cused of being relativistic and subjective-sins from the perspective of 
the more traditional view of knowledge and truth, which seeks a single, 
universal, and objective perspective. However, careful reading of the wide 
variety of views explored in these traditions (again, something beyond the 
scope of this chapter) reveals that their relativism is a critical relativism, 
not an "anything goes" approach to knowledge and truth. Their subjectiv-
ity actually results in a more informed and objective stance. 
Perhaps pragmatists and feminists who have worked hard to gain cred-
ibility for these schools of thought will cringe at the idea of connecting 
them to some of the more radical beliefs found in The X-Files series, and in 
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this episode in particular. However, it is important to remember that both 
these schools of thought, in all their diversity, are grounded in both a radi-
cal empiricism and a radical pluralism. Knowledge and truth are always 
partial and incomplete, which means dogmatism and close-mindedness 
are not viable options. Their brand of relativism, while not overly permis-
sive, does require remaining open. Scully remains skeptical and careful and 
moves her beliefs a little at a time, like James's grease spots. 
Our minds thus grow in spots; and like grease-spots, the spots 
spread. But we let them spread as little as possible: we keep unal-
tered as much of our old knowledge, as many of our old prejudices 
and beliefs, as we can. We patch and tinker more than we renew. 
The novelty soaks in; it stains the ancient mass; but it is also tinged 
by what absorbs it. Our past apperceives and co-operates; and in 
the new equilibrium in which each step forward in the process of 
learning terminates, it happens relatively seldom that the new fact 
is added raw. More usually it is embedded cooked, as one might 
say, or stewed down in the sauce of the 01d.26 
Scully allows her experiences, strange as they may be, to become part of the 
experiences she brings to the inquiry-an inquiry based on long-held be-
liefs and practices. She uses intelligence, purpose, and foresight to achieve 
the critical engagement with the world that John Dewey calls lived experi-
ence-the most complete and satisfying kind of experienceY I think prag-
matists and feminists alike should embrace Agent Scully as a great example 
of the kind of inquiry they seek to promote. 
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leable. Her duties remain in the private realm, she takes on his religion and political 
views, and she is dependent on Emile. Rousseau argues that Emile and Sophie need to 
remain opposites so they can complement each other when they unite in marriage-a 
stronger state for each than when they are on their own. We find, however, that Sophie 
cannot be on her own. She is necessarily dependent on a male figure, while Emile can 
exist productively in his own right (just missing the refinements Sophie provides). 
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Moral Musings on 
a Cigarette Smoking Man 
Timothy Dunn and Joseph]. Foy 
CIGARETTE SMOKING MAN: "It's a scary story. You want to come 
sit on my lap?" 
AGENT SCULLY: "You don't scare me:' 
CIGARETTE SMOKING MAN: "My story's scared every president 
since Truman in '47." 
- "The Truth" 
In a series filled with intriguing and enigmatic characters, the Cigarette 
Smoking Man (CSM) is surely one of the most fascinating. From his initial 
appearance in "Pilot:' in which he is first seen lurking in the background 
as Dana Scully is assigned to work on the X-Files, to his almost mythical 
demise in the series finale "The Truth:' the CSM is shrouded in mystery. 
He is a man of many nicknames (Smoking Man, CIA Man, Captain, Old 
Smokey) and aliases (c. G. B. Spender, Mr. Hunt, Mr. Bloodworth). He is 
allegedly responsible for numerous historical events, from the assassina-
tions of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. to the United States' 
"Miracle on Ice" Olympic hockey victory over the Soviet Union in 1980. 
While much is revealed about him, his identity remains largely inscrutable. 
But while there is no consensus regarding his identity, most X-Philes 
agree about his character. Dressed in a dark suit, always smoking, rarely 
smiling, he is the quintessential villain and the principal enemy of Mulder 
and Scully, the heroes of the series. Full of lies and deceit, he will stop at 
nothing to accomplish his mission, even if it means sacrificing his wife for 
secret genetic testing or attempting to kill his son. He is as ruthless as he 
is clever, and his contempt for humanity is perhaps the only thing he does 
not bother to disguise. The conventional wisdom regarding the CSM is 
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supported by series creator Chris Carter, who once referred to him simply 
as "the devil.") 
Yet a minority of X-Philes-including William B. Davis, the actor 
who plays the CSM-argue that the conventional wisdom is mistaken. In 
their view, the CSM is not a sinister villain but rather a hero compelled by 
extraordinary circumstances to lie, deceive, and even kill, all for the sake of 
protecting humanity. He is one of the few people with the courage and the 
steely resolve to do what is necessary, even if it means ignoring traditional 
moral norms. He should be honored, not condemned, for what he does. 
What are we to make of such disparate interpretations? Is his charac-
ter, like his identity, ultimately inscrutable? Is there anything to be learned 
from an ethical analysis of his character? In this chapter, we will attempt to 
answer these questions. In our view, the conventional wisdom is partially 
correct, but it does not explain why he is evil. Our goal is to sketch an inter-
pretation of his character that sheds some light not only on the CSM but 
also on the nature of evil more generally. Our conclusion is that the CSM 
is no ordinary villain but represents a particularly perverse inversion of 
the moral order and, as such, challenges traditional morality in a far more 
fundamental way. 
The CSM as Immoral Villain 
In "Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man;' Melvin Frohike (Tom Braid-
wood) claims, "If you find the right starting point and follow it, not even 
the secrets of the darkest men are safe:' Our own starting point will be the 
conventional account of the CSM's moral character. Before discussing the 
conventional wisdom, however, a few words about our methodology are in 
order. There are at least two ways in which we might morally evaluate a per-
son's character and actions. First, we can rely on widely accepted, prereflec-
tive, commonsense moral judgments and principles. Taking these as given, 
we can then use them to evaluate a person's character or the moral quality 
of his actions. For example, almost everyone agrees that lying and killing 
innocent people are wrong, and anyone who routinely commits these acts 
is normally considered to be an immoral person. Such a method is some-
times called a "bottom-up" approach: generalizations regarding a person's 
character are drawn from specific examples of clearly immoral conduct. 
Alternatively, we might opt for a more theoretical, "top-down" approach, 
arguing from general, abstract ethical principles and sophisticated moral 
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philosophical frameworks to a conclusion about a specific person or action. 
Such an approach begins by assuming the truth of a given ethical theory 
and ends with a judgment about a specific case. These two methods are 
complementary; we can use widely held moral intuitions to form general-
izations, and in turn use these generalizations to reach conclusions about 
specific cases. 
Using either approach, a prima facie case can be made in support of 
the conventional wisdom. Consider, first, the bottom-up method. Lying 
and killing innocent persons are, as we said earlier, widely considered im-
moral. And this is precisely what the CSM does over and over again. His 
obfuscation of the truth ranges from artfully manipulating Mulder into 
drawing conclusions that the CSM wants him to reach (he is quite adept 
at carrying out his own order to Marita Covarrubias [Laurie Holden] in 
"Zero Sum" to tell Mulder "what he wants to hear"), to directly lying to 
Deep Throat in "Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man" when he says that 
he has "never killed anyone."2 
The conventional analysis of his character becomes clearer when we 
consider the broader X-Files mythology. As a member of the shadow or-
ganization known as the Syndicate-which some X-Philes refer to as the 
Consortium-the CSM is involved in an ongoing secret collaboration 
with aliens who are plotting to colonize Earth. As part of this Vichy-style 
alliance, he attempts to perpetually deceive humankind in order to divert 
attention from the covert operations of the Syndicate and the alien colo-
nists. The CSM's con of humanity, therefore, places him in an antagonistic 
position in relation to Mulder and Scully and their pursuit of the truth and 
makes him, in a sense, a traitor to humankind. That he smokes, is always 
dressed in a dark suit, oversees events from the shadows, and so on, only 
makes the conventional wisdom seem obvious: if the series has a clear and 
unambiguous villain, surely it is he.3 
The harsh judgment of moral common sense seems to be further sup-
ported by standard ethical principles and theories. We will limit our dis-
cussion to two of the most important ones, beginning with Kantianism. 
For Immanuel Kant, our moral duties are derived from a principle known 
as the Categorical Imperative. Kant held that all moral obligations arise 
from this one principle, though he believed that it could be expressed in 
more than one way. According to one version of this principle, known as 
the Universal Law Formula, we must "act only according to that maxim by 
which ... [we] can at the same time will that it should become a univer-
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sal law." Exactly what this means and how this principle is supposed to be 
applied are complicated matters; however, Kant himself clearly intended 
it to preclude lying and murder. The core idea behind the Universal Law 
Formula is that, in order for an action to be ethical, we must be able to will 
that everyone in similar circumstances act in a similar fashion; otherwise, 
we are merely making exceptions for ourselves.4 
Consider, for example, lying. Why is it wrong to lie? Although a de-
tailed explanation is quite complicated, for Kant the simple answer is that 
it is ethically unacceptable because if lying were a universal law, then lying 
itself would become impossible. In a world in which everyone lied, no one 
would be believed. Thus, lying, which requires that one succeed in getting 
another to adopt a false belief, would become impossible. (Perhaps this is 
why the CSM has the phrase «Trust no one" engraved on his lighter. He 
himself is not to be believed, thus he does not believe anyone else.) The 
liar, therefore, contradicts himself, and no contradictory principle can be 
morally correct. Since the CSM routinely lies, and presumably is motivated 
by a desire to lie, his behavior, and indeed his character, is clearly vicious. 
Our assessment of the CSM's actions would fare no better if we adopted 
the second version of the categorical imperative, sometimes called the Re-
spect for Persons Formula. In this version, we must always treat persons 
as ends in themselves, never merely as a means. What, exactly, does this 
mean? According to Onora O'Neill, to treat persons merely as a means is 
«to involve them in a scheme of action to which they could not in principle 
consent." Since lying involves misrepresenting the facts, and such mis-
representation is inconsistent with genuine consent, lying violates the sec-
ond formula of the categorical imperative as well. 5 
If the CSM were simply a pathological liar, he would not be the person-
ification of evil many X-Philes consider him to be. But of course he is far 
more than that, as the list of his iniquities ranges from having an affair with 
Teena (Rebecca Toolan), the wife of his friend Bill Mulder (Peter Donat), 
to the merciless execution of those who get in his way. Consider, for ex-
ample, his willingness to murder his son in order to keep his secrets-and 
those of the Syndicate and alien colonists-hidden. In the season 6 epi-
sode «One Son:' the CSM watches his son, Jeffrey Spender (Chris Owens), 
turn from furthering his father's interests to helping Mulder and Scully in 
their pursuit of the truth. In the end, the CSM confronts his son, and real-
izing that young Spender will not aid him in hiding the truth, he shoots his 
son in cold blood. The attempted murder of one's own son crosses the line 
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between the prosaic immorality of lying and manipulation and irredeem-
able villainy, demonstrating the depths to which the Cigarette Smoking 
Man will sink to conceal the truth from the world. Such an act is widely as-
sumed to be inconsistent with both versions of the categorical imperative.6 
The judgment of Kantian ethics is further supported by utilitarianism. 
Utilitarians believe that actions are right insofar as they tend to promote 
happiness, and wrong insofar as they tend to promote unhappiness. For 
the classical utilitarians, happiness is equivalent to pleasure, and unhap-
piness is equivalent to pain. Thus, for utilitarians, an action is right if it 
produces more overall happiness than any alternative. Unlike Kant, utili-
tarians do believe that lying and even murder are sometimes morally per-
missible. However, such actions are permissible only if they produce more 
good than harm. 
Similar to Kantianism, therefore, utilitarian ethics seems to provide 
ample reason to condemn the CSM. His actions, after all, frequently cause 
harm, suffering, and even death to others. For example, he orders his sub-
ordinate, Alex Krycek (Nicholas Lea), to carry out a number of assaults 
and assassinations- including a raid of Dana Scully's apartment that leads 
to the murder of her sister Melissa (Melinda McGraw) in "The Blessing 
Way" -and then in turn orders the failed attempt to eliminate Krycek 
with a car bomb in the season 3 episode "Paper Clip." Likewise, the CSM 
is thought to be tied to the abduction of innocent people for a variety of 
genetic tests, including the abduction tests performed on Agent Scully as 
indicated in the episodes "Ascension" and "One Breath." The CSM also 
uses people's weaknesses in an effort to control them. For example, he toys 
with Agent Mulder, capitalizing on his obsession with finding his sister to 
manipulate Mulder by allowing him to meet Samantha (Megan Leitch) in 
"Redux II." However, it was later revealed to Mulder that this Samantha 
was a clone, just like the clones of his sister that he found working the 
Syndicate's bee colony in "Herrenvolk:' Finally, the sheer delight he takes 
in inflicting this pain is indicative of a sadistic character. In the season 6 
premier, "The Beginning:' the Cigarette Smoking Man says of his actions 
regarding Mulder: "You can kill a man, but you can't kill what he stands 
for. Not unless you first break his spirit. That's a beautiful thing to see:' 
In sum, from the perspective of both moral common sense and two 
prominent ethical theories, the Cigarette Smoking Man's actions are highly 
immoral. Unless a justification can be found for his behavior, it seems that 
the conventional wisdom is correct. 
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The CSM as Moral Hero? 
Despite the above arguments, there are those who are unhappy with the 
conventional wisdom and are unlikely to be convinced by our arguments 
in support of it. William B. Davis himself offered a spirited defense of the 
CSM in an online interview conducted on March 11,1999. Davis essentially 
argued that the CSM's actions, though at times ruthless, were necessary to 
prevent a far greater evil. If humanity ever discovered the truth about the 
impending alien invasion, the world would erupt in chaos and panic. And 
though not all X -Philes would go as far as Davis does, many of them argue 
that the CSM cannot be summarily dismissed as purely eviU 
Davis's defense of the CSM is more plausible when we recall the elabo-
rate mythology of the series. Alien colonists are looking, not to subjugate 
humanity to slavery, but to use their bodies as a host for the black oil, a 
virus that gestates and feeds off the human body while it comes to term as 
a full alien life form. Thus, the success of the colonists would necessarily 
mean a new form of holocaust in which all of humanity is eliminated. The 
aliens have solicited help from the Syndicate in order to implement their 
plans to more efficiently and effectively create a slave class of genetically 
engineered, human-alien hybrids. They are fully capable, however, of using 
brute force to completely destroy humanity should they deem it necessary, 
and there is no evidence that there is anything anyone can do to stop them. 
Yet we learn in the 1998 feature film Fight the Future that the CSM is a part 
of a secret plot to refine and produce a vaccine that would prevent the alien 
virus from infesting humans and using their bodies as hosts for incuba-
tion. Such a plot is enormously risky. If the truth ever got out that a vac-
cine was being developed, the alien colonists would step up the timetable 
for colonization, resulting in the inevitable extinction of humanity. On the 
other hand, if the members of the Syndicate were to succeed in deceiving 
both the aliens and humanity, then the development of the vaccine might 
defeat the plans of the alien colonists.8 
In such extraordinary circumstances, many of the CSM's actions seem 
morally defensible. Recall that, for utilitarians, even lying and murder 
are morally permissible if the good to be gained (or the harm to be pre-
vented) thereby is sufficiently great. In the circumstances described above, 
the development of a vaccine is humanity's only realistic hope for sur-
vival. On the plausible assumption that the vaccine's development depends 
on absolute secrecy, preserving that secret using any means necessary is 
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at least arguably justified. Moreover, what are the alternatives? If he does 
nothing, the CSM essentially consigns himself and all of humanity to near 
certain doom. In all likelihood, anyone he kills will die anyway. It is of 
course uncertain whether killing his son is, for example, necessary to pro-
tect the secret plan, but it is a reasonable calculation. In some cases, his 
single-minded devotion to protecting humanity actually saves lives. In ''As-
cension:' for example, the CSM actually persuades fellow Syndicate mem-
bers not to kill Mulder, on the grounds that killing him would turn "one 
man's religion into a crusade:' thereby increasing chances of exposure. 
Ironically, given this perspective, it is the series's putative heroes, Mul-
der and Scully, who pose the greatest threat to humanity. Their relentless 
search for the truth, while generally a noble endeavor, is in this case a grave 
threat. Not knowing the truth, of course, they should not be blamed. But 
that is precisely the point. The CSM does know the truth, and he knows 
what he must do, no matter the cost. Thus, the conventional wisdom that 
the CSM is a despicable villain fails to acknowledge the circumstances in 
which he is forced to act. 
In real-life cases, of course, the morally correct course of action will 
often be much more difficult to determine. Ruthless actions such as tor-
ture and murder, even when done for the sake of society or humanity, will 
in practice almost invariably involve troubling moral trade-offs, ethical 
ambiguities, and potentially disastrous side-effects. Our argument above, 
therefore, is not to be interpreted as a blank check for public officials to do 
whatever they deem necessary for the public good. Nevertheless, utilitari-
ans would argue that, even in real life, if the potential gains were sufficiently 
great, ruthless actions such as those done by the CSM would be justified. 
Interestingly, the Cigarette Smoking Man himself tries in "Talitha Cumi" 
to defend his actions. Borrowing from the infamous Inquisitor character 
from Fyodor Dostoyevsky's novel The Brothers Karamazov, he claims that 
"men can never be free, because they're weak, corrupt, worthless and rest-
less." He then offers renegade alien Jeremiah Smith (Roy Thinnes) the justi-
fication alluded to above: if humanity were ever to learn the truth, anarchy 
and chaos would erupt. Humankind, therefore, needs someone like the 
CSM who has the mettle and fortitude to do what must be done. He sum-
marizes this position in "One Breath" when he tells Mulder, "If people were 
to know the things I know, it would all fall apart!' From a utilitarian per-
spective, therefore, his actions seem defensible. 
One might think that, even if utilitarians would, in light of further ex-
amination, approve of his actions, Kantians would clearly not. Recall Kant's 
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argument that lying is wrong because no rational being could will that the 
maxim of his action should become a universal law. Kant thought that 
lying was wrong in all circumstances, regardless of the consequences. Even 
lying to save an innocent person's life would be wrong, as Kant explicitly 
argues in his essay On the Supposed Right to Lie for Philanthropic Reasons. 
Needless to say, many people find Kant's insistence on the absolute wrong-
ness oflying highly implausible. Some philosophers summarily reject Kant's 
theory on the grounds that it leads to such absurd conclusions, but Kant's 
defenders have argued that the problem is not with Kant's theory itself but 
rather with Kant's own application of it. Again, the argument here is rather 
complicated, but the basic idea is that while lying in general is not univer-
salizable, lying to save an innocent person's life is universalizable and one 
could consistently will that exceptions be made in such cases. This is con-
sistent with the spirit of Kantianism because as long as one is willing to say 
that it would be morally permissible for anyone to lie in similar circum-
stances, one's actions pass the universal-law test. In defense of the CSM, we 
could likewise argue that his actions are universalizable and hence permis-
sible from a Kantian perspective. 
The above arguments represent a mere fraction of the sophisticated 
philosophical resources available. The Kantian and utilitarian arguments 
alone barely scratch the surface. It is important to keep in mind, therefore, 
that the above is intended only as a sample of the kind of argument one 
could offer in defense of the CSM. At this point some might conclude that 
enough has been said to vindicate him from the charge of moral turpi-
tude. Unfortunately, the above defense, while persuasive as far as it goes, 
overlooks certain important facts. While some of the CSM's actions might 
be justified by virtue of his role in the dual cover-up, there are too many 
examples of behavior that cannot be so justified. For example, in "Talitha 
Cumi," when Jeremiah Smith informs him he is dying of cancer, the CSM 
threatens the plans of the alien colonists-as well as jeopardizing every-
thing the Syndicate is attempting with the development of a vaccine-by 
releasing Smith. His reason, however, was not for mercy or charity but for 
a tit -for- tat exchange: if he releases this renegade, Smith will cure his can-
cer. This shows that, although he likes to present himself as someone who 
will sacrifice anything for the sake of humanity's survival, the CSM is a 
hypocrite. Likewise, a true hero would likely seek to cause no more harm 
than is absolutely necessary for the sake of his mission. But much of the 
evil the CSM causes has no bearing whatsoever on his mission but is com-
pletely gratuitous. In fact, the CSM performs so many nefarious deeds that 
150 Timothy Dunn and Joseph J. Foy 
he amusedly asks Mulder in the season 7 episode "The Sixth Extinction II: 
Amor Fati": "How does anything I do surprise you now? Aren't you expect-
ing me to sprout vampire fangs?" Concomitantly, unlike a morally justified 
but reluctant hero, the CSM seems to perform moral actions only when 
he can get something in return. He admits to Scully in the seventh-season 
episode "En Ami" that he believes that "no sacrifice is purely altruistic. We 
give expecting to receive." In overlooking the essentially gratuitous nature 
of much of the harm he causes, the CSM's defenders paint a distorted pic-
ture of his character. 
In sum, while both ethical theory and commonsense morality offer a 
potential justification for some of the CSM's actions, much of his behavior 
remains unjustifiable by any plausible moral standard. All too often, he 
displays a reckless disregard and contempt for humanity. This leads us to 
suspect that he is not primarily motivated by moral concerns but rather by 
something altogether different. What follows is a reevaluation of the CSM 
that goes beyond the traditional arguments about his character, and an 
examination of the true motivation driving his behavior. 
The CSM and the "Transvaluation of Power" 
Both the conventional wisdom about the CSM and the challenge raised by 
his defenders capture part of the truth but ultimately miss the mark. While 
he is not uniformly evil, at least not in any ordinary sense, he neverthe-
less is no moral hero. Of the two positions, the conventional wisdom is 
perhaps closer to the truth. However, it does not really adequately explain 
why he is evil, and for that reason it fails to come to terms with the distinct 
nature of the CSM. Moral theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism 
help to explain why his actions are wrong, but they do not explain why he 
does them. What does the CSM ultimately stand for? 
To answer this question, we must employ some basic philosophical ter-
minology. Philosophers distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic goods. 
Intrinsic goods are things that are good in themselves, or good for their 
own sake. Extrinsic goods (also known as instrumental goods), on the other 
hand, are things whose value depends on their usefulness in promoting 
other values or goods. They are good, not for their own sake, but rather for 
the sake of other things. Utilitarianism, for example, holds that the only 
thing intrinsically good is happiness. All other goods-health, wealth, know-
ledge, and so on-are valuable only insofar as they promote happiness.9 
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One of the defining characteristics of the CSM is his lust for power. 
According to most moral theories, power has extrinsic, but not intrinsic, 
value. That it has extrinsic value, both good and bad, is easy to see. Power 
can be used for numerous purposes, from the magnificent to the mundane. 
It can be used to move mountains, build bridges, irrigate drought-stricken 
lands, and liberate oppressed peoples. It can also be used to destroy moun-
tains and bridges, flood cities, and oppress liberated peoples. This standard 
view of power is that it is simply a tool: by itself morally neutral, but capable 
of producing good or bad results depending on how it is used. 
Perhaps the most interesting and disturbing thing about the CSM is 
that he appears to perform what we call a transvaluatioh of power. By this 
we mean that he elevates power to the level of intrinsic goods. For him, 
power becomes not merely a means to an end but an end in itself. All other 
values, including friendship, virtue, and even his own happiness, become 
subordinate. The CSM regards power as singularly valuable in itself, and 
everything else is valuable only insofar as it enables him to maintain or 
increase that power. Rather than viewing power as a means to some type 
of end-even an immoral end, as, say, the classic examples of Hitler and 
Stalin would do-the CSM regards power itself as the rightful object of 
human affairs. His closest parallel is neither Stalin nor Hitler but rather 
the character O'Brien in George Orwell's 1984. O'Brien's vision of the fu-
ture is one in which the party reigns supreme and humanity is ultimately 
vanquished. Nothing escapes the clutches of the party, not even objective 
truth. If the party says that 2 + 3 = 7, then it is so. If the party says some-
one never existed, then he did not. To what end does the party seek such 
power? Certainly it is not for such vulgar purposes as the abolition of capi-
talism or bolshevism. No, the party seeks power for the sake of acquiring 
more power, which in turn will enable it to acquire still more power. 
There is ample evidence from the series to support our assessment of 
the CSM's character. Consider, for example, the way in which his obfus-
cation of the truth increases his authority over others. In "One Breath:' 
Mulder threatens an unarmed CSM with a gun. The CSM, however, is only 
too delighted to reveal to Mulder that, although he is unarmed, he is still 
the one with the power. "You can kill me now, but you will never know 
the truth," he explains. "And that's why I'll win:' Likewise, he is able to 
control his subordinates, such as Alex Krycek, by withholding information 
from them while they act on his behalf. In "Ascension:' for example, when 
Krycek insists that he has the right to know the CSM's plans for Scully, he 
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solidifies his power over Krycek by continuing to withhold the informa-
tion. "You have no rights;' he told Krycek, "only orders to be followed!' 
Here he is clearly demonstrating that Krycek is not an equal partner, not 
someone who gets to be in on the plan. Having complete access to the truth 
that he denies to others gives him power to control situations, people, and 
outcomes. 
Critics of our view might point out that while these examples show 
that the CSM values power, they do not yet show that he values power for 
its own sake. For all we have shown so far, the CSM may well value power 
as a means to some "higher" end. He might still be criticized as a villain for 
his actions, but he would be a much more ordinary villain than we imag-
ine him. We have two responses to such a challenge. 
First, there are just too many examples in which the CSM seems to 
take pleasure in the mere possession of power over others. For example, 
at the end of "Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man;' he sits alone, staring 
through the sight of a sniper rifle targeted on Frohike. Rather than shooting 
him, the CSM quotes from one of his supposed Jack Colquitt novels: "I can 
kill you whenever I please-but not today!' Only he would ever know that 
at that moment he held the power of life and death over another human 
being, but he seems to bask in the sadistic joy that such power brings him. 
It is the same twisted pleasure that he seems to derive when, in "Paper Clip;' 
he venomously describes to Assistant Director Skinner (Mitch Pileggi) all 
the ways he could kill Skinner and make it look like an accident should he 
so choose (arrange for a plane to crash, cause him to get botulism or have 
a heart attack). One might still try to argue, of course, that such behavior 
is really motivated by a desire to promote some other end, but the simpler 
explanation seems to be that he desires power for its own sake. This point 
is further supported by considering examples in which he appears to have 
used his power for completely trivial purposes (e.g., preventing the Buffalo 
Bills from winning the Super Bowl). It is hard to imagine what end would 
be served thereby, other than delighting in one's own power. 
Additionally, if he did desire power merely as a means to an end, what 
end would this be? Two plausible candidates (each corresponding roughly 
to one of the competing interpretations of his character that were dis-
cussed earlier) are his own self-interest or happiness, or the altruistic end 
of protecting humanity from the alien plot. Neither of these possibilities, 
however, holds up under scrutiny. Consider, first, the idea that he really de-
sires power in order to promote his self-interest or as a means of achieving 
happiness. The main problem with this interpretation is that his pursuit 
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of power does not in fact serve his interests, nor does it make him happy. 
The power he possesses enables him to survive, but he lives only to acquire 
more power. Seeking such power robs him of whatever happiness he might 
hope to achieve, as symbolized in his isolated existence. He lives alone. 
When he is shown celebrating holidays, it is by himself. He is despised by 
every member of his family and is alienated from the rest of humanity. 
Insofar as happiness is a necessary part of a person's well-being, his pursuit 
of power seems to run counter to his self-interest. Thus, the acquisition of 
power, if unchecked, does not even benefit its possessor, while its possessor 
threatens all others. This inversion of the moral order, in which pleasure 
and happiness (not to mention Kantian or Aristotelian virtue) are sacri-
ficed for the sake of more power, is indeed a potent challenge to traditional 
morality. 
It is also implausible to say that his desire for power is motivated pri-
marily by altruistic concerns. For one thing, as we have already argued, 
there are too many examples in which the CSM causes gratuitous harm. 
If he desired power only as a tool for protecting humanity from harm, he 
would not take such delight in causing harm, even if such harm were nec-
essary. Furthermore, the CSM's pursuit of power contrasts with that of fel-
low Syndicate members such as Bill Mulder, Deep Throat (Jerry Hardin), 
and the Well-Manicured Man (John Neville). Although less is known about 
them, each of these characters eventually forsakes his pursuit of power be-
cause such power interferes with other values that he cares about. In Fight 
the Future the Well-Manicured Man, for example, is assassinated for de-
fecting from the Syndicate in an attempt to bring about a better future 
for his children and grandchildren. Likewise, although deeply involved 
with the Syndicate's activities for many years, men like Bill Mulder, Deep 
Throat, and Alvin Kurtzweil (Martin Landau) also reach a point where the 
power struggles and deception become too much for them. They indicate 
that their involvement with the Syndicate's shadow conspiracies were for 
their families and humanity and to hold on to a hope for the future. With 
the CSM, however, his involvement in developing a vaccine for the alien 
virus-or developing the tools to cure cancer, as in the season 7 episode 
"En Ami" -could be easily seen as being done, not for his own good or 
humanity's, but simply because having such cures offers him substantial 
power over life and death. 
Perhaps the most telling example of his transvaluation of power is 
revealed even as he draws what were to be his final smoky breaths. In the 
series finale, "The Truth;' after detailing the plan for a full alien colonization 
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by 2012, he wickedly delights in telling Mulder: "My power comes from 
telling you. Seeing your powerlessness, hearing it. They wanted to kill you, 
Fox. I protected you all these years; waiting for this moment. To see you 
broken, afraid. Now you can die." His last appearance on the show offers us 
a reminder that his only joy is not in the success of saving the planet from 
the alien colonists, or subjugating humanity as one of their collaborators, 
but simply in having power over others. That is his raison d'etre. 
If our analysis is correct, then the defining moral characteristic of the 
CSM is his monomaniacal pursuit of power for its own sake, no matter 
what the cost. His willingness to sacrifice all other values for the sake of 
something that, in itself, seems morally neutral is a particularly insidious 
perversion of the moral order. This is in part what makes the CSM such 
a fascinating villain. But the question remains whether such a character 
teaches us anything interesting about the nature of good and evil. 
Insights into Good and Evil 
One conclusion seems fairly certain: the CSM's moral pathology is highly 
unusual, but it is not without literary or pop cultural precedent. A simi-
lar transvaluation of power can be seen not only in Orwell's O'Brien but 
also in such popular science fiction characters as SmeagollGollum (Lord of 
the Rings) and Palpatine / Darth Sidious (Star Wars). Likewise, this brand 
of moral pathology is not limited to power. Dickens's Ebenezer Scrooge 
is like the CSM except that it is not power that he desires above all but 
money. Scrooge's desire for pecuniary gain comes to dominate and pervert 
his system of values in an analogous fashion. The CSM is of interest in part 
because of his similarity to these and other fictional characters. 
But he is also of interest because his peculiar pathology is not limited 
to fictional characters. Examples of an analogous transvaluation of money 
can be found in real life as well. Consider the argument made by Robert E. 
Lane concerning the transvaluation of prosperity in many of the world's 
advanced economies. While he does not use the language of transvaluation, 
Lane empirically demonstrates that although wealth that allows people to 
meet their basic needs greatly increases their overall happiness, beyond 
that it has a diminishing marginal return. In fact, at a certain point, the 
pursuit of more wealth actually generates greater relative unhappiness. Yet, 
in many advanced economies in the world, people work over seventy hours 
a week to make more and more money. The cost is often their families, 
health, psychological well-being, and overall happiness, but the pursuit of 
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more and more wealth supersedes all that. Of course, if asked, we would 
never admit that our values are as distorted as all that. Yet our behavior 
suggests otherwise. Real-life examples of a transvaluation of power, such as 
this example provided by Lane, abound in everything from politics to inter-
personal relationships to sports, and indicate the propensity of humans to 
invert the traditional moral order by valuing power as an end rather than a 
means to an end. 10 
The CSM's moral pathology is of interest, then, because it is not utterly 
foreign to us. In fact, it is all too familiar, though not to such an extreme. 
The CSM represents the logical conclusion of the inversion of moral value. 
Note that this does not mean that the CSM will always be evil in the or-
dinary, mundane sense. To make power an end in itself does not neces-
sarily result in bad behavior. As we have seen, some of the CSM's actions 
are at least partially justifiable, and his pursuit of power is not altogether 
lacking in salutary effects. Indeed, our analysis helps explain why there is 
no consensus regarding his character. His detractors point to the harmful 
consequences of his lust for power, while his defenders point out its good 
effects (or at least a context in which such a pursuit is morally imperative). 
However, neither side sees that the problem lies with the CSM's distorted 
sense of the value of power itself. 
This point can be most clearly seen when we contrast the CSM with 
Bill Mulder. Bill Mulder is involved in the same type of Syndicate activities 
as the CSM, but he never sees power as anything other than a tool for use 
in protecting humanity. Eventually realizing that the CSM and other mem-
bers of the Syndicate are no longer seeking power for benevolent ends, 
Bill Mulder defects from the Syndicate. While one may object morally to 
his exercise of power in pursuit even of noble ends, one cannot deny Bill 
Mulder's ultimately instrumental understanding of the value of power. It is 
Bill Mulder, in fact, who more closely resembles the tragic hero the CSM's 
defenders imagine him to be. Bill Mulder is the man the CSM could have 
been. 
We have argued that the CSM is no ordinary villain, but a particularly 
disturbing one. In so arguing, we might have left the impression that he 
is morally worse than ordinary villains-that his perversion of the moral 
order is more pernicious than mere garden-variety immorality. One might 
wonder whether this implication really follows. After all, if, as utilitarians 
insist, consequences are what ultimately matter, then to view power as an 
end in itself but not to exercise it may be a moral perversion but is far less 
morally disturbing than the instrumental exercise of power in the service 
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of deeply immoral ends. In other words, what difference does it make if the 
CSM values power for its own sake, as long as he does not exercise it? If it 
is only because he uses power to harm others that we care about his lust 
for power, then he is no worse (and in some respects is significantly better) 
than a Hitler or a Stalin, for whom power was merely a tool that caused 
enormous suffering. 
This is a difficult question, and a full response to the above line of 
reasoning is well beyond the scope of this chapter. But there are at least 
two reasons to think that the matter is not that simple. First, insofar as he 
regards power as intrinsically good, worth pursuing at whatever cost, the 
CSM necessarily degrades the value of other things. He has no room for 
happiness, virtue, or the promotion of human welfare precisely because 
of his single-minded and wrongheaded pursuit of power. Those who pur-
sue immoral ends need not be as single-minded, nor need they necessarily 
degrade other values. To that extent, the CSM is arguably worse. Moreover, 
the transvaluation of power creates a moral vacuum in which, all too often, 
immoral ends rush in. Those who seek power for its own sake are unlikely 
to be satisfied with its mere possession: eventually, the temptation to use 
it will become overwhelming. Consider, for example, the argument that 
the mere possession of nuclear weapons creates a temptation to use them. 
Once one has decided that power alone is valuable for its own sake, it no 
longer matters to what ends one uses power. Given plausible assumptions 
about human nature, the person who values power for its own sake is, in 
practice, more likely to use it for immoral ends. 
The second, and arguably more important, reason the CSM is a more 
disturbing type of villain has to do with the possibility of moral persuasion. 
The ordinary villain sees power as a means of promoting immoral ends. 
Even if he is unwilling to abandon his ends or otherwise subject them to 
moral or rational criticism, we can at least engage him in rational dialogue. 
We can attempt to persuade him that the possession or exercise of power 
is not the best means to achieve his ends. For example, even if we disagree 
with Al-Qaeda's ends, we might succeed in persuading its leaders that the 
use of terrorist tactics is unlikely to achieve its objectives. The ordinary vil-
lain typically allows some room for rational discussion and is in a limited 
sense committed to the pursuit of an objective moral truth-he simply 
disagrees with us regarding its content. The CSM, however, will brook no 
rational or moral criticism. Not only does he regard the alleged intrinsic 
value of power as self-evident, he also will not allow anyone to criticize its 
use, precisely because its use-value and end-value have become one. When 
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power becomes an end in itself, there is nothing left for it to serve but itself. 
The CSM thus disengages from rational and moral criticism altogether, 
making it nearly impossible for him to alter his behavior or his viewpoint. 
To that extent, we think, he is worse. 
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Walter Skinner 
The X-Files' Unsung Hero 
s. Evan Kreider 
Fellow X-Files fans sometimes ask me, "Who's your favorite character: Mul-
der or Scully?" To this, I cheekily reply, "Neither." To be perfectly frank, I've 
never felt that either one of them exhibits much personal character. Mulder 
strikes me as self-centered, obsessive, and immature, while Scully seems 
cold, passive, and inconsistent in her beliefs (though I'm quite sure I'll be 
hearing from fans of Mulder and Scully about why I am so very wrong 
about this). I would argue that if anyone on the show is truly worthy of 
admiration, it is their boss, Assistant Director Walter Skinner. In particular, 
Skinner is especially admirable in terms of classical philosophical ideals of 
virtues such as courage, good temper, and temperance. In the following 
pages, I will discuss these virtues and then demonstrate how Skinner em-
bodies each of them. Finally, I will raise the question of whether Skinner's 
virtue guarantees him "the good life"; that is, is Skinner happy for being 
virtuous? 
Theories of Virtue: Classical Sources 
In the minds of many contemporary philosophers, Aristotle offers the best 
classical theory of virtue. Whether or not one agrees with this judgment, 
Aristotle certainly does provide us with a clear and systematic account of 
the character virtues, so if nothing else, this gives us a good starting point 
for our discussion. According to Aristotle, each of the character virtues is 
a mean between extremes. For example, the virtue of generosity (the mean 
of giving-giving an appropriate amount of one's resources) lies between 
the vice of extravagance (the extreme of excessive giving-giving too much) 
and the vice of stinginess (the extreme of deficient giving-giving too 
little); the virtue of pride (the mean of self-worth-feeling an appropriate 
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amount of self-worth) lies between the vice of vanity (an excessive feeling 
of self-worth-thinking more highly of oneself than is merited) and the 
vice of undue humility (a deficient feeling of self-worth-thinking less of 
oneself than is merited); and so on. In some cases, the virtues and vices 
seem to be related to behavior or actions of some sort (e.g., generosity, 
extravagance, and stinginess are related to the action of giving); in other 
cases, the virtues and vices seem to have to do with an emotion or desire 
of some kind (e.g., pride, vanity, and undue humility are related to the feel-
ing of self-worth). In either case, the basic idea is captured by the age-old 
cliche "All things in moderation." Virtue manifests itself in a person's feel-
ing or behaving in the appropriate amounts, in the appropriate ways, at 
the appropriate times, toward the appropriate people, rather than feeling 
or behaving too much or too little, in the wrong ways, at the wrong times, 
toward the wrong people. It's also important to note that the mean is not 
always exactly in the middle; sometimes it is closer to one extreme rather 
than the other (e.g., pride is closer to undue humility than to vanity; gen-
erosity is closer to extravagance than to stinginess).! 
Plato does not provide us with the same kind of systematic theory of 
virtue that Aristotle does, at least not in any particularly obvious way. Be-
cause of this, it's tempting in discussions such as this simply to leave Plato 
out, if only for the sake of expediency. This is unfortunate, since Plato 
has a great deal to say about virtue. Some of his ideas are similar to Aris-
totle's-not surprising, since Plato was Aristotle's teacher-and in those 
cases, simply sticking with Aristotle makes a certain amount of sense, if 
only to add to the clarity and conciseness of the discussion. However, on 
other occasions Plato's ideas about virtue are significantly different from 
(and in some cases, possibly superior to) Aristotle's. For this reason, I be-
lieve it is a serious error to ignore Plato entirely; thus, I will incorporate 
Plato at several points in the following discussion, either to supplement 
Aristotle or to provide an alternative to Aristotle, especially since I believe 
certain aspects of Skinner's virtues are better characterized by Plato's ac-
count of virtue than by Aristotle's.2 
The Virtue of Courage 
Courage is an excellent virtue to discuss first, given the large role that it plays 
in so many dramatic works, The X-Files included. According to Aristotle, 
courage is the mean concerning fear and confidence. The courageous per-
son feels neither too much nor too little fear or confidence, but rather the 
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appropriate amounts of fear and confidence, in the appropriate situations, 
toward the appropriate objects. One vice is cowardice, which involves feel-
ing too much fear and too little confidence. The other vice is recklessness, 
which involves feeling too little fear and too much confidence. While the 
viciousness of cowardice is rather obvious, the viciousness of recklessness 
is less so. Is it really bad to feel no fear? Isn't that the ideal? Not according 
to Aristotle. All natural emotions, including fear, play some legitimate role 
in human motivation, as long as they do so in moderation. For example, a 
soldier with no fear whatsoever might be tempted to fight an unwinnable 
battle or to ignore an order for a strategic retreat. Also, an appropriate 
amount of fear helps a soldier to keep his or her guard up and to be aware 
of the very real dangers of the battlefield. Furthermore, according to Aris-
totle, only the mean of fear and confidence of death in battle is properly 
called courage; thus, only the soldier has the opportunity to exercise the 
true virtue of courage. A mean of fear and confidence toward other objects 
such as dishonor, poverty, and so on, bears some resemblance to courage 
but is not true courage.3 
Obviously, Aristotle's concept of courage is extremely narrow by con-
temporary standards. We tend to think that courage is a virtue that anyone 
can possess, whether or not he or she is a soldier; for example, it seems 
obvious that a teacher, a parent, and a prospective job candidate all need 
courage. We also tend to think that courage is a virtue that anyone may 
need to draw upon in a variety of situations, not just on the battlefield; for 
example, it seems obvious that public speaking, giving birth, and interview-
ing for a job all require courage. However, this does not make Aristotle's 
account irrelevant, especially in the context of our discussion. Skinner, as 
a law enforcement officer, is a soldier of sorts and sees his share of violent 
conflict. As a result, Aristotle would have no problem with our discussing 
Skinner's courage. However, Skinner also demonstrates courage in other 
contexts, so we need a broader account of courage to supplement the ac-
count given to us by Aristotle. For such an account, Plato is an excellent 
source to investigate. 
Plato discusses the virtue of courage in a number of works, but for 
our purposes here, we will examine the account given in his most famous 
work, The Republic. In this dialogue, Plato discusses everything under the 
sun (pun intended for those who may have read The Republic), but one 
subject in particular is that of "the just person" -that is, a person who 
embodies the virtue of justice, which in turn requires the virtues of wis-
dom, courage, and temperance. Each of these three virtues corresponds to 
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one of the three parts of a person's soul: wisdom is the virtue of reason, 
courage is the virtue of the spirit, and temperance is the virtue of the ap-
petites. At the moment, we're concerned only with courage, but we will 
examine temperance later on and briefly discuss wisdom in the last section 
of this chapter.4 
Plato gives us a much broader (and, as a result, superior, I think) ac-
count of courage than Aristotle. According to Plato, courage is a virtue not 
just for soldiers but for everyone. Courage is not defined as a virtue deal-
ing only with feelings of fear and confidence, nor is it concerned only with 
death in battle. Plato's idea of courage is nicely captured by the phrase 
"having the courage of one's convictions." According to Plato, courage is 
holding fast to one's beliefs, especially one's beliefs about right and wrong, 
especially in the face of emotions such as fear, greed, and various tempta-
tions that might lead one astray. According to Plato, a person with a cou-
rageous spirit is someone who does what reason says is the right thing to 
do, even if there is some other part of that person (especially that person's 
emotions or desires) that doesn't particularly want to do the right thing. 
The superiority of Plato's version of courage to Aristotle's seems to me 
rather obvious: courage is something that all of us need, not just the sol-
dier, and it is something which is relevant to all walks of life, not just the 
battlefield. 
Finally, it's worth noting that the Greek word for courage that both 
Aristotle and Plato use is andreia, which is cognate with aner, which means 
"man;' in the specific sense of a male person. Thus, andreia could also be 
translated as "manliness." Historically and culturally, it's understandable 
that the ancient Greeks might see courage as a distinctly male virtue, given 
that it is the sort of virtue easily associated with and ascribed to soldiers, 
and given that ancient Greek soldiers were typically male and that war was 
a more central part of ancient Greek life than it is (arguably) with mod-
ern life. In Aristotle's case, I suspect the connection is intentional, given 
that he believes that only men are capable of total virtue. In Plato's case, 
I suspect the connection is not intended, given that he believes that cour-
age is not just for soldiers and that virtue more generally is not just for 
men. Though I personally find Plato's conception of courage far superior, 
I shall not ignore Aristotle's narrower-and probably sexist-conception 
of courage, since both can help us shed some light on Skinner's character, 
given that in addition to being human, he is also more specifically a man 
and does on occasion fulfill a soldier-like role in his work for the FBP 
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When we first meet Skinner in the episode "Tooms," he doesn't exactly 
strike us as courageous, warrior-like, or manly. In fact, he comes off as a 
caricature of the stereotypical bureaucrat, almost asexual or even entirely 
inhuman. He is a balding man, sitting behind a desk, wearing glasses. He 
speaks and acts in a strictly professional manner. He gives no indication of 
having any real independence but appears to take his direction from the 
Cigarette Smoking Man. He criticizes Mulder and Scully for their failure 
to abide by conventional investigation techniques and demands that they 
operate according to procedure, "by the book:' from here on out. 
However, we soon learn that first impressions are seriously misleading 
and that Skinner is in fact very much the modern-day warrior. For example, 
as explained in "One Breath," Skinner is a Vietnam veteran who saw seri-
ous combat. Also, he takes an active role in field operations throughout the 
series, especially in a capacity much like a military leader. For example, in 
"The Field Where I Died" he heads up the team that shuts down a poten-
tially dangerous religious cult that has been hoarding weapons. However, 
he is not merely a giver of orders but is also capable of direct combat when 
necessary. Late in the series we discover that Skinner trains as a boxer. This 
discovery would not have come as a surprise to regular viewers, since Skin-
ner had repeatedly demonstrated his competence in hand-to-hand com-
bat. For example, in "End Game:' Skinner engages in fisticuffs-not to 
mention a couple of well-placed head-butts-with X (one of Mulder's 
Deep Throat-like contacts) to get information about Mulder's mysterious 
disappearance. Eventually, X gets the upper hand and draws his gun, but 
Skinner does not back down. Even with a gun in his face, Skinner looks 
X in the eye and demands to know Mulder's whereabouts: "You pull that 
trigger, you'll be killing two men. Now I want to know where Mulder is." 
Skinner demonstrates not only the Aristotelian courage of a warrior 
but also the Platonic courage of acting upon the courage of his convictions. 
He does this consistently, even at great risk to himself, whether the risk of 
physical harm or the more mundane risk of professional suicide. Specifi-
cally, we see Skinner standing up to the Cigarette Smoking Man on several 
occasions, even though the CSM clearly has great power over Skinner's 
position in the FBI. In particular, Skinner sticks up for Scully and Mulder 
when he feels that they are pursuing the right goals. One particularly no-
table example of this is Skinner's reopening of the X-Files in "Ascension" 
contrary to the wishes of his superiors. Another important example, from 
"Paper Clip," is Skinner's essentially blackmailing the Cigarette Smoking 
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Man for Scully's and Mulder's safety by suggesting that he might reveal the 
location of a data tape containing sensitive Defense Department files. That 
particular scene is especially notable for the obvious look of fear on the 
Cigarette Smoking Man's face-possibly the first real fear we've seen from 
him-in contrast to Skinner's confident and controlled demeanor. 
Clearly, then, Skinner embodies the virtue of courage and does so in the 
whole variety of ways in which Aristotle and Plato characterize the coura-
geous person. The above examples demonstrate that he possesses not only 
the courage appropriate to a soldier but also the courage needed to act ac-
cording to his beliefs. Moreover, it's interesting-if also a little amusing-
to note that the show's creators made a special point of showing Skinner 
shirtless on more than one occasion (as in "Avatar" and "Tunguska"). It's 
rather surprising to see how muscular he is, especially in contrast to the 
initial impression of the assistant director of the FBI as an asexual bureau-
crat. Beyond possibly trying to add some sex appeal to the show for a seg-
ment of the audience, these scenes also reinforce Skinner's "manliness;' once 
again making him a good example of the ancient Greek virtue of courage. 
The Virtue of Good Temper 
Anger is an emotion that gets a bad rap in many ethical systems, includ-
ing some other ancient Greek ones, but Aristotle has an appreciation for 
the legitimate role that anger in moderation can play. He points out that 
neither the mean nor the extremes of anger have particularly obvious and 
convenient names-something true of both ancient Greek and modern 
English. Thus, he has to settle for "good temper" for the mean and "iras-
cibility" for the extreme of excess. The extreme of deficiency he leaves 
nameless, which perhaps is just as well, given that the awkward "iniras-
cibility" seems the only option. Anger has many sources and objects but 
seems particularly appropriate as a response to oneself or one's family or 
friends being harmed or wronged in some way. Thus, anger serves as a 
legitimate motivation for morally justified retaliation against those who 
have wronged us. However, the mean of good temper is probably closer to 
the deficiency than it is the excess; we probably ought to feel moderately 
less anger rather than more, else we risk becoming vengefu1.6 
Plato doesn't explicitly characterize good temper as its own virtue, 
but there are some occasions in which he discusses the kinds of emotions 
and behavior that Aristotle addresses. According to Plato, the spirit is the 
source of anger; in fact, the Greek word that Plato uses that we translate 
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as "spirit" (thumoeides) is related to the Greek word for anger (thumos). 
Since the spirit is also the source of courage, it might be argued that Plato's 
conception of the virtue of courage contains within it good temper as a 
sort of auxiliary virtue. Extrapolating, we might say that Plato conceived 
of the courageous/good-tempered person as one who is able to call upon 
the emotion of anger for motivation in times of danger and conflict. These 
dangers could include both the dangers that a soldier faces in battle- for 
example, a soldier might use his anger toward his enemies to help him over-
come his fear of death or injury-and the more subtle dangers that each 
of us faces in trying to live a moral life-for example, a spouse who has 
been propositioned for an extramarital affair might be able to overcome 
the temptation by becoming angry with herself for even considering it.7 
Skinner routinely shows just the right amount of anger in his capac-
ity as assistant director of the FBI. On numerous occasions (e.g., in "Little 
Green Men") Skinner chews out Mulder and Scully for their failure to fol-
low proper procedure, a precedent he sets early on and in no uncertain 
terms. On everyone of these occasions, his level of anger is appropriate: 
he raises his voice but does not scream and shout, he shows his anger on 
his face but does not lose his composure, and so on. Displaying his anger 
in these ways is always just enough to get across to Mulder and Scully the 
gravity of the situation. If Skinner were to display too little anger, he would 
fail to establish the seriousness of their breaches of conduct. If he were to 
display too much anger, he would shift the attention away from the issue at 
hand and toward himself instead. Thus, the appropriate use of anger helps 
to establish Skinner as a competent superior officer. 
Skinner also displays appropriate anger after he has begun to identify 
more strongly with Mulder and Scully and their goals and has started to 
engage more directly in off-the-books activities to support them. For ex-
ample, in "Terma;' Skinner becomes appropriately angry at Mulder and 
Scully for not being kept in the loop regarding the contents of a mysterious 
diplomatic pouch. His anger is completely justified because they are put-
ting him in a potentially difficult situation, in terms of both personal safety 
and professional well-being, especially given that he may soon be called 
to testify before a special committee regarding the X-Files and the where-
abouts of Mulder. His anger is an appropriate response to being wronged. 
Skinner also understands that there are situations in which anger is not 
appropriate at all. This nicely demonstrates Aristotle's idea that a "moder-
ate" amount of anger (or of any emotion, for that matter) means feeling 
anger only in the appropriate situations, toward the appropriate people, 
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and so on. In "Apocrypha;' for example, Scully visits Skinner in the hospi-
tal after he has been shot, apparently for looking into Scully's sister's mur-
der even after the case has been closed. Scully takes the shooting as a sign 
of conspiracy and indicates that she will pursue the matter. Skinner wisely 
cautions her: "Listen to me, anger is a luxury that you cannot afford right 
now. If you're angry you're going to make a mistake, and these people will 
take advantage of that." Here Skinner shows us that sometimes the appro-
priate amount of anger is none at all. 
Skinner also demonstrates good temper in his dealings with the Ciga-
rette Smoking Man. For example, in "Tunguska;' when the Cigarette Smok-
ing Man approaches Skinner about the aforementioned pouch, Skinner all 
but tells him to take a hike. However, he does so in an extremely controlled 
manner and as a result is able to prevent himself from tipping his hand 
and revealing any information to the Cigarette Smoking Man, including 
whether he knows anything at all about the pouch. A more dramatic ex-
ample can be seen in "Zero Sum" when Skinner attempts to cut off all ties 
with the Cigarette Smoking Man, despite previously having figuratively 
sold his soul to him in return for Scully's life. Skinner contemplates killing 
the Cigarette Smoking Man but instead merely fires a few rounds into the 
wall next to the CSM's head. This display of anger is exactly appropriate to 
the situation: Skinner uses his anger to get the Cigarette Smoking Man to 
back off, without getting carried away and doing something that he would 
regret. 
Finally, my favorite example of Skinner displaying an appropriate 
amount of anger is the scene in "Tunguska" in which Skinner greets Kry-
cek, whom he is placing under protective custody. "He'll be safe here;' Skin-
ner says, opening the door to his apartment. Once Krycek is inside, Skinner 
punches him hard in the stomach. "Relatively safe," he explains. Some 
might interpret this as excessive anger, but it seems to me just right, given 
Krycek's status as one of the most despicable characters in The X-Files. 
The Virtue of Temperance 
Both Aristotle and Plato identify temperance as an important virtue. Ac-
cording to Aristotle, temperance is the mean of the desire for pleasures of 
touch, which in Aristotle's biology includes the sense of taste as well. Thus, 
temperance is the virtue concerned with pleasures such as food, drink, and 
sex. The extreme of excess is called "self-indulgence;' though in English 
"overindulgence" is perhaps more precise. Specific kinds of overindulgence 
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have additional names, such as "gluttony" for an overindulgence in food 
and "licentiousness" for an overindulgence in sex. Aristotle claims that the 
extreme of deficiency is so rarely seen as to lack an obvious name-once 
again as true for the ancient Greeks as it is for us now-and so the awk-
ward "insensitive" has to do. As with anger, the mean desire for pleasure is 
probably closer to the deficiency than it is to the excess-in general, we 
are probably better off with moderately less food and sex than we are with 
more. However, a complete lack of such desires seems inhuman, not to 
mention potentially harmful. For example, an individual's health would be 
severely compromised if he or she failed to eat enough, and humanity as a 
whole might risk extinction without some interest in sex.8 
Plato talks about temperance in terms similar to Aristotle's, but he 
broadens the relevant desire to include other, less strictly biological plea-
sures such as desires for wealth and material possessions. Like Aristotle, 
Plato believes that we are better off with moderately less of such things 
than we are with more, and so a good life is a fairly simple one, not a life 
of luxury. Plato also discusses an additional dimension of temperance not 
mentioned by Aristotle, a kind of knowing of one's place in the scheme 
of things. According to Plato, in an ideal republic each member of society 
would stick to his or her class and contribute to society in the ways appro-
priate to that class. For example, the producers (that is, those who produce 
the goods that fulfill the basic needs of society, such as food, clothing, and 
shelter) wouldn't try to rule the republic, the rulers wouldn't try to fight 
battles, and so on. The idea of "knowing one's place" probably rubs many 
of us in the twenty-first century the wrong way, connoting as it does im-
perialism and oppression. Still, we might agree that there is something at 
least practical about each of us finding a place in the scheme of things and 
playing a positive role in society.9 
Temperance may not seem like the most interesting of virtues from 
a dramatic point of view. After all, the courage of a hero can be demon-
strated by having him dodge bullets, but temperance tends to manifest it-
self by not doing anything too terribly interesting. However, it does play 
an essential dramatic role, albeit a more subtle one, in the respect that it 
is easier for an audience to identify with temperate characters than with 
overindulgent or insensitive ones. For example, a drunken, gluttonous 
womanizer isn't an easily likable sort of character (though I'm told some 
people actually like the James Bond character). On the other extreme, a 
character with no appetites whatsoever seems inhuman and is difficult to 
identify with. 
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During the first several of Skinner's appearances on The X-Files, he 
gives the impression of suffering from the vice of insensitivity. As previ-
ously noted, he initially seems almost inhuman in his devotion to the 
bureaucratic trappings of his role as assistant director. Furthermore, he 
appears to have no personal life at all-no relationships, no hobbies, no 
interests, no personal desires or appetites-at least as far as anyone work-
ing with him can tell. "Truth is, we don't know very much about him. We 
don't know what he does off duty, who he really is;' says Scully of Skinner 
in ''Avatar;' already well into season 3. By all impressions up to that point, 
Skinner seems more like an extra than a main character and certainly not 
the sort of character of whom one might say, "He's my favorite!' 
We soon learn that there is more to Skinner than meets the eye and 
that he is not one to completely forgo human pleasures. In particular, the 
episode ''Avatar'' is devoted to exploring Skinner's personal side for the first 
time. In this episode, we discovered that Skinner is married, though sepa-
rated and on the verge of getting a divorce. We see him drinking alcohol, 
though without becoming drunk, a sign of moderation. He even becomes 
sexually involved with an attractive stranger he meets at a bar. She later 
turns up dead, and Scully, performing the autopsy, notes that "there was 
some irritation, probably an allergic reaction to latex." Mulder remarks, 
"At least they were having safe sex." This is a rather dark joke consider-
ing the outcome, but it is also another sign of Skinner's temperance: he's 
not the sort of man to let his desires prompt him to do anything foolish, 
such as having unprotected sex with a total stranger. Toward the end of 
the episode, Skinner admits to Mulder that he had partaken of various 
indulgences as a young soldier in Vietnam: "I was no choir boy. I inhaled." 
AIl of these examples are essential to establishing Skinner as a temperate 
person rather than an overindulgent or insensitive one. This in turn estab-
lishes him as person with whom we can empathize and makes him into a 
dramatic character we can support throughout the series. 
The other dimension of Plato's account of temperance-"knowing 
one's place" -provides much of the dramatic tension for Skinner's char-
acter. As the assistant director, Skinner is basically the FBI equivalent of 
upper-middle management. He must constantly balance his obligations 
to his superiors and subordinates while also taking into consideration his 
beliefs about the right thing to do in any particular situation. Given that 
his subordinates include the likes of Mulder and Scully, this is clearly not 
an easy task. As Skinner himself puts it in "F. Emasculata;' "I stand right 
on the line that you keep crossing." He must constantly search for ways to 
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play by the book as far as his superiors are concerned (or at least aware), 
while occasionally operating more independently off the clock, sometimes 
through less-than-orthodox channels. 
Sometimes Skinner can achieve this balance while still playing by the 
book-for example, in "Piper Maru" when he has to tell Scully that the 
official investigation into her sister's murder has been put into inactive 
status. Despite this, he tells her he will do everything he can, including fil-
ing appeals and rechecking the investigation personally. This shows Skin-
ner acting within the appropriate bounds of his role in the FBI, respecting 
the wishes of his superiors and the feelings of his subordinates, and at the 
same time trying to do the right thing. 
However, playing by the book isn't always possible, and when it is nec-
essary, Skinner shows himself capable of bending and stretching the rules, 
without ever quite lapsing into outright insubordination or abuse of his of-
fice. For example, during one of Mulder's disappearances, Skinner initially 
refuses to help Scully pursue the matter. He rejects her request to inves-
tigate through unofficial channels, citing his duties to the FBI. However, we 
later see Skinner (in "End Game") pursue this information off the clock, 
without abusing his position or resources in the FBI, when he confronts X 
(as we saw in the section on courage). 
Finally, we see a perfect example of Skinner's "standing on the line" in 
his reopening of the X-Files. When the X-Files were closed a few episodes 
earlier, the order had come down from Skinner's superiors. However, this 
is not exactly an order in the obligatory sense, since Skinner does techni-
cally have the authority to keep the X-Files open. Thus, when he exercises 
that authority (in "Ascension"), he is not guilty of insubordination and is 
well within the boundaries of his role in the FBI. However, it is also clearly 
a decision he makes to the dissatisfaction of his superiors, and it demon-
strates his willingness to stand directly on the edge of the line of keeping 
his place ifhe believes it is the right thing to do. 
Virtue and the Good Life: Is Skinner Happy? 
I've made the case that Skinner embodies the virtues of courage, good 
temper, and temperance. To conclude our discussion, I want to consider 
the question of whether, for all his virtue, Skinner has achieved "the good 
life." Put another way, we might ask, Does the fact that Skinner is a virtu-
ous person make him happy? Unfortunately, the answer seems to be no. As 
we see throughout the series (and especially in "Avatar"), Skinner does not 
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have a particularly happy life. His marriage is on the brink of collapsing, 
and he spends his time off alone or sitting alone in bars (not usually an 
activity of someone with a fulfilling personal life). In addition, his desire to 
do the right thing, especially to protect Scully and Mulder, often gets him 
into professional trouble. 
Can Skinner's unhappiness be explained within the context of classical 
theories of virtue? Perhaps. According to Aristotle, the character virtues are 
just one part of the good life; in addition, the development and exercise of 
the intellectual virtues is required. On Aristotle's account, the intellectual 
virtues include theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom. Theoretical wis-
dom is the kind of wisdom and knowledge gained from engaging in fairly 
abstract, highly theoretical intellectual disciplines such as math, physics, 
certain kinds of philosophy, and so forth. Practical wisdom is roughly 
what we might call prudence, in the older sense of the word: a kind of 
moral understanding and wisdom. For reasons we needn't get into here, 
Aristotle claims that exercise of theoretical reasoning and the development 
of theoretical wisdom are superior to exercise and development of practi-
cal reasoning and wisdom; thus, Aristotle says that the happiest person is 
. the philosopher-in the term's older, broader sense, which includes scien-
tists, mathematicians, and other people professionally engaged in high-level 
theoretical intellectual enterprises, including (I hope) some contemporary 
academic philosophers. IO 
So the Aristotelian answer to the question of why Skinner isn't happy 
might simply be that he isn't a professional egghead. However, this isn't 
a particularly satisfying answer from our perspective; it's quaint at best, 
elitist at worst. Moreover, even Aristotle himself thought that a life of prac-
tical reasoning and wisdom, especially as demonstrated through a life of 
public service, made for a fairly close second-best happiness. This being 
the case, Skinner certainly ought to be happier than he is, even from Aris-
totle's perspective: he lives a life of public service in his work for the FBI 
and certainly seems to be a moral person. 
Thus, if the problem isn't particularly with Skinner's choice of profes-
sion or any lack of relevant wisdom, perhaps the problem lies back where 
we started: in the character virtues. I've made the case that Skinner has 
some virtues-courage, good temper, and temperance-but this short list 
hardly exhausts all the character virtues. Is there any virtue that Skinner 
lacks, or at least fails to exercise consistently? Does Skinner have a character 
flaw? I believe so. Like many heroes in classical literature, Skinner suffers 
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from a "tragic flaw." In fact, Skinner has the most common of such flaws: 
what the Greeks called hubris, roughly translated as "excessive pride."ll 
Skinner's particular brand of hubris manifests itself in his routinely 
holding himself to a higher moral standard than others. When we hold 
ourselves to a higher standard than someone else, it suggests that we be-
lieve that we are morally and rationally superior to them. For example, we 
don't hold children to the same moral standards as adults, precisely be-
cause we know that adults are more morally and rationally developed than 
children. Neither do we ascribe the kinds of moral obligations to animals 
that we do to humans, precisely because there is a sense in which we think 
of humans as superior to animals wid-i regard to our moral and rational 
capacities. Thus, by holding himself to a higher moral standard than he 
does others, Skinner shows us that he believes that he is in some sense 
superior to those around him. 
Two key examples, one from his personal life and one from his profes-
sionallife, clearly demonstrate Skinner's hubris and its serious consequences. 
In his personal life, Skinner's hubris manifests itself in an unwillingness 
to open up to his wife. She herself (in "Avatar") testifies to this fact dur-
ing her first meeting with Mulder and Scully: "He lives under this mis-
guided notion that silence is strength. He's built a wall to keep everyone 
out." Skinner's belief that he has to be strong for both of them shows that 
he does not believe that his wife is capable of being similarly strong-not 
because he necessarily thinks she is weak, but because he believes that he is 
stronger. Needless to say, such an attitude has disastrous consequences on 
a relationship that is supposed to be based on trust, respect, and-most 
important-equality. 
In his professional life, Skinner's hubris manifests itself in his taking 
on greater moral obligations than those he assigns to others with whom he 
works. Of course, there are times when this is justified. Skinner should take 
on greater obligations than those he assigns to Mulder or Scully when such 
obligations are directly related to his role as their superior officer. However, 
Skinner's hubris causes him to ask more from himself than from those 
around him even when his professional status does not demand it. A key 
example of this occurs after Scully has been diagnosed with a terminal ill-
ness. In "Memento Mori," Mulder asks Skinner to set up a meeting with the 
Cigarette Smoking Man, intending to sell his soul in return for a cure for 
Scully. Skinner refuses to let Mulder sell himself out, even for Scully: "Find 
another way ... there's always another way." However, as we soon learn, 
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Skinner has simply made the deal himself and as a result turns himself into 
one of the Cigarette Smoking Man's puppets, at least for a while. Faustian 
deals are not part of Skinner's job description and are no more required 
of him than of Mulder, and yet Skinner makes this deal contrary to his 
own professed judgment about the wisdom of such a course of action. In 
doing so, Skinner shows us that he believes that he has moral obligations 
that Mulder does not, which suggests that he thinks of himself as morally 
superior to Mulder-a sign of hubris. 
The X-Files'Tragic Hero 
Skinner remains a hero despite this flaw, and possibly even because of it to 
some extent. As Aristotle argues in The Poetics, the dramatic hero must be 
a good person but not perfect, or else the audience will not be able to iden-
tify with him or sympathize with him when he meets misfortune. Skin-
ner's virtues and his tragic flaw make him a person we can admire, support, 
cheer for when he succeeds, and pity when he suffers. Thus, Skinner is not 
only The X-Files' unsung hero but also its tragic hero-and so much the 
better for us, his admiring viewers. 12 
Notes 
1. The main source for Aristotle's theory of virtue is Nicomachean Ethics (NE); 
in particular, his general theory of the character virtues can be found in book 2. Refer-
ences in this chapter are to the standardized line numbers, so that interested readers 
may look them up in any edition or translation. My preferred translation is still the 
one by David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), though Terence Irwin's 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000) is perhaps more popular these days; either would serve 
any casual reader well. As far as translation issues are involved, I usually follow Ross's 
choices, though I occasionally substitute Irwin's or my own when it seems best suited 
to the modern English-speaking reader. 
2. As with Aristotle, my references to Plato will be to the standardized line num-
bers, so that interested readers may refer to any edition. A particularly good collection 
of excellent translations is Plato: Complete Works, edited by John Cooper (Indianapo-
lis: Hackett, 1997). 
3. Aristotle, NE, bk. 3, 1llsa7-11I7b21. Though Aristotle says that true courage 
is concerned with death in battle, I suspect he would be amenable to broadening it 
slightly to include a concern with injury in battle. 
4. Plato, Republic, bk. 4, 43Sb ff. There are some translational issues that are con-
fusing for the speaker of modern English. For example, "soul" is a typical translation 
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of the Greek psuche, which did not necessarily have religious connotations, and in the 
context of this section of The Republic might just as well be translated "psyche" or 
"mind." "Spirit" is a potentially misleading translation of the Greek word thumoeides, 
which means "spirit" somewhat in the sense of the English word as we find it in ex-
pressions such as "keeping one's spirits up" or "having school spirit," not in the sense 
of the word as we find it in discussions of mythical evil spirits or religious concepts of 
the soul. 
5. Aristotle argues that complete virtue requires the development and exercise 
of our highest rational faculties. He does not believe that women possess these facul-
ties. Thus, on Aristotle's account, women are not capable of total virtue. In contrast, 
Plato says on at least one occasion that both men and women have the same "souls;' 
and so both possess the same faculties, including reason and the capacity for virtue. 
Thus, according to Plato, both men and women are capable of attaining virtue, at least 
in a society that would allow them to do so. 
6. Aristotle, NE, bk. 4, 1125b27-1126bll. 
7. Plato, Republic, bk. 4, 43ge ff.; bk. 5, 465a ff. 
8. Aristotle, NE, bk. 3, 1117b23-1119b20. 
9. Plato, Republic, bk.4, 430d ff. 
10. Aristotle, NE, bk. 6; bk. 10, 1176a30-1179a33. 
11. Aristotle, Poetics, bk. 13, 1453a6 ff. "Tragic flaw" is a traditional translation of 
the Greek hamartia. There is some disagreement about whether this refers to a flaw 
of character or simply a mistaken course of action based on an error in judgment. 
Though strictly speaking I tend to sympathize with the latter view, I think the idea of 
the tragic flaw as a character flaw has become ingrained solidly enough in our com-
mon consciousness-not to mention standard literary analysis-that I'm happy to 
treat it that way. Furthermore, there is some debate about whether the tragic flaw, if it 
is a character flaw, is a full-fledged vice or merely an occasional lapse of virtue. A solu-
tion to this debate requires more time and attention than can be offered here. How-
ever, in Skinner's case, his flaw seems more like the occasional lapse than an enduring 
state, as evidenced by the few (though serious) occasions on which it manifests itself. 
12. See Aristotle, Poetics, bks. 13 and 15 for a discussion of character in tragedy. 
Science and the Mystery 
of Consciousness 
A Dialogue between Mulder and Scully 
Gordon Barnes 
It is May 9, 1994. Special Agent Dana Scully telephones Special Agent Fox Mulder 
at his apartment. Mulder's telephone is bugged, and somewhere in the silent dark-
ness, a man smoking a cigarette is listening. He subtly but smugly smiles as he 
lights up another Morley. Mulder and Scully begin discussing their philosophical 
differences, and the man smoking the cigarette is both amused and intrigued. 
MULDER: That's the difference between you and me, Scully. I think 
there are limits to what science can explain. Not everything can be reduced 
to the physical, chemical, and biological dimensions of reality. Not every-
thing can be modeled in the current paradigms of the natural sciences, 
which exist solely for the purpose of predicting and controlling a universe 
that is much larger and more complex than our limited human minds will 
ever comprehend. That's my view. But not you. You think that science can 
explain everything. 
SCULLY: The scientific method is predicated on the assumption that 
all natural phenomena are governed by laws of nature, and that these 
laws can be discovered by formulating hypotheses and testing them with 
experiments. As a scientist, I accept this view. I believe that the universe is 
governed by physical, chemical, and biological laws, and that the scientific 
method is the best way to discover these laws. Of course, we have not yet 
discovered every law of nature, nor can we explain every natural phenom-
enon. However, it is possible, at least in principle, that everything will be 
explained by the methods of science. Nothing is beyond the power of sci-
ence to explain. 
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MULDER: Why do you think that? Why think that science can explain 
everything? 
SCULLY: My commitment to the scientific method is based on the suc-
cess of science in explaining natural phenomena. No other method of inves-
tigation has increased our understanding of the world as much as science. 
You've seen it for yourself, Mulder. Last November, when we visited the 
Arctic Ice Core Project in Alaska, we discovered tapeworms that produced 
violent behavior in their hosts. Do you remember that? 
MULDER: Yes, I remember. 
SCULLY: We eventually figured out that the tapeworms were affect-
ing the hypothalamus. Medical science has taught us that the hypothala-
mus secretes a hormone called acetylcholine, and this hormone in large 
quantities causes violent behavior. So the scientific method enabled us to 
explain why the tapeworms were causing their hosts to be violent. Science 
explained what was happening to those people, and that's just one example 
out of many. When it comes to explaining natural phenomena, the scien-
tific method has proven to be the most reliable method. 
MULDER: But since you've joined the X-Files, Scully, you've also seen 
things that science cannot explain. Remember Luther Boggs? 
SCULLY: Yes, of course I do. I will never forget him. 
MULDER: When Luther first claimed to be a psychic, even I was skepti-
cal. I thought that there must be some natural explanation of what Luther 
knew. My suspicion was that Luther was cooperating with the killer, and 
that's how he knew what he knew. But then Luther said things about your 
father that he couldn't possibly know unless he was psychic. You told me 
that he called you "Starbuck," which is a nickname that only your father 
ever used. Isn't that right? 
SCULLY: Yes, Mulder, that's true, and I am as puzzled as you are about 
Luther Boggs. I don't know what to make of it. But even if Luther is actu-
ally psychic, that does not mean that science will never explain his ability. 
Maybe science will one day explain how psychic powers are possible. After 
all, science has a long history of explaining mysterious phenomena. The 
ancient Vikings could not explain where lightning came from, and so they 
invented the myth that the god Thor made the lightning. However, science 
now tells us that lightning is an electrical discharge. Many ancient tribes 
believed that evil spirits caused our diseases, but then science discovered 
bacteria and viruses. So science has a long history of explaining mysterious 
phenomena. I think that is likely to continue in the future. 
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MULDER: Well I don't doubt the historical success of science, Scully, 
but I think there are some mysteries that science will never explain. 
SCULLY: It sounds like you have a specific example in mind, Mulder. 
What is it? What will science never explain? 
MULDER: Albert Einstein once said that science cannot explain "the 
taste of soup."You might think that he was just joking, but I don't think so. 
I think he was talking about consciousness. That's what science will never 
explain, Scully, consciousness. 
SCULLY: I've read that remark by Einstein, back when I was researching 
my thesis on his "twin paradox:' But I want a clear definition of what you mean 
by consciousness. People use the word "consciousness" to refer to lots of differ-
ent human capacities. Sometimes they mean our capacity for self-awareness, 
and sometimes they mean our ability to reason, and sometimes they mean 
something else altogether. So tell me what you mean by consciousness. 
MULDER: Well, by consciousness I mean a certain feature of our experi-
ences. To say that an experience is conscious is to say that there is something 
that it feels like to have that experience. For example, when I nibble on the 
shell of a sunflower seed, I have an experience that feels a certain way; it has 
the feeling of a salty taste. Every experience feels a certain way. The smell 
of a rose feels one way, and the sound of a violin feels another way, but all 
experiences feel some way or other. So when I talk about consciousness, I'm 
talking about the fact that our experiences feel a certain way. 
SCULLY: Philosophers actually have a term for this, Mulder. They call 
these feelings "qualia:' Qualia are the ways that our experiences feel to us-
the way that salt tastes, the way a rose smells. Those are qualia. 
MULDER: Yes, that's exactly what I'm talking about. I don't think that 
science will ever explain qualia. Why does a rose smell the way it does? Why 
does salt taste the way it does? In fact, why do any of these things cause us 
to have any feeling at all? 
SCULLY: Science has a lot to say about this, actually. Take the taste of 
salt, for example. Salt activates the receptors of certain sensory cells in the 
taste buds of the tongue. This activation then causes a series of signals in 
the nervous system, which leads up to a pattern of electrical activity in the 
taste center of the brain. Whenever you have this pattern of electrical activ-
ity in the taste center of the brain, then you have an experience that feels 
like a salty taste. That is the scientific explanation of why salt causes you to 
have an experience that feels the way it does. So I think that science does 
explain why salt tastes the way it does. 
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MULDER: But does that really explain it? Notice what all that science 
does not explain. When you get to the end of your scientific explanation, 
you say that a certain pattern of electrical activity in the brain causes me to 
experience a salty taste. But this is where my question starts. Why does that 
pattern of electrical activity in the brain cause an experience that feels 'like 
a salty taste? Why doesn't it cause me to experience the smell of a rose, or 
the sound of a violin? 
SCULLY: It is because this pattern of electrical activity wasn't caused by 
a rose or a violin. It was caused by salt. 
MULDER: But that doesn't really answer the question. I asked you why 
salt causes an experience that feels exactly the way it does, rather than feel-
ing some other way, or no way at all. You said that science could explain 
that, and you told me that salt causes a chemical reaction that leads up to 
a certain brain state, and then that brain state causes me to have an expe-
rience that feels like a salty taste. So then I asked you why that particular 
brain state causes me to feel a salty taste, and you answer that this brain 
state causes a salty taste because it was caused by salt. But that doesn't 
answer the question, because it still doesn't tell us why salt causes an expe-
rience that feels exactly the way it does, rather than some other way, or no 
way at all. Do you see? 
SCULLY: Yes, I think so, but go on. 
MULDER: I started out asking you why salt causes an experience that 
feels exactly the way it does, and you've come back to saying that it's be-
cause the experience was caused by salt. But that's exactly what I want ex-
plained: why does salt cause me to have an experience that feels exactly 
this way, rather than feeling some other way, or no way at all? I think that 
you were right to describe the physical process that leads from salt to a 
particular state of my brain, but then that's where the real problem of con-
sciousness begins. Why does that particular brain state cause that particu-
lar feeling, rather than some other feeling, or no feeling at all? 
SCULLY: I wonder if you're expecting too much out of a good expla-
nation here. Science often explains things by identifying their causes, and 
once we have identified the cause of something, then we consider it ex-
plained. So if we can identify the cause of a conscious experience as being 
a particular state of the brain, then why isn't that enough to explain that 
conscious experience? 
MULDER: It's not enough because it leaves a perfectly intelligible ques-
tion unanswered. Why does this electrical activity in the brain cause me to 
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feel the taste of salt, rather than feeling some other way, or no way at all? 
That is a legitimate question, and it hasn't been answered. 
SCULLY: But even if science has not yet answered this question, why 
think that it never will? Maybe this question has not been answered because 
scientific research is not finished yet. I've already admitted that there are 
many phenomena that science cannot explain just yet. But you want to say 
that science never will explain this. What evidence do you have for that? 
MULDER: That's a fair question, but I think I have an answer. As you 
demonstrated just a minute ago, we already know an awful lot about the 
mechanisms that cause taste experiences. We know about the receptors in 
the sensory cells of the taste buds, and about the series of signals in the 
nervous system. And when it comes to the brain, we know that the brain is 
made up of neurons, and that these neurons give off electrical discharges 
across synapses, and so on. None of this science is likely to be refuted in 
the future. We're only likely to add to it. So whatever new scientific infor-
mation we get, it will almost certainly be more information of the same 
kind. What we are likely to discover in the future is just more detailed in-
formation about neurons and their electrical discharges. Now here is the 
important point. No matter how much more of that kind of information 
we get, it will still be just as puzzling why certain electrical activity causes an 
experience that feels a certain way. More details about the electrical activity 
won't dispel the mystery. So I don't think that science is likely to discover 
anything that will solve this problem. 
SCULLY: Well, I'm not certain that future science will be "just more of 
the same:' but for the sake of the argument I will concede that for now. It 
occurs to me that there is a theory of consciousness that I've been overlook-
ing, and it's very relevant here. Some philosophers think that consciousness 
itself is really just a state of the brain and nothing more. This is sometimes 
called the identity theory, because it says that every state of consciousness 
is identical with some physical state of the brain. According to the identity 
theory, it is misleading to say that our brain states cause our conscious-
ness, because that suggests that we are talking about two different states, 
one of which is a physical state of the brain and one of which is a state of 
consciousness. However, the truth is that every state of consciousness is re-
ally just a physical state of the brain and nothing more. So it is misleading 
to say that a pattern of electrical activity in the brain causes an experience 
of the taste of salt. In reality, the pattern of electrical activity in the brain is 
the very same thing as my experience of the taste of salt. There is just one 
event happening here, not two. It's just that we have two different ways of 
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talking about this one event. We can describe it as a conscious experience, 
or we can describe it as a brain state, but either way we are talking about 
the very same thing. Now suppose that the identity theory is true, and that 
my experience of the taste of salt is really just a physical state of my brain 
and nothing more. Then when you ask why this pattern of electrical activ-
ity causes me to experience the taste of salt, you are failing to realize that 
the experience of the taste of salt is really nothing more than this pattern 
of electrical activity. So there is really nothing left to explain here. 
MULDER: So you're going to solve the problem by denying that con-
sciousness is real? Only brain states are real? 
SCULLY: No, Mulder, I'm not denying that consciousness is real. What 
I'm saying is that consciousness really is a physical state of the brain. I'm 
not denying that it's real; I'm just putting forward a theory of what it is. 
Here's an analogy. I pointed out earlier that lightning is really an elec-
trical discharge from clouds to the earth. In saying that, I wasn't denying 
that lightning is real. I was just telling you what lightning really is. In the 
same way, when I say that consciousness is a physical state of the brain, I'm 
not denying that consciousness is real. I'm just saying what consciousness 
really is. 
MULDER: Well I don't think that consciousness is just a physical state 
of the brain. In fact, there is an argument that refutes that idea. An Aus-
tralian philosopher named Frank Jackson first stated the argument, which 
goes like this.' Imagine a time in the distant future when science has dis-
covered all the physical and chemical facts that there are to know about 
the universe. Now imagine a scientist in this distant future. We'll call her 
Mary. Suppose that Mary spends her entire life studying the physics and 
chemistry of taste. By the end of her life, Mary knows all the physical and 
chemical facts there are to know about the human sense of taste. Take, for 
example, the taste of salt. Mary knows the exact molecular structure of salt, 
and she knows exactly which chemical reactions these molecules cause in 
the taste buds of the tongue. Mary also knows everything there is to know 
about the physics and chemistry of the process that leads up to the brain 
state that causes the taste of salt. Finally, Mary knows everything physical 
and chemical that there is to know about the final brain state that occurs 
when we experience the taste of salt. Mary knows all that. Okay, but now 
here is the twist. Mary has never tasted anything salty. Mary has a medical 
condition that requires that she be fed intravenously. So Mary has never 
tasted much of anything at all. Now, here is the important point in all of 
this. Even though Mary knows all the physical and chemical facts that there 
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are to know about the taste of salt, there is still something that she does 
not know: she does not know what it feels like to experience the taste of 
salt, because she has never tasted it. For all the physical and chemical facts 
that she knows, Mary still does not know what it feels like to experience 
the taste of salt. Now, what does this prove? Well, if the experience of the 
taste of salt were really just a physical or chemical state of the brain, then 
once Mary knew all the physics and chemistry of this state of the brain, 
she would know everything there is to know about this experience. But as 
we've just seen, Mary doesn't know everything there is to know about this 
experience, because she doesn't know what it feels like to have this experi-
ence. I think this example shows that the experience of the taste of salt is 
not just a physical or chemical state of the brain. And of course this gener-
alizes to other experiences as well. If a conscious experience were really just 
a physical or chemical state of the brain, then if you knew all the physical 
and chemical facts about that state of the brain, you would know every-
thing there is to know about that conscious experience. But the example 
of Mary shows that you wouldn't necessarily know everything there is to 
know about the experience, because you wouldn't necessarily know what 
it feels like to have the experience. So conscious experiences are not just 
physical states of the brain. That's the argument. 
SCULLY: I have several questions. Let me start with this. Are you sure 
that someone could really know all the facts that you say Mary knows? 
Could one person really know all that physics and chemistry? 
MULDER: Well, that's why I've limited Mary's knowledge to the human 
sense of taste. I only say that she knows all the physical and chemical facts 
about the human sense of taste. If you want, we could even limit her knowl-
edge to the specific taste of salt. I could use that modified story to prove my 
point just as well. 
SCULLY: Well, even when it comes to a specific experience, like the 
taste of salt, I think all the physics and chemistry of that experience would 
be a huge amount of information, and I'm not sure that one person could 
really know all that. But I'm willing concede that for now. I think there is a 
much more serious problem with your argument. First of all, it is impor-
tant to understand that there can be more than one way of thinking about 
the same thing. Here is an example to illustrate the point. Think about 
Eugene Victor Tooms. Dr. Aaron Monte knew Tooms as "Eugene;' the shy, 
mild-mannered person who worked for the city's animal control unit. By 
contrast, you and Detective Frank Briggs knew Eugene as "Tooms;' the one-
hundred-year-old genetic mutant who needs five human livers every thirty 
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years to sustain his hibernations. Now, when Dr. Monte thought about 
Eugene, and when Detective Briggs thought about Tooms, they were both 
thinking about the same person. They were just thinking about this per-
son in two different ways. Moreover, since Eugene and Tooms were the 
same person, any fact about Eugene was also a fact about Tooms. Suppose 
that both Dr. Monte and Detective Briggs followed Tooms after work one 
day. As Dr. Monte followed him, he might think to himself, "There goes 
Eugene, past the pharmacy;' and Detective Briggs might think to himself, 
"There goes Tooms, past the pharmacy:' When Dr. Monte and Detective 
Briggs think these thoughts, they are really both thinking about the same 
fact. It's just that they are thinking about that fact in two different ways, 
because they are thinking about the same person in two different ways. 
MULDER: What does any of this have to do with my story about Mary? 
SCULLY: I'm getting to that, Mulder. Be patient. Here is how this is rele-
vant to the case of Mary. I think that the experience of the taste of salt is 
really just a brain state, but there are two different ways of thinking about 
this brain state: we can think of this brain state as a physical state of your 
brain, or we can think of it as an experience of the taste of salt. These are 
just two different ways of thinking about the same thing. So I think that 
when Mary knows all the physical facts about your brain when you taste 
salt, she really does know what it feels like to taste salt. She just doesn't 
know it in the same way that you and I know it. She knows this feeling as 
a physical state of the brain, which is what it is, whereas you and I know 
this feeling as the feeling of the taste of salt. On my view, Mary and I know 
the very same things and the very same facts, but we know them in two 
different ways. Just as Dr. Aaron Monte and Detective Frank Briggs know 
the same person in two different ways, so Mary and I know the same state 
of the brain, but in two different ways. So I don't think that Mary lacks 
any knowledge of any real facts. All that she lacks is one way of knowing 
those facts. 
MULDER: Okay, I think I understand the idea. According to you, Mary 
does not really lack any knowledge of any real fact, but only one way of 
thinking about a fact. I get the idea, but I don't think it's going to solve the 
problem. In order to explain why, I need to clarify how I'm going to use a 
certain term. Let's use the term "property" for any real feature or charac-
teristic of something. For example, the shape of an object is a property of 
that object, and the size of an object is also a property of that object. If we 
were to list every property that I have, the list would include properties like 
being a man, being an FBI agent, and believing that consciousness is not 
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physical. These are all properties of me, which is just to say that they are 
real features or characteristics of me. 
SCULLY: I understand. Scientists often use the term "property" in the 
same way. For instance, they say that the mass of a particle is a property 
of that particle, which is just another way of saying that the mass of a par-
ticle is a feature or characteristic of the particle. Other physical properties 
include charge and spin. To say that these are properties is just to say that 
they are features or characteristics of things. 
MULDER: Exactly. Now let's go back to the example of Tooms. We can 
think of this person in two different ways: we can think of him either as 
Eugene or as Tooms. But now notice something. The reason that we can 
think of this person in two different ways is that this person has two sets of 
properties. We could call these two sets of properties the Eugene properties 
and the Tooms properties. The Eugene properties include properties like 
being mild mannered and working at the city's animal control unit. The 
Tooms properties include properties like being a genetic mutant, being 
able to stretch and contort in fantastic ways, and needing five human livers 
every thirty years. Now, the reason that we can think of this person in two 
different ways is that he has these two different sets of properties, and we 
can think of him either as the person who has the Eugene properties, or as 
the person who has the Tooms properties. So it is because he has these two 
really different sets of properties that we can think about him in these two 
different ways. If he didn't have both sets of properties, then we couldn't 
think of him in both of these ways. For example, if Eugene didn't have the 
properties that make him Tooms the killer, then we couldn't think of him 
as Tooms the killer. The moral of the story is that whenever there are two 
ways of thinking about the same thing, that is because that thing has two 
truly different properties. Finally, then, let's come back to the case of con-
sciousness and brain states. You say that thinking about a conscious state, 
like the taste of salt, and thinking about a physical state of the brain are 
two different ways of thinking about the same thing. Is that right? 
SCULLY: Yes, that's right. 
MULDER: Well, as the Tooms example shows, whenever there are two 
different ways of thinking about something, it is because that thing has 
two different properties. So if we can think of a brain state in two dif-
ferent ways, either as a brain state or as a state of consciousness, then it 
must be because this brain state has two different properties. And I think 
it's clear what these two different properties must be. Obviously a brain 
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state has physical properties, like mass and charge, and if this brain state 
is also a state of consciousness, then there is some way of feeling such that 
it also has the property of feeling this way. And that is why we can think 
of this brain state in two different ways. It is because this brain state has 
two different properties, one being a physical property (or set of physical 
properties), and the other being the property of feeling the way it feels to 
be in that brain state. But then, at the end of all this, it seems to me that 
your response to the story of Mary-that she only lacks one way of think-
ing about brain states-implies that brain states have properties that are 
not physical properties. Think of it this way. If brain states had only physi-
cal properties, then there would only be one way of thinking about those 
brain states- the physical way. If Eugene only had the Eugene properties, 
and not any of the Tooms properties, then there would only be one way 
to think about Eugene, namely, as Eugene. The reason that we can think 
about him in another way is that he has more properties-the Tooms 
properties. Likewise, if you admit that the physical way of thinking about 
brain states is not the only way of thinking about them, because we can 
also think about them as states that feel a certain way, then you are com-
mitted to the conclusion that these brain states have more properties than 
just their physical properties. So your defense of the identity theory leads 
straight to what is called property dualism. Property dualism is the view 
that our brains have two really different kinds of properties. They have 
physical properties, like mass and charge, but they also have mental prop-
erties, like the property of feeling a certain way, and the mental properties 
are not just more physical properties. They are nonphysical properties. 
SCULLY: That's a very interesting argument, Mulder, but I can tell you 
exactly where I disagree. You say that whenever there are two different ways 
of thinking about something, there must be two different properties. What 
you are assuming is that the only way to think about something is to think 
about it in terms of one of its properties. Is that your view? 
MULDER: Yes, that's my view. 
SCULLY: Well, then, that's where I disagree. I think it's possible to think 
about something directly, without thinking about any of its properties at 
all. For example, suppose that I come home one day to find a strange-
looking object on my desk, and suppose that I ask myself, "What is that?" 
Now, I have just had a thought about this object. After all, I asked a ques-
tion about the object, and in that very act I have succeeded in thinking 
about it. But I have not thought about any of its properties yet. I simply 
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asked, "What is that?" So it is possible to think about something without 
thinking about any of its properties. How is this possible? It is possible to 
think about this object directly because I am in direct contact with it. I can 
literally point to it, and thus I can think about it directly, without thinking 
about any of its properties at all. Whenever a person is in direct contact 
with something, I will say that they are acquainted with it. Being acquainted 
with something is a different way of thinking about it than knowing any 
of its properties. For that reason, the English philosopher Bertrand Russell 
distinguished between two kinds of knowledge: knowledge by acquain-
tance and knowledge by description. I will start with knowledge by descrip-
tion. Knowing something by description is knowing true descriptions of it. 
For example, I know lots of true descriptions of To oms: that he is a genetic 
mutant, and that he can stretch and contort in fantastic ways, and that he 
needs five livers every thirty years. When I know these true descriptions of 
Tooms, then I have knowledge by description of Tooms. But when I meet 
Tooms, I acquire something new: I become acquainted with Tooms, and 
my acquaintance with Tooms is a new way of knowing him. Now here is 
the important point. The Tooms that I know by description and the Tooms 
that I know by acquaintance are the very same person. This illustrates how 
it is possible to know the same person in these two different ways, first by 
description, and then by acquaintance. 
MULDER: Okay, so how does all of this apply to the case of Mary? 
SCULLY: When Mary is locked in her environment devoid of taste, 
learning brain science, I think she is acquiring knowledge by description of 
conscious experiences, since conscious experiences are really brain states. 
When Mary learns the brain science of tasting salt, for example, I think 
she is learning exactly which physical and chemical descriptions are true of 
that experience. In fact, I think that Mary could learn every true descrip-
tion of the experience in this way. However, I agree that until Mary tastes 
salt for herself, she is lacking something. So what does Mary lack at this 
point, before she has tasted salt? What Mary lacks is simply an acquain-
tance with the taste of salt. Mary knows lots of things about the taste of 
salt, but her knowledge is all knowledge by description. Until she actually 
tastes salt for herself, she does not yet have any direct acquaintance with 
that experience. But now remember, knowledge by description and knowl-
edge by acquaintance can be knowledge of the very same thing. I can know 
Tooms by description, and then I can know Tooms by acquaintance, and 
I am just knowing the same person in two different ways. Likewise, in the 
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case of Mary, I think that when Mary knew all of the physical facts about 
the brain when a person tastes salt, she actually knew all the facts about the 
taste of salt. So when she tasted salt for the first time, she didn't learn any 
new facts about the taste of salt. Rather, she just came to know the taste of 
salt in a new way: by acquaintance. 
MULDER: I agree that when Mary tastes salt for the first time, she 
becomes directly acquainted with that taste for the first time. However, 
it seems to me that this new acquaintance also gives Mary knowledge of 
something new, namely, what it feels like to experience the taste of salt. I 
don't deny that there is such a thing as direct acquaintance, but I do deny 
that this is all that Mary acquires when she tastes salt for the first time. It 
just seems clear to me that through her new acquaintance, Mary learns a 
new fact about the experience of the taste of salt, and since Mary already 
knew all the physical facts about the brain, this fact cannot be a physical 
fact about the brain. 
SCULLY: Well, I'm just not convinced, Mulder. I think it's possible that 
Mary has simply become acquainted with something that she already knew 
by description. Say, Mulder, I hate to interrupt you, but all this talk about 
sunflower seeds has made me really hungry. Could we continue this dis-
cussion over dinner? 
MULDER: Sure, Scully, but before we get a bite to eat, I'd like to show 
you a video I made last night from a local news broadcast at the suggestion 
of our inside contact. I'd tell you about the contents of the tape over the 
phone, but I'm suspicious. Although we found the bug not so inconspicu-
ously disguised as a pen and the bug wrapped around the electrical outlet, 
you never know when they'll be listening next and from where. Anyway, 
safe to say, I think we'll be soon traveling to Ardis, Maryland. 
SCULLY: Okay, Mulder. Let's meet in the office. 
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[This dialogue is limited to natural phenomena; thus, we are to believe that 
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"Clyde Bruckman's Final 
Repose" Reprised 2009 
Dean A. Kowalski 
Darin Morgan's X-Files episodes are wickedly clever. "Clyde Bruckman's 
Final Repose" is no exception. Clyde Bruckman (Peter Boyle) has captured 
what Mulder so elusively seeks-the truth out there-at least a part of it. 
The St. Paul, Minnesota, resident cannot foretell next week's winning lot-
tery ticket numbers, but he can foresee how people will die. In telling his 
tale through Bruckman, Morgan may be poking fun at those who take 
soothsayers too seriously. After all, recall Scully's reaction to seeing "the 
Stupendous Yappi" (Jaap Broeker) on a late-night commercial and, more 
important, the various fortunetellers' inabilities to discern that Puppet (Stu 
Charno) is about to kill each of them. Nevertheless, it's clear that we are 
supposed to take Bruckman seriously. He lives alone, sees his gift as a curse, 
and tries to deal with his unique perspective on the future by becoming a 
life insurance salesman. His attempt doesn't succeed, however; he becomes 
dour and resigned and eventually commits suicide-a death that he appar-
ently foresaw and one that no insurance policy would cover. 
Morgan's writing is as thoughtful as it is clever (and more on this later). 
Among other interesting topics, his Clyde Bruckman story also reminds us 
of the classic philosophical "freedom and foreknowledge" problem.' At the 
intuitive heart of the alleged problem is the following: In order for one to 
know what will happen in the future, there must now be truths about it 
to be known. But if there are now such truths, then the future is already 
determined. If the future is already determined, it cannot be altered, and if 
the future cannot be altered, then we cannot act any differently in it than 
we do. Therefore, insofar as foreknowledge requires that descriptions of the 
future are true now, foreknowledge of our choices is inconsistent with our 
freely making them. In this chapter, however, I hope to show two things. 
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First, once it is clearer how Bruckman is able to see the future at all, it will 
be argued that contrary to popular opinion-including Aristotle's-the 
reasoning at the heart of the problem is faulty. The so-called freedom and 
foreknowledge problem generated by the antecedent truth of statements 
about the future ("future contingents") rests on arguments that tend to 
confuse "determinate truths" with "determined truths:' But only the latter 
truths are problematic for human freedom. Second, upon conducting a 
careful philosophical investigation into the antecedent truth of future con-
tingents, we will better see why the sort of fatalistic resignation Bruckman 
adopts about the future can be avoided, even if one foreknows the future. 
Determinism and Human Freedom 
Before tackling the so-called freedom and foreknowledge problem, it may 
be worthwhile to briefly explore a different, but related, philosophical 
problem between human freedom and determinism. The beliefs that we 
are genUinely free and that determinism is true are commonly held. Both 
beliefs attempt to describe basic features of the world around us, but when 
conjoined, they unfortunately seem to be logically inconsistent. We can 
begin to better understand both beliefs and how they seem incompatible 
by turning to the episode at hand. 
Recall that once Mulder begins to believe that Bruckman has psychic 
abilities, the two men and Scully visit a crime scene under investigation. 
Mulder asks Bruckman "why the killer is murdering people in the way 
that he is;' including the doll collector (who was also an amateur tasseog-
rapher). Bruckman replies, "Why does anyone do the things they do? Why 
do I sell insurance? I wish I knew. Why did this woman collect dolls? What 
was it about her life? Was it one specific moment where she suddenly said, 
'I know ... dolls!' Or, was it a whole series of things? Starting when her 
parents first met that somehow combined in such a way that in the end, 
she had no choice but to be a doll collector?" Mulder and Bruckman are 
contemplating the reasons we make the choices we do. If we peer carefully 
enough into Bruckman's dialogue, we can find two basic ideas about this. 
On the one hand, people make decisions that don't seem to be com-
pelled or determined by anything outside of the agents themselves. These 
decisions, from another's perspective, may sometimes seem completely 
spontaneous, as captured in Bruckman's, "I know ... dolls!" However, they 
might be, and often are, the result of careful deliberation on the part of the 
agent. Such choices are believed to be genuinely free, exactly because they 
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only occur as the result of processes of which the agent is in direct control. 
This isn't to say that she is in direct control of all the processes relevant to 
her decision, but it is to say that the choice is "up to her" in the sense that 
two viable choices were open to the agent at the time and the fact that she 
chose to begin collecting dolls (or whatever) is essentially explained by her 
activity and not anything external to her. Choices meeting these criteria 
are those that are freely made; we typically believe that some, if not most, 
of our choices meet these criteria. 
On the other hand, we also tend to believe that the world around us 
operates through cause and effect. In fact, with just a bit of thought, it 
seems plausible to hold that everything that happens in the world around 
us was caused to happen. This intuition is supported by the fact that it is 
very difficult to conceive of an uncaused event. Everything that we experi-
ence happening, simply didn't pop into existence out of nowhere. The fact 
that my car didn't start this morning had a cause-perhaps the battery died 
during the night because I left the lights on again. Thus, the car did not fail 
to start for absolutely no reason. Sometimes we may not presently know 
why something-cancer, say-occurs, but everybody assumes that there 
is a cause; this is why we spend countless dollars on cancer research. But if 
everything has a cause, C, then whatever caused event E itself was caused. 
That is, if C caused E, then C itself was also caused. Of course, whatever 
caused C also was caused to happen. But because causes are sufficient for 
their effects in that, necessarily, if C obtains, then E obtains, it follows that 
for anything that happens, it couldn't have happened any other way, at least 
given what has happened in the past. This is known as the philosophical 
theory of determinism. Determinism is conveyed in Bruckman's alternative 
account of why the woman became a doll collector. It can be traced back 
through a long causal chain that reaches back before her birth. Because 
that chain was in place, she seemingly had no choice but to become a doll 
collector. Of course, if we were to ask why her parents got together, that, 
too, has a causal explanation that precedes their births, assuming the truth 
of determinism. So, the alternative account of our choices is to note that if 
determinism is true, then any choice a person makes is merely one more 
link in a causal chain that stretches back to a time before his birth. We still 
decide and we still choose, but, given the truth of determinism, we couldn't 
have decided any differently than we did, given what has happened in the 
past.2 And this is why many philosophers hold that the truth of determin-
ism is inconsistent with our being genuinely free. If being genuinely free 
requires that there be two viable options before us and which we select is 
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up to us in the relevant sense, then the truth of determinism is inconsistent 
with our being genUinely free. 
The goal of this chapter is not to explore the freedom and determin-
ism problem in any great depth. However, that problem does serve as a 
conceptual model for the problem we will explore-namely, whether hav-
ing knowledge of how a person will choose in the future is in some way 
inconsistent with that person's choosing freely. Even if it is true that deter-
minism is inconsistent with our choosing with genuine freedom, it seems 
to be an open question whether the antecedent truth of future contingents 
(a necessary feature of foreknowledge) is inconsistent with our choosing 
with genuine freedom. Hopefully, the answer (or, at least, an answer) to 
that question will become clearer as this chapter develops. 
The "Seen Future" 
A dismayed Bruckman looks up at Mulder from his chair and rhetori-
cally asks, "How can I see the future if it didn't already exist?" At first 
blush, Bruckman's statement seems a bit odd. How should we understand 
his alleged ability to see the future? This question might be answered in 
one of two ways. First, we might focus on the specifics of his being able to 
see the future. That is, by what distinguishable means is Bruckman able 
to see the future? Second, we might focus on the necessary conditions 
for this happening at all, more or less leaVing aside the specific processes 
involved. That is, generally speaking, what must the world be like for 
Bruckman to have this ability in the first place, regardless of whether he 
actually possesses it? The second version of the question is much more 
philosophically interesting; thus, we will focus on it, although we will not 
completely ignore the first. 
We might interpret Bruckman's claim quite literally. Perhaps he peers 
into the future analogously to the wayan astronomer gazes at a distant star. 
Astronomers have access to powerful telescopes; this accounts for their 
ability to see celestial bodies in great detail. But Bruckman doesn't rely on 
any such apparatus-not even some sort of fanciful "Jules Verne-o-scope;' 
whatever that might be. Rather, he apparently relies on some sort of unique 
mental process-something akin to a "mind's eye" -to see future events 
like those that are allegedly to happen to Mr. Gordon (David MacKay). 
Consider the way Peter Boyle acts out his dialogue in the scene involving 
the Gordon newlyweds: His eyes roll back into his head, his eyelids are 
almost shut, and he begins speaking in a trancelike state, almost channel-
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ing what he apparently sees. In this eerie fashion, Bruckman states: "Two 
years from now, while driving down Route 91 ... coming home to your 
wife and baby daughter ... you're going to be hit head-on by a drunk ... 
driving a blue 1987 Mustang. You'll end up looking worse than sixty feet of 
bad road your body slides across ... after flying out your front windshield:' 
This strongly suggests that Bruckman is indeed "looking within" himself to 
better see the young father's (proposed) gruesome death. 
Episode director David Nutter seems to substantiate this interpreta-
tion of Bruckman's ability. The best piece of evidence of this is Bruckman's 
foretelling of Mulder's unfortunate demise in the hotel kitchen. Bruckman 
closes his eyes, and we the viewers experience Bruckman's visualizing Mul-
der's unfortunate demise. Actually, Bruckman claims that he is visualizing 
what the killer (Puppet) is visualizing. Presumably, this is why the vision is 
"so hazy:' In a way only Morgan could devise, Mulder's throat is to be slit 
while he is standing in a banana cream pie. That Nutter provides a visual 
representation of Bruckman's visions is additional evidence that Bruckman 
actually sees, even if in a dreamlike fashion, what will happen regarding 
Mulder's death. Thus, the way the episode is constructed provides some 
credence to the claim that Bruckman literally sees the future. 
However, interpreting Bruckman's unique perspective as akin to literal 
Sight harbors some philosophically interesting implications. This gets us 
squarely back to exploring the philosophical import of Bruckman's claim. 
In order for him to literally see future events, they must already exist, now, 
in the present. For example, for Bruckman to actually see Mulder's death, 
Mulder must be dead (or dying); however, as Bruckman describes these 
events, Mulder is very much alive and standing in front of him. This leads 
us to conclude that Bruckman's previsions entail that events exist before 
they exist. But this is self-contradictory. Nothing can exist before it comes 
into existence. Therefore, it seems prudent to interpret Peter Boyle's act-
ing methods and David Nutter's choice to share Bruckman's alleged visions 
with the episode viewer as merely dramatic effects and not evidence that 
Bruckman has the ability to literally see future events. Furthermore, Mor-
gan's screenplay proVides additional evidence that we need not interpret 
Bruckman's foreknowledge as literal sight. When Mulder inquires into how 
Bruckman receives his prophetic information, he asks, "I mean, are you 
seeing it in a vision or is it a sensation? How do you know where to go?" 
Bruckman responds, "I just know:' When Mulder presses, "But how do you 
know?" Bruckman retorts, "I don't know!" Bruckman's responses are tan-
tamount to his denying that he sees (literal) visions. Although this makes 
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Boyle's choice of acting methods a bit mysterious, it seems that we are on 
firm ground in reinterpreting Bruckman's statement "How can I see the 
future if it didn't already exist?" Bruckman's visions of the future seemingly 
require a less-than-literal interpretation. 
The "Written Future" 
We come to know the world around us primarily through the five senses. 
In doing so, we come to know propositions about our environment. A 
proposition is the exact meaning of a declarative sentence; philosophers 
tend to mark them by using single quotation marks. For example, 'Snow 
is white' and 'The earth has one moon' are both true propositions. Thus, 
propositional knowledge can be described as knOWing what the facts are 
or being aware that such and such is the case. The suggestion proposed in 
this section will be that Bruckman might be able to know the future insofar 
as he now knows true descriptions of what will obtain; that is, Bruckman 
might know true propositions about how people will die. 
Admittedly, the difference between the "seen future" and the "written 
future" may not be readily apparent. At the risk of oversimplification, the 
idea is something like this. On the "seen future" model, it is as if Bruckman 
is watching a play like any other member of the audience. The twist, how-
ever, is that Bruckman has the unique and paradoxical ability to see the 
play before the (actual) first-night performance. On the "written future" 
model, it is as if Bruckman is experiencing a play in that he has an advance 
copy of a very detailed script. The script contains descriptions, and thus 
propositions, of what will be said and done during the play. If the script 
is detailed enough, then Bruckman could have very explicit knowledge 
of how the play will proceed and, presumably, could be able to visualize 
these proceedings before they actually happen. Analogously, if Bruckman 
somehow had epistemological access to detailed descriptions of what will 
happen (leaving aside the practical issue of how he gained access to the 
"script"), then he could have propositional knowledge of the future. Thus, 
the difference between the two models could be explained this way: On the 
"seen future;' Bruckman has immediate epistemic access to sensory input 
of future events and then translates those experiences into descriptions of 
future events; on the "written future;' Bruckman has immediate epistemic 
access to the descriptions of the future and then translates these descrip-
tions into mental pictures corresponding to events in the future. 
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Understanding Bruckman's unique perspective on the future in this 
way does not commit us to the view that Bruckman can literally see events 
before they happen. On the written future model, descriptions of events are 
conceptually distinct from the events they describe. An analogy with the 
past might be helpful here. Even though past events are no longer happen-
ing because time has "passed them by:' their corresponding descriptions 
remain unaffected. So, propositions like 'The first episode of The X-Files 
episode airs on September 10, 1993' and 'Peter Boyle wins a 1996 Emmy 
for his portrayal of Clyde Bruckman' remain true, even though the events 
they describe have receded into the distant past. In a sense, then, the truth-
value of the propositions remains forever unchanged, but the correspond-
ing events in history are not. Analogously, the truth of future contingent 
propositions might always remain fixed even if the events they describe 
have yet to be. Therefore, if the truth-value of propositions never changes, 
it is possible (however unlikely) that someone could know future contin-
gents before the events they describe obtain. Therefore, on the written fu-
ture model, Bruckman pOSSibly knows the descriptions of future events 
because he knows which propositions about the future are true. 
Future Contingents and Fatalism 
However, more than two millennia ago, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) consid-
ered what it would mean to say that someone could know the written fu-
ture. He believed that the written future model leads us straight into very 
familiar concerns about foreknowledge and fatalism-that is, the idea 
that the future is somehow unavoidable. If Aristotle is correct in this, then 
while we might obtain a defensible account that Bruckman possibly sees 
the future, it also seems to follow that Bruckman's knowledge of the future 
discounts our acting freely in it.3 
Contemporary philosopher Theodore Schick encapsulates Aristotle's 
position like this: 
If someone knows that something is going to happen, then it's true 
that it is going to happen because you can't know something that is 
false. You can't know that 1 + 1 equals 3, for example, because 1 + 1 
does not equal 3. But if it's true that something is going to happen, 
then it cannot pOSSibly not happen. If it's true that the sun will 
rise tomorrow, for example, then the sun has to rise tomorrow, for 
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otherwise the statement wouldn't be true. So, if someone knows 
that something is going to happen, it must happen. But if it must 
happen-if it's unavoidable-then no one is free to prevent it from 
happening.4 
If someone possesses foreknowledge, then there are now truths about how 
the future will unfold. If there are now truths that accurately describe future 
events, then the future must obtain in just that way. This leads Schick-and 
many others-to starkly conclude that the price of having foreknowledge 
is our freedom. 
If no one is free to prevent future events from happening, then any de-
liberation about the future is meaningless. No matter what we decide, it was 
fated that we make just that decision. Mulder seems to agree with Schick on 
this score. Recall his response to Bruckman, "Then if the future is written, 
why bother to do anything?" Puppet echoes this sentiment in his anony-
mous letter to Bruckman, the one Bruckman allows Mulder to read aloud: 
"To whom it may concern. Like our lives, this is a mere formality to let you 
know I know that you know. Can't wait till our first meeting when I kill you. 
Not before you explain some things to me. First on the list, why in the world 
did I send you this letter? Sincerely, you know who. P.S.: Say 'hi' to the FBI 
agents:' To avoid the meaninglessness of the future, Schick would no doubt 
hold (as Aristotle did) that the future cannot be foreknown because there 
aren't now any truths about it. Truths about our future choices become true 
only at the time of our decision and not before. 
Recall that propositions are statements that make claims about how 
things are. If the proposition matches up with how things are (the facts of 
the matter), then it is true. If it doesn't match up with them-if it gets the 
facts wrong-then it is false. The statement '[ Want to Believe was released 
in July 2008' is true because it accurately describes the facts. 'Rob Bowman 
was the director of [ Want to Believe' is false because Chris Carter directed 
the second X-Files motion picture. So, there indeed seems to be a neces-
sary relationship between truth and how things are. If a statement about 
some set of events is true, it seems that the world must be that way. This 
leads Schick to claim that if there are now truths about the future, then the 
events it describes must happen. His example is: If it is now true that the 
sun will rise tomorrow, then it is impossible for the sun not to rise tomor-
row. Sunrise tomorrow cannot possible not happen if it is now true that 
it rises. So, according to Shick, if Bruckman knows that Puppet will kill 
again, then it is impossible for Puppet to not commit murder (in the near 
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future). Since this leads to fatalism, we are forced to deny the antecedent 
truth of future contingents so the freedom and foreknowledge problem 
never arises. 
But there is another approach to the problem. The alternate way to 
understand the alleged freedom and foreknowledge problem involves 
rethinking the conceptual relationship between true statements and the 
events they accurately describe. In order for Schick's argument to work, 
the events described by a true proposition must obtain such that the events 
themselves become necessary or logically unavoidable. But the relationship 
between truth and facts need not be understood like this. Rather, any ne-
cessity involved only applies to the relationship between true propositions 
and the events they accurately describe; it need not apply to the propo-
sitions themselves or the events themselves. Consider: If there are three 
editors of The Lone Gunman, then the number of its editors is not equally 
divisible by two. This statement expresses a relationship between a num-
ber and its being odd or even. This relationship holds necessarily. How-
ever, we have no reason to believe that it is necessary that there are just 
three editors of The Lone Gunman; the "The Thinker" (played by Bernie 
Coulson in (~nasazi") could have become a full-fledged member. And it's 
not necessary that the magazine has an odd number of editors. Both are 
contingent matters. The relationship between true propositions and the 
events they describe works like this, too. Clarifying Schick's ambiguous use 
of the word "must;' the relationship could be put this way: Necessarily, 
if a proposition is (now) true, then the event it describes happens. This 
interpretation, avoiding the ambiguous term "must;' merely expresses a 
necessary relationship between true propositions and the events to which 
they accurately correspond. But this entails neither that true statements 
are necessarily so nor that the relevant states of affairs obtain necessarily. 
Because the alternative interpretation retains all that is crucial to the cor-
respondence between truth and reality without sacrificing contingency, it 
is preferable to Schick's interpretation. 
It is now easier to see how Schick's argument turns dubious. He holds 
that to foreknow a future event, it must (now) be true that it happens. If 
Bruckman knows that Puppet will kill again, it must be true that he does. 
Schick's specific example is that if it is now true that the sun rises tomor-
row, then it has to so rise-the sun must rise tomorrow. His sense of the 
term "must" entails that it is impossible for the sun not to rise tomorrow if 
it is now true that it does. By now it is clear that we should avoid the usage 
of "must" and express this truth as: Necessarily, if it is now true that the 
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sun rises tomorrow, then it does (or will do) so. This interpretation keeps 
the necessary relationship between true propositions and the events they 
describe, but it does not pertain to the propositions or events in them-
selves. In this way, even if it is true that the sun will rise tomorrow, this 
doesn't mean that the sun rises necessarily. And if Bruckman knows that 
Puppet will kill again, he will, but this doesn't entail that Puppet necessar-
ily or unavoidably murders in a way that renders his terrible acts unfree. 
Therefore, concerns like Schick's about the incompatibility of freedom 
and foreknowledge are invariably grounded in misconception. It is true 
that foreknowledge requires that there are now true statements about the 
future. But we fall into error if we interpret this to mean that the determi-
nate antecedent truth of such statements determines how events unfold. 
This misconstrues the conceptual dependency. Because true propositions 
are merely descriptions of how things are, how future events unfold thus 
explains why some statements about the future are (determinately) true 
rather than others. So, if it is a contingent matter, as it seems, that the sun 
rises tomorrow, then the determinate antecedent truth of the correspond-
ing statement cannot make its so rising necessary or unavoidable. If it is 
a contingent matter, which this debate must initially assume, that Pup-
pet will kill another fortuneteller, then the antecedent truth of this can-
not make his act necessary or unavoidable in a way that renders it unfree 
(even if there is a necessary relationship between true propositions and 
what they describe). Thus, how events unfold explains which statements 
are true, and not vice versa. Once this is realized, worries about freedom 
and foreknowledge begin to subside. 
They continue to subside once we likewise grasp that, as knowledge 
requires truth, what is foreknown about the future is also explained by 
what will happen. The obtaining of future events as they do explains why 
there are (or can be) now true propositions about the future, and the cur-
rent (determinate) truth of those propositions explains (in part) why they 
can be known. Therefore, assuming the purported knower is in a posi-
tion to know the antecedently true statement about the future, knowing 
it does not impact how the corresponding events unfold. This knowledge 
cannot make a contingent fact necessary; knowing the facts cannot make 
them true or impact how they are true. Rather, how the corresponding 
events unfold determines what can be known about them. If Puppet does 
not choose to kill Detective Havez (Dwight McFee) in the hotel room, 
then Bruckman would never have known that he so kills him (or at the 
very least it would never be true that he would). Thus, what anyone fore-
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knows about us depends on what we will do, and not vice versa. 5 Once 
these dependency relationships are kept straight, it is easier to see how the 
determinate antecedent truth of statements about the future-or having 
knowledge of them-does not determine our choices in anyway that poses 
a logical threat to human freedom. . 
Fatalism and Powerlessness 
We have therefore discovered that Schick's (and Aristotle's) reasons for 
believing that the written future model entails fatalism are mistaken. But 
still, the intuition that the antecedent truth of future contingents leads to 
fatalism dies hard. Some may state: But if it has always been true that Chris 
Carter would move the show to Los Angeles for season 6, then this was 
true long before Chris Carter's birth. But if it this was true long before 
his birth, then how could he have done anything different? After all, if he 
were to do something different, like keep the show in Vancouver or move 
it to New York, doesn't that mean that he has the ability to change the past, 
namely, to make a true proposition about him false? But no one, not even 
Carter himself, has the ability to change what takes place before his birth. 
So, even if Schick's argument fails, it seems that the problem about the 
written future remains. 
This last objection is understandable. Its spirit harkens back to the 
problem that determinism poses for human freedom. In fact, it seems to 
be another attempt to equate "determinate truth" with "determined truth:' 
The idea is to somehow link the intuition that the antecedent truth of fu-
ture contingents somehow determines, or otherwise makes inevitable, 
our future choices. To see how this might be attempted, let's go back the 
screenplay or script analogy. Before, we had suggested that what might 
explain Bruckman's knowledge of the future is that he has (less-than-
perfect) cognitive access to an incredibly detailed script of what will be. But 
it is tempting to believe that if future contingents are always determinately 
true, then the script has always been in existence. If it has always existed, 
then you, I, Chris Carter, and everyone else must act in the future just as it 
is written in the script. Furthermore, acting differently than the script has 
it seems to entail that we have the ability to alter past events that were true 
long before our birth. But because no one has the ability to alter events that 
happened prior to birth, it seemingly follows that we don't have the ability 
to act differently than it is written in the script. And if we don't have the 
ability to act differently, then there are not two viable options open to us 
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when we make our choices. True, there appear to be two viable options. 
However, just as it is with the case where determinism is true, it merely 
appears this way. The fact of the matter is that we must act as the script 
has it and we lack the ability to do otherwise. Therefore, the antecedent 
truth of future contingents remains inconsistent with our making future 
free choices, even if Schick's argument is not completely convincing. 
This last argument for fatalism from the antecedent truth of future 
contingents can be resisted. Resisting it requires that we keep fully in mind 
that what we (will) do explains why the proposition is true at all. The truth 
of the proposition does not explain your action. Therefore, the only reason 
that the script says what it does is because of how we (will) act. The script, 
being what it is, reflects whatever we freely choose to do in the future. As 
such, determinate truths about how we will freely act do not entail that our 
choices are determined in a way that is inconsistent with our acting freely. 
Thus, had you, I, Chris Carter, or anyone decided to choose differently 
than he or she in fact does, then the script would have always reflected that 
choice instead of the one that we, in fact, will make. Understood in this 
way, our acting otherwise than written in the script does not entail that we 
have the ability to alter the past in terms of making a proposition that was 
(determinately) true for a time into one that then becomes false as a result 
of exercising our genuine freedom. Because the script will reflect whatever 
we freely decide to do, it is never changed (or falsified) in this way. All that 
is required is that we have the power, were we to use it, to make a different 
script actual. That is, had we exercised free will and chosen differently in 
some situation, then the script would have always been different from what 
it actually is. 
In this way, our freedom is protected-and fatalism is avoided-by the 
realization that we are all coauthors of the script. Admittedly, it is a bit dif-
ficult to accept the possibility that a script about our lives, one that we co-
author, can be written before our births. Many find this just as paradoxical 
as the suggestion that Bruckman can literally see events before they hap-
pen. However, we are not considering a regular script, typed on paper. The 
so-called script considered here is more abstract than substantial. There is 
no actual script containing typeset pages. Rather, it is "filled" with descrip-
tions-what philosophers tend to call propositions, which are abstract ob-
jects-and because these abstract objects, like numbers, always exist if they 
ever do, then a script can be forever in existence. We might now wonder 
whether Bruckman could have cognitive access to such a script, but that 
question does not detract from the possibility that there might be the kind 
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of script described here. Therefore, future contingents can be antecedently 
true-and determinately so-without this entailing that their being so is 
in any way inconsistent with our genuine freedom. Therefore, while it may 
be that determinism is inconsistent with our genuine freedom, the mere 
fact that future contingents possess determinate, antecedent truth-value 
does not entail that future contingents are determined in a way inconsis-
tent with our acting freely. In fact, what explains their being determinately 
true at all is how we (will) freely act. Consequently, even if someone fore-
knows our future choices, our choices explain what is foreknown about 
them; their being foreknown doesn't explain why we choose as we do. 
"Hey, It's Not Supposed to Happen that Way" 
As we all know, Mulder doesn't get his throat slashed while standing in 
a banana cream pie. Scully mistakenly uses the service elevator, sees the 
struggle between Mulder and Puppet, and then fires two rounds into 
the serial killer's chest. Puppet's prevision of Mulder's murder was faulty. 
Should we interpret this scene as Morgan's affirmation of contingency and 
happenstance? And if so, is the episode not really about fatalism, but actu-
ally the opposite? Perhaps, but the point of the last two sections cannot be 
overlooked. Sometimes Bruckman's (and Puppet's) previsions turn out to 
be true. What should we say about those correctly foreseen events? Were 
they fated to happen because they were forseen? The answer seems to be 
"no." If the arguments (contra Schick) in the previous sections are correct, 
then the fact that a future event is foreknown is explained in part by what 
will happen and not vice versa. How the future unfolds shapes or deter-
mines what can be known about it; it's not the case that what is foreknown 
shapes or determines the future. 
Why does Puppet incorrectly believe that he will murder Mulder in 
the hotel kitchen? The answer must be the fact that Bruckman somehow 
tapped into Puppet's prevision and told Mulder about it. Armed with this 
information, Mulder threw up his hand when he stepped in the cream 
pie, keeping Puppet's knife from his throat. So, we might say that Puppet 
didn't foresee Bruckman sharing his prevision and, because of this, things 
turned out in a way that he didn't expect. Had Bruckman not told Mulder 
about Puppet's prevision, we might have met John Doggett (Robert Pat-
rick) much sooner than season 8! (Of course, Mulder still needs to be care-
ful about "autoerotic asphyxiation;' leading us to wonder whether Scully 
shouldn't dispose of his desk drawer "movie collection" after all.) 
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When psychics or soothsayers make false predictions, it might be 
wondered whether the future can be known at all. Morgan's belief is clear: 
Fortunetellers are invariably frauds, and people who spend huge sums of 
money seeking their advice are fools. This is expressed in the episode's teaser 
when Puppet tells Madame Zelma, "You're a fortuneteller. You should have 
seen this coming:' But the mere fact that some prognosticator's predictions 
turn out to be true doesn't mean that they know the future. The Stupen-
dous Yappi is an excellent example of this. After Yappi's performance at the 
crime scene, Mulder comments, "His leads are so vague as to be practically 
useless yet easily interpreted to be correct after the fact:' When Detective 
Cline (Frank Cassini) reminds Mulder that Yappi made many predictions, 
Mulder replies, "Yeah, and some are bound by percentages to be right, but 
most will turn out wrong. Now, which is which?" Ignoring Mulder's res-
ervations, Cline utters one of the funniest pieces of X-Files dialogue ever: 
"Look, all I know is that so far, Yappi has provided more solid, concrete 
leads on this case than you have. Now, if you don't mind, I have to get an 
APB out on a white male, age seventeen to thirty-four, with or without a 
beard, maybe a tattoo ... who's impotent. ... Let's roll:' 
This leads to a discussion of what it means to know anything. Phi-
losophers tend to discuss knowing propositions (because these allegedly 
describe the facts). A proposition is known only if it is true. Asserting 
false propositions is a sign of being ignorant of the facts, and ignorance is 
opposed to knowledge. Furthermore, a proposition is known only if it is 
believed. Knowledge thus requires true belief. But it also requires justifica-
tion-we must be justified in holding a true belief. This is where the dif-
ficulty about having foreknowledge arises. Yappi can have beliefs about the 
future that turn out to be true, but if these are merely lucky guesses-if he's 
"just playing the odds;' as Bruckman would say-then Yappi's true belief 
doesn't count as knowledge. If you're just guessing about something, you 
don't know it; if you did know it, then you wouldn't have to guess. But 
what could justify a soothsayer's (true) belief? Bruckman's terse "explana-
tion" doesn't satisfy (although Morgan should be credited for addressing 
it). It's difficult to see how obsession about the Big Bopper's plane crash 
could lead to having justified belief about a person's future death. However, 
Bruckman's morbid previsions might be justified simply because they in-
variably turn out to be true. After repeated and constant predictive success, 
it couldn't be that Bruckman is merely guessing. And if his prognostica-
tions are specific enough (unlike Yappi's, but as his were with Mulder and 
the Gordon newlyweds), requiring no strained interpretation, it seems that 
"Clyde Bruckman's Final Repose" Reprised 2009 203 
his morbid previsions count as knowledge. Whether anyone could actually 
have this kind of foreknowledge (without somehow causing the murders to 
happen, as Mulder initially suspected of Luther Lee Boggs [Brad Dourif] 
and Scully initially suspected of Father Joe Crissman [Billy Connolly]) is 
another matter, which is one of the reasons the freedom and foreknowl-
edge debate invariably involves God. 
Bruckman's Sense of Powerlessness 
We have seen how the antecedent truth of future contingents-even if they 
are known to be true-need not lead to fatalism. However, it admittedly 
may be psychologically difficult for a possessor of foreknowledge not to 
develop a fatalistic outlook on life. This was certainly true of Bruckman. 
Consider Scully's estimation of Bruckman's general demeanor. Although 
not quite yet convinced of his psychic abilities, she nevertheless confides 
to Mulder, "By thinking he [Bruckman] can see the future, he's taken all 
the joy out of his life:' Upon becoming convinced that Bruckman pos-
sesses psychic abilities, Mulder confronts him, "But you admit to having 
this gift:' Bruckman replies, "Oh, I got it, all right. The only problem is, 
it's non-returnable." To say the least, Bruckman doesn't cherish his unique 
ability. When Mulder presses Bruckman for his help in catching the se-
rial killer (Puppet), a dejected Bruckman replies, "And he'll commit more 
[murders] whether I help you or not." When Mulder inquires why Bruck-
man is so sure of this, Bruckman answers with the now familiar, "How can 
I see the future if it didn't already exist?" Mulder retorts, "If the future is 
written, then why bother to do anything?" And, finally, Bruckman adds, 
"Now you're catching on:' This exchange clearly expresses Bruckman's fa-
talistic psychological approach to life. It's clear that Bruckman's outlook is 
grounded in his ability to divine the future. 
We quickly learn the depths of Bruckman's resignation. Still in Bruck-
man's apartment, Mulder regroups and tells him, "Mister Bruckman, I be-
lieve in your ability but not your attitude. I can't stand by and watch people 
die without doing everything in my, albeit unsupernatural, power to in-
terfere with that fate:' Rather than making another attempt to convince 
Mulder that the future is unavoidable, Bruckman takes a different tack. He 
explains, "I can't help you catch this guy. I might adversely affect the fate 
of the future:' But, then, after posing to Mulder some fantastic events that 
might happen if he helps him, Bruckman finally comes to the conclusion 
that if he does help Mulder, something might result "in the fact that my 
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father never meets my mother and consequently, I'm never born:' Only 
this potential result motivates Bruckman to aid Mulder and Scully. Clearly, 
Bruckman believes that he would be better off if he had never been born. 
Ironically, or perhaps in the last gasps of irrationality, Bruckman strives 
to change things so that he never exists, even though he also believes that 
the future cannot be changed. Bruckman's psychological outlook is dark 
indeed. 
Let's assume that, Bruckman's previsions (unlike Puppet's) always turn 
out to be true. If so, then Bruckman foresees his own pending suicide. Per-
haps he would have taken his own life regardless of whether he has the 
"gift" to foresee the future. But it seems more plaUSible to contend that the 
reliability of his previsions led to his darkened demeanor, which ultimately 
led him to take his own life. I acknowledge that this raises the specter of 
. a causal loop: Did Bruckman's foreknowledge cause his suicide, or did his 
pending suicide cause him to foresee it? The thesis of this chapter is that, 
strictly speaking, the fact that he foresaw his suicide is explained by his 
chOOSing to kill himself. His previsions may influence his dour demeanor 
and eventual suicide. However, it still seems defensible to hold that Bruck-
man's resignation is ultimately due to his choice (assuming, of course, that 
it was a matter of choice at all). 
Therefore, how Bruckman reacts to the discovery in 1959 that he has 
the ability to foretell someone's death is up to him. Furthermore, his reac-
tion to any prevision after 1959 is also up to him. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the reason Bruckman commits suicide is that he regularly chooses 
to deal with his "gift" in an unhealthy way. Further, it seems plausible to 
maintain that Bruckman's foreknowledge of his death is explained by what 
he chooses; his choice is not caused by his foreknowledge, at least not in 
any way that impedes his freedom. That is, Bruckman's coming to know 
about his "gift" might have influenced his decision to eventually commit 
suicide and was a contributing factor in his choice. However, if Bruckman 
is free, none of this rendered his choice necessary or unavoidable. 
''All Right, So How Do I Die?"-"You Don't" 
By the end of the episode, Scully becomes open to the possibility that 
Bruckman knows how people will die. Despite herself, but after some 
gentle goading from Bruckman, she asks him how she will die. Smiling, 
Bruckman looks up at her and claims that she doesn't. This very brief dia-
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logue exchange has become mythic among X -Philes. (It plays a central role 
in the mythos of the Internet Order of the Blessed Saint Scully the Enig-
matic [OBSSE], for instance.) Can Scully really be immortal? 
There seem to be three leading X-Phile theories about Bruckman's 
response. The first is that he is merely being considerate, subtly suggest-
ing to Scully that she is far too young to worry about such things. The 
other two theories evolved as the series progressed. In "En Ami" (season 
7), CSM drives Scully to a remote location where they meet Marjorie But-
ters (Louise Latham). CSM tells Scully that he is "Marjorie's angel;' in that 
the woman is now 118 years old even though she doesn't look a day over 60. 
As Scully tries to ignore his words, she sees a scar at the base of Marjorie's 
neck-one that is very similar to Scully's. Could Scully also live as long 
as Marjorie with CSM's help? What would she have to do to garner his 
aid? The third theory is solidified with "Tithonus" (season 6). Tithonus 
is a character from Greek mythology whom was granted immortality; he 
is also the immortal narrator of a Tennyson poem by the same name.6 In 
the episode, Scully meets photographer Alfred FeIlig (Geoffrey Lewis). We 
learn that Fellig is roughly 150 years old, incessantly attempting to photo-
graph Death. He claims to be immortal because he cowardly looked away 
from Death, in effect hiding behind the nurse who was caring for him as 
he suffered from yellow fever. Death took the nurse rather than Fellig; it 
seems he missed his turn to die. But at the end of the episode, Fellig makes 
amends. Scully has been mortally wounded (by her temporary partner). 
Fellig grasps her hand (as the nurse was grasping his all those years ago) 
and tells her not to look at Death. Fellig, also wounded, faces his fate this 
time and dies. But Scully lives. Many X -Philes thus interpret Bruckman's 
words as the prognostication that Scully missed her turn to die, leaving her 
immortal. 
It seems incredibly unlikely that Morgan intended to provide the spark 
for this titillating piece of X-Files lore. It seems that something closer to the 
first theory explains Bruckman's response. Morgan's episodes don't neatly 
follow The X-Files' driving imperative to find the "truth out there" at all 
costs. In his first episode, "Humbug;' Morgan writes, "Some mysteries are 
never meant to be solved:' In his second, "Clyde Bruckman's Final Repose;' 
he in effect tells us a story of an ordinary man who learns (in part) the 
mysteries of death. Is he better off for knowing this? In anti-Socratic fash-
ion, Morgan implicitly answers, "no:' It would be better ifhe had remained 
ignorant. Knowledge of when people will die has led him to become bitter 
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and lonely. It has driven him to lead a solitary life; after all, once he suf-
ficiently knows a person, he begins to see how his new friend will die. His 
bitterness drives him to selling life insurance. But this only immerses him 
completely in death. It is no wonder that Bruckman agrees to help Mulder 
only after he entertains the idea that he might accomplish his own nonex-
istence. Bruckman wishes only to spare Scully the pains of worrying about 
death. It is a mystery that was never meant to be solved. 
When we meet Mulder and Scully in I Want to Believe (2008), after a 
six-year hiatus, Mulder strikingly resembles Bruckman. He shares a roof 
with Scully, a woman he deeply loves, but he doesn't seem to share his life 
with her. Rather, he spends his days-alone-in a spare bedroom-turned-
office combing the Internet and clipping newspapers. Searching out the 
paranormal has become a full-blown obsession for ex-Agent Mulder. He 
keeps a picture of his sister, Samantha, clearly displayed among clippings 
on the back of his door. It directly faces his "I Want to Believe" poster on 
the opposing wall. He has accepted her death but still searches for her from 
his desk chair. Scully has reentered the world as a medical doctor, but Mul-
der remains isolated. Anxious to engage Mulder in the world, Scully sug-
gests that he consult on an X-Files-type case, even though the X-Files is the 
ultimate source of his dour demeanor. Her suggestion is desperate (and 
she later regrets it). Like Bruckman, Mulder has become embittered and 
reSigned as a result of learning some of life's mysteries, not about death, 
but concerning earthly biogenesis, "star children;' and the nature of evil 
itself. Morgan's summation of Mulder's character-via novelist Jose Chung 
in season 3-prophetically rings true: Mulder's "quest into the unknown 
has so warped his psyche, one shudders to think how he receives pleasures 
from life:' So, is Mulder better off for chaSing monsters in the dark, search-
ing for that elusive thing he calls "the truth"? 
But crafting episodes that require The X-Files to examine itself has al-
ways been the beauty of Morgan's work. His artistry was making us (the 
X-Phile viewer) laugh while he (subtly) poked fun at our favorite show. 
(Does anyone else remember the pose Mulder strikes at the end of "Hum-
bug"?) But his poignant commentary was neither merely inflammatory nor 
spiteful. Are we always better off knowing the truth? Is ignorance always 
bad? Socrates (especially in Plato's Apology) is famous for his affirmative 
answers to these questions. Morgan, for his part, implicitly invites us to 
reconsider Socrates' answers by providing us rather rogue X-Files episodes 
that question Mulder's and Scully's heroism. Are they heroes, or merely 
two obsessed people (Mulder especially) flirting with psychological disas-
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ter? This isn't to say that Morgan's implicit philosophical views are always 
correct, but he did raise important questions. These led many to reevaluate 
The X-Files and profound issues beyond television . .In this way, he (implic-
itly) played an important role in the crafting of this book. 
Notes 
I am grateful for helpful commentary by Al White and Patricia Kowalski on earlier 
drafts of the 2007 version of this chapter. I am grateful to Internet X-Phile "Who-
ToTrust?" especially, and other contributors to the NewSpace XPhile Forum (http:// 
anewspace.20.forumer.com/index.php) for the suggestion to recraft this essay for the 
2009 edition. (Website last accessed August 26, 2008.) 
1. Other fans of this episode have recognized this long ago. In her 1995 online 
review, noted X-Phile Sarah Stegall (coauthor on the first three official guides to The 
X-Files) writes: "If Clyde Bruckman or any other visionary can accurately foretell the 
future, then it is immutable, and the concept of free will vanishes. We cannot 'choose' 
to do that which is already set in concrete; it distorts the meaning of the word to insist 
that we do. On the other hand, if we have true existential freedom, there can be no 
future set in concrete (for a prophet to discover) because we have not yet made the 
choices that will create it:' See http://www.munchkyn.com/xf-rvws/bruckman.html 
(accessed October 12,2006). 
2. If determinism is true, it doesn't follow that we choose against our will. 
In "Pusher;' The X-Files vividly conveys people making choices they don't want to. 
Through an extreme power of suggestion, Robert Modell (Robert Wisden) has the 
ability to force people to choose against their will merely by talking with them, as he 
did in compelling the SWAT officer to set himself on fire. Clearly, with tears streaming 
down his face and begging Mulder to stop him, the SWAT officer is not acting freely. 
But determinism doesn't entail anything like this. It very well may be that we choose 
what we want. However, if determinism is true, then our wants and desires are also the 
result of a very long causal chain stretching back before birth. Thus, the philosophical 
problem remains, even if we choose to do what we want. 
3. The 2007 version of this essay, '''Clyde Bruckman's Final Repose' Reprised;' ap-
pearing in The Philosophy of The X-Files (189-208), contains a much more extensive 
treatment of Aristotle's views of future contingents and fatalism. This section contains 
similar arguments as its 2007 predecessor, but it does not offer such careful exposition 
of Aristotle's De interpretatione 9. 
4. Theodore Schick Jr., "Fate, Freedom, and Foreknowledge;' in The Matrix and 
Philosophy, ed. William Irwin (Chicago: Open Court Press, 2002), 93. Given the overall 
tenor of Schick's article, he clearly is not merely espousing this argument; he embraces 
the conclusion that freedom and foreknowledge are incompatible. 
5. This does not necessarily lead to the counterintuitive position of the effect (what 
Bruckman knows) existing prior to the cause (what Puppet will do), as some have 
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claimed; see, for example, Schick, "Fate, Freedom, and Foreknowledge;' 94-95. The 
relationship is not causal in the straightforward sense; thus, the claim that freedom 
and foreknowledge are compatible does not commit one to the position that effects 
predate their causes. Philosophers tend to characterize the relationship as counterfac-
tual dependence. This complex notion is addressed a bit more fully in the "Fatalism 
and Powerlessness" section. 
6. For an in-depth study of Tithonus and his relationship to the X-Files episode 
that bears his name, see Matthew Van Winkle, "Tennyson's 'Tithonus' and the Exhaus-
tion of Survival in The X-Files," in The X-Files and Literature, ed. Sharon Yang (New-
castle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007). 
The Many Tales of ((Jose Chung" 
Dean A. Kowalski and S. Evan Kreider 
In his last known piece of writing for The X-Files, an uncredited rewrite of 
"Quagmire:' Darin Morgan again questions Mulder's incessant pursuit of 
"the truth out there:' Chapter 10 (per episode DVD) bears his distinctive 
clever exchanges between Mulder and Scully. While they are marooned on 
a rock in Heuvelman's Lake, Scully compares Mulder's quest for an "intan-
gible" truth "out there" to Ahab's search for the white whale. She laments to 
her partner, "It's the truth or a white whale. What difference does it make? 
I mean, both obsessions are impossible to capture, and trying to do so will 
only leave you dead along with everyone else you bring with you:' Here, as 
he did in "Clyde Bruckman's Final Repose:' Morgan questions whether pur-
suing the truth at all costs is worthwhile. If chasing "monsters in the dark" 
brings with it the death of your own father (among other casualties, like 
Scully's sister), perhaps your quest is misguided? Morgan, not content with 
leaving us with that (to him) rhetorical question, takes his modus operandi 
of adroit X-Files critiques a step further. He claims (through Scully) that the 
truth cannot be captured. So, not only is Mulder's quest a matter of inverted 
priorities, it is simply impossible, though he doesn't tell us here why it is im-
pOSSible-this might be because he believes that he already expressed this 
in "Jose Chung's From Outer Space." In fact, it seems that in "Jose Chung's 
From Outer Space," Morgan attempts to topple the X-Files' main credo: "The 
truth is out there:' But if Morgan is correct and the truth is not "out there" 
to be found, then what is "the truth:' and where can we find it? Exploring 
these questions serves as the cornerstone for this essay. 
In this celebrated episode, Morgan crafts a tale about two Klass County 
teenagers, Harold Lamb (Jason Gaffney) and ChriSSY Giorgio (Sarah 
Sawatsky). During their first date, they are allegedly abducted by aliens. 
However, the now familiar account of their car systemically shutting down in 
the middle of tee highway and their passing out, leading to "missing time:' 
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receives a new wrinkle. The gray alien abductors are themselves abducted 
by what appears to be a rocklike creature bathed in a red light. Enter flam-
boyant novelist Jose Chung (Charles Nelson Reilly). In the months follow-
ing the abduction, he has been interviewing Klass County residents in the 
faint hope of discovering what really happened that night. He quickly gives 
up that goal and begins pursuing another, one his publisher had originally 
suggested: writing the first nonfiction science fiction novel. Mulder and 
Scully were also called to Klass County to investigate the alleged "double 
abduction:' Chung visits Washington, D.C., to interview our heroes to get 
their professional opinion about what happened that night. Mulder refuses 
to speak with Chung, but Scully agrees only because she greatly admires 
his work (Chung's The Lonely Buddha and The Caligarian Candidate are 
among her favorite novels). 
The episode is shot in flashback sequences with Scully narrating and 
Chung occasionally interjecting in her narration. An early exchange be-
tween Scully and Chung is especially pertinent. After Chung admits that 
the ultimate driving factor in writing the book is money, Scully admon-
ishes Chung: "Well, just as long as you're attempting to record the truth:' 
He quickly replies, "Oh, God, no. How can I possibly do that? I spent three 
months in Klass County, and everybody there has a different version of 
what truly happened. Truth is as subjective as reality. That will help explain 
why when people talk about their 'UFO experiences; they always start off 
with, 'Well, now, I know how crazy this is going to sound ... but.'" 
It seems to us that this exchange between Scully and Chung sets the 
tone for the episode to follow. In fact, it seems that this episode is plausi-
bly interpreted as Morgan conveying some classic philosophical ideas re-
garding truth and knowledge. The inherent uncertainty about truth and 
knowledge leads Morgan (we believe) to two implicit conclusions: (I) that 
disagreement about the alleged facts casts doubt on the existence of a truth 
"out there" independent of our experiences of it; and (2) the lack of truth 
independent of our experiences leads him to an existentialist-type position 
captured by his concluding line, "For although we may not be alone in the 
universe, in our own separate ways on this planet, we are all ... alone;' 
which has rightfully taken its proper place in X-Files lore. 
Appearance, Reality, and Values 
The teaser opens with a camera shot that appears to be a close-up of an 
Empire Cruiser (from Star Wars). The episode's soundtrack reinforces this 
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judgment. But as director Rob Bowman's camera pans back, we (the X-
Phile viewers) quickly realize that we are deceived. The shot is actually the 
bottom of a power company utility bucket, lifted high off the ground. Roky 
Crickenson, a power company engineer, is checking some power lines. 
This opening sequence foreshadows the dominant theme of the episode: 
things may not be as they appear. 
This theme continues as Scully shares with Chung her version of the 
alleged double abduction. Scully tells him about her first meeting with 
Detective Manners, the lead investigator of the case. Bowman provides us 
a flashback; we see Manners complaining to Mulder and Scully, "You re-
ally bleeped up this case:' Bowman's camera qUickly cuts back to Scully 
and Chung in the basement office; she explains to the novelist, "Manners 
didn't actually say 'bleeped.'" Scully censored Manner's "colorful phrase-
ologY:' What the X-Phile viewer can surmise from this exchange is that 
all of Scully's narration is filtered through her experiences. This leaves us 
to wonder whether the Klass County events actually transpired exactly 
as she describes. Furthermore, X -Phile viewers also soon learn that our 
vantage point of the alleged double abduction was actually that of Roky 
Crickenson. Note that our perspective of the teenagers' car is from the 
back, as Roky's truck approaches it. We see what Roky sees-or so it seems. 
Through Roky's eyes, we see the rocklike creature, a lava monster from the 
earth's molten core named Lord Kinbote, lumber to Roky's truck. Kinbote 
announces, "Roky! Roky! Be not afraid! No harm will come onto thee. Your 
efforts are needed for the survival of all earthlings. Come, 1 shall showeth 
thee:' Roky (as we see later in the episode) takes this charge very seriously. 
Nevertheless, the point remains: the viewer is again left to wonder what, 
if any, of Roky's experiences actually happened? Has he embellished any-
thing? He swears that he hasn't, as he admits to Mulder and Scully later, "I 
know how crazy this sounds, but ... "1 
Additional worries about discovering the truth of that night soon 
emerge. There are discrepancies among the personal reports. Harold's and 
Chrissy's accounts of what happened that night in Klass County are far 
from identical, at least at first. Harold believes that they were abducted 
along with the grey alien abductors, but Chrissy claims date rape. Blaine 
Faulkner's (the jobless, living-at-home, twenty-something UFO fanatic 
played by Allan Zinyk) recollections of that night include Mulder acting 
like an emotionless mandroid at times and a menacing "man in black" at 
others. But this is never substantiated. Faulkner also claims that Scully 
threatened his life, but Scully emphatically denies it. Mulder evidently has 
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a meeting with Air Force lieutenant Jack Shaefer (Daniel Quinn) at a local 
diner. Shaefer confides to Mulder that the government orchestrates many 
«alien abductions" for scientific and psychological research, and that he is 
one of the government's «UFO" pilots. The cook at the diner denies that 
Shaefer was there. Rather, the cook informs Chung, Mulder sat alone at the 
counter and order piece after piece of sweet potato pie. For each new piece, 
Mulder asked the cook a question, including, «You ever had the suspicion 
that you've been abducted by aliens?" and «Have you ever found a metal 
implant in your body?" and «Have you checked everywhere?" Which of 
these reports is true? Are any of them true? It is no wonder that «How the 
hell should I know?" was a mantra echoed throughout the episode. 
It is tempting to argue that because each of us is a distinct individual, all 
of our respective experiences describe each of us (the «experiencer") more 
than they describe how things are in themselves. Which experience is privi-
leged enough to discern reality as it truly is, independent of our experiences 
of it? If no one's experiences are so privileged, then how can we know any-
thing at all about how things actually are? And if this is correct, then it must 
be wondered whether Mulder could ever capture the truth. If the truth rep-
resents reality (in itself), but no one's experiences-not even Mulder's-are 
privileged in terms of discerning the truth about how things actually are, 
then Mulder has no hope of accomplishing what he seeks. Furthermore, it 
is tempting to press these considerations to argue that the widely divergent 
experiences of reality lead to the conclusion that there isn't any objective 
truth ("out there") to know apart from our experiences of it. After all, if 
there were an objective truth apart from our experiences, then we wouldn't 
expect our experiences to differ as much as they do. But, as «Jose Chung's 
From Outer Space" reminds us, our experiences do widely diverge. There-
fore, it seems unlikely that there is any objective truth or reality to know 
apart from our experiences. All that exists are our experiences, which, by 
their very nature, are subjective. 
Morgan isn't the first to broach this sort of reasoning; it is rather com-
mon. However, it is most prevalent when it comes to the interrelated issues 
of ethics (matters of right or wrong) and values (what is good or bad). 
The default view is that, although there are many judgments about right, 
wrong, good, or bad, there isn't any (objective) truth to the matter apart 
from those beliefs. Many are inclined to believe that, when it comes to 
right and wrong or good and bad, such judgments are little more than per-
sonal preference. The value judgments made by Harold, Chrissy, and Roky 
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about their experiences that night all seem equally valid, at least for each 
individual. Harold wasn't affected all that much by it, after all. Thus, he 
wished to resume his relationship with Chrissy, in the hope of rekindling 
their blossoming romance. Chrissy sees more value in leading her life to 
make the world a better place. She has left Harold behind and now lives for 
such organizations as Greenpeace. Roky took Lord Kinbote at his word; he 
left for California in the hope of enlightening other human beings about 
the spiritual journey that awaits us-to the center of the earth ("assuming, 
of course, that your soul is able to avoid ... the lava men"). Blaine, Scully, 
and Mulder have also made choices about what makes their lives meaning-
ful, but in a more pervasive way. Blaine, already convinced of the existence 
of extraterrestrials, now looks toward the sky more frequently in his new 
post as Roky's successor at the power company. Scully continues to view 
her current assignment as merely a nine-to-five job (according to Chung 
at least), despite Mulder's best efforts to convince her otherwise. Mulder's 
passionate quest for "the truth" (again, according to Chung) has warped 
him to the point that "he receives no pleasure from this life:' So, Harold 
longs for love, but Chrissy now shuns it. Blaine searches the skies for a 
better form of existence, but Roky looks toward the center of the earth. 
Mulder's life is his work-he sleeps on the couch and can't bear to take a 
vacation (except for a raucous trip or two to Graceland}-but Scully does 
her best to leave her work at work, despite Mulder's constant interference. 
Here art imitates life. There is the debate between the so-called pro-
life and pro-choice positions regarding abortion. Pro-life advocates believe 
that the value associated with human life is more or less absolute, while 
the latter believe that this value must be balanced with a woman's right to 
have autonomy over her own body. There is the debate between utilitar-
ian conceptions of the greater good and issues pertaining to the rights of 
individuals. Utilitarians believe that a person's rights can be superseded 
when more good will come of it, but supporters of individual rights believe 
that it is always impermissible to practice injustice. In the debate about 
protecting the environment, some environmentalists believe that active 
but reasonable measures must be employed to safeguard our natural re-
sources, while "environmental activists" sometimes find it necessary to use 
extreme tactics to preserve resources. Which value judgment is correct, or 
even "truer" than another? There doesn't seem to be any plausible way to 
tell. Furthermore, if there was something like an objective fact of the mat-
ter about ethics or values, then we wouldn't expect such divergent opinions 
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about right or wrong and good or bad. But opinions about these matters 
are especially divergent. Thus, it is unlikely that there is some sort of objec-
tive fact of the matter about ethics or values. 
Freedom and Responsibility: The Existentialism of 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
French philosopher and novelist Jean-Paul Sartre would no doubt concur 
with much of the previous section. He believed that we couldn't make any 
meaningful claims about reality apart from our experiences of it. Thus, re-
ality (in itself) is either unknowable or an incoherent notion. Sartre was 
also concerned about intractable moral disagreement. His famous example 
involved a young Frenchman during World War II. On the one hand, the 
young man seems obligated to help his fellow countrymen fight against 
Nazi occupation. On the other hand, he seems obligated to care for his ail-
ing mother, as she has no one else. What should he do? Sartre believed that 
there wasn't an objectively true answer to this question, at least not one 
that pertained to everyone in relevantly similar circumstances. There are 
no truths about right or wrong and good or bad until the person chooses 
as she does. In this sense, we create truths about ethics and values by our 
personal choices. Furthermore, Sartre wondered, for the sake of argument, 
how objective moral standards might be grounded. He saw two possibilities. 
The first was God; the nature of right or wrong and good or bad could be 
grounded in features of the omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent 
Creator. However, Sartre believed that God did not-in fact could not-
exist. The divine concept, thought Sartre, was self-contradictory because 
(as we shall see) there are no fully actualized or perfect persons. The sec-
ond possibility was human nature; what is universally right or wrong and 
good or bad for us might be grounded in the distinctive kind of thing we, as 
humans, are. But persons possess no defining characteristics; we continu-
ally define ourselves via the choices we make (which begins to explain why 
there are no fully actualized persons). Sartre claimed, "Man is nothing else 
but that which he makes of himselC'2 The failure of these possibilities led 
Sartre to construct a different conception of right, wrong, good, and bad. 
This is known as existentialism. 
Defining-much less explaining-existentialism is no easy task, since 
particular existentialists differed so greatly from one another. However, 
in the minds of many, Sartre is the definitive existentialist. Thus, for our 
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purposes here, we will confine ourselves to a brief elucidation of some of 
Sartre's basic tenets, which themselves will then shed light on the episode's 
various characters and the ways in which they choose to live after their 
various encounters with entities described in Chung's From Outer Space. 
We can profitably understand Sartre's existentialism as a rejection of 
the philosophical notion of essence and a committal to the philosophical 
notion of existence-thus the term "existentialism." The existence/essence 
distinction is not an obvious one, especially considering they both connote 
"being" of some sort. Roughly, the existence of something is that it is, while 
the essence of something is what it is. In other words, when we say that 
something exists, we are merely saying that it is, that it is a real thing. How-
ever, when talking about the essence of something, we are talking about 
whatever it is that makes something the kind of thing that it is, whatever 
it is that defines it. Sartre's existentialism is a rather radical philosophi-
cal position in that it rejects the notion of essence altogether. According 
to Sartre, when we strip away all of the nonessential properties of some-
thing, we are left with nothing-or rather, Nothingness. That is, there is 
something-it does exist, after all-but it is something stripped of all of its 
properties. All that remains is a brute, undifferentiated, propertyless "Is-
ness;' a something which is nothing in particular-thus, Being in its barest 
form is Nothingness. There·are no essences. There is only existence.3 
This might not seem like much on paper-"Nothingness" is rather 
abstract, after all. However, Sartre believed that an actual encounter with 
this Nothingness would be a horrifying, nauseating experience, like being 
suspended in a nightmarish void or peering into Nietzsche's famed abyss: 
the world as we know it disappears and coalesces into a single, indescrib-
able, primordial Nothingness. Worse yet is the realization that it is not only 
the world which is this way, but ourselves as well. There are no essences; 
thus, there is no human essence, no human nature on which we can base 
our lives or in which we can ground our choices. Take a moment to grasp 
the seriousness of this conclusion. One of the major motivations for phi-
losophers to discover the human essence is to provide some sort of ethical 
gUidance; the idea is that if we can know what we are, then we can figure 
out what we should be-that is, how we ought to live. For example, if we 
were to determine that the essence of a human being is an immortal soul 
created by God, then we might reasonably conclude that we ought to live 
in a way that pleases God. Alternatively, if we were to determine that the 
essence of a human being is reason, then we might conclude that we ought 
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to spend our lives developing and exercising our powers of reason to their 
fullest. However, if Sartre is correct, and there simply is no such thing as 
human nature, then we seem to have nothing on which to base our lives. 
Still, one might say: "Whether or not there is some abstract metaphysi-
cal human essence, I am still guided by my own personal identity. That 
is, I am a particular kind of person-a person with a particular character, 
personality, memory, experience, et cetera-and I base my life, my choices, 
and my actions in that individual personhood. For example, there are 
some things I simply would not, even could not do (say, commit murder), 
because I am simply not that kind of person (that is, a murderer):' How-
ever, this too is an illusion, according to Sartre: personal identity has no 
more reality than essence and is nothing more than a convenient myth. At 
its core, the ego is Nothing, but a Nothing that can be anything, a kind of 
pure potentiality. Thus, we are not our pasts, our memories, our previous 
actions, all of which we tend to lump together and call a "personality" or 
"moral character;' as though it were something essential to us. Instead, we 
create ourselves anew from moment to moment through our choices and 
actions, on which there are no literally limits. For example, it is tempting to 
utter such sentences as "I am not a murderer;' implying that one has a cer-
tain essential moral character and, further, that one could not ever commit 
murder because that action simply could not follow from one's character. 
According to Sartre, this is a self-deception. One cannot say that one is or 
is not a murderer. One simply chooses to murder or not to murder at any 
given moment. One might go one's whole life without murdering, but then 
commit murder the very next second. 
This is roughly Sartre's notion of human freedom. Everything that we 
are and everything that we do is freely chosen. Of course, the obvious im-
plication of this complete freedom is that we are also completely responsi-
ble for our choices, our actions, our lives, and our whole world. It is simply 
never true that we are forced to do anything against our will or to live in 
a world not of our chOOSing. This truth, and the burden of responsibility 
it embodies, is invariably forced on us by our experiences of anxiety, an-
guish, and despair-what is often called existential "angst:' We might be 
tempted here to think of counterexamples to this kind of radical freedom 
and responsibility. "What ifI were mugged at gunpoint? Couldn't I say that 
I had no choice but to hand over my wallet?" "Certainly not;' Sartre would 
say. "You had a choice: you could have chosen not to hand over your wal-
let. You probably would have been killed, of course, but don't say that you 
didn't have a choice. That you exist in a world in which you were mugged 
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is a result of your choice, and nothing and no one else could literally force 
you to make that choice:' Thus, we cannot blame others for our choices 
and actions-no "Society is to blame" or "I accuse my parents!" The world 
that each of us has is the product of our own choices, over which we always 
have control.4 
Of course, most people can't live with the crushing angst that is total 
responsibility. As a result, they live "inauthentically" or "in bad faith;' as 
Sartre alternately characterizes it. That is, they live in denial of their free-
dom and responsibility and blame circumstance and other people for their 
lives. They create myths-such as religion or human nature or theories 
of morality-so they can pretend there is something else that determines 
what they are and what they ought to be. According to Sartre, we are to 
live "authentically" or "in good faith." We do this by accepting our freedom 
and responsibility and choosing for ourselves what we want to be, how we 
want to live, and what projects we want to create and commit ourselves 
to. There are no external standards-no absolute morality, no divine com-
mands from God-that make a project "good" or "bad"; all that matters 
is that it be authentic. Certainly, this has an empowering and optimistic 
tone to it. However, there is a dark side to it as well, which creates a funda-
mental kind of ambivalence in the human condition. Total freedom from 
everything and everyone else is also a kind of radical alienation from the 
world and others in it. (Note Jose Chung's opening comment: "I had never 
thought much about it before. I guess that's because I always felt like such 
an alien myself. That to be concerned with aliens from ... other planets, 
that just seemed so, uh ... redundanf') We cannot look to anything or 
anyone other than ourselves for gUidance, advice, or validation. Thus, in 
a very real sense it is just as Jose Chung says in his closing comment: "For 
although we may not be alone in the universe, in our own separate ways on 
this planet, we are all ... alone:'5 Jose Chung makes this remark just after 
having given us his take on the various characters in it. But is it true? How 
well do each of Morgan's characters stack up against Sartre's call to authen-
ticity, and is the result that they are in fact each alone? 
A Sartrean Assessment of Morgan's Characters 
Regarding Blaine, Chung says: "Evidence of extraterrestrial existence re-
mains as elusive as ever, but the skies will continue to be searched by the 
likes of Blaine Faulkner, hoping to someday find not only proof of alien 
life, but also contentment on a new world. Until then, he must be content 
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with his new job:' This evaluation of Blaine is fairly optimistic, and as such, 
we might be tempted to characterize him as authentic. However, perhaps 
the main reason we feel good about how things turned out for Blaine is 
simply that he's finally gotten out of the house and landed a job. (Recall 
Blaine's admission to Chung: "I know how crazy this is going to sound, but 
... I want to be abducted by aliens .... I hate this town. I hate ... people. I 
just want to be taken away to someplace where I ... I don't have to worry 
about finding a job:') Once we see past that, it's hard to assess whether or 
not his project to find proof of alien life is authentic. On the one hand, 
the series certainly suggests that there are aliens, so Blaine's project isn't 
without merit, and it could be seen as the result of a free and responsible 
choice. On the other hand, as the episode repeatedly shows us, Blaine has 
a way of disingenuously describing everything that happens to him. He's 
living in a fantasy world he has created for escapist purposes. This kind of 
escapism rings of in authenticity. Ultimately, Blaine is a mixed case, with 
elements of both authenticity and in authenticity. 
Regarding Roky Crickenson, Chung tells us, "Others search for an-
swers from within. Roky relocated to EI Cajon, California, preaching to the 
lost and desperate:' What to make of this? It's possible that Roky is simply 
delusional; Scully believes he has a fantasy-prone personality. If so, then 
an evaluation of his choices in terms of good faith or bad faith is probably 
moot. Still, assume for a moment that he is not delusional. If Sartre requires 
of us that we create and commit to our own projects, and that there are no 
particular criteria for choosing one or the other, why couldn't Roky choose 
to found a new religion? We might be tempted to say that Sartre would 
reject this on the grounds that there is no God. However, Roky doesn't 
seem to have traditional God in mind, so Sartre's arguments against the 
existence of God simply don't apply. Furthermore, it's perfectly possible 
that Roky is correct; after all, for all we know, everything he is saying about 
Lord Kinbote and his inner realm is true. Unfortunately, there might sim-
ply be no Single, definitive way to evaluate Roky. Without knowing more, 
we might reasonably argue both a bad- and a good-faith interpretation of 
Roky's decision: on the former, Roky is inauthentic because he has allowed 
Lord Kinbote to determine his projects for him; on the latter, Roky is au-
thentic because he has freely and with full responsibility chosen to follow 
Lord Kinbote. Ultimately, Roky's case is probably indeterminate-he may 
or may not be authentic, based on what the episode shows us. 
Finally, what of the teens of the episode, Harold Lamb and Chrissy 
Giorgio? Regarding Harold, Chung says: "Then there are those who care 
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not about extraterrestrials, searching for meaning in other human beings. 
Rare or lucky are those who find it:' Harold is still looking for validation 
from others. He wants to be the object of the projects of others rather than 
create his own project-the worst kind ofSartrean inauthenticity. However, 
Chung says that Chrissy "has come to believe her alien visitation was a mes-
sage to improve her own world, and she has devoted herself to this goal 
wholeheartedlY:' Of all the characters in this episode, Chrissy fares the best 
in Sartrean terms. Rather than worry about what "really" happened, Chrissy 
expressed her freedom and responsibility by making her experiences into 
what she wants them to be. Furthermore, she has used her experiences as the 
basis for the creation of her own project: a commitment to humanistic politi-
cal activity. This is ultimately what Sartre himself advocated and lived, as evi-
denced by his commitment to Marxist-inspired activism. If there is anyone 
in the episode who is authentic, it is most certainly Chrissy. 
After considering the authenticity (or lack thereof) of each of the char-
acters unique to this episode, we are finally left with a question: Are they 
all, in fact, alone, as Jose Chung claims? Certainly Sartre's philosophy en-
tails an "aloneness" in that each of us has to choose our own projects. How-
ever, not everyone of the characters is alone in the same way and to the 
same degree. In fact, it appears that the more authentic the character, the 
less alone he or she is. Leaving Chung's assessment of Mulder and Scully 
aside for now, Harold was the most inauthentic character of the lot and 
the most alone. The authenticity of Roky and Blaine was unclear, but they 
are less alone than Harold-Roky has his followers, and Blaine, at least, 
is out of his room and in a new job. The only truly authentic character is 
Chrissy, and she is the least alone of any of them. True, she is still alone to 
the degree that she must choose her projects without the external valida-
tion of knowing what really happened to her. However, it is precisely her 
authenticity that leads her to connect with others and actively engage with 
the world with full freedom and responsibility. So in Sartrean terms, we 
can see though we are all alone in having to choose our own projects, the 
authenticity of our choices can mitigate that aloneness. 
So much for the characters unique to the "Jose Chung's From Outer 
Space" episode. But what about Jose Chung himself? Is he authentic? In 
many ways, Chung is the most Sartrean person of the episode. Chung ex-
plicitly denies the possibility of a Single, objectively correct way oflooking 
at the world or living one's life. Recall that when asked by Scully to record 
the truth about the events in Klass County, Chung flatly asserts that this 
would be impossible. 
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Furthermore, Chung deliberately refuses to engage in any sort of bad-
faith self-deception. He is blunt with Scully about his motives for writing: 
"At first I was reluctant, until I realized that I had an opportunity here to 
create an entirely new literary genre: a non-fiction science fiction. Now, 
see, that gimmick alone will guarantee its landing on the best-seller list. In 
short, to answer your question? Money!" At the same time, he has no illu-
sions about his literary importance, despite the fact that he clearly enjoys 
the adoration of his fans. In "Jose Chung's Doomsday Defense" (an episode 
of the X-Files spin-off Millennium), Chung asks Frank Black (Millennium's 
protagonist, played by Lance Henrickson) to guess which two authors will 
still be read in a thousand years time. Frank guesses "Shakespeare and 
Chung?" In spite of the great pleasure that this answer clearly gives Chung, 
he disagrees, answering instead "Shakespeare and Goopta" (the latter being 
the fictional author around whom the events of the episode turn). In ad-
dition, Chung recognizes the equal value of all good-faith projects, even 
to the point of comparing his work as an author-despite its apparent 
lack oflasting value-to Frank's criminal profiling: "I realized how similar 
our jobs are. You see, based on some vague details and notions, you try to 
sketch out a person's past, in order to imagine their future actions. Detec-
tion, dramaturgy: it's all the same:' 
Finally, Chung's own characterization of his life has a distinctly exis-
tentialist ring to it (as long as we take his reference to God as tongue-in-
cheek). When confronted by a member of the Selfosophist religion (which 
Chung had recently ridiculed in a short story) about why Chung would 
make fun of their beliefs, Chung replies: "It's not just your beliefs: I ridicule 
a whole bunch of other beliefs .... If I used your therapies to wipe away 
my pains, IO disappear! And if my right to choose amusement wherever 
I want, if that were wiped away too, IO die! ... But I've developed a few 
therapies of my own. I've learned to appreciate the preposterousness of any 
profundity, and in my distress, I am able to find the smallest, most absurd 
details, as if God were looking down, winking at me, and letting me in on 
the joke:' 
Mulder and Scully in Sartrean Terms 
Morgan, through Chung, offers his interpretation of Mulder and Scully as 
he sees them at near the end of season 3. Chung calls Scully's character in 
From Outer Space "Agent Diana Lesky" and Mulder's literary pseudonym is 
''Agent Reynard Muldrake:' Regarding Agent Lesky, Chung says "Seeking 
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the truth about aliens means a perfunctory nine-to-five job to some. For 
although Agent Diana Lesky is noble spirit and pure of heart, she remains, 
nevertheless, a federal employee:' This is clearly a description of a charac-
ter that lives in bad faith. Rather than committing herself to a project of 
her own choosing, she allows the FBI to choose her projects for her. Worse, 
she pursues those projects only perfunctorily, without passion, or even any 
real interest in whether or not the cases are solved, so long as she can clock 
out at five and draw her paycheck. Of Muldrake, Chung says "As for her 
[Lesky's] partner, Reynard Muldrake-that ticking time bomb of insan-
ity-his quest into the unknown has so warped his psyche, one shudders to 
think how he receives pleasures from life:' This is a description of a person 
who may have been authentic at one point but has lost his way. Certainly, 
his project-to discover proof of alien life-is one of his own chOOSing, 
and one that he has pursued even in the absence of external validation. 
However, as Chung sees it, Muldrake's commitment has turned to obses-
sion. He now feels compelled to pursue this project because he allows it to 
define him as a person and thus determine his choices and actions. 
However, we may wonder whether Chung-that is, Morgan-fairly in-
terprets Scully and Mulder. Is Chung's terse assessment too quick? The se-
ries continued for six more seasons, and six years after that we meet Scully 
and Mulder again in I Want to Believe (2008). If we include these data, 
what should we say about whether our heroes-as we (the X-Phile view-
ers) know them-live in good or bad faith? 
The first time we see Scully showing signs of existential angst is per-
haps in "Beyond the Sea:' Luther Lee Boggs, a convicted serial killer, claims 
to have psychic abilities after his first (stayed) brush with the gas chamber. 
Mulder is uncharacteristically skeptical, but Scully begins to believe in 
Boggs's abilities. With Mulder in the hospital from a gunshot wound, Scully 
cracks the case, follOWing Boggs's psychic leads. But when she files her field 
report, she doesn't admit to the veracity of Boggs's abilities. By the end of 
the episode, she strains to develop one of her Scully-type scientific/natu-
ralistic explanations for Boggs's leads. Mulder subsequently asks, "Dana, 
after all you've seen, after all the evidence, why can't you believe?" She con-
fesses that she is afraid to believe. Believing in the paranormal would mean 
giving up her training as a scientist and FBI agent. This seems to be an 
example of Scully living in bad faith. However, in "Empedocles" (season 8) 
she has overcome her fear. Agent Doggett (Robert Patrick) abruptly seeks 
Scully's counsel: "You never believed in any of this stuff. This paranormal 
or whatever you call it. So, what changed your mind?" She informs him: 
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"I realized it was me, that I was afraid. Afraid to believe:' Scully has given 
up the fetters of her scientific and FBI training. She doesn't completely dis-
regard them (which itself might be a sign of leading an authentic life), but 
she no longer fears living her life without them. At the end of the episode, 
she thanks Mulder for providing her the courage to believe as the evi-
dence-paranormal or naturalistic-presents itself. She no longer allows 
people to define her as (merely) a medical doctor, FBI agent, or "time-card 
puncher;' and her life is freer for it. She is no longer the character Morgan 
knew in season 3; she has transcended her former self. 
Even so, it must be admitted that along the way she sometimes acted 
like Mulder simply because she was the senior X-Files agent. When 
Doggett, a skeptical New York police officer turned FBI agent, is assigned 
to the X-Files (to find Mulder), he asserts (in "Invocation" from season 
8) that words like '''anomalous: 'supernatural; 'paranormal' -they purport 
to explain something by not explaining it. It's lazY:' Scully finds herself 
working very hard to acclimate Doggett to his new post. Sometimes she 
works too hard. In "Patience" (season 8) we find her taking leaps of logic 
and making opaque connections that only Mulder (on his bravest of days) 
would dare. However, it seems that she does so only because this is what 
Mulder would do and not as a result of making an authentic choice. Argu-
ably, Scully's early interactions with Doggett are in bad faith. But by season 
8, acting in bad faith was the exception for Scully and not the rule-we 
might explain these instances away with the angst she feels due to Mulder's 
disappearance. In "Without" (season 8) she declares to Doggett's incredu-
lity that a scientist like Scully could ever believe in the paranormal: "I will 
go on record to say this; that I have seen things that I cannot explain. I 
have observed phenomena that I cannot deny. And that as a scientist and 
a serious person it is a badge of honor not to dismiss these things because 
someone thinks they're BS:' This might be the epitome ofSartrean authen-
ticity (although her looking for Mulder in "Without" -alone at night in the 
desert with only a flashlight-perhaps is a close second).6 
For the most part, then, Scully lives in good faith, at least as the se-
ries progresses. An important turning point might be Scully's cancer (di-
agnosed in season 4). She refused to let it define her. But when we (the 
X-Phile viewers) meet Scully again in I Want to Believe, the assessment 
of Scully in Sartrean terms seems a bit clouded. She has left the bureau. 
This was her choice, and it seems that she could choose to return; at least 
this is what the I Want to Believe novelization impliesJ She now practices 
pediatric medicine full time at Our Lady of Sorrows hospital. She consults 
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specialists at more prestigious institutions but doesn't blindly follow their 
advice. She chooses to contravene the authority of Chief of Staff Father 
Ybara (Adam Godley) about stopping treatment on one of her patients. 
He believes that the boy should receive palliative care, but Scully is not 
ready to accept that course. She lives with Mulder and continually strives, 
presumably, to be a good partner even though Mulder refuses to leave the 
house. All of these data point to Scully leading an authentic life. In this 
way, her character continues to develop from its humble beginnings of a 
young woman labeled at a scientist, doctor, and FBI agent. 
Another source of angst for Scully was her religious (Roman Catholic) 
upbringing. Clashes between Scully's faith and (scientific) reason occurred 
more than once in the series-"Revelations" and "All Souls" are two notable 
examples. This clash arises again in I Want to Believe. Her disagreement with 
Father Ybara seems to be over not the facts of the case but whether Scully 
can let go of the boy. It is hinted in the movie that he reminds Scully of her 
son, William, primarily because they are about the same age. If the image 
of the son she placed for adoption is impeding her judgment, it might be 
argued that her dispute with Father Ybara is in bad faith. However, near the 
end of the film, it seems that, with Mulder's help, Scully begins to believe 
in her own abilities to cure the boy with a radical stem-cell treatment. This 
might be evidence that she treats the boy in Sartrean good faith, espeCially 
given Catholicism's official stance against most stem cell therapies. 
Scully has different difficulties with another priest, Father Joseph 
Crissman (Billy Connolly). "Father Joe:' now defrocked, is a convicted pe-
dophile. But he begins to have psychic visions of kidnapped women. The 
FBI calls on Mulder and Scully to consult in the case, and they hesitantly 
agree. Scully is revolted by Crissman. Her revulsion leads her to not believe 
in his alleged psychic abilities. In perhaps the most controversial aspect 
of Sartre's position, it might be argued that Scully's preconceived notions 
about ethics, grounded as they are in her religious upbringing, are leading 
her to choose in bad faith. Sartre seems committed to the position that no 
act in itself-even pedophilia-is impermissible. Consequently, it could be 
argued that Scully's choice to deny Father's Joe's abilities is grounded in her 
fear of giving up her religiOUS background. But in the end, as she did with 
Boggs, she gets herself to believe that Father Joe's eerie command, "Don't 
give up:' was meant for her. It becomes a source of strength for her as she 
decides to proceed with the radical stem-cell treatments. 
A Sartrean assessment of Mulder is perhaps murkier than of Scully. 
The immediate source of existential concern is that his character has not 
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. grown very much. The microcosm for this is his sister, Samantha. At first, 
Mulder's decision to reopen the X-Files unit -at the risk of a comfortable 
and decorated career in the violent crimes division-is a prime example of 
leading an authentic life. In Sartre's terms, the value Mulder places on Sa-
mantha's disappearance and her rescue is Mulder's own choice. It's a choice 
that he continues to make, even though it earns him a basement office and 
the nickname «Spooky:' This embodies his assertion to Scully in «Memento 
Mori": «The truth will set you free. It will set us both free:' His choice to 
pursue the truth at all costs can only be an example of good faith. However, 
Morgan is correct in that this choice has arguably consumed Mulder. The 
problem isn't that «he receives no pleasure from life:' because that, too, 
could be an existential choice Mulder makes for the sake of finding Saman-
tha and ultimately «the truth:' The problem seems to be his obsession with 
pursuing the truth. Consider that in «Closure" (season 7) Mulder manages 
to find Samantha's teenage journal. He seems to accept that it is written 
in her hand. In it he reads about all the times she was abducted (presum-
ably in ways similar to Cassandra Spender) and all the experiments that 
she suffered through. The last person to see Samantha alive was Arbutus 
Ray (Patience Cleveland), a registered nurse. She tells Scully that Saman-
tha somehow disappeared from a locked hospital room, never to be seen 
again. Later in the episode, he has something of a paranormal encounter 
with Samantha, which leads him to believe that she is deceased. At the end 
of the episode, he murmurs, 'Tm free:' It seems that Mulder has found the 
truth about his sister, but it has not set him free. He continues to search for 
her, even though he seems to know she is dead. She died long before he 
reopened the X-Files. 
When we meet Mulder in I Want to Believe, he has shut himself in a 
makeshift office. Much like in his basement FBI office, he throws pencils 
at the ceiling as he combs newspapers and the Internet for evidence of 
paranormal activity. A picture of Samantha is clearly displayed on the back 
of his door. It appears that his obsession with Samantha and the elusive 
«truth out there" prevents him from being a good partner for Scully. We 
(the X-Phile viewers) believe that Mulder loves Scully (from «Existence" in 
season 8). But it seems that he cannot fully commit to that love. When he 
finally decides to leave the house to consult for the FBI, it looks pretty clear 
that it only fuels his obsession (which is why Scully qUickly regrets her 
decision to involve him). However, if there is evidence of Mulder choos-
ing in Sartrean good faith, it might be at the very end of the film. With the 
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case solved, rather than lament the fact that Father Joe's involvement wasn't 
truly conveyed to the public, he promises Scully that after her operation 
they will-together-get as far away from the darkness as they can (at least 
for a while). In a surprise scene at the end of the closing credits, we see 
Mulder and Scully on a small boat-alone in the bright sun-sailing on 
tropical waters. What exactly this scene represents is unclear, but it might 
be evidence that Mulder has finally grown, headed for a more authentic 
life. 
"You Seem Non-Nonplussed by These Contradictions?" 
Darin Morgan's episodes are invariably rich with philosophical content. 
But philosophy, by its very nature, is also invariably controversial. We 
believe that the arguments about knowledge and truth implicit in "Jose 
Chung's From Outer Space" can be resisted. 
Morgan's first implicit argument, that knowledge of reality as it is in 
itself is impossible because of the subjective nature of experience, seems to 
assume that knowledge requires certainty. If it is possible that our belief is 
false, then it cannot count as knowledge, even if the belief turns out to be 
true. So, because no vantage point is privileged, it is always possible that it 
doesn't accurately represent how things actually are. It thus allegedly fol-
lows that knowledge of reality is impossible. Immediately, whether no epis-
temic vantage point is privileged must be questioned. Doesn't it seem plain 
that some-due to poor health or psychological disorders-are clearly 
diminished? Nevertheless, this argument faces two additional damaging 
objections. 
First, it isn't clear that all judgments are prone to the possibility of 
error. Ironically, Morgan brings this issue to the foreground in the diner 
scene via Lieutenant Shaefer, who tells Mulder: "Don't you get it? I'm abso-
lutely positive me, my copilot, and those two kids were abducted but I can't 
be absolutely sure it happened. I can't be sure of anything anymore! ... I'm 
not sure we're even having this conversation .... I don't know if you even 
exist:' Mulder responds: "I can only assure you that I do;' to which Shaefer 
replies, "Well, thanks, buddy. Unfortunately, I can't give you the same as-
surance about me:' Rene Descartes would disagree. He argued that you can 
have knowledge of your own existence, at least whenever you think about 
it, indeed, whenever you doubt it. This is so because doubting (or think-
ing generally) requires a doubter (or thinker). Because a thinker has im-
226 Dean A. Kowalski and S. Evan Kreider 
mediate and self-certifying cognitive access to her thoughts, it follows that 
she can never be wrong in her belief that she exists, at least whenever she 
thinks about it. This is Descartes' celebrated "cogito ergo sum;' or "I think, 
therefore I am" argument. It shows that there are pieces of knowledge we 
cannot believe falsely.8 Thus, some knowledge of reality-that you are in-
cluded in it-is obtainable. 
Second, it is not clear that knowledge requires the impossibility of error 
in the first place. Think of all the beliefs you might be incorrect about: who 
your parents are, your birthday, your phone number, whether you have 
two hands, whether you're reading this book. It seems more likely that you 
know these things than it is that knowledge requires the impossibility of 
error. Moreover, if knowledge did require the impossibility of error, how 
could that requirement itself be known? Isn't it possible that knowledge 
doesn't require this stringent standard? Note the difference with Descartes' 
"cogito:' It is impossible to believe falsely that you exist, even when you 
doubt your existence, because thought requires a thinker. Since you cannot 
mistakenly believe that you are thinking, you cannot mistakenly believe 
you exist. But the assumption that knowledge requires the impossibility of 
error isn't self-certifying in this way. Thus, it cannot be known, and relying 
on it for a condition of knowledge seems self-defeating. 
Morgan's second argument is that the fact of disagreement about real-
ity entails that there are no objective truths about reality to be known. If 
there are no objective truths, then everything is subjective. This is a very 
common argument, heard most often from those who are brand new to 
philosophy. It also has two flaws. First, there have been many cases of dis-
agreement that don't lead to subjectivism. Cultures disagreed about the 
shape of the Earth: some held it was perfectly round like a marble; others 
that it was flat with four corners; others that it is spherical, but not per-
fectly so. But from this disagreement, it cannot be concluded that it there 
is no objective truth to the matter about the shape of the earth. This con-
clusion does apply generally, however. Theists disagree with atheists about 
God's existence, but whether God, in fact, exists is immune to this debate. 
Either God exists or he doesn't, just as the Earth has this determinate shape 
or not. Belief is one thing, but truth (and existence) is another. If so, then 
disagreements about ethical beliefs and value judgments don't necessarily 
lead to ethical subjectivism either. Secondly, and ironically, the claim that 
everything is subjective is itself supposed to be objectively true. But by its 
own meaning, there cannot be any objectively true claims, as these would 
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describe reality as it is in itself. Thus, the very idea of subjectivism about 
truth is self-contradictory. But if it cannot be true, then its logical opposite 
must be, which entails that there are some objective truths about reality. 
Therefore, perhaps Mulder is correct: the truth is out there, even about 
philosophical topics like God, ethics, and values. We are to discover it; we 
don't merely invent it. If so, then perhaps we are not forced to conclude 
that we are all alone-in a moral world of our own making-as Morgan 
suggests at the end of the episode. Perhaps Mulder and Scully should be 
our guides: if we all put new batteries in our flashlights and help each 
other find the truth about ethics and values, we could live in the same 
moral universe together, or at least live more peacefully in more reward-
ing ways. 
But we suspect that the spirit of Morgan's trenchant criticisms of The X-
Files remains. In fact, The X-Files would be incomplete without them. How 
can a show that obstinately refuses you closure on any thematic topic-
whether Krychek is lying this time, if CSM is really dead, why the black oil 
behaves differently in various situations, if William was a miracle of God 
or technology, or what reaUy happened to Samantha-not allow someone 
to question its own ideals. Week after week we (the X-Phile viewers) are 
told "the truth is out there:' Morgan asks (in "Jose Chung's From Outer 
Space"), "Is it?" Mulder is canonized for his relentless search for the truth 
regardless of personal sacrifice. Morgan asks (in "Clyde Bruckman's Final 
Repose"), "Wouldn't he be happier [and less lonely] if he relented?" Mul-
der drags Scully across the globe in the hopes that she, Skinner, Doggett, 
and everyone else will believe. Morgan asks, "Isn't this megalomaniacal?" 
Mulder appears as a modern day Arthurian knight on a Grail quest for 
the truth.9 Morgan asks (in "War of the Coprophages"), "Isn't he more 
like Don Quixote jousting windmills [especially when traveling without 
Scully]?" Mulder and Scully will find the truth and set us free, even the 
circus folk. In "Humbug:' Morgan asks, "But, then, why do they seem like 
the freaks?" By raising these questions-by encouraging us think about 
them for ourselves-he ironically wrote the most genuine X-Files episodes 
of the series. He didn't advance the mythology. He didn't create frightening 
monsters or creepy villains. He got us to ponder what we should believe 
about The X-Files. Many of us wanted to believe that Mulder and Scully 
were heroes. Morgan asked whether we should believe this of them. For 
this we (and, perhaps, even Chris Carter) owe him our gratitude. Only a 
writer of Morgan's caliber could get us to ponder what we believe about 
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show that requires us to think about our beliefs (and also make us laugh in 
the process). 
Notes 
I again express my gratitude to "WhoToTrust?" and my other new NewSpace XPhile 
Forum friends ("SecretAgentGirl;' "kamish42;' site administrator "Marita Covarru-
bias") at NewSpace XPhile Forum (http://anewspace.20.forumer.com/index.php ) for 
the inspiration to recraft this essay for the 2009 edition. There isn't a more cordial 
bunch ofX-Philes on the Internet. (Website last accessed August 26, 2008.) 
1. Margaret Kaner has also recognized the significance of perspective in this epi-
sode. See "Believing the Lie: Interpretive Strategies and Epistemic Choices in The X-
Files," in The X-Files and Literature, ed. Sharon R. Yang (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2007), 234-36. 
2. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism Is a Humanism;' trans. Philip Mairet, in Exis-
tentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufman (New York: Meridian Books, 
1956), 290-91. 
3. The preceding is very freely summarized from Sartre's Being and Nothingness, 
trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1984)-see especially the 
introduction and part 1, chapter 1. 
4. See Being and Nothingness part 4, chapter 1 for more on freedom. 
5. See Being and Nothingness part 1, chapter 2 for more on bad faith. 
6. In the desert scene, Scully doesn't (quite) find Mulder, but Doggett finds Scully. 
An enlightening exchange ensues between the new X-File partners: 
SCULLY: For someone who claims he's not following me, you sure have a 
knack. 
DOGGETT: Hey, you're where the action is. 
SCULLY: What does that tell you? That I'm crazy or that I'm right? 
DOGGETT: Wandering around in the desert in the dead of night, you call 
it. 
SCULLY: You say you want to find Mulder, but you won't do what it takes. 
You're afraid that I'm right. 
DOGGETT: I'm not afraid of anything. Except that maybe Mulder's got even 
you belieVing in this crap now. 
SCULLY: You've seen this crap for yourself now. How do you explain what 
took place today? 
DOGGETT: Let me ask you something hypothetically. Now, if you were to 
find him out here or this ship or this alien bounty hunter, what would you 
do then? 
SCULLY: I know what Agent Mulder would do. Hea do whatever it took. 
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Because Scully refuses to kowtow (or revert back) to Doggett's entrenched skepticism 
and disdain for all things paranormal, she is leading an authentic life. Moreover, here 
she relies on Mulder's example in good faith, unlike in "Patience:' She fully realizes 
the important and pervasive role that Mulder has in her life, and she authentically 
chooses to act accordingly-as he would authentically choose to do "whatever it took" 
to rescue Scully. 
7. Max Allan Collins (based on the screenplay by Chris Carter and Frank Spot-
nitz), The X-Files: I Want to Believe (New York: HarperColiins, 2008), 23-25. 
8. Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See especially Meditations 1 and 2 for Des-
cartes' argument that the thinker has knowledge of her existence. 
9. For more on the analogy between The X-Files and the Arthurian knights, please 
see Joan R. Vredenburgh, "The Grail of Truth: The X-Files as a Modern-Day Arthurian 
Quest;' in The X-Files and Literature, ed. Sharon R. Yang (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge 
Scholars Press, 2007),43-65. 
Feelings and Fictions 
Exploring Emotion and Belief 
in Fight the Future 
Christopher R. Trogan 
Film has enormous power to affect our emotions. Sometimes, as in docu-
mentary, our emotions are targeted via the intellect. More often than not, 
however, our emotions are provoked directly through the fictional presen-
tation of characters and events. The X-Files movie Fight the Future demon-
strates the ways in which film as an aesthetic medium can induce a plethora 
of feelings and emotions - from skepticism to belief and anxiety to relief-
in order to put forth a series of propositions for intellectual consideration. 
While any Single episode in The X-Files also induces emotions in order 
to carry out such ends, the feature-length film gives viewers the chance 
to experience a longer, sustained, and wide-ranging emotional experience. 
The nearly two hours of continuous narrative gives viewers an extended 
opportunity to enter into the lives of the characters and to suspend disbe-
lief through emotional identification. We are moved by Fox Mulder, Dana 
Scully, and the challenges they face. And we experience emotions - fear, 
relief, anger, excitement - due to their experience of events that are, like 
the characters themselves, fictional. 
Real Responses, Fictional Characters 
When we stop to think about it, films like Fight the Future, which depict 
these fictional characters and events, make our emotional responses puz-
zling. Of course, it may be that some part of us does not quite "know" that 
the film is fictional- after all, some of us are fans of The X-Files series be-
cause it "could be" real. However, this would only partially explain our 
emotional reactions to it. In fact, we know that Special Agents Fox Mulder 
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and Dana Scully and the events they encounter in the film are the deliber-
ate creation of screenwriters. Yet we experience some of the same emotions 
we would if they were real people and events. The film raises interesting 
aesthetic issues about the connection between beliefs, judgments, and 
emotional responses. The nature of this connection forms the core of an 
intense aesthetic debate. Regarding this debate, it will be argued here that 
although our beliefs, judgments, and emotional responses to Fight the Fu-
ture (and to other fictional works) may seem unjustified because the events 
are not "real" events, a proper appreciation of the imagination will allow 
for a rationally justified and even ethically advantageous response. In short, 
it will be argued that our appreciation of Fight the Future is more than 
an enjoyable pastime: it allows us to enhance our capacity for empathy 
and understanding of other people in general- in effect, to become more 
"human:' 
The film begins in 37,000 Be when a deadly secret was buried in a Texas 
cave; two cavemen hunt down what is recognizable as an extraterrestrial in 
an ice cavern. A mood of suspense and loneliness arises immediately as 
these primitive humans trudge through the snow and ice. Within min-
utes, we are shuttled to the present (1997), when the secret has been un-
leashed. A young boy, Stevie, falls through the ground while playing with 
his friends and lands in the same cavern. As his friends peer down from 
above, young Stevie is attacked by the black cancer, which also infects two 
firemen who attempt to rescue him and two additional firemen who go in 
after the first two. It is worth noting here that Stevie is infected in a unique 
way. For the first five seasons of the show, if a character was infected by the 
black cancer, the cancer entered through the facial orifices. Here, however, 
the black cancer attacks Stevie through his skin (presumably his feet). 
Watching a child being infected in this mysterious way is alarming 
enough. However, for fans of the show-the so-called X-Philes-the situ-
ation was even more emotionally charged. It is learned that there are two 
strains of the alien virus. X -Philes were familiar with the pooling, swarm-
ing version that infected Krycek in "Apocrypha:' This alien life form then 
used Krycek's body to return to an alien craft buried in the missile silo. 
Stevie is infected with the wormlike version that was first witnessed in-
fecting the scientist in "Tunguska:' In that episode it was left ambiguous 
exactly how (besides how the "oil" moved and entered the body) this sec-
ond version was different. The Syndicate originally believed that coloniza-
tion would take place via the pooling/swarming version, which leaves its 
human subjects physically intact but takes away control of their bodies. 
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However, in Fight the Future, it is made clear that a human infected with 
the second strain becomes merely a source of nutrition for the alien as it 
gestates. The victim's body literally turns to a bag of jelly before the alien 
bursts out of the torso. Furthermore, the gestated alien is large, clawed, and 
vicious, evoking even greater fear and dread among the X -Philes.! All this 
information is strategically placed at the very beginning of Fight the Future 
to evoke suspense, excitement, anxiety, horror, dismay, and - if one is a 
truly sensitive fan - perhaps even grief. 
But what role do our beliefs and judgments play in these emotional 
responses? Does the experience of these emotions indicate that we believe 
that these events are "true"? Moreover, these questions are significant in 
relation to our emotional reactions as the film continues: we experience 
anxiety (and perhaps confusion) as we watch the FBI agent sitting in front 
of the bomb waiting to explode in his face, dread when the bees are un-
leashed on Mulder and Scully in the strange metallic half globes, frustra-
tion (or relief!) during Mulder and Scully's first aborted kiss, regret that 
Mulder can no longer believe what the Well-Manicured Man (or anyone 
like him) has to say about the alien conspiracy or his sister. 
In everyday circumstances, beliefs and judgments clearly playa crucial 
role in our emotional responses. If I am afraid of someone chasing me, I 
must first judge and believe that someone is chasing me. If I feel sorry for 
my friend Jones because he is experiencing hardship, I must believe that 
Jones exists and that he is, in fact, having difficulty. Is it any different in 
film? If we feel sorrow at the loss of young Stevie through an attack of the 
black cancer, do we believe that Stevie and the black cancer exist and that 
this event has actually occurred? 
On the one hand, it seems that in many circumstances an emotional 
response is in one way or another dependent on belief in the existence of 
what we are responding to: I cannot feel sorry for Jones unless Jones and the 
reasons for feeling sorry for him exist. On the other hand, it seems that - as 
in the case of Stevie, the firemen, and the black cancer-we are moved by 
what happens to fictional characters and events, even though we know full 
well that they do not and never did exist. So, it seems that we must choose 
between the conclusion that our emotional responses to fiction are unjusti-
fied because they are irrational and the opinion that our justified emotional 
responses, at least sometimes, need not be grounded in truth. 
Aestheticians (philosophers who debate issues in the arts) are divided 
in their approach to resolving this apparent dilemma. One approach is to 
analyze the rationality of our responses to film in which fictional charac-
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ters and events are portrayed. These philosophers argue that our emotional 
experiences are inconsistent and irrational since we know that these char-
acters and events do not exist. A second, and quite different, approach is 
to argue that certain emotions depend on the adoption of a certain sort of 
perspective - that is, on "seeing things from another point of view" by fo-
cusing on the power of the imagination. Perhaps films even demand such 
a response from viewers. 
The Paradox of Being Moved and "Being Moved" 
Before we undertake an analysis of what it means to be "moved" by this, 
or any, film, we would do well to consider emotions and how they differ 
from other affective states, such as feelings, moods, and desires. Many phi-
losophers subscribe to a "cognitive" theory of emotion in which emotions 
are defined by having cognitive components. A "cognitive component" is 
a mental proposition-what one contemporary philosopher calls an "un-
asserted thought" -a thought tentatively considered but not believed (Le., 
not thought actually to correspond to facts in the world).2 The cognitive 
theory of emotion, then, maintains that to experience an emotion like fear 
or anger requires that (1) I have a certain kind of belief, for example, that I 
am in danger or that I have been wronged (and that there is sufficient cause 
in the external world to warrant this belief); and that (2) I have certain cor-
responding values or desires (i.e., that I want to stay out of danger so that I 
can survive, or that I should not be held responsible for something I have 
not done). 
If we think about "feelings" in light of the cognitive theory of emo-
tion, we might conclude that they are unlike emotions in that they have 
no cognitive import and are not linked to a particular external object (we 
may "feel" one way or another regardless of what we believe to be the case 
externally). Desires, unlike feelings, are cognitive because they require a 
belief that what we desire is (for lack of a better term) somehow to our 
advantage (whether phYSically, psychologically, etc.). In fact, it may be only 
because of that belief that we have the desire to do something in the first 
place (e.g., I desire to go swimming because I know that exercising is bene-
ficial to me). But we must not forget that some desires are desires to do 
things whether or not we believe they are good for us (e.g., my desire to 
take a walk in Central Park). We might even have the belief that something 
is good simply because we want to do it, rather than the other way around. 
Finally, we cannot neglect to mention that some desires are completely ir-
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rational. These are the kinds of desires we have even though we know full 
well that fulfilling them will be bad for us (e.g., deliberately becoming in-
toxicated). As we can see, arriving at clear definitions of emotion, feeling, 
and desire is no easy feat, and the relationship between these is even more 
complicated, yet thinking about these issues is crucial for understanding 
the relationship between our affective responses to film and our responses 
to real-life situations. 
If my friend Jones sits me down to tell me a story about how his mother 
and brother were killed in a horrific automobile accident the day before, 
and if I react to that story with sadness - perhaps even with tears - only to 
find out that the story is false, that Jones has no sister and that his mother 
passed away in her sleep years ago, I would feel quite embarrassed at my-
selffor behaVing the way I did and probably angry (and somewhat per-
plexed) at him for lying to me about something so serious. Yet, when I sit 
down to watch Fight the Future and watch Scully become infected with a 
virus and get taken to a secret installation in Antarctica, I might also have 
emotions of frustration, sadness, and anger even though the events de-
picted are clearly fictional ("It's just a movie"). In the first case, my reaction 
to Jones's deception is justified, even expected, once I find out the truth. In 
the second case, the same reaction would be ridiculous since the success 
of the film hinges upon its ability to deceive us even though we are never 
unaware that we are, in fact, being deceived. In other words, my reaction to 
learning ofJones's deception (embarrassment, outrage) is expected, while 
this same reaction to the "deception" of what happens to Scully would be 
considered lunacy. How do we reconcile these two scenarios? 
Some philosophers argue that we simply cannot. Jerome Shaffer has 
argued that emotions are irrational and indefensible. Here and there an 
emotion might be beneficial because it is pleasant or has some practical 
advantage, but as a whole there is no good reason to have emotions and 
we would be better off without them.3 But the argument can be made that, 
under the right circumstances, emotions need not be irrational: perhaps 
they are arational. Although less extreme, but still skeptical, Colin Radford 
challenges philosophers to qplain how it is possible and desirable for us to 
have emotional reactions to fictional works. 4 Radford offers several "solu-
tions" to this dilemma. Although Radford's analysis is focused on fiction 
and drama, it would be useful to apply some of his proposals to our cin-
ematic case study. 
First, Radford proposes that when we read a book or watch a play, 
we get "caught up" in it so that we "forget" we are being deceived. Analo-
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gously, as we watch Fight the Future, we are "taken in" to such an extent 
that, among other things, we "believe" in the shadowy Syndicate set up to 
aid aliens in their colonization plans. We forget that "it's just a movie" and 
that there is no Syndicate, there are no aliens, and so on. Our emotional 
reactions are excused because the intensity of the film cajoles us into losing 
ourselves in the narrative. In fact, one way to interpret what people mean 
when they say a film or television series is "good" is just that it is powerful 
enough to get us caught up. But Radford argues that this is not a real solu-
tion to the problem because it "turns adults into children:' After all, we are 
adults and we know that what is really happening on the screen is fictional, 
that the characters are actors, and that the events are not real. Radford, 
therefore, dismisses this as a viable solution to the problem. 
Perhaps, Radford continues, we can explain our emotional reactions 
to fictional events by saying that we "suspend our disbelief" in their real-
ity. After all, millions of dollars are spent to create a world that makes it 
easier for us to do this. Directors, writers, cinematographers, and produc-
ers dedicate their lives to enabling the suspension of disbelief. When we 
went to the theater to watch our favorite characters Mulder and Scully, we 
would have been quite upset if there were a baby crying in the seat behind 
us, or if the picture were out of focus. That is, we would have been annoyed 
if we had paid admission to the illusion of the film and not gotten what we 
paid for. We consciously and voluntarily went in to be deceived, to enter 
into the minds and worlds of Mulder and Scully. So, Radford maintains, 
since we are fully aware of the deception, we cannot be fully justified in 
our emotional reactions since these reactions are, again, predicated upon 
fictional characters and events. 
Could it be that when we see Scully encased in a cryotube in the ant-
arctic installation and feel pain and sorrow for her, we are actually expe-
riencing the pain and sorrow we would feel for a real person in a similar 
situation? Radford agrees that there is something to this explanation, but 
that it is not enough. He maintains that we feel for Scully the character, not 
for someone like her in a similar situation. Even though Radford's com-
ments are here focused on the fictional character of Anna Karenina, they 
apply just as well to Agent Scully: "We are moved by what happens to her, 
by the situation she gets into, and which is a pitiful one, but we do not feel 
pity for her state or fate, or her history or her situation, or even for others, 
i.e. for real persons who might have or even have had such a history.s 
In other words, Radford discounts the possibility that our emotional 
reaction is directed toward someone else in a similar situation. Instead, he 
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argues that we are emotionally invested in this character and this situation. 
So we are sad for Scully because of the situation she faces. But because 
Scully isn't an actual person, feeling sorry for her is analogous to feeling 
sorry for my daughter's imaginary friend, Molly. The only problem, for 
Radford, would be that since Scully does not actually exist, our emotional 
reaction would be based on a false belief. Since our emotions in everyday 
situations are based on true beliefs (I feel angry at Jones because Jones stole 
my wallet; in order for Jones to steal my wallet, there must «really" be a 
Jones and a wallet), Radford holds that it is «inconsistent and so incoher-
ent" that we would apply one standard to life and another standard to art. 
Radford proposes that our emotional reactions to any fictional character 
or event mirror the kind of fear one might have of death. To be sad for a 
fictional character like Scully is similar to fearing death in that, according 
to Radford, there is no true belief Just as it is inconsistent and incoherent 
to base our emotional reaction to Scully's situation on a belief in her exis-
tence (since she doesn't exist), it is equally as inconsistent and incoherent 
to be fearful of death since, in Radford's estimation, fearing death is, liter-
ally, fearing nothing. To fear death is to experience an emotion not based 
on true belief: «There is, literally, nothing to fear:'6 
Accordingly, Radford does not accept that one could justifiably experi-
ence an emotion based on a fictional belief. But others would argue that 
entertaining this possibility would explain away the apparent experiential, 
epistemological, and - by extension - aesthetic paradox that so confounds 
him. Perhaps the kinds of beliefs we have when watching Fight the Future 
or reading a novel are fundamentally different from those we have when 
experiencing real people and events. If so, then it might not be incoherent 
to have two different standards for beliefs regarding fictional and actual 
scenarios. 
The Ethical Significance of Imagination 
To resolve this seeming paradox we might adopt a less narrow view of «be-
lief" than Radford does. Perhaps the beliefs involved are of a more general 
sort than he lets on. Perhaps I (justifiably) believe that the events of the 
sort presented in Fight the Future have occurred, or that they are likely to 
occur, or even that they might possibly occur, even if I do not believe in 
the existence of the particular people, situations, and events described in 
the film. Perhaps I may respond to the film as a result of my more general 
beliefs about what the world is like. 
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We might also question Radford's assumption that belief in the truth 
of what one reads or sees is necessary for having an emotional response. 
It could be that the "cognitive component" of an emotion could be an un-
asserted thought, rather than an actual belief; we would then avoid the 
charge of irrationality (i.e., that the emotion is irrational because the be-
lief is irrational). To generate an emotional response, it might be enough 
simply to think of Mulder and Scully and the events of the film and imag-
ine that they are real. However, the question remains as to whether an un-
asserted thought is potent enough to get us as emotionally worked up as a 
belief can. If I believed that Jones's mother and brother were on the plane 
that crashed, I would feel intense despair for him. Once Jones admits that 
he was lying and that his family members were not on this plane, I would 
no longer feel intense despair for him (although I probably would be angry 
at his deception). 
It is also the case that many un asserted thoughts pass through our heads. 
Some un asserted thoughts are emotionally affecting while many others are 
not. How could this be? Something else besides simply having the thought 
and the relevant desires and values is necessary to explain why watching a 
film that generates such thoughts can be emotionally affecting. Perhaps it 
is a mark of a "good" film that it can present characters and events in such 
a way that they are emotionally affecting (that they "stick"). A film that af-
fects us emotionally must have convincing actors, an engrossing plot line, 
perhaps even some special effects. 
In truth, the problem Radford poses is broader than even he lets on. 
We respond to fictional works - including film - not only with emotions 
but also with feelings, moods, and desires. Feelings and moods are not 
generally held to have cognitive components in the form of beliefs or un-
asserted thoughts (the jury is still out about desires). So, it is unclear how 
beliefs or un asserted thoughts could help to explain non-emotion affective 
responses, such as feelings and moods, which do not have cognitive com-
ponents. How does one explain such responses? 
Any explanation of the emotional effectiveness of a film, assuming that 
the film in question presents fictional events, needs to develop some ac-
count of how imagination is involved. Kendall Walton responds to this by 
developing a systematic account of imagination.7 He argues that respond-
ing to fiction is an extension of ordinary games of make-believe similar 
to, but more sophisticated than, those that children play. In responding to 
fictional events we are using a book (or in our case, the film) as a prop in 
a game of make-believe, and within the game I believe what happens to 
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Mulder and Scully and the world they inhabit. It becomes provisionally 
«true" in this game of make-believe that they are faced with great chal-
lenges to save the world, they suffer unjustly, and so on. On this view, just 
as it may be true in the game of make-believe that I feel sorry for Scully 
or admire Mulder, it is not true of me (qua me) that I «really" have these 
emotions. Contrary to Radford's view that a response like this would trans-
form an adult into a child, it is important to note that Walton argues for an 
extension of the game of make-believe that children play. Far from suffer-
ing a change from adults into children who are «victims" of a game's logic 
and emotional effect, we adults willingly and self-consciously enter into 
the «game" of the film and are aware - on some level- that we are playing 
the game. Unlike children who are often (but not always) unable to detach 
themselves from make-believe, we can make this conceptual separation. It 
may take some effort to make the transition, but it can be done. Radford's 
view does not take this into consideration. 
But if emotional responses to film are not mere child's play, then how 
we respond may importantly matter. It certainly seems that anyone who 
cheers on the Syndicate's colonization plans and laughs when Scully is kid-
napped and encased in a cryotube in the Antarctic is responding inappro-
priately to the film. What makes these cheers and laughter inappropriate? 
Little work has been done on explaining how to make any such assessments 
of our responses, but clearly they are of the greatest import. If I laugh when 
the FBI agent allows himself to be blown up, when Scully is kidnapped, or 
when the scientist is locked in the cave with the gestated alien, I seem to 
have missed a very important part of the point of the film. Those events 
are created to move us to sorrow and outrage. If we don't experience these 
feelings, it seems fair to conclude that we've failed to get some of the most 
important value from the film. 
Assessments of responses as appropriate or inappropriate are inti-
mately connected with questions about why it is important to respond to 
fiction of any kind at all. So what if the events in the film don't have the 
intended emotional effect upon us? Is anything lost? Why bother watching 
the film at all? It seems that the value and importance of film, literature, 
or any other kind of fiction is wrapped up with our responses to it, and a 
failure to respond is (to that extent) a failure to appreciate the work. And 
this helps to understand why it is so important to have not just any old 
response to a work but to have appropriate responses (conceding that sev-
eral responses may be equally appropriate, revealing different qualities or 
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aspects of a work). Rather than settling the issue, however, this solution 
merely raises another question. 
Having appropriate affective responses to a film are part of what it 
means to appreciate it, but why is it important to appreciate a film in the 
first place? To put this another way, why is it good to have things around 
like films that are supposed to (and presumably do) move us in all sorts 
of ways? A very old idea is that the function of the arts is to delight and 
instruct. Suppose we say that the function of a film is solely to please or 
delight us. It would then appear that we should respond with emotions and 
feelings that provide the most delight or pleasure; this would remove the 
need for an exclusively objective standard for the responses (i.e., a standard 
that resides in the properties of the object, the film, to which we respond) 
and accept the preferences of each viewer. But some ways of responding 
to film may be more likely to produce richer and more fulfilling pleasures 
than simply reacting or responding in any way one wishes. If so, the ap-
proach with the richest overall potential in the long run could provide a 
basis for judgment of the appropriateness of the responses. 
Furthermore, delight might not be separate from instruction. Aristotle 
pointed out that learning can be pleasurable. How can emotions and other 
affective responses instruct? Martha Nussbaum has argued persuaSively 
that literature teaches us to "see;' where seeing involves not merely a cogni-
tive or sensory dimension but is broadly experiential and affective as well. 8 
Perhaps something like this kind of "seeing" connects to Walton's notion of 
experiencing something like sophisticated "make-believe:' Far from turn-
ing us into children, as Radford claims, temporarily allowing ourselves to 
accept propositional content and the resulting emotional states may hone 
our ethical sensitivities. This is no small change: these sensitivities are 
affective as well as cognitive and influence how we experience the world 
and how we relate to other people. We can learn in a very straightforward 
way what it is like to be another sort of person, or to be in a situation 
other than our own. We can certainly imagine how this would apply to 
empathizing with Mulder and Scully. By watching this film and seeing it in 
the way Nussbaum suggests, we might enhance our capacity for empathy 
and understanding of other people in general. And contrary to Radford's 
notion that responding emotionally to film turns adults into children, an 
emotional response to film may help us as adults better deal with other 
adults. Perhaps by developing the cognitive and affective skills required 
to appreciate Fight the Future, by expanding the capacities of the human 
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mind, by genuinely experiencing what this film - or any "good" film - can 
do to us, we are put on the road toward awareness of our own choices and 
what leads to them in order that we can begin to understand the choices of 
others. We can then appreciate what film can do for us. 
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I Want to Believe . .. But Now What? 
Dean A. Kowalski and S. Evan Kreider 
You've always said that you want to believe. But believe in what, 
Mulder? If this is the truth that you've been looking for, then what 
is left to believe in? 
- Dana Scully in "The Truth" 
Most X-Philes remember the final scene of the series finale. Mulder and 
Scully, pursued by the FBI (or at least shadowy factions within it), take 
refuge in a motel room. The scene is blocked Similarly to the motel scene 
in "Pilot:' in which Mulder first tells Scully about Samantha. In a way, then, 
their circle is complete, but Chris Carter, once again, has left us hanging. 
Yes, Mulder and Scully are together. Yes, they speak of hope, however 
ephemeral, for the future. But we simply don't know what the future holds, 
except that December 22, 2012, looms ominously on its horizon. 
X-Philes waited more than six years to reconnect with their intrepid 
heroes Mulder and Scully. Where have they gone? What have they done? 
Are they still together? Some of those questions are answered in I Want 
to Believe (2008). They are no longer on the lam. For the past five years, 
they have lived together in a modest home outside of Richmond, Vir-
ginia.' Scully practices pediatric medicine at Our Lady of Sorrows hospital 
in urban Richmond. Mulder remains interested in the paranormal, albeit 
from his makeshift home office. Rather than gallivanting across the conti-
nental United States chasing leads about unexplained phenomena, he now 
incessantly cruises the Internet and combs through newspapers and maga-
zines for glimpses of his former life's work. But perhaps it has remained 
his work; he never leaves the house, except for covert missions to his post 
office box in Richmond. In some ways, our intrepid heroes-for good or 
for ill-have become more like us. 
What, then, is the point of our being reacquainted with Dr. Scully and 
her reclusive partner Fox Mulder? Many X-Philes have asked themselves 
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that question after seeing I Want to Believe. We were promised a stand-
alone, "monster of the week" episode, having little or nothing to do with 
the series mythology (which immediately disappointed a number of X-
Philes). But some of the "monster of the week" episodes were memorable: 
"Squeeze/Tooms;' "The Host;' and "Home" are X-Phile favorites. The on-
line trailers suggested that it might contain a psychic element; this was 
also reassuring, as "Beyond the Sea" and "Clyde Bruckman's Final Repose" 
appear regularly on X-Phile "top ten episodes" lists across the Internet. 
But even those who preferred the stand-alone episodes left the theaters 
scratching their heads (at least many of them). The villains weren't nearly 
as frightening as Eugene Victor Tooms (Doug Hutchison) or the incestu-
ous Peacock family; they weren't nearly as creepy as the Flukeman (played 
by famed episode writer Darin Morgan).2 The psychic was neither insidi-
ous, like Luther Lee Boggs (Brad Dourif), nor sadly familiar, like Clyde 
Bruckman (Peter Boyle), at least not exactly (and more on this below). 
There were no gunshots and very little CGI. Mulder and Scully spent most 
of their time apart, which prevented X -Philes from reminiscing about their 
completely complementary investigative styles. Many X -Philes thus left the 
theater confused and disappointed; in a matter of mere weeks, our heroes 
were gone again. For some, all hope was lost, the last nail in the X-Files cof-
fin; others awaited the DVD release, hoping for copious "bonus features" 
to soothe their pain.3 
But we believe that if you look past the familiar archetypes of my-
thology or "monster of the week" episodes, and focus on the characters 
themselves, the value of the film is easier to discern. Carter and Spotnitz 
took advantage of the fact that our heroes have become more like us. What 
they prOVided us gets to the core of The X-Files: a meditation on what to 
believe. After years of credit tag lines like "Trust no one;' "Deny every-
thing;' "Deceive inveigle obfuscate;' and "Believe the lie;' Carter and Spot-
nitz, themselves six years older, have realized that each of us must believe 
in something. It's simply human nature. But in what should we believe? 
Can we believe whatever we want, or are there standards we should fol-
low in forming our beliefs? What would such standards be, and why are 
they so important anyway? I Want to Believe is infused with these sorts of 
questions. Upon careful inspection, it also begins to answer some of them, 
thereby manifesting a philosophy of The X-Files. Understood in this way, 
we argue, I Want to Believe is not the disappointment that many X-Philes 
and movie critics believe. 
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Connections to the Series 
An often heard complaint about I Want to Believe is that it had nothing 
to do with The X-Files, but this seems brash. To see why, consider how 
the movie relates to the series corpus. The movie probably most resem-
bles "Beyond the Sea;' with perhaps a dash of "Clyde Bruckman's Final 
Repose:' The connection to "Beyond the Sea" is obvious. In that classic 
episode, we meet Luther Lee Boggs, a convicted serial killer-guilty of 
murdering his entire family on Thanksgiving Day. Boggs announces that 
he has a psychic connection to a recent kidnapping case. He will divulge 
what he knows only ifhe is spared the gas chamber. Mulder (uncharacter-
istically) immediately doubts Boggs. Mulder's profile (when he worked the 
violent crimes division) helped apprehend Boggs; he believes that this is 
another of Boggs's stunts to avoid execution. Although Scully (uncharac-
teristically) begins to believe in Boggs's psychic abilities, our heroes soon 
learn that Lucas Henry (Lawrence King), a known Boggs accomplice, is 
the kidnapper. So, the evidence suggests that Boggs is indeed orchestrat-
ing this charade as a way to avoid the gas chamber. Similarly, the Mul-
der and Scully of fifteen years later meet Father Joseph Crissman (Billy 
Connolly), who also claims to have a psychic connection to a kidnapping. 
But doubts about his psychic abilities swirl; that Father Joe is a convicted 
pedophile-having molested thirty-seven altar boys-provides reason to 
doubt his story. Moreover, Agent Dakota Whitney (Amanda Peet), who 
calls on Mulder to consult in the case, hypothesizes that he might be 
staging this stunt for reconciliation with the Church. But when it is later 
discovered that one of the kidnappers is a boy Father Joe molested years 
ago, even Mulder doubts his psychic connection. The one difference from 
Boggs is that Father Joe seems remorseful, almost penitent, for his crimes. 
He castrated himself at twenty-six. He now lives voluntarily with other 
sex offenders in a dormitory-type compound where the residents police 
each other. Father Joe says of his neighbors, "We hate each other as we 
hate ourselves for our sickening appetites:' It's tempting to feel sympathy 
for him, at least decades removed from his crimes. This is where the dash 
of Clyde Bruckman applies: we feel sad for lonely Bruckman and wish 
that he could overcome his resignation. In fact, one of the challenges for 
the viewer is that Father Joe seems to be more like Bruckman than Boggs. 
Father Joe has done monstrous things, but he is far from the monster that 
Boggs is.4 
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There is another episode that seems relevant, namely, "Empedocles" 
from season 8. This episode also contains psychic visions, but the connec-
tion to I Want to Believe lies elsewhere. First, recall how "Empedocles" por-
trays John Doggett's (Robert Patrick) memory of his son's tragic death. The 
following dialogue exchange between Doggett and Agent Monica Reyes 
(Annabeth Gish), the FBI agent who participated in the case involving 
Doggett's son, is particularly telling. After Reyes comforts him by saying 
that he did everything he could to save his son, Doggett reiterates: "I got 
to believe that I did everything I could to save him, to get him back safe, 
to not let him down. I got to believe that I did everything humanly pos-
sible cause if I can't believe that then these other possibilities that you talk 
about, that Mulder talks about, that Agent Scully talks about ... if they're 
real ... if they're real, then ... that's something else I could have done to 
save my son:' Doggett, a skeptic, expresses his fear about giving into the 
possibility of "extreme possibilities" as Scully has. If the paranormal is a 
possible avenue to explore, then Doggett believes he has failed his son. In 
effect, he gave up the fight when there was something more-no matter 
how unlikely or unorthodox-that could have been done.5 
This connection helps to clear up some concern about the plot of I 
Want to Believe. Some X-Philes complained that Scully's interactions 
with her patient Christian Fearon (Marco Niccoli) had little to do with 
the theme of the movie. This complaint is probably grounded in the fact 
that Dr. Scully and her patient didn't seem to have any substantial link to 
Father Joe's visions, nor, in fact, was there any paranormal element to it 
at all. However, there is a parallel between Scully's commitment to sav-
ing Christian and the Russians' dire attempt at saving Franz Tomczeszyn 
(Fagin Woodcock). Going back to Doggett and the memory of his son, we 
can imagine that both Scully and Janke Dacyshyn (Tomczeszyn's partner, 
played by Keith Rennie) might believe that if there was something else that 
they could have done to save the life of those they care about-no matter 
how unlikely or unorthodox-then they have failed. Now we can better 
see the force of Father Joe's eerie command of "Don't give up:' What if 
someone like Father Joe had uttered this to Doggett? Would he have taken 
additional, unorthodox steps to save his son? Interesting ethical questions 
soon arise with this interpretation, but these will be discussed later. 
The second connection to "Empedocles" involves its treatment of the 
nature of evil. We are given at least four distinct interpretations. We have 
Agent Reyes's and Mulder's more-or-Iess straightforward psychological 
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view. Reyes's speaks of "stressors" that tend to cause psychological trauma; 
Mulder notes how one's environment and upbringing are factors. The sec-
ond is more philosophical. Catha Dukes (Wendy Gazelle), the sister of the 
man whom the FBI seeks for murder, voices the idea that human beings 
are born good, but society-life itself, perhaps-somehow corrupts us. The 
third view isn't voiced so much as dramatized. It is a supernatural one, such 
that evil is a demonic entity that possesses the people it encounters, jump-
ing to the nearest body when its last host-body dies. The fourth view is pro-
vided by Mulder near the end of the episode. After informing Doggett that 
none of the straightforward psychological explanations satisfied him, given 
what he saw working in the violent crimes division, he now thinks of evil as 
a disease that we become susceptible to in some circumstances. But by the 
end of the episode, we aren't quite sure which explanation we are to believe. 
In fact, Mulder admits to Doggett, "The pisser is you may never knoW:'6 
In true X-Files form, the exact nature of evil is left up to us to ponder and 
determine for ourselves. Similarly, in I Want to Believe, we must determine 
which things are we to believe and which things we should never give up 
on. Thus, the connection to "Empedocles" is not about what to believe about 
evil but what to believe at all and what to do about those beliefs. 
Blaine Faulkner, Fox Mulder, and "Don't Give Up" 
If you look closely, you can see an "I Want to Believe" poster on Blaine 
Faulkner's (Allan Zinyk) bedroom wall in "Jose Chung's From Outer Space." 
However, it is unlike Mulder's poster in one important way: Blaine has 
blotted out the words "Want" and "to:' His poster simply reads "I Believe:' 
By doctoring his poster, Blaine provides the impression that he believes in 
extraterrestrial visitors regardless of what anyone else believes. Moreover, 
it seems that he would believe regardless of any evidence or new findings 
to the contrary. Many (like Richard Dawkins, perhaps) ascribe this view 
to Mulder; however, this is unfair. Mulder is much more careful about the 
evidence. He invariably looks for scientific explanations and uses sound 
principles of reasoning in developing his hypotheses. Thus, we could inter-
pret Mulder's poster as omitting words, rather than crossing out those that 
appear. It might read: "I Want to Believe, So Long as the Evidence Allows:' 
Presumably, then, Mulder displays his poster as a statement, but not the 
one you might think. He is reminding others to keep an open mind about 
what the evidence shows-or doesn't show-and how one might profitably 
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proceed depending on what one discovers. Thus it is an explicit affirmation 
of neither extraterrestrial visitors nor of his credulity.! 
This interpretation of Mulder's favorite tag line is solidified as the series 
progresses. It is personified in Scully's <;haracter development (and prob-
ably Skinner's, too). It is voiced in the season 9 episode "Daemonicus:' writ-
ten and directed by Frank Spotnitz. Scully, having been reassigned to an 
FBI academy teaching post, announces to her forensic pathology class: 'l\n 
X-File is a case that has been deemed unsolvable by the bureau, because 
such a case cannot be solved it may beg other explanations .... Science, 
however, tells us that evil comes not from monsters but from men. It offers 
us the methodology to catch these men, and only after we have exhausted 
these methods should we leave science behind to consider more ... extreme 
possibilities:' This statement echoes Mulder's admonishment from "Pilot": 
"When convention and science offer us no answers, might we not finally 
turn to the fantastic as a plausibility?" Fifteen years ago, Scully would have 
none of this; her response was: "What I find fantastic is any notion that 
there are answers beyond the realm of science. The answers are there. You 
just have to know where to look:' Fifteen years of chasing after the likes of 
Eugene Victor Tooms, Jeremiah Smith (Roy Thinnes), and Donnie Pfaster 
(Nick Chinlund) has led her to look beyond the realm of current science. It 
has also led her to the position she shares with her students in "Daemoni-
cus" and brings her much closer to the spirit of Mulder's famed poster. 
The question The X-Files often raises is whether the evidence is always 
sufficient to adjudicate our beliefs. Some philosophers, like W K. Clifford 
(and perhaps Richard Dawkins), answer this question affirmatively. Belief 
should be determined by the evidence, and the evidence alone, and if the 
evidence isn't sufficiently decisive, one should suspend judgment (presum-
ably until additional evidence can be garnered). This philosophical posi-
tion is often called "evidentialism"; contemporary philosophers Theodore 
Schick and Lewis Vaughn express it powerfully: "It is wrong for belief to 
outstrip the evidence because our actions are gUided by our beliefs, and 
if our beliefs are mistaken, our actions may be misguided:'8 But as Scully 
notes at the end of "Daemonicus:' another thoughtful episode (like "Em-
pedocles" and "Grotesque") that forces the X-Phile viewer to determine 
"the truth" herself, rarely is the evidence completely decisive. She lectures: 
"Just as juries seek to convict beyond reasonable doubt, the forensic inves-
tigator will seek conclusions supported by a preponderance of evidence. 
Rarely will you encounter a case where all of the variables, all of the open 
questions, are fully answered." Evidentialists would no doubt agree but re-
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mind us to believe in probabilities, especially when they are strong. Regu-
larly ignoring the evidence and the probabilities it establishes and instead 
choosing to believe in bare possibilities is being a bad investigator and (ac-
cording to the likes of Clifford) a bad person. But what if all the scientific 
evidence has been marshaled, but no hypothesis is more probable than an-
other? Is it always prudent to withhold belief and thus deny personal com-
mitments and corresponding action? What kind of life would this entail?9 
These difficult questions are most pressing in situations where dis-
agreement among competing beliefs is intractable. In such cases, the evi-
dence, which is supposed to provide us signposts for what to believe, is 
often ambiguous. In fact, what counts as evidence in the first place comes 
into dispute. This often happens with fundamental issues-philosophical 
explorations-about how the world is. Can science explain all of life's mys-
teries, or must we include a religious or supernatural element to proVide 
a satisfying account of the universe and our experiences of it?1O Contem-
porary theologian and philosopher John Hick has investigated this issue, 
calling it the "religious ambiguity of the universe:'ll Naturalists or atheists 
argue that the universe, including our experiences of it, is sufficiently ex-
plained via science. Theists (among others) disagree. Both have proVided 
a rather sophisticated battery of arguments for their respective positions. 
What does the evidentialist advise in these cases? Should we believe nei-
ther, having no personal commitments or activities (except perhaps to 
keep searching for new evidence or arguments) with respect to the debate? 
Wouldn't this necessarily preclude religious commitments? 
The idea of "religiously ambiguous" is nothing new to The X-Files. Re-
call Mulder's voice-over at the beginning of "Essence" (season 8) about the 
miracle of life, especially given the fact that Scully was left barren. (In fact, 
Carter's treatment of William's birth in this episode has obvious religiOUS 
overtones, complete with the three Lone Gunmen arriving, each bearing 
gifts.) In "Improbable" (season 9), another episode written by Chris Carter, 
we are left to wonder whether the numerical patterns we find in nature are 
merely coincidental or whether there is a supernatural intelligence behind 
them (who surprisingly looks a lot like Burt Reynolds). Reyes agrees with 
Einstein that God does not play dice with the universe; however, she won-
ders whether it is more like playing checkers, leaving room for analysis of 
the numbers and, thus, free will. 
Questions involving religiOUS ambiguity are continued in I Want to Be-
lieve. Interestingly, however, they are more pressing exactly because Mulder 
and Scully have become more like us. Each of us, we suspect, has pondered 
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God's existence and whether he is the Creator. On the one hand, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the universe, like all dependent things, must be 
explained by something apart from it. However, the explanation cannot in-
volve another dependent thing, for the existence of dependent things is ex-
actly what you are trying to explain. Thus, the explanation must reside with 
something that is not a dependent thing. But what? When you remember 
that the independent thing in question must have causal powers sufficient 
to explain the existence of the universe, the list of candidates seems short 
(cue Burt Reynolds). On the other hand, many of us, like Scully, have won-
dered why God would place a child on this Earth only to have it suffer 
terribly and then die so young. That this happens makes many of us, like 
Scully, lie in bed, "cursing God for all of His cruelties:' But, of course, God 
isn't cruel; God is supposed to be perfectly good. Furthermore, God, being 
omnipotent and omniscient, has the ability and knowledge to prevent cru-
elty, especially those involving innocent children. Thus, it seems that God 
does not exist and cannot be the Creator. Should we believe that God ex-
ists or not? Might other pieces of evidence (scientific data or philosophical 
arguments) be relevant? If none are decisive, what should we believe? On 
what personal commitments should we act? Should Scully give up on her 
religious convictions? Should any of us? 
There are other examples of religious ambiguity in I Want to Believe. 
First, Father Joe, as a convicted pedophile, has committed the gravest kind 
of sexual immorality. In the book of Corinthians, it clearly states, "Do you 
not know that the wicked will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be 
deceived: Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor 
male prostitutes nor homosexual offenders nor thieves nor the greedy nor 
drunkards nor slanderers nor swindlers will inherit the kingdom of God" 
(1 Cor. 6:9-10). Corinthians goes on to state that Christians should "flee 
sexual immorality" (1 Cor. 6:18). All other sins are committed outside the 
body, but this one is committed against the sinner's own body. It is thus 
no wonder that Father Joe, now penitent, continually prays "for the salva-
tion of his immortal soul:' And the movie suggests that his prayers have 
been answered. He cold-calls the FBI, informing them of his alleged vi-
sions of a missing woman-who bears some resemblance to missing FBI 
agent Monica Bannan (Xantha Radley). In crying tears of blood, he ex-
hibits stigmatic marks. He presses on in aiding Mulder and the FBI, even 
though Scully despises him. His visions, while at times a bit hazy, turn out 
to be helpful in cracking the case. And don't forget the thief on the cross 
next to Jesus. He was redeemed. Furthermore, Augustine of Hippo, once 
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a regular visitor of prostitutes and, thus, a fornicator, was later canonized 
by the Catholic Church. So, what are we to believe about Father Joe? Was 
he granted the chance to redeem himself? Moreover, what should Father 
Joe believe about his own situation? Should he give up on himself-his im-
mortal soul-like everyone else has? Mulder believes (at the end of I Want 
to Believe) that Father Joe's redemption is grounded in the very fact that 
the disgraced priest didn't give up-even though any evidence of his being 
redeemed was insufficient to warrant this belief. Was his personal commit-
ment to the salvation of his immortal soul improper, as the evidentialist 
would have us believe?12 
The issue of what to believe and corresponding personal commitment 
is just as pressing in this life, especially end of life situations. Scully and 
Father Ybara (Adam Godley) disagree about the proper care for Christian, 
given his brain illness. Ybara believes that it is time for palliative care and 
claims that he has it on "the highest authority" that this is so. Scully be-
lieves that there are treatments for the boy's condition yet to be explored. If 
these cutting-edge (and largely untested) treatments prove successful, the 
boy could be cured. In these sorts of circumstances, weighing the evidence 
can be difficult. The scientific community is agreed that there is no known 
cure for Christian's illness. Scully believes that a new stem-cell treatment 
is potentially successful. Would the evidentialist hold that we should side 
with Ybara and prepare the Fearons for palliative care? May the Fearons 
permissibly side with Scully and attempt the radical new treatment even 
though it is unlikely that it will succeed? Reconsider Doggett's memory 
of his son. He is willing to admit that if paranormal avenues were possibly 
successful, then he would be willing to explore them. Stem-cell treatments 
are not paranormal; they are cutting-edge science. Do Doggett, the Fear-
ons, Scully, or any parent act impermissibly for exploring the possibility 
of success, even if the evidence is against them? At this point, Father Joe's 
"Don't give up" echoes. 
But an objection is brewing. The Russian same-sex couple, Dacyshyn 
and Tomczeszyn, presumably could also appeal to Crissman's imperative 
in exploring the Dr. Frankenstein-like experiments. Tomczeszyn, suffer-
ing from terminal cancer, apparently has run out of treatment options. In a 
desperate move, his partner somehow arranges for a Russian scientist and 
medical doctor-a researcher who has had success in transplanting the 
heads of dogs onto new canine bodies-to conduct his research on human 
mammals. The idea is that if this scientist has had success with dogs, it is 
possible that a human head could be transplanted onto a torso that wasn't 
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infected with cancer. Thus, there is a possible cure to explore. Presumably, 
Dacyshyn would feel exactly the same way as Doggett: if there was another 
avenue-no matter how unlikely or unorthodox-to be explored, not pur-
suing it would be tantamount to failing the person he cares for most. 13 But 
the obvious objection is that the Russians act impermissibly in exploring 
this possibility. Does Scully also act impermissibly is exploring her cutting-
edge treatment? If not, what is the difference between the two cases? Why 
do the Russians go too far in following the "Don't give up" imperative, but 
Scully does not? 
It's tempting to argue that the Russians act impermissibly because their 
actions are unnatural. On this account, acting unnaturally is (more or less) 
equated with acting in morally objectionable ways. Because it is unnatural 
to sever a human head and attach it to another body (not to mention a 
body of a different sex), it follows that the Russians act impermissibly. This 
kind of reasoning is common. However, it is also very difficult to defend. 
First, note that Scully's injection of stem cells from one body into another 
seems eerily close to what the Russians are attempting. Regardless of how 
close the analogy is, Scully's treatment still smacks of being unnatural. 
Extracting cells from one person and injecting them into another simply 
doesn't occur naturally. So, it's not clear that this response will sufficiently 
distinguish Scully's treatment from the Russians. 
A deeper problem with the unnatural response remains. As the ex-
ample about stem-cell therapy begins to suggest, it is not entirely clear 
what counts as being unnatural. Two definitions are regularly proposed. 
First, something is unnatural if it corresponds to behavior that is statisti-
cally infrequent. What happens regularly-as a matter of course-is natu-
ral and what doesn't happen regularly is unnatural. Second, something is 
unnatural if it contravenes a thing's primary function. The eye's primary 
function is to see, and the primary function of teeth is to chew food. But 
both definitions lead to counterintuitive results. The first makes doing the-
oretical physics or speaking Sanskrit unnatural and, thus, morally wrong. 
The second, even if it is granted that things have primary purposes, makes 
winking and opening packages with your teeth unnatural and, thus, mor-
ally wrong. Because doing theoretical physicS, speaking Sanskrit, winking, 
or opening packages with your teeth is not morally wrong, it follows that 
neither of the proposed definitions for being unnatural is successful.14 
We believe that a different response is more defensible. Quite simply, 
the Russians conduct their treatments by failing to respect the rights of in-
nocent persons. It is universally believed that knowingly taking the life of 
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an innocent person (especially that of a healthy person against her will)' is a 
hallmark of impermissible behavior. Scully, it seems, does no such thing in 
treating Christian.'5 There is a lingering philosophical concern that Scully 
causes unnecessary harm (pain and suffering) to Christian by conduct-
ing these treatments. This is, perhaps, where concerns about evidentialism 
again emerge. If there is evidence neither that the treatments will work 
nor that they won't, then (the argument goes) Scully impermissibly causes 
Christian harm. However, it is important that Scully gets consent from the 
patient or his surrogates, in this case, his parents. Again, Doggett's memory 
of his son is relevant, and Mrs. Fearon clearly concurs, as she asks Scully, 
"You're saying that you can save my son?" Even Scully's colleagues who 
disagree with her decision to proceed with the radical stem-cell therapy 
demur when Scully asks, "What if it were your son?" Can a parent's per-
sonal commitment to the life of his or her child necessarily be improper if 
it is chosen on insufficient evidence?16 
Mulder, Scully, Aristotle, and Friendship 
Although all of us are concerned about the end of our earthly lives, there 
are, obviously, concerns to face along the way. We want our lives to go as 
well as pOSSible. Many believe that a full life includes genuine and mean-
ingful relationships. But even here, there are elements of uncertainty. How 
well do we know anyone? Do we know anyone well enough to determine 
whether our friendship with him or her is genuine? Many of us want to 
believe that our close relationships are genuine and, thus, able to withstand 
hardship or even temporary separation. Some of us pledge ourselves exclu-
sively to another, pinning our hopes on true friendship. What evidence is 
there to justify the belief that a friendship is genuine? If there is evidence 
supporting genuineness but also evidence to the contrary, what should we 
believe? Do we simply weigh the evidence and let it determine the fate of 
the friendship? But is genuine and meaningful friendship possible if you 
are incessantly weighing the evidence to see whether the other person is 
being a friend? 
The nature of friendship has long been a topic of philosophical dis-
cussion. At first this seems odd. Why would philosophers worry about 
something that is so obvious? We assume we know what friendship is, how 
to identify it, and how to judge its worthiness. For example, in I Want to 
Believe, it seems rather obvious that Walter Skinner (Mitch Pileggi) acts 
as a worthy friend when he comes to Mulder's rescue at Scully's request, 
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despite the risks to his personal safety and possibly even his professional 
well-being. But once we remind ourselves that we have different kinds of 
friends, and that our friendships come in varying degrees, we soon see 
that understanding the nature of friendship can get a bit tricky. Moreover, 
some people claim to be "the best of friends:' But what does this actually 
mean? What kind of friendship is best, anyway? Aristotle tried to answer 
questions like these in his Nicomachean Ethics. Indeed, he devotes two full 
books to the nature of friendship, and in doing so distinguishing its true 
form from two lower forms.'7 
The first of the lower forms of friendship is that based on pleasure. 
Friendships of this type are made and sustained because they "feel good" 
or are fun in some way-for example, a drinking buddy or tennis partner. 
Aristotle is certainly not claiming that true friendships shouldn't give us 
pleasure or that we shouldn't engage in fun activities with true friends. He 
is only claiming that friendships that are based primarily on pleasure are 
of a lower form. One reason for this is rather obvious: pleasure friendships 
tend not to last once the fun is gone or something better comes along. We 
can rather easily rule out pleasure friendship as the type that best describes 
the relationship between Scully and Mulder. Neither one of them seems to 
have much fun alone, much less together, and, in any event, there is clearly 
something deeper between them. 
The second of the lower forms of friendship is that based on utility. 
Friendships of this type are made and sustained because they are useful or 
profitable to us in some way-for example, a business partnership. Again, 
even true friendships can be useful to us, but here Aristotle has in mind 
those friendships based primarily on utility. As with pleasure friendships, 
utility friendships are easily dissolved once the other is no longer useful to 
us and, as such, constitute a lower form of friendship. Some friendships in 
The X-Files are arguably like this. Perhaps Deep Throat (Jerry Hardin) and 
Mulder are friends of this sort -assuming that they are friends at all. Per-
haps Alex Krycek (Nicholas Lea) and Marita Covarrubias (Laurie Holden) 
have this kind of friendship, even though it also became physical (and, 
thus, perhaps also qualifies as friendship for pleasure). We might conceiv-
ably place Scully and Mulder in this category of friendship based on a few 
early episodes-say, if Mulder merely relied on Scully's expertise in doing 
autopsies or Scully merely saw her partnership with Mulder as a stepping-
stone in her career. However, their relationship clearly develops into some-
thing much more-even by the end of the first season, we can see that they 
are more than mere partners in the FBI. 
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According to Aristotle, the best friendships are not based merely on 
pleasure or utility. True friendship is a relationship between good people, 
each of whom recognizes the good character of the other, and each of 
whom desires to preserve and promote the other's virtue simply because 
it is good to do so. True friendship occurs between equals-a relation-
ship in which one person is vastly superior to the other in moral virtue 
is more likely a paternalistic relationship than a true friendship. Unlike 
pleasure and utility friendships, true friendships must involve a genuine 
caring for the well-being of the other person, not merely egoistic motives. 
Of course, that doesn't mean that one may not consider how the friend-
ship affects one's own interests-Aristotle is not advocating slavishness or 
radical self-sacrifice. It just means that one cares about the other person for 
his or her own sake and wants to see the other person flourish, regardless 
of any benefit that one might also receive as a result. Nevertheless, Aris-
totle does believe as a matter of fact that true friendships are beneficial to 
those involved. In that way, true friendship involves a happy convergence 
of self-interest and altruism and, as such, results in an ideal kind of moral 
motivation. 
So, for Aristotle, the highest form of friendship occurs between per-
sons of roughly equally good moral character (virtue) that is enhanced in 
various ways due to their interactions. They spend a great deal of time to-
gether, participate in joint ventures, and engage in activities that exercise 
their own virtues for the betterment of the other and the friendship. All of 
this is done primarily for the sake of the other person (and not for selfish 
purposes), even though their interests have grown so close together that 
it is difficult to separate one's good from that of the other. IS That is true 
friendship. Sound like anyone we (X-Philes) know? 
That the relationship between Mulder and Scully satisfies Aristotle's 
conditions for true friendship arguably begins with "Memento Mori:' The 
episode opens with Scully's voice-over; we are privileged to hear some of 
Scully's innermost thoughts and feelings as she faces the very real prospect 
of losing her battle with cancer. Much of her soliloquy concerns the issue 
we'd expect-fear of death-but it's also revealing how her thoughts turn to 
Mulder. Scully thinks of Mulder as an equal partner on an important jour-
ney of shared values and trusts him as one can only trust the closest of con-
fidantes, someone with shared values and a mutual concern for the other's 
well-being. Also note Mulder's resounding refusal to accept that Scully's 
cancer is terminal. Mulder goes to great lengths to find a cure and consid-
ers making a deal with CSM (William Davis). He expresses his passion and 
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determination for Scully, not because he is merely fond of her phone voice 
or fears that no one else will perform all the autopsies he requests, but 
simply for her own sake. Scully reciprocates in "Sixth Extinction" (season 
7). Mulder has been beset by a mysterious and mentally-debilitating ill-
ness after encountering an alien artifact. Scully continues the investigation 
without him, in part for the hope of curing him and in part to continue his 
work, despite her own doubts. She perseveres for Mulder and utilizes her 
unique traits for their joint pursuit of "the truth:' She does so on her own 
terms-as a scientist-because she believes that "in the source of every ill-
ness lies its cure:' But she does this for Mulder's sake-not for any glory of 
discovering a cure to his fantastic illness. Indeed Mulder and Scully regu-
larly act on the behalf of the other, thereby satisfying one of the conditions 
Aristotle requires for true friendship. 
Our intrepid heroes have also strengthened each other, shoring up 
their virtuous character traits. Recall that in Fight the Future, Scully visits 
Mulder's apartment to tell him she has reSigned from the FBI. In pleading 
for her not to quit, Mulder replies: "But you saved me! As difficult and as 
frustrating as it's been sometimes, your goddamned strict rationalism and 
science have saved me a thousand times over! You've kept me honest ... 
you've made me a whole person:' Mulder recognizes that he has gained a 
kind of temperance through his relationship with Scully and is a better in-
vestigator-and person-for it. But Mulder has also strengthened Scully. In 
"Empedocles;' Scully confides in Mulder that the greatest gift he has given 
her is courage-courage to accept the possibility of unexplained phenom-
ena. Before she met Mulder, she was afraid to reexamine her worldview 
and, thus, simply rejected any experience that didn't fit it. She now wishes 
to impart this gift to her new X-Files partner, John Doggett. As a result of 
her relationship with Mulder, Scully is a better investigator-and person. 
Thus, another of Aristotle's conditions is met. 
Mulder and Scully's joint venture of seeking the truth "out there" has 
also led to the intertwining of their individual goods into one, unified good. 
Going back to Fight the Future, after Mulder suggests (near the end of the 
film) that she was right to quit, Scully replies, "I can't. I won't. Mulder, I'll 
be a doctor, but my work is here with you now. That virus that I was ex-
posed to, whatever it is, it has a cure. You held it in your hand. How many 
other lives can we save? Look ... If I quit now, they win:' Mulder's quest 
has become her work, too. Their work requires, and deserves, complete 
solidarity. This solidarity reaches its pinnacle in "Sixth Extinction: Amor 
Fati" (season 7), and the penultimate scene is especially telling. Mulder is 
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trapped in his own mind. Either as a result of the illness from which he suf-
fers, or an insidious plan hatched by the CSM (or both), Mulder is tempted 
to give up his search for the truth in exchange for the (false) comforts of 
a "normal" suburban life, complete with Samantha, a wife (Diana Fow-
ley!), and children. Scully arrives and somehow taps into Mulder's psyche. 
She calls him a "traitor, deserter, and coward:' She tells him to get up and 
continue his "true mission:' He must "fight the fight:' She soon becomes 
desperate and pleads with him: "No one can do it but you, Mulder. Mulder, 
help me:' He finally regains consciousness, only to see Scully standing over 
him in a Department of Defense medical room, and hoarsely rasps, "You ... 
help ... me:' The episode concludes with a shaken Scully visiting a mend-
ing Mulder. She is confused and uncertain of what exactly happened. She 
is no longer sure who to trust or, even, what the truth is. Mulder confides 
in her: "Scully, I was like you once. I didn't know who to trust. Then I ... 
I chose another path ... another life, another fate, where I found my sis-
ter. The end of my world was unrecognizable and upside down. There was 
one thing that remained the same. You were my friend, and you told me 
the truth. Even when the world was falling apart, you were my constant .. 
. my touchstone:' She replies, "And you are mine:' Thus it seems clear that 
the interests of these virtuous persons have become intricately linked, and 
their bond strengthens them. 
By season 9, Mulder and Scully can only be separated by distance. For 
their own good and that of their son, William, they decide to temporarily 
part, but even this becomes a source of strength. That this is so is poetically 
embodied in Scully's voice-over from "TrustNOl": 
Know there is an answer, my child, a sacred imperishable truth, but 
one you may never hope to find alone. Chance meeting your per-
fect other, your perfect opposite-your protector and endangerer. 
Chance embarking with this other on the greatest of journeys-a 
search for truths fugitive and imponderable. If one day this chance 
may befall you, my son, do not fail or falter to seize it. ... You will 
learn the truth is not found in science, or on some unseen plane, 
but by looking into your own heart. And in that moment you will 
be blessed-and stricken. For the truest truths are what hold us 
together, or keep us painfully, desperately apart. 
In words meant for her infant son, Scully tells of knOWing truths that can 
only be discovered through the perfect other. And even though embark-
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ing on and sustaining this sort of friendship inherently involves risk and 
personal commitment that doesn't fit neatly into the evidentialist program, 
Scully reaffirms what Aristotle knew long ago: a life fulfilled with true 
friendship is worth the risk. 
Having established this sort of idyllic relationship, the early scenes of 
I Want to Believe come as a bit of a shock. Mulder and Scully's relationship 
here seems far from idyllic. Strain on it is evident from their first scene to-
gether. In attempting to convince Mulder to help with the Monica Bannan 
case, Scully says, "Wouldn't you like to step out into the sunshine again, 
Mulder? Wouldn't it be nice if we both could? Together?" Mulder eventu-
ally responds, 'Tm fine, Scully. Happy as a clam here:'19 It seems that their 
interests are no longer closely intertwined. Mulder doesn't seem to grasp 
the force of her question: togetherness. Furthermore, Scully approaches 
Mulder about the Bannan case apprehenSively. She believes that it is the 
right thing to do. She also believes that getting Mulder out of the house will 
be good for him. Being involved with a paranormal case may even reener-
gize him, bringing back some of the passion, courage, and determination 
that once defined him. But she also fears that it isn't right for him to be out 
chasing monsters in the dark again. It may reignite his obsessive tenden-
cies, especially with respect to the misguided notion of saving Samantha. 
Thus, Scully's choice is risky. Are there any relevant evidentiary consid-
erations to gUide her here? This is difficult to say. She is already deeply 
committed to Mulder. What of her new personal commitment to keep the 
darkness away from the home that they now share? 
As it turned out, Mulder's obsessive tendencies became problematic 
as a result of his consulting on the Bannan case. It seemed as if he couldn't 
help but keep searching in the dark wherever Father Joe's visions led. But 
this time, Scully didn't impart temperance to Mulder. Rather, she starkly 
tells him to leave the case; it is no longer his job to search out monsters 
in the dark. Maybe he could write a book about it? When Mulder gently 
scoffs at these suggestions-reminding Scully that seeking the truth wher-
ever it might lead is part of who he is-she not -so-subtly threatens that she 
won't be coming home. The Scully of old would never react this way. This 
is more evidence that living under the same roof has actually caused them 
to grow further apart. Because this is reminiscent of so many relationships, 
we again can see how Mulder and Scully have become more like us. All 
of us have faced a difficult fork in the road after traveling so long with the 
same companion. What should they do? Should they give up? What evi-
dentiary considerations are relevant to this choice?20 
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Throughout the movie, it is never quite clear whether Father Joe's 
"Don't give up" refers to Scully's attempt to cure Christian or Mulder and 
Scully's involvement in the Bannan case. But it seems to equally apply to 
Mulder and Scully and their relationship. But perhaps all three threads 
weave together. Should Mulder decide to remain involved in the Bannan 
case-seeking the truth out there-he must be mindful of Scully's protests 
to the contrary. In being reinvigorated by Mulder's passion, courage, and 
determination, Scully more effectively proceeds with Christian's treat-
ments. As a result, their relationship is renewed, as intimated by the first 
signs of spring at the end of the movie. Mulder and Scully have made it 
past one of the darkest, coldest winters of their relationship and have found 
each other again. Their passing from the dark of winter to the renewal of 
spring is dramatized by Carter's decision to include the rowboat scene after 
the credits. Because they didn't give up on each other, we see Mulder and 
Scully in the warm tropical sun, literally basking in their being away from 
the darkness (at least for a while). 
Mulder's choice to escape the darkness with Scully is actually quite sig-
nificant because it now seems that he can either "fight the fight" and con-
tinue his "true mission" of seeking the truth out there, or he can nurture 
his relationship with Scully, but no longer can he do both. Presumably, 
the truths he pursues now-those of his "own heart" -are in competition 
with seeking the truths "out there." Which personal commitment should 
he pursue? How could evidentialism decide this for him? Note that his 
choice is not unlike Scully's hesitation to inform Mulder of the missing FBI 
agent in the first place. She misses her "perfect other"; Mulder has become 
someone else holed up in his makeshift office. But to find him again, she 
must risk reawakening her "endangerer" and face all the psychological and 
phYSical perils of searching for monsters in the dark. It is interesting that 
both characters decided to pursue the truths of the heart -to nurture their 
Aristotelian friendship. Paradoxically, might the most elusive but impor-
tant truths-the "truest truths" -only be found by looking within oneself? 
Is this the truth "out there" that Mulder has finally found?2l 
Of Rowboats and X -Files Philosophy 
But what should X-Philes make of the now famous (or infamous) rowboat 
scene? Let's quickly consider the evidence. It certainly looked as if Scully 
was waving goodbye to the X-Phile viewers. Perhaps our intrepid heroes 
were literally sailing off into the sunset? This conjecture is strengthened in 
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retrospect by the fact that the film didn't do very well at the box office. But that 
scene was oddly filmed. The X-Phile viewer could see a helicopter shadow on 
the water in the shots leading up to it. If Scully was waving to some sort of om-
niscient perceiver above (us in the theater), why allow the helicopter shadow 
into the shot? Perhaps this is explained by shoddy or rushed camera work? 
But why not edit it out later? Furthermore, many X-Philes claimed to see a 
submerged "X;' noticeable to the careful eye beneath the rowboat. Why in-
clude this imagery? Might we thus contend that the X-Files has found Mulder 
and Scully again, as signified by the submerged 'X;' and Scully is waiving to 
(perhaps) Skinner in a helicopter just before he lands and again asks for their 
assistance? If the evidence does not sufficiently warrant believing one hypoth-
esis over the other, how should we (the X-Phile viewers) proceed? Perhaps our 
personal commitment to The X-Files allows us to take action? Perhaps being 
committed to the possibility of a third movie-not giving up on seeing our 
heroes again-is not only permissible in this case, but also beneficial? Once 
again, Chris Carter has left us hanging. 
This essay admittedly provides as many questions as it answers." Cer-
tainly, evidentialists like Schick and Vaughn would welcome the opportunity 
to respond to it. But ending the book in this way follows the modus ope-
randi of The X-Files itself: you, the reader, are invited to ponder questions 
about evidence, belief, and commitment, thereby beginning to determine 
"the truth" yourself. Nevertheless, this essay achieves (we think) one goal: it 
articulates what the philosophy of The X-Files might be. It seems that there 
are or might be times when evidentiary considerations don't sufficiently jus-
tify one competing hypotheSiS over another. In such cases, we aren't sure 
which to believe. But we may want to believe one of them over another. How 
should we proceed? The answer we seem to get from The X-Files is this: so 
long as we have honestly and carefully weighed the available evidence and 
remain open to new eVidentiary findings, we may choose to follow our per-
sonal commitments, knowing our own hearts so long as we do not violate 
any obvious, "common-sense" ethical constraints in doing so. Our personal 
commitments should not run contrary to insurmountable evidence, and we 
should not choose to harm innocent people. And, short of these two quali-
fiers, we should not give up on our personal commitments.23 
Notes 
Thanks go to X-Phile Natalie Floeh and (especially) Frank Spotnitz for sharing their 
respective ideas and inSights about The X-Files and I Want to Believe. Natalie read and 
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commented on a draft of the essay, and Frank took time out of his busy schedule to 
aptly field my various X-Files and philosophy-related questions. 
1. This is per the novelization; see Max Allan CoIlins (based on the screenplay by 
Chris Carter and Frank Spotnitz), The X-Files: I Want to Believe (New York: HarperCol-
lins, 2008), 24. 
2. In conversation, Frank Spotnitz confirmed that he and Chris Carter intended 
to leave the villains of I Want to Believe with underdeveloped characters. They thought 
that too much time spent developing the Russians' backstories and motivations would 
take away from the main storyline, which was the relationship between Mulder and 
Scully. I Want to Believe is thus similar to the season 8 episode "Alone:' which Spot-
nitz wrote and directed. The reptilian monster in "Alone" (as Spotnitz fully intended) 
took a backseat to the dramatic interactions among Mulder, Scully, and Doggett. As a 
monster of the week episode, "Alone" is far from extraordinary. However, it is a rather 
moving character study of the evolution of the X-Files team. We argue that I Want to 
Believe is best interpreted as an episode like "Alone" rather than more archetypical 
"monster of the week" episodes like "Squeeze:' "The Host:' or "Home:' 
3. Natalie Floeh is concerned that I have overstated this point. She argues that 
the predominantly negative reviews and commentary found on Internet Movie Data-
base (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0443701/board. last accessed on October 8, 2008) 
are counterbalanced by the positive reviews found on http://www.xfilesultimate.com 
and http://www.biglight.com/blog (both last accessed October 8,2008). She wonders 
whether a majority of the negative response to the movie cannot be explained away by 
fans of the show who became disillusioned with it in the latter seasons. 
4. The novelization contains a scene deleted from the movie. The scene involves 
Scully finding Father Joe in her young patient's hospital room. Scully is horrified. But 
when she barges into the room, Father Joe is merely attempting to comfort the boy in 
his suffering. The patient looks up at Scully and says, "It's okay, Dr. Scully. He didn't do 
anything bad. He's nice. Sad ... but nice" (188). 
5. This sentiment was arguably first raised in "Memento Mori;' as Scully (in a 
voice-over) reassures Mulder: "If the darkness should have swallowed me as you read 
this, you must never think there was the possibility of some secret intervention, some-
thing you might have done:' Undoubtedly, if Mulder believes that there was something 
more he could have done to spare Scully's life, he surely would believe himself to be a 
failure. This is why Scully preventively assures him of the contrary. 
6. In the end, it's not immediately clear how Mulder's view-the idea that evil is 
some sort of supernatural or non-natural disease that we become susceptible to in 
times of stress or loss-is all that different from the more straightforward or conven-
tional psychological explanation involving "stressors" voiced by Reyes. Perhaps the dif-
ference is the level of depravity Mulder has witnessed working violent crimes. Perhaps 
Mulder wonders whether any human being, without being "infected" with something 
that isn't human, could do the sorts of monstrous things that he's seen. In this way, 
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Mulder hypothesizes that the scientific explanation can only take us so far. At some 
point, we must begin looking elsewhere for an adequate explanation. Without com-
menting on the plausibility of Mulder's theory in this case, suffice it to say that that the 
theme of science only taking us so far (obviously) pervades the entire series, beginning 
with "Pilot:' 
7. Interestingly, on the rare occasion that Mulder is not sufficiently mindful of the 
evidence (regarding Samantha or the infamous ectoplasm hypothesis in "all things" 
[season 7]), he clearly seems to be misguided in ways analogous to Blaine Faulkner 
(which is probably the connection Darin Morgan wanted us to make in the first place). 
This is either a case of obsession clouding his judgment (Samantha), or simple investi-
gative laziness (ectoplasm). What is more interesting, we think, is that these instances 
are clearly the exception to the rule (contra Darin Morgan), which make Mulder's 
character so intriguing. 
8. Theodore Schick and Lewis Vaughn, How to Think about Weird Things: Criti-
cal Thinking for a New Age, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 123. (See pages 
12-13 for another affirmation of believing with the evidence and pages 72-73 for com-
mentary that sounds strikingly similar to Scully's view of the paranormal in "Pilot:') 
Interestingly, on page 38, Schick and Vaughn seemingly describe Mulder in his more 
Blaine Faulkner-like moments: "Part of the task of critically evaluating an unusual 
claim is to control our tendency to believe or disbelieve without good reason. For some 
people, the need to believe in paranormal phenomena is very strong-so strong that 
in some cases people have refused to accept the confessions of others, who admit (and 
sometimes demonstrate) that their paranormal feats are fraudulent:' 
9. For more on questions like these, see '"I Want to Believe': William James and 
The X-Files," by Keith Dromm in this volume. 
10. For an argument that we must add at least a non-natural element, see "Science 
and the Mystery of Consciousness: A Dialogue between Mulder and Scully;' by Gor-
don Barnes in this volume. 
11. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), esp. 73-125. 
12. In an incredibly thoughtful review, blog critic John Kenneth Muir has also 
seen the importance of redemption in I Want to Believe. See his "Reflections on Film/ 
TV" at http://reflectionsonfilmandtelevision.blogspot.com12008_07 _27 3rchive.html 
(site last accessed August 24, 2008). My thanks go to Natalie Floeh for sending me the 
link to Muir's site. 
13. Some have wondered why Carter and Spotnitz decided to write this couple 
as Russian. It's tempting to argue that this is just a cold war holdover, but another 
answer is available. The kind of Dr. Frankenstein research conveyed in the movie was, 
in fact, seemingly pursued in Russia circa 1940. (See http://www.archive.org/details/ 
Experimel940, last accessed September 1, 2008.) So, it is plaUSible to assume that Rus-
sians would explore this kind of treatment. 
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14. The quick analysis of being unnatural expressed in this paragraph is indebted 
to Burton M. Leisure, Liberty, Justice, and Morals: Contemporary Value Conflicts, 3rd 
ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1986), 51-57. 
15. We assume that the stem cells Scully uses are obtained via umbilical cord blood 
and are not embryonic. In fact, as Scully works at a Catholic hospital, it seems certain 
that they could not be embryonic. Consequently, any relevant philosophical qualms 
about abortion are circumvented. 
16. We admit that, at some level, ethical disputes appear to be intractable. How-
ever, there are many issues about which there is very little (or no) disagreement. Con-
sequently, "commonsense" morality seems equipped to provide a sort of constraint on 
the personal commitments we make when the evidence among competing hypotheses 
isn't decisive. 
17. See books 8 and 9 of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998). 
18. This paragraph (but not the three preceding it) is indebted to Richard Kraut's 
discussion of Aristotle's ethics (section 9), which can be found online at the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/#Fri 
(site accessed September 1, 2008). (We thought that we would provide you an example 
of sound scholarship that is done via the Internet-even Google-rather than simply 
admit that we also use the Internet in our research; the trick is figuring out which sites 
are trustworthy and which aren't-sound familiar?) 
19. This is per the novelization, page 24. 
20. Evidentiary considerations do playa role in assessing friendships. If your part-
ner routinely ignores your interests, then it's clear that he (or she) is not a true friend. 
However, there are elements of friendship that, given the level of personal commit-
ment involved, don't fit neatly into the evidentialist program. The trick is to determine 
how much of friendship fits it and how much is left over to adjudicate in other ways . 
. 21. Thanks go to Natalie Floeh for the suggestion to develop Mulder's character 
transformation in this way. 
22. In this way, it is more like William Schneider's "Ancient X-Files" essay than it 
is Gordon Barnes's "Science and the Mystery of Consciousness" or Dean Kowalski's 
"'Clyde Bruckman's Final Repose' Reprised 2009:' 
23. This imperative has been a philosophical staple (even if not the only staple) 
of the X-Files corpus. Scully tells Mulder not to give up in the parking garage scene of 
"Little Green Men" in season 2, and the Lone Gunmen say the same to their associates 
at the end of "Jump the Shark" in season 9. But it is one thing to correctly articulate 
what someone's philosophical doctrines are; it is another thing to ask whether those 
doctrines can plausibly withstand the assessment of others. Each philosophical doc-
trine should be properly evaluated for plausibility. Whether the imperative here would 
require revision after a proper evidentialist critique remains to be seen. 
Appendix A 
The X-Files Mythology 
In July 1947, at a site in Roswell, New Mexico, it is reported that the u.s. 
military engaged in a salvage mission of a crashed alien vessel. Although 
contradictory stories emerge as to whether this incident was real or merely 
a dodge concocted to divert attention from other covert operations, it is 
around this time that members of a clandestine order known as the Syndi-
cate, operating on behalf of government and economic interests around the 
world, made contact with extraterrestrials. It was through this contact that 
the Syndicate was informed of an extraterrestrial plot to colonize Earth, 
and it was revealed that alien colonists were Earth's original inhabitants. 
The origin of all life on the planet, it was discovered, was extraterrestrial, 
stemming from microorganisms on a meteor that struck Earth millions 
of years earlier. Subsequently, also before human history, aliens traveled 
to Earth to study it for potential colonization. However, the coming of the 
Ice Age forced the aliens to depart, leaving a command ship and its crew 
hidden and dormant in Antarctica. The aliens were now returning to put 
into motion a full-scale colonization of the planet, which would result in 
the complete extermination of all human life. 
The Syndicate agreed to collaborate with the alien colonists in exchange 
for safe haven during colonization. The aliens would use the Syndicate as 
their operatives on Earth, so as to continue to hide knowledge of their col-
onization plans. Additionally, the Syndicate would help the aliens develop 
a population of alien-human hybrids that would constitute a new race of 
slaves to serve the colonists upon their arrival. The rest of humanity would 
be used as a host for a virus known as the "black oil;' a virus that infects the 
human body, turning the host into a gelatinous substance and killing it so 
that it might be used to feed the gestating alien life form until it matured. 
262 
The X-Files Mythology 263 
The collaboration between the Syndicate and alien colonists was im-
plemented under the working title of "The Method;' which drew upon 
the horrific eugenics experiments performed in World War II concentra-
tion camps by Nazi doctors who were granted immunity for war crimes 
by the allied powers to continue their experiments. In exchange for alien 
biomaterial needed to carry out experimentation on human ova, Syndi-
cate members allowed the aliens to abduct members of their families, who 
would be released back to them upon the successful creation of an alien-
human fetus that would provide the genetic materials necessary for the 
creation of the slave race. 
While working on the development of the hybrid, the Syndicate began 
conducting its own secret experiments under the code name Purity Control 
to develop a vaccine that would make its members immune to the effects 
of the black oil. Such experiments made the secrecy of their existence and 
operations all the more vital, as they had to keep the alien colonization plot 
hidden from humanity, and the effort to develop the vaccine hidden from 
the alien colonists. Soon, although maintaining their ties and access to the 
governments of Earth they once served, members of this shadow agency 
began to operate independently, with no accountability to any Single gov-
ernment or organization. 
In December 1991, Agent Fox Mulder of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation was assigned to work on a series of unsolved, unexplained cases 
known as the X-Files. His work, which includes an investigation into the 
abduction of his sister, Samantha, leads him on to the path of discover-
ing the truth about extraterrestrials and the covert work of the Syndicate. 
The danger Agent Mulder poses to their secret operations prompts mem-
bers of the Syndicate to assign Agent Dana Scully, a medical officer, to use 
established scientific knowledge to debunk Agent Mulder's investigations 
into the paranormal. Although the two agents are initially skeptical of each 
other, in time they begin to develop a deep mutual trust, which only serves 
to increase their effectiveness as investigators. 
In the course of their work on the X-Files, Mulder and Scully begin to 
peel back the layers of secrecy insulating the Syndicate. This magnifies the 
threat of exposure of the organization, which must maintain control over 
its covert operations. The tensions within the Syndicate begin to mount as 
a power struggle among its members threatens their cohesion and singu-
lar purpose in furthering their work. Agent Mulder is even contacted by 
members of the Syndicate and given information to assist him with his 
quest for the truth about the existence of extraterrestrials. 
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Soon Mulder and Scully find how deep the conspiracy to withhold 
the truth from the world truly runs; they discover that the abductions of 
thousands of humans can be linked to the eugenics tests overseen by the 
Syndicate. They also discover a complex catalog of human DNA compiled 
during the administration of smallpox vaccinations that could be used to 
identify and track individuals and test subjects. The Syndicate employs a 
program a disinformation to conceal its work. The Syndicate's members 
even twist the truth about the existence of extraterrestrials into a story so 
fantastical as not to be believed, making it easier for them to continue test-
ing abductees without fear of exposure. 
Work on the X-Files reveals to Mulder and Scully the truth not only 
about alien life but also about humanity itself. They discover that human-
kind - its physiology, religious beliefs, and social and political institutions 
and arrangements - can be traced to extraterrestrial origins. In their pur-
suit of the reality behind our reality, the agents are pulled into a multifari-
ous plot that runs beyond borders and outside the scope of any recognized 
governmental agency. It is then that they discover that the Syndicate is 
working with the alien colonists to bring about a total genocide of human-
kind and that the timetable for colonization is set. When the date arrives, 
the Syndicate will seize control of the entire social order by declaring a 
state of emergency and using the power of established agencies like the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency in the United States. By then, 
Agents Mulder and Scully would be powerless to prevent the holocaust of 
humankind. 
The date of colonization was foretold in the last entry on the tradi-
tional Mayan calendar: December 22, 2012 ... 
Joseph J. Foy 
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The X-Files Debriefed 
(September 10, 1993-June 19, 1998) 
SEASON 1 
Pilot (lX79) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Robert Mandel 
Dana Scully is assigned to her new 
partner, "Spooky" Fox Mulder, to de-
bunk his work on the so-called X-Files. 
This episode implicitly raises philo-
sophical issues associated with abductive 
inference. (See the first chapter, "Truth Is 
Out There.") 
Deep Throat (lXOl) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Daniel Sackheim 
A mysterious informant approaches 
Mulder to caution him against investi-
gating a U.S. military base. 
(This episode is featured in "Postdemo-
cratic Society and the Truth Out There" 
and elsewhere.) 
Squeeze (lX02) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: Harry Longstreet 
Genetic mutant Eugene Victor 
Tooms is the prime suspect in a series 
of gruesome murders; Scully faces ridi-
cule about her new post from a former 
colleague. 
(This episode is featured in "Science 
and the Mystery of Consciousness" and 
elsewhere. ) 
Conduit (lX03) 
Story: Alex Gansa and Howard 
Gordon 
Director: Daniel Sackheim 
While investigating the alleged ab-
duction of a teenage girl, Mulder relives 
the pain of losing his sister. 
The Jersey Devil (lX04) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Joe Napolitano 
Mulder and Scully investigate Bigfoot-
type sightings in the Atlantic City area. 
Shadows (lXOS) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: Michael Katleman 
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Someone is protecting a young of-
fice worker; Mulder suspects that it is 
her deceased boss. 
This episode raises the philosophical 
issues of disembodied existence and in-
teractionism between physical and non-
physical entities. 
Ghost in the Machine (IXo6) 
Story: Alex Gansa and Howard 
Gordon 
Director: Jerrold Freedman 
In a seeming homage to Kubrick's 
2001, Mulder and Scully investigate a 
strange murder at a research develop-
ment company. 
This episode raises issues in the 
philosophy of mind, including artificial 
intelligence, machine consciousness, and 
personhood. (See "Science and the Mys-
tery of Consciousness" for other issues 
relevant to the philosophy of mind.) 
Ice (IX07) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: David Nutter 
Mulder and Scully clash over what 
ought to be done with a parasite found 
deep in the ice north of the Arctic 
Circle. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
pertaining to axiological and normative 
issues in scientific research. (This episode 
is featured in "Science and the Mystery 
of Consciousness.") 
Space (IXo8) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: William Graham 
A NASA official relives the horrors 
he once faced as an astronaut. 
This episode broaches the philosophi-
cal debate over whether it is ever permis-
sible to be dishonest and, if so, when. 
Fallen Angel (IX09) 
Story: Howard Gordon and Alex 
Gansa 
Director: Larry Shaw 
Deep Throat informs Mulder of a 
UFO that has allegedly crashed near 
Townsend, Wisconsin. 
Eve (IXlO) 
Story: Kenneth Biller and Chris 
Brancato 
Director: Fred Gerber 
Deep Throat informs Mulder of the 
Lynchfield Experiments-an attempt 
to clone and genetically engineer human 
beings during the cold war. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
germane to biomedical ethics: are cloning 
and genetic engineering ever permissible 
and, if so, when? 
Fire (IXU) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Larry Shaw 
When British Parliament members 
begin spontaneously combusting, Mul-
der receives a visit from his old flame 
during his Oxford days. 
This episode raises philosophical is-
sues pertinent to mental causation and 
interaction ism. 
Beyond the Sea (IX12) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: David Nutter 
As Scully mourns her father, incar-
cerated serial killer Luther Lee Boggs 
contacts Mulder claiming to have psy-
chic knowledge of new homicides. 
This episode raises issues pertaining to 
life after bodily death and disembodied 
existence. (This episode is featured In 
"Scully as Pragmatist Feminist.") 
Gender Bender (IXI3) 
Story: Larry Barber and Paul Barber 
Director: Rob Bowman 
Strange events surrounding a metro-
politan murder lead Mulder and Scully 
to a secretive, rural religious community. 
Lazarus (IXI4) 
Story: Alex Gansa and Howard 
Gordon 
Director: David Nutter 
Scully aids a fellow FBI agent-who 
is also her former lover-in tracking 
down two bank robbers; the agent then 
undergoes a radical personality shift. 
This episode raises the philosophical 
issues of reincarnation and the alleged 
possibility of "body switches." (This epi-
sode is featured in "Freedom and World-
views in The X-Files.") 
Young at Heart (IXI5) 
Story: Scott Kaufer and Chris Carter 
Director: Michael Lange 
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Mulder's past catches up with him 
when a criminal seemingly returns from 
the grave to exact his revenge. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
pertaining to axiological and normative 
issues in scientific research. 
E.B.E. (IXI6) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: William Graham 
Deep Throat purposely sends Mul-
der and Scully on a wild-goose chase 
regarding a downed UFO; the Lone Gun-
men make their first appearance. 
Miracle Man (IXI7) 
Story: Howard Gordon and Chris 
Carter 
Director: Michael Lange 
Mulder and Scully are led to Tennes-
see to investigate a young religious man 
with the power to heal by laying on of 
hands. 
Shapes (IXI8) 
Story: Marilyn Osborn 
Director: David Nutter 
Strange events at an Indian reserva-
tion in Montana prompt Muller to re-
open the very first X-File. 
Darkness Falls (IXI9) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Joe Napolitano 
Mulder and Scully are trapped in a 
forest with light as their only protec-
tion from unknown insects. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
germane to environmental ethics: What 
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reasons are there for protecting our envi-
ronment, and to what lengths ought we 
to go in order to protect it? 
Tooms (lX20) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: David Nutter 
Victor Eugene Tooms is released from 
the psychiatric ward and plots his re-
venge against Mulder and Scully. 
(This episode is featured in "Science 
and the Mystery of Consciousness.") 
Born Again (lX21) 
Story: Howard Gordon and Alex 
Gansa 
Director: Jerrold Freedman 
Mulder and Scully are called to Buf-
falo when a young girl manages to hurl 
a police officer out a window to his 
death. 
This episode raises philosophical is-
sues regarding reincarnation and per-
sonal identity. 
Roland (lX22) 
Story: Chris Ruppenthal 
Director: David Nutter 
Tragedy befalls a team of scientists 
attempting to develop a cutting-edge 
supersonic jet engine. 
The Erlenmeyer Flask (lX23) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: R. W. Goodwin 
When a scientist mysteriously disap-
pears, Deep Throat tells Mulder that he 
has never been closer to the truth about 
the alien conspiracy. 
This episode implicitly raises philo-
sophical issues associated with prag-
matism. (See "'[ Want to Believe."') It 
also raises philosophical issues related to 
ethics of trust and egoism. (See "Some 
Philosophical Reflections on 'Trust No 
One,''' which features this episode.) 
SEASON 2 
Little Green Men (2XOl) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: David Nutter 
Although the X-Files Unit has been 
officially dissolved and Mulder and 
Scully reassigned, Senator Matheson 
sends Mulder to a SETI listening post 
in Puerto Rico. 
When explored in conjunction with 
"The Erlenmeyer Flask," this episode fur-
thers the philosophical connection to pra-
gmatism and the ethics of belief (See" '[ 
Want to Believe."') 
The Host (2X02) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Daniel Sackheim 
Mulder and Scully investigate a mu-
tant humanoid fluke worm (played 
by Darin Morgan) trapped in a sewer 
system. 
Blood (2X03) 
Story: Darin Morgan, Glen Morgan, 
and James Wong 
Director: David Nutter 
Mulder suspects secret government 
tests when several inhabitants of a small 
New England town become violent. 
This episode implicitly raises issues in 
political philosophy, including the gov-
ernment's proper role and relationship 
with society. (See "Postdemocratic Soci-
ety and the Truth Out There.") 
Sleepless (2X04) 
Story: Howard Gordon 
Director: Rob Bowman 
Alex Krycek teams with Mulder when 
a sleep-disorder specialist dies, leading 
them to a sleepless Vietnam veteran 
with unique abilities. 
Duane Barry (2XOS) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Chris Carter 
Former FBI agent and alleged alien 
abductee Duane Barry escapes from a 
psychiatric ward, leading to Mulder's 
first hostage negotiation. 
Ascension (2Xo6) 
Story: Paul Brown 
Director: Michael Lange 
Duane Barry survives a bullet wound, 
escapes from the hospital, and takes 
Scully to the place he was first abducted; 
Skinner reopens the X-Files Unit. 
(This episode is featured in "Walter 
Skinner" and elsewhere.) 
3 (2X07) 
Story: Chris Ruppenthal, Glen 
Morgan, and James Wong 
Director: David Nutter 
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While Scully has mysteriously dis-
appeared, Mulder investigates a case 
that presumably involves vampires. 
One Breath (2Xo8) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: R. W. Goodwin 
Scully is found at a hospital near 
death, and Mulder resorts to unofficial 
channels to discover what happened 
to her. 
(This episode is featured in "Walter 
Skinner" and elsewhere.) 
Firewalker (2X09) 
Story: Howard Gordon 
Director: David Nutter 
A scientist enlists the help of Mulder 
and Scully to determine what happened 
to his colleagues inside a volcano. 
Red Museum (2XlO) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Win Phelps 
Mulder and Scully once again leave 
for Wisconsin, this time to investigate 
teenagers who mysteriously disappear 
only to be returned changed people. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with animal rights and the 
ethics of vegetarianism. (This episode is 
featured in "Postdemocratic Society and 
the Truth Out There.") 
Excelsis Dei (2Xll) 
Story: Paul Brown 
Director: Stephen Surjik 
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At a convalescent home, Scully con-
vinces Mulder to investigate a nurse's 
claim that she was raped by a ghost. 
This episode raises several philosophi-
cal issues, including the ethics of death 
and dying, moral relativism, and inter-
action ism. 
Aubrey (2.X12) 
Story: Sara B. Charno 
Director: Rob Bowman 
When a young police officer unknow-
ingly digs up the skeleton of a pioneer-
ing FBI agent from the 1950s, Mulder 
and Scully are led to reopen a forty-
year-old serial murder case. 
This episode raises the philosophical 
issue of human freedom and biological 
determinism. (See "Freedom and World-
views in The X-Files.") 
Irresistible (2.X13) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: David Nutter 
Scully is caught up in a psychopath's 
extreme fetishes of collecting the hair 
and fingernails of his female victims. 
This episode raises (at least implicitly) 
philosophical issues relating to moral 
responsibility and the nature-versus-
nurture debate. 
Die Hand Die Verletzt (2.X14) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: Kim Manners 
After a boy is murdered in demonic, 
ritualistic fashion, Mulder and Scully are 
called to a town that seems entrenched 
in the occult. 
Fresh Bones (2.X15) 
Story: Howard Gordan 
Director: Rob Bowman 
Suicidal tendencies among the sol-
diers housing Haitian immigrants put 
Mulder and Scully in the middle of a 
voodoo war. 
This episode implicitly raises issues per-
taining to moral relativism. (This episode 
is featured in '''I Want to Believe."') 
Colony (2.X16) 
Story: Chris Carter and David 
Duchovny 
Director: Nick Marek 
As Samantha seemingly appears 
at William Mulder's house, a shape-
shifting alien bounty hunter is sent 
to quash a colony of renegade alien-
hybrids. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with biomedical ethics, . most 
notably cloning and genetic engineering. 
(This episode is featured in "'[ Want to 
Believe.''') 
End Game (2.X17) 
Story: Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Rob Bowman 
In hopes of discovering the true 
whereabouts of his sister, Mulder tracks 
the alien bounty hunter to the Arctic 
Circle. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
pertaining to personal identity and psy-
chological continuity. 
Fearful Symmetry (2X18) 
Story: Steven DeJarnatt 
Director: James Whitmore Jr. 
A rampaging invisible elephant leads 
Mulder and Scully to "investigate a zoo 
that has never had one successful mat-
ing attempt among its animals. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with animal rights and en-
dangered species. 
Story: Alex Gansa and Howard 
Gordon 
Director: Rob Bowman 
When a twenty-eight-year-old naval 
officer dies of old age, Mulder convinces 
Scully to investigate an area of the North 
Atlantic that presumably contains a 
wrinkle in time. 
This episode raises philosophical is-
sues associated with ethical dilemmas 
involving limited resources, sometimes 
called "lifeboat" ethics. (This episode is 
featured in "Freedom and Worldviews in 
The X-Files." 
Humbug (2X20) 
Story: Darin Morgan 
Director: Kim Manners 
Mulder and Scully investigate an un-
usual string of murders involving car-
nival sideshow folk. 
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(This episode is featured in "Clyde 
Bruckman's Final Repose.") 
The Calusari (2X21) 
Story: Sara B. Charno 
Director: Michael Vejar 
Four Romanian holy men aid Mul-
der in removing a family from an evil 
influence. 
F. Emasculata (2X22) 
Story: Chris Carter and Howard 
Gordon 
Director: Rob Bowman 
Mulder and Scully are sent to inves-
tigate a biological contagion mistakenly 
sent to a prison. 
Soft Light (2X23) 
Story: Vince Gilligan 
Director: James Contner 
A physicist experimenting with "dark 
matter" is cursed by his own success. 
This episode raises philosophical ques-
tions pertaining to axiological and nor-
mative issues in scientific research. 
Our Town (2X24) 
Story: Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Rob Bowman 
An extremely rare brain disease af-
flicts workers at a chicken-processing 
plant. 
Anasazi (2X25) 
Story: Chris Carter and David 
Duchovny 
Director: R. W. Goodwin 
A computer hacker provides Mulder 
a tape of top-secret data encrypted in 
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Navajo, leading him to a buried train 
car (and perhaps an untimely, fiery end) 
in the New Mexico desert. 
SEASON 3 
The Blessing Way bXOl) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: R. W. Goodwin 
Mulder is rescued and healed accord-
ing to ancient Navajo tradition by Al-
bert Hosteen, as the Syndicate strives to 
retrieve the lost data tape. 
(This episode is featured in "Post-
democratic Society and the Truth Out 
There" and elsewhere.) 
Paper Clip (3X02) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Rob Bowman 
With the help of a mysterious, well-
manicured man, Mulder and Scully learn 
about operation "paper clip," an early 
attempt to develop alien-hybrid tech-
nology; Scully discovers that she was 
an unwitting participant in the current 
stages of the operation. 
D.P.O. (3X03) 
Story: Howard Gordon 
Director: Kim Manners 
A troubled teen acquires the ability 
to control lightning. 
Clyde Bruckman's Final Repose 
(3X04) 
Story: Darin Morgan 
Director: David Nutter 
A Minnesota insurance salesman's 
ability to foresee future deaths proves 
helpful to Mulder and Scully in their 
attempt to catch a serial killer. 
This episode raises a variety of philo-
sophical issues: freedom, fate, and fore-
knowledge and questions in epistemology 
generally. (See "Clyde Bruckman's Final 
Repose," which features this episode.) 
The List (3X05) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Chris Carter 
A well-read death-row inmate vows 
vengeance from beyond the grave upon 
five people who mistreated him in this 
life. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
related to transmigration of the soul, re-
incarnation, and personal identity. 
2SHY (3X06) 
Story: Jeffrey Vlaming 
Director: David Nutter 
A genetic mutant who is also a trans-
lator of medieval Italian texts uses the 
Internet to meet women to ingest their 
fatty tissues. 
The Walk (3X07) 
Story: John Shiban 
Director: Rob Bowman 
A bitter quadriplegic Desert Storm 
veteran is somehow involved in a string 
of murders at the medical hospital where 
he resides. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
related to mind-body dualism. 
Oubliette (3Xo8) 
Story: Charles Grant Craig 
Director: Kim Manners 
A woman becomes psychically linked 
to a teenage girl when her abductor 
strikes again thirteen years later. 
Nisei (3X09) 
Story: Chris Carter, Howard Gordon, 
and Frank Spotnitz 
Director: David Nutter 
Mulder is warned by Skinner and 
X not to pursue a lead he discovers by 
ordering an alien autopsy video; Scully 
meets women who, like her, have had 
microchips extracted from their necks. 
731 (3XlO) 
Story: Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Rob Bowman 
As Mulder pursues a Japanese scien-
tist and the purported alien-hybrid the 
scientist created, the Syndicate assassin 
pursues all three of them. 
Revelations (3X11) 
Story: Kim Newton 
Director: David Nutter 
While Scully is investigating alleged 
stigmatics, her religious convictions 
lead her to believe in the veracity of the 
case even though Mulder is skeptical. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with faith and reason and di-
vine command theory ethics. 
War of the Coprophages (3XI2) 
Story: Darin Morgan 
Director: Kim Manners 
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Mulder stumbles on a small town 
dealing with a string of strange deaths 
all involving cockroaches; Mulder sus-
pects extraterrestrial involvement even 
though Scully's scientific and psycho-
logical explanations seem persuasive. 
(This episode is discussed in "The 
Many Tales of'Jose Chung."') 
Syzygy (3XI3) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Kim Manners 
After quickly debunking the local 
authority's demonic-cult theory, a per-
turbed Scully and a vexed Mulder attempt 
to solve murders involving two teenage 
girls who have the same birthday. 
This episode implicitly raises philo-
sophical issues associated with freedom 
and compatibilism. (See "Freedom and 
Worldviews in The X-Files. ") 
Grotesque (3XI4) 
Story: Howard Gordon 
Director: Kim Manners 
One of Mulder's mentors from the 
academy enlists Mulder's help to solve a 
string of murders involving gargoyles. 
Piper Maru (3XI5) 
Story: Chris Carter and Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Rob Bowman 
A French salvage ship (sharing the 
same name as Gillian Anderson's daugh-
ter) uncovers a forty-year-old secret, 
and Mulder's nemesis, Alex Krycek, is 
responsible. 
(This episode is featured in "The Truth 
Is Out There.") 
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Apocrypha (3X16) 
Story: Frank Spotnitz and Chris Carter 
Director: Kim Manners 
The shapeless, "black oil" alien force 
inhabits Krycek's body, presenting prob-
lems for the Syndicate and the Cigarette 
Smoking Man; Scully finds the man 
who killed her sister. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with personal identity and 
virtue ethics. (This episode is featured in 
"Moral Musings on a Cigarette Smoking 
Man.") 
Pusher (3X17) 
Story: Vince Gilligan 
Director: Rob Bowman 
Mulder matches wits with a man who 
has the power to control people merely 
by talking with them. 
(This episode is featured in the intro-
duction and "Clyde Bruckman's Final 
Repose.") 
Teso Dos Bichos (JX18) 
Story: John Shiban 
Director: Kim Manners 
When the bones of a South Ameri-
can shaman are excavated and sent to 
the United States, all those involved be-
gin to die. 
This episode raises philosophical is-
sues associated with moral relativism. 
Hell Money (3X19) 
Story: JeffVlaming 
Director: Tucker Gates 
Mulder and Scully investigate a 
ghostly lottery with grave consequences 
in San Francisco's Chinatown. 
This episode raises philosophical is-
sues associated with autonomy, pater-
nalism, and moral relativism. 
Jose Chung's From Outer Space 
(3X20) 
Story: Darin Morgan 
Director: Rob Bowman 
In an homage to Rashomon, an ec-
centric fiction writer interviews Scully 
about an alleged double alien abduc-
tion; Mulder fears that the writer's story 
trivializes his work. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with truth, knowledge, objectiv-
ity, and existentialism and how these are 
interrelated. (See "The Many Tales of1ose 
Chung,'" which features this episode.) 
Avatar (3X21) 
Story: Howard Gordon and David 
Duchovny 
Director: James Charleston 
Skinner can't fully explain his in-
volvement in events that may ruin his 
career; he is aided by a mysterious el-
derly woman. 
This episode implicitly raises philo-
sophical issues associated with virtue eth-
ics. (See "Walter Skinner," which features 
this episode.) 
Quagmire (3X22) 
Story: Howard Gordon and Kim 
Newton (and Darin Morgan) 
Director: Kim Manners 
Mulder drags Scully out to lake 
country in the hope of finding defini-
tive proof of "Big Blue." 
This episode implicitly raises philo-
sophical issues associated with environ-
mental ethics. 
Wetwired (3X23) 
Story: Mat Beck 
Director: Rob Bowman 
Scully is influenced by subliminal 
messages from watching hours of vid-
eotape; Mulder, not affected, is aided by 
Scully's mother in rescuing her. 
This episode implicitly raises philosoph-
ical issues associated with compatibilism 
and moral responsibility. (See "Freedom 
and Worldviews in The X-Files.") 
Talitha Cumi (3X24) 
Story: Chris Carter and David 
Duchovny 
Director: R. W. Goodwin 
In an homage to Dostoyevsky's "Grand 
Inquisitor;' Jeremiah Smith miracu-
lously heals gunshot victims, which 
threatens to expose the CSM and the 
Syndicate. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
related to human nature, freedom, hap-
piness, and existentialism. (See "Moral 
Musings on a Cigarette Smoking Man," 
which also features this episode.) 
SEASON 4 
Herrenvolk (4X01) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: R. W. Goodwin 
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Jeremiah Smith leads Mulder to a 
Canadian agricultural site where ge-
netically altered bees pollinate strange 
flowers; there he finds his cloned sister 
as she was when she was abducted in 
1973. 
This episode implicitly raises philo-
sophical issues associated with personal 
identity and psychological continuity. 
Home (4X03) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: Kim Manners 
Mulder and Scully investigate an iso-
lated, incestuous family. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with ethical subjectivism and 
Kantian ethics. 
Teliko (4X04) 
Story: Howard Gordon 
Director: James Charleston 
A genetic mutant with no pituitary 
gland arrives from Africa. 
This episode implicitly raises philo-
sophical issues relevant to folk theories 
and scientific explanations: Will mature 
science explode all of our "folk theories"? 
Unruhe (4Xo2) 
Story: Vince Gilligan 
Director: Rob Bowman 
A dentist's disturbed son with the 
ability to produce "thought-o-graphs" 
stalks young women, including Scully. 
The Field Where I Died (4XOS) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: Rob Bowman 
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Mulder and Scully become part of an 
FBI team sent to subdue a religious cult 
accused of child abuse and stockpiling 
weapons; Mulder undergoes regression 
hypnosis, which seemingly reveals that 
his previous lives have invariably in-
cluded Scully. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with reincarnation, personal 
identity, and psychological continuity. 
Sanguinarium (4Xo6) 
Story: Valerie Mayhew and Vivian 
Mayhew 
Director: Kim Manners 
A plastic surgeon who is also a pow-
erful witch preys on the vanity of his 
patients and colleagues to change his 
identity every ten years. 
Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man 
(4X07) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: James Wong 
As Frohike tells his cohorts (and 
Mulder) what he seemingly discovered 
about the mysterious "smoking man;' we 
are taken back in time to witness some 
of the CSM's alleged "achievements." 
This episode implicitly raises philosoph-
ical issues associated with epistemology: 
How can we determine which conflicting 
reports are true? (Compare with "Apoc-
rypha.") There also seems to be a connec-
tion with Alasdair MacIntyre's views on 
narrative, self, and character. (See "Moral 
Musings on a Cigarette Smoking Man" 
generally for more on the CSM.) 
Tunguska (4X09) 
Story: Chris Carter and Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Kim Manners 
Mulder makes an uneasy alliance 
with Krycek (recently rescued from the 
abandoned missile silo) as both leave 
for Russia to discover the contents of a 
diplomatic pouch destined for Siberia; 
the CSM and the Well-Manicured Man 
move to intercept them. 
("Walter Skinner" features this 
episode.) 
Terma (4XlO) 
Story: Chris Carter and Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Rob Bowman 
Mulder survives being infected by 
the "black cancer;' escapes the Tun-
guska gulag, and follows the evidence 
to an oil refinery near the Canadian 
border; Krycek's true diplomatic colors 
are revealed. 
Paper Hearts (4X08) 
Story: Vince Gilligan 
Director: Rob Bowman 
When convicted serial killer John 
Lee Roach, in prison for kidnapping 
and killing young girls, crosses Mulder's 
path again, Mulder starts to question 
whether his memories of Samantha's 
disappearance are accurate. 
EI Mundo Gira (4XII) 
Story: John Shiban 
Director: Tucker Gates 
Mulder and Scully run up against the 
mythical Chupacabra (a small, gray car-
nivorous creature with a big head and a 
small body and big, black, bulging eyes) 
near a migrant workers' camp. 
Leonard Betts (4X14) 
Story: Vince Gilligan, John Shiban, and 
Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Kim Manners 
In the next step of evolutionary adap-
tation, EMT Leonard Betts ingests can-
cerous tissues to survive; at the end of 
the episode he approaches Scully, say-
ing, ''I'm sorry, but you have something 
I need." 
Never Again (4X13) 
Story: Glen Morgan and James Wong 
Director: Rob Bowman 
When Mulder is forced to take vaca-
tion time, Scully travels to Philadelphia 
and meets a newly divorced man with a 
fantastic tattoo. 
Memento Mori (4X15) 
Story: Chris Carter, Vince Gilligan, 
John Shiban, and Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Rob Bowman 
Scully is diagnosed with inoperable 
cancer; as Mulder races to discover a 
cure, Scully keeps a journal for him to 
read later if no cure is found. 
Kaddish (4X12) 
Story: Howard Gordon 
Director: Kim Manners 
When a Brooklyn Jewish man IS 
murdered in his own store, Mulder 
and Scully suspect that it is a racially 
charged hate crime; when his murder-
ers begin turning up dead, Mulder con-
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suits a local Jewish scholar about the 
Golem myth. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with moral relativism. 
Unrequited (4X16) 
Story: Howard Gordon and Chris 
Carter 
Director: Michael Lange 
Mulder and Scully are assigned to 
protect two American generals from an 
assassin who can hide in plain sight. 
Tempns Fugit (4X17) 
Story: Chris Carter and Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Rob Bowman 
When Max Fenig's sister contacts 
Mulder and Scully about a plane crash, 
the two agents travel to Albany, and Mul-
der soon suspects UFO involvement. 
Story: Chris Carter and Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Kim Manners 
Mulder's suspicions are confirmed 
when he determines that Max was car-
rying a piece of alien technology he stole 
from the government; the aliens again 
appear to reobtain the technology. 
Synchrony (4X19) 
Story: Howard Gordon and David 
Greenwalt 
Director: James Charleston 
A scientist uses futuristic technology 
to travel back in time to prevent a mis-
take he made years before. 
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This episode raises the philosophical 
issues of freedom, fate, and time travel. 
(See "Clyde Bruckman's Final Repose.") 
Small Potatoes (4X20) 
Story: Vince Gilligan 
Director: Cliff Bole 
Only two things about Eddie van 
Blundt (played by Darin Morgan) make 
him unique: the scar near his tailbone, 
and musculature that allows him to take 
the form of other men. When five ba-
bies, all with four-inch tails, are born in 
Eddie's hometown, Mulder and Scully 
investigate. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
related to Kantian ethics, specifically the 
impermissibility of not respecting anoth-
er's autonomy. 
Zero-Sum (4X21) 
Story: Howard Gordon and Frank 
Spotnitz 
Director: Kim Manners 
Not heeding his own advice, Skin-
ner agrees to do the CSM's dirty work 
in hopes of obtaining a cure for Scully's 
cancer; Skinner soon realizes just how 
ill advised his choice was. 
This episode implicitly raises philoso-
phical issues associated with virtue ethics 
and the ethics of tragic situations: What 
measures may someone permissibly take 
to save the life of another? (See "Wal-
ter Skinner" for connections to Skinner's 
character. ) 
Elegy (4X22) 
Story: John Shiban 
Director: James Charleston 
After investigating strange occur-
rences at a bowling alley, Mulder hy-
pothesizes that ghosts of the recently 
deceased appear to those who are them-
selves dying; one such ghost appears to 
Scully. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with disembodied existence. 
Demons (4X23) 
Story: R. W. Goodwin 
Director: Kim Manners 
Mulder's desperate attempt to recap-
ture his fleeting memories of his sister's 
disappearance embroils him as the pri-
mary suspect in a murder investigation. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
involving the ethics of scientific research 
(Do researchers have an obligation not to 
conduct dangerous research even if their 
patients consent to it?) and epistemology 
(Are drug-induced experiences evidence 
of anything?). 
Gethsemane (4X24) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: R. W. Goodwin 
After searching for an alien pre-
served in solid ice, Mulder is visited 
by Department of Defense employee 
Michael Kritschgau; Kritschgau pres-
ents Mulder with information that he 
has been duped by governmental forces, 
and Scully reports to her superiors that 




Story: Chris Carter 
Director: R. W. Goodwin 
Upon faking his death, Mulder gains 
access to highly restricted areas of the 
Department of Defense; while inside, he 
finds a potential cure for ScuIIy's cancer. 
Redux II (5X03) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Kim Manners 
The CSM provides Mulder the two 
things he wants most: the missing piece 
of the puzzle for Scully's cure, and a 
meeting with Samantha; in return, the 
CSM asks Mulder to leave the bureau 
to work for him, which draws the ire of 
the Syndicate. 
Unusual Suspects (5X01) 
Story: Vince Gilligan 
Director: Kim Manners 
We learn the backstory between Mul-
der and the Lone Gunmen: in 1989, 
their paths cross over a case involving 
biologist Suzanne Modeski. 
Detour (5Xo4) 
Story: Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Brent Dowler 
While driving to an FBI "creative 
team" seminar, Mulder and Scully are 
sidetracked by reports of forest crea-
tures that are invisible except for their 
glowing red eyes. 
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The Post-Modern Prometheus (5Xo6) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: Chris Carter 
In this black-and-white episode,Mul-
der and Scully investigate a Frankenstein-
type character called the Great Mutato; 
the creature possesses an unusual at-
traction to peanut butter sandwiches 
and Cher. 
This episode implicitly conveys philo-
sophical issues associated with postmod-
ernism, including the deconstruction of 
truth. (See "Postdemocratic Society and 
the Truth Out There" and "Some Philo-
sophical Reflections on 'Trust No One'" 
for interesting applications of postmod-
ernism.) 
Christmas Carol (5X05) 
Story: Vince Gilligan, John Shiban, and 
Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Peter Markle 
Scully meets Emily Sim and through 
a strange twist of events comes to be-
lieve that Emily is the daughter of her 
deceased sister Melissa; after Emily's 
(adoptive?) parents die, only Scully is 
left to protect the girl. 
Emily (5X07) 
Story: Vince Gilligan, John Shiban, and 
Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Kim Manners 
Scully discovers that she-and not 
Melissa-is Emily's biological mother; 
as Scully attempts to become Emily's 
legal guardian, and while Emily's health 
fails, Mulder uncovers disturbing facts 
about mother and daughter. 
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This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with parental rights involving 
surrogate mothers and genetic donors. 
Kitsunegari (SXo8) 
Story: Vince Gilligan and Tim Minear 
Director: Dan Sackheim 
Robert "Pusher" Modell returns to 
continue his cat-and-mouse game with 
Mulder; however, Mulder is led to be-
lieve, seemingly by Modell, that a new 
player has joined the "fox hunt" game. 
Schizogeny (SX09) 
Story: Jessica Scott and Mike Wollager 
Director: Ralph Hemecker 
In an orchard community, the parents 
of children being treated by the same 
psychologist begin to die mysteriously. 
Chinga (SXlO) 
Story: Stephen King and Chris Carter 
Director: Kim Manners 
On her vacation, Scully is drawn into 
a New England town's obsession with a 
woman and her daughter, who are sus-
pected to be witches. 
Kill Switch (SXll) 
Story: William Gibson and Tom 
Maddox 
Director: Rob Bowman 
Mulder and Scully are led to a fe-
male computer hacker who wishes to 
achieve immortality by being uploaded 
onto the Internet. 
This episode raises issues associated 
with the philosophy of mind, including 
artificial intelligence, functionalism, and 
personal identity. (See "Science and the 
Mystery of Consciousness" for other phi-
losophy of mind issues.) 
Bad Blood (SX12) 
Story: Vince Gilligan 
Director: Cliff Bole 
Mulder drags Scully to Texas to in-
vestigate exsanguinations; after Scully's 
autopsy reveals that the latest victim 
ingested a powerful sedative, Scully 
hypothesizes that a local has seen too 
many vampire movies. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with epistemology and critical 
thinking: When reports, memories, and 
biases conflict, how can we determine 
what actually happened? 
Patient X (SX13) 
Story: Chris Carter and Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Kim Manners 
Mulder and Scully meet Cassandra 
Spender, an alleged alien abductee and 
the mother of their new colleague Jef-
frey; Mulder is now skeptical of Cassan-
dra's reports, but Scully sympathizes. 
The Red and the Black (SX14) 
Story: Chris Carter and Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Chris Carter 
While Mulder remains skeptical, de-
spite Krycek's best efforts the Syndicate 
learns that its alien colonization plan 
has become even more complicated by a 
race of rebel aliens who resist the plan. 
Travelers (5XI5) 
Story: John Shiban and Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Billy Graham 
In 1990, violent crimes specialist Fox 
Mulder visits a former FBI agent who 
knew Mulder's father, Bill, as a result of 
working on an early X-File. 
Mind's Eye (5XI6) 
Story: Tim Minear 
Director: Kim Manners 
A young woman blind from birth is 
suddenly able to see events surround-
ing a string of murders; Mulder discov-
ers that the woman and the murderer 
share a special bond. 
All Souls (5XI7) 
Story: Frank Spotnitz, John Shiban, 
Billy Brown, and Dan Angel 
Director: Allen Coulter 
Mulder and Scully investigate a re-
ligiously charged case involving qua-
druplet sisters, all of whom have severe 
biological abnormalities. 
This episode raises philosophical issues 
associated with faith and reason and, 
implicitly, the nature of religion itself. 
The Pine Bluff Variant (5XIS) 
Story: John Shiban 
Director: Rob Bowman 
Mulder goes under deep cover to 
investigate a troublesome militia group 
bent on anarchy through the use of a 
dangerous bioweapon. 
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This episode implicitly raises philo-
sophical issues relevant to political philos-
ophy, including the government's proper 
role and relationship with society. (See 
"Postdemocratic Society and the Truth 
Out There," which features this episode.) 
Folie a Deux (5XI9) 
Story: Vince Gilligan 
Director: Kim Manners 
After Mulder becomes unexpectedly 
involved in a hostage situation, he be-
gins to suspect that the perpetrator sees 
what no one else does; Scully suspects 
that Mulder is suffering from a weII-
documented psychological disorder as 
a result of being held hostage. 
The End (5X20) 
Story: Chris Carter 
Director: R. W. Goodwin 
A twelve-year-old boy becomes the 
linchpin to the Syndicate's alien con-
spiracies and attempts to subdue Mul-
der and Scully. 
Fight the Future (feature-length film) 
Story: Chris Carter and Frank Spotnitz 
Director: Rob Bowman 
With the X-Files Unit again shut 
down, Mulder and Scully are reassigned 
to a new division. They stumble on to the 
Syndicate's attempt to cover up an unex-
pected appearance of the black oil, which 
leads them back into investigating the 
alien conspiracy. The Well-Manicured 
Man, instructed to kill Mulder, instead 
shares with him all of the Syndicate's 
grim secrets about colonization. Scully is 
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once again captured, but this time she is 
infected with the black cancer and taken 
to an alien craft buried in Antarctica. 
Mulder must rescue her before it is too 
late. 
This movie, like most, can be mined 
for philosophically significant issues re-
lated to aesthetics. (See "Feelings and Fic-
tions," which features this episode. It is 
also featured in the introduction.) 
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